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Abstract
During the German occupation of the Netherlands during the Second World War, the
Nazi occupiers attempted to use education as one part of their larger project to create a new,
Germanic identity in the Netherlands. This effort was supported by the highest echelons of the
German leadership in the Netherlands and the leadership of the Dutch Education Department.
Together, the Nazis and their Dutch helpers began a series of changes to Dutch education aimed
at bringing Dutch youth closer to the German Reich, with the ultimate aim of divorcing the
Dutch from their previous, independent national identity and winning them over to the Germanic
ideal.
This effort involved many different initiatives. In an effort to completely reorganize the
Dutch educational establishment along more Germanic lines, the occupiers and their Dutch
helpers attempted to gain control over private, confessional education and to reorganize public
education through the lengthening of compulsory attendance requirements and the introduction
of an eighth year of primary education. Moreover, the occupiers attempted to introduce new
subjects, such as physical education, and increase the emphasis on other subjects, including
historical instruction and German language instruction. Finally, the German occupiers also
attempted to both foster the development of German International Schools in the Netherlands as
well as to create new educational institutions (the NIVO and the Reichsschulen) designed to give
instruction in an explicitly völkisch, Germanic sense, both of which aimed at educating the
leaders of the future Greater Germanic Reich. These two institutions would also serve as models
for the education of ordinary Dutch students in Dutch institutions.
The efforts of the Nazi occupiers were a failure, as their efforts were resisted by the
majority of Netherlanders and the changes instituted during the occupation were mostly reversed
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after the return of democratic rule to the Netherlands in summer 1945. Nonetheless, the Nazis’
efforts show the ultimate goals of the occupier as regarded the Netherlands and Europe more
generally, should they have won the war. That goal included a European empire based on the
racial ideal of a Germanic ruling class presiding over the subjugated peoples of Europe.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
The Second World War was the deadliest conflict in human history. A clash of ideologies
along with the implementation of total war led to the death of tens of millions of Europeans, to
say nothing of the deaths in other theaters, over the course of almost six long years. Most of
those deaths in Europe came as a result of the Nazis’ brutal war of extermination against their
“racial” and ideological enemies in Eastern Europe. In the lands that had previously made up
Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, the Germans attempted to
create an empire that would last a thousand years. In doing so, Nazi Germany engaged in a
genocidal campaign against the local inhabitants, murdering millions directly, while causing the
deaths of millions more through conquest and occupation.
In waging their war of genocide across Eastern Europe, the Nazi leadership believed that
there was a fundamental “racial” difference between the local populations that inhabited their
conquests in the east and those that inhabited their conquests in Western Europe. The east was
largely inhabited by Slavs, Jews, and other Untermenschen, while the west was populated by
various types of the so-called Aryan race, even if, in the Nazis’ racial mindset, the purity of
Western Europeans’ blood decreased as one moved further south. This fundamental difference in
the Nazis’ view of their subjugated peoples was translated into differing styles of both warfare
and occupation across the European continent. By and large, while the conquered peoples of
Eastern Europe were shown little, if any, mercy, in the West a more traditional style of military
occupation was the norm. Or was it?
This work seeks to challenge the prevailing scholarly consensus that the occupation of
Western Europe was in some way less radical than that of Eastern Europe by using the Nazis’
occupation of the Netherlands and their efforts in the education sphere during that period as a
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case study of the Nazis’ goals for the future of European society. To be certain, the German
occupation of the Netherlands during the Second World War was not marked by the same sort of
all-encompassing violence that pervaded Nazi hegemony in Eastern Europe, at least not at first.1
Rather, the Nazi occupiers did at the outset take a more lenient attitude toward the Dutch public,
largely because they viewed the Dutch as their racial kin. As the occupation endured and the war
turned against the Germans, this changed, and a more repressive style of governance emerged,
but that is not the focus of this study. Rather, the focus is, mostly, limited to the first several
years of Nazi occupation. That was the period during which the supposedly milder, less
oppressive form of occupation reigned.
To a certain extent, this was certainly the case. During the first several years of German
occupation, the Netherlands enjoyed relative relief from Nazi tyranny, at least as compared to the
experience of subjugated peoples of Eastern Europe. With the exception of the Netherlands’
Jewish community, most Netherlanders were not slated for extermination, were not forced to
perform slave labor, and did not have to worry about continued fighting threatening their lives.
The military conquest of the Netherlands was quick, lasting only five days, and after that
conquest ended, the Dutch could settle back into routines that were much more reminiscent of
their pre-war lives than they were different.
Even though the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands was not marked by the allencompassing, genocidal violence that characterized the German occupation of the east, in
another, less obvious way, the German occupation of the Netherlands was still quite radical in its
own right. Much as in the living spaces being carved out of the east through genocide, the Nazi
leadership planned, not before the conquest, but quickly after it was achieved, to incorporate the

Jennifer L Foray, “The ‘Clean Wehrmacht’ in the German-Occupied Netherlands, 1940-5,” Journal of
Contemporary History 45, no. 4 (2010): 768–87.
1
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Netherlands into a larger post-war polity dominated by Germany. This polity had several names,
including the Greater Germanic Reich and just the Reich. But whatever it was called, this future
super-state would, it was planned, dominate the European continent from the North Sea to the
Ural Mountains and encompass more than one hundred million Europeans that the Nazis
believed made up the larger Germanic race, which was, in their twisted worldview, the purest
branch of the larger Aryan racial family. In order to incorporate the Netherlands into this
planned empire, however, the Nazis correctly understood that some sort of cultural shift would
be necessary. The Dutch had a long history of independence, achieved after they managed to
throw off the shackles of imperial hegemony in the mid-seventeenth century. Over the
intervening three hundred years, the Dutch no longer viewed themselves as connected to
Germany in the ways that the Low Countries had been in the Middle Ages when they were a
constituent part of the Holy Roman Empire. The Netherlands was an independent state, with its
own language and culture, with a history that was unique and which helped the Dutch define
their own, independent cultural identity.
In order to effect the cultural shift that would be a necessary precursor to inclusion into
the Greater Germanic Reich, the Nazis implemented a wide array of efforts in the Netherlands
aimed at creating a new cultural identity. These included, among other examples, propaganda
initiatives aimed at inculcating a racialist, national socialist worldview, the recruitment for
resettlement of Dutch civilians in the vast, newly depopulated expanses of Eastern Europe, the
establishment of racially approved SS units, the elimination of Jewish and other allegedly
unworthy individuals from Dutch society, and, the key focus of this study, a broad campaign of
educational changes aimed at permanently fusing this new Germanic identity with the next
generation of Netherlanders.
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The historiography of the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands is surprisingly small when
compared to most other aspects of historical study concerning National Socialism. In English
language scholarship, there are only a handful of scholars who work (or worked) on any aspect
of the German occupation of the Netherlands. When one ventures into the Dutch and German
language scholarship, the field broadens significantly, but there is still much work to be done
before the field is even remotely comparable to the volume of scholarship on other topics related
to Nazism.
This project, which argues that the Nazis used education in the Netherlands in an attempt
to foster a new national and cultural identity among the Dutch based on a racialist, völkisch, and
Germanic ideal, challenges the existing scholarship in three distinct ways. First, there are those
works that attempt to focus on German administration of the Netherlands in some way or fashion
and which usually discuss education policy, the Nazis’ Germanic project, or both. Second are the
works of a handful of scholars who focus on the Nazi occupiers’ Germanic project. Finally, there
are a few works that deal directly with education, or some facet thereof, during the Nazi
occupation of the Netherlands. Above and beyond those three types of works which are
discussed in more detail below, there is a larger set of works that deal with the Netherlands and
the Second World War in some way not directly connected to this study, whether that is through
close examination of topics not entirely connected to education, such as the police or the
Holocaust, or works that deal with Nazi Empire on a larger scale, only part of which deals with
the Netherlands.2
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A non-exhaustive list would include: Gerard Aalders, Nazi Looting: The Plunder of Dutch Jewry During the
Second World War, trans. Arnold Pomerans and Erica Pomerans (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2004); Benien van
Berkel, Tobie Goedewaagen (1895-1980): een onverbeterlijke nationaalsocialist (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij,
2013); J. J. van Bolhuis, Onderdrukking en verzet: Nederland in oorlogstijd (Arnhem: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1955);
Bart van der Boom and Peter Romijn, The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands: 1940 - 1945 - New
Perspectives (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers, 2012); Louis De Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956); Jeroen Dewulf, Spirit of Resistance: Dutch Clandestine Literature
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Of all of the works that discuss the occupation of the Netherlands in the Second World
War, by far the most expansive is Loe de Jong’s Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede
Wereldoorlog. In its fourteen volumes, most of which are themselves split into two parts because
of their size, de Jong covers almost every aspect of the Nazi occupation in some detail, including
education.3 De Jong, who after the war became the director of the Netherlands State Institute for
War Documentation,4 was commissioned by the Dutch Education Ministry to write the work and

During the Nazi Occupation (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2010); Jennifer L. Foray, Visions of Empire in the
Nazi-Occupied Netherlands (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Erik Hansen, “Fascism and
Nazism in the Netherlands 1929-39,” European History Quarterly 11, no. 3 (1981): 355–85; Katja Happe, Deutsche
in den Niederlanden, 1918-1945: eine historische Untersuchung zu nationalen Identifikationsangeboten im Prozess
der Konstruktion individueller Identitäten (Siegen: Universität-GH Siegen, 2004); Chris van der Heijden, Joodse
NSB’ers: de Vergeten Geschiedenis van Villa Bouchina in Doetinchem (Utrecht: Bk18, 2006); Barbara Henkes and
Ad Knotter, Themanummer De “Westforschung” en Nederland (Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 2005); G
Hirschfeld, “Die Universität Leiden unter dem Nationalsozialismus,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 23, no. 4 (1997):
560–91; Dienke Hondius, Return: Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Anti-Semitism, trans. David Colmer (Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 2003); Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in
Western Europe, 1945-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); M. F. Lenaerts, National Socialist
Family Law: The Influence of National Socialism on Marriage and Divorce Law in Germany and the Netherlands
(Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015); Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin
Press, 2008); Guus Meershoek, Dienaren van het gezag: de Amsterdamse politie tijdens de bezetting (Amsterdam:
Van Gennep, 1999); Bob Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany in the Netherlands, 1933-1940 (Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1986); Bob Moore, Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940-1945
(New York: Hodder Education Publishers, 1997); Thomas Müller, Imaginierter Westen: das Konzept des
“deutschen Westraums” im völkischen Diskurs zwischen Politischer Romantik und Nationalsozialismus (Bielefeld:
Transcript, 2009); Dietrich Orlow, The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe : German Nazis, Dutch and French
Fascists, 1933-1939 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Jacob Presser, Ashes in the Wind: The Destruction of
Dutch Jewry, trans. Arnold Pomerans (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969); Peter Romijn, Burgemeesters
in oorlogstijd: besturen tijdens de Duitse bezetting (Amsterdam: Balans, 2006); Benjamin Aäron Sijes, De
Februari-staking, 25-26 Febr. 1941. (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954); Benjamin Aäron Sijes, De
arbeidsinzet: de gedwongen arbeid van Nederlanders in Duitsland 1940-1945. (’s-Gravenhage: SDU, 1990); Robin
te Slaa and Edwin Klijn, De NSB: ontstaan en opkomst van de Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, 1931-1935
(Amsterdam, Netherlands: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009); Stephen Snelders, “National Socialism, Human Genetics and
Eugenics in The Netherlands, 1940-1945,” in Scientific Research in World War II: What Scientists Did in the War,
by Ad Maas and Hans Hooimaijers (London: Routledge, 2009), 109–20; C.J.F Stuldreher, Concentratiekampen:
systeem en de praktijk in Nederland (Bussum: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1970); M.C. van den Toorn, Dietsch en
volksch: een verkenning van het taalgebruik der nationaal-socialisten in Nederland (Groningen: Tjeenk Willink,
1975); K.H Tusenius, De kansen van het Nationaal Socialisme in Nederland: groei en neergang der N.S.B.
(Zutphen: Thieme, 1936); Ad van Liempt, Hitler’s Bounty Hunters: The Betrayal of the Jews, trans. S. J. Leinbach
(Oxford: Berg, 2005); Adriaan Venema, Schrijvers, uitgevers en hun collaboratie, 5 vols. (Amsterdam:
Arbeiderspers, 1988); Sytze van der Zee, Voor Führer, volk en vaderland: de SS in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn:
A.W. Sijthoff, 1979).
3
Volume XIV is actually a compilation of critiques and discussions of the previous thirteen volumes composed by
other scholars. Unfortunately, it does not go into educational policy at all. See Louis De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (’s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1969), XIV/247249, 271-276.
4
Now the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam.
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it has become the standard reference work for all things related to the Second World War in the
Netherlands. His sections on education are generally accurate, but quite sparse. He covers in a
mostly cursory manner the German Schools, the NIVO, and the Reichsschulen under the larger
heading of “Germanization,” under which he also discusses attempts to give certain Dutch
individuals, such as spouses of Germans, actual German citizenship.5 In his view, the efforts of
the German occupiers in these three types of educational institution were essentially similar in
nature to actual attempts to make certain Dutch individuals legally German. It is worth quoting
him at length:
Obviously, the entire policy of the occupying forces can be seen as an attempt to make the Netherlands a
German country, that is to say, a country that, apart from its language, would appear to be the spitting
image of National Socialist Germany. In this sense, the entire aim that came from the SS sector can also be
regarded as an attempt at de facto Germanization: after all, the SS wanted the Netherlands to merge into a
Greater Germanic whole, which meant that the historically developed distinction between Dutch and
Germans would fade and eventually disappear.6

On its face, de Jong’s statement is largely correct, but in its details, it slightly misses the
point. He is certainly correct that the SS faction, which was the leading faction in the
Netherlands, wanted to merge the Netherlands into the Greater Germanic whole. But the notion
that this effort consisted of little more than Germanization is not quite correct. The German
leadership did not view the Greater Germanic Reich as simply Germany with added territories.
Rather, it was Germany plus other Germanic nations. That is, the Greater Germanic Reich was
something bigger, something new, it was the combined sum of Germany and the other Germanic
nations of Europe. Viewing the Nazis’ goals in the Netherlands as little more than Germanization
thus actually contradicts the very goals high ranking Nazis discussed among themselves. For
example, on this exact subject, specifically the two Reichsschulen, Seyss-Inquart noted to
Himmler that the “curriculum would need to take more into account the history of the

5
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Verduitsing. De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/248-254.
Ibid., V/245.
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Netherlands and the nature of the Dutch people, but through the pan-Germanic point of view.”7
The goal at these institutions, much like at regular Dutch schools, was not to erase the
“historically developed distinction” between Germany and the Netherlands, but on the contrary
to emphasize the connections between the two countries, both in terms of their past and future.
The Germans had no more wish to erase Dutch history and culture than they did to erase the
history and culture of Austria or Bavaria in favor of Prussian culture. Thus, Germanization is not
really the correct term, for its implications go too far. Rather, Germanicization, the act of making
the Dutch Germanic, not German, fits the model more accurately.
The other two sections of de Jong’s magnum opus that discuss education focus on public
and confessional education respectively.8 The sections on confessional education are based
primarily on work done by J. H. C. de Pater in his work Het Schoolverzet, and so will be
discussed below.9 The section on public education is dealt with in his larger chapter on
Gleichschaltung, while the section on religious education is split between Gleichschaltung and a
larger chapter on churches and artists. Between the two, the overwhelming majority focuses on
confessional education, while his section on public education gets comparatively short shrift. He
begins with a lengthy biography of Secretary-General of Education Jan van Dam, then speeds
through the attempted changes to discuss how it was all entirely unsuccessful. For de Jong, van
Dam, and to a lesser extent Noordijk and Terpstra, are the key players here. The Germans’
designs are ignored almost entirely, which means that he places altogether too little emphasis, in
my view, on the similarities between van Dam’s designs and those of the German occupiers.

N. K. C. A. In ‘t Veld, De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935-1945 (’s Gravenhage: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1976), 667.
8
De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/336-368, 725-742.
9
Ibid., V/725n.
7
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In either case, the goal of educational “reform” as de Jong sees it is little more than
nazification. To a certain extent, he is, of course, correct. Nazification was part of the goal of
educational “reform,” but it was only the first part. De Jong misses entirely the second goal, the
goal of Germanicization, of turning the Dutch population Germanic in order to bring them closer
to the Reich. This is, however, not entirely surprising because the limited historiography of the
Nazis’ Germanic project in Europe is much newer than de Jong’s masterpiece. The larger focus
among historians of Nazi Germany on the creation of a new Germanic empire in Europe only
came to the fore after de Jong’s final volume was published in the late 1980s, so he can hardly be
faulted for not having correctly predicted the way that subsequent scholarship on the subject
would develop.10
Along with De Jong’s Het Koninkrijk, there are several other standard works that offer an
overview of the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands. One of the earliest was Werner
Warmbrunn’s The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940-1945.11 The first English language
work on the occupation, Warmbrunn’s study predates De Jong’s by several years. Warmbrunn
focuses his study on the upper echelons of the occupation and gives little attention to education
in any form. What attention he does give to education is almost entirely limited to the
universities, and then only as a consequence of how students and faculty participated in or were
affected by the larger milestones of the occupation, such as the October 27, 1940, closure of
Leiden University after the dismissal of Jewish civil servants and the effect on universities of the
general conflagration surrounding the Loyalty Decree, forced labor, and the April/May Strike of
De Jong’s work has also been criticized for an over-reliance on the otherwise simplistic notion of “good” and
“bad” when it comes to collaboration during the Second World War. Ironically, in de Jong’s view, van Dam was
simply too weak to be either himself. Rather, he was used by both. See Bob Moore, “‘Goed En Fout’ or ‘Grijs
Verleden’? Competing Perspectives on the History of the Netherlands under German Occupation 1940–1945,”
Dutch Crossing 27, no. 2 (December 1, 2003): 155–168.
11
Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation, 1940-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1963).
10

9
1943.12 He does also devote three paragraphs to non-higher education in his section on “the
nazification of public life” in his fourth chapter. The discussion is limited, however, to the
Appointment Decrees, which he notes were failures, and a mere three sentences on the entire rest
of the Germans’ efforts in the educational sphere:
The new Secretary-General [van Dam] also made some minor changes in the curriculum. German became
the first foreign language, while French was relegated to an inferior place. More time was devoted to
language, history, physical education, and vocational instruction, and a decree was passed, but not
implemented, making the eighth year of elementary school compulsory. 13

As a summary of the major efforts at educational “reform,” those three sentences are certainly
adequate, but their paucity suggests that Warmbrunn was simply not interested in education,
likely because he correctly understood the Nazis’ efforts in that realm as decidedly unsuccessful.
On the other hand, however, Warmbrunn does spend several pages discussing the
ultimate designs of the German administration in the Netherlands. Interestingly, he does note that
at least part of the impetus behind the planned annexation was “Hitler’s romantic-historical
vision of a reconstitution of the Holy Roman Empire … [a] vision of a ‘Holy Germanic Empire
of the German Nation.’”14 He even references Hitler’s statement comparing the incorporation of
the Netherlands into a Germanic Empire with the incorporation of Bavaria into Germany, but
either misses or dismisses the point of Hitler’s comparison that the new creation would be
something greater than Germany alone, for “in the final analysis, Hitler, if victorious, probably
would have annexed the Netherlands.”15
The next major work to cover the German occupation of the Netherlands was Konrad
Kwiet’s 1968 Reichskommissariat Niederlande: Versuch und Scheitern nationalsozialistischer
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Neuordnung.16 Kwiet’s work, which focuses only on the first year or so of the occupation, was a
major advance in the field, for it correctly displayed the competition between the various groups
of the German leadership for ultimate control in the Netherlands.17 His work was also the first to
take seriously the notion of various German leaders that the Netherlands was to be incorporated
into a Greater Germanic Reich after the end of the war.18 This eventual possibility was, however,
according to Kwiet, little more than a fantasy given the competing interests during the
occupation, with various groups going about achieving this goal in different ways.19
Seyss-Inquart hoped to lead with a soft hand, given his instructions from Hitler, and so he
proceeded by implementing unsuccessful policies, such as supporting the Nederlandsche Unie,
that had little real chance of effectively winning the Dutch over to Nazism, let alone the Greater
Germanic Reich.20 On the other hand, the SS was more interested, in Kwiet’s view, in creating a
series of specifically SS oriented groups that aimed to consolidate power within the Netherlands
squarely in the hands of the SS, and therefore Himmler and his deputy Rauter.21 This meant that
the various efforts of Seyss-Inquart, especially those that sought to use specifically Dutch
institutions, such as the Nederlandsche Unie or the NSB, as partners in the work of building up
the Greater Germanic Reich, were countered by the efforts of the various SS organizations,
especially the various Waffen-SS units that came out of the Netherlands. That many of the
recruits for SS divisions had previously been affiliated with the völkisch wing of the NSB only
exacerbated the tensions between the SS faction of the occupying regime and the native Dutch
Nazi movement, creating distrust among those who should have otherwise been allies.
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In essence, then, while Kwiet acknowledges that the long-term goal of the occupiers was
to incorporate the Netherlands into the Greater Germanic Reich, the competing power centers
proved too worried about their own political bases to effectively implement a coherent strategy
toward that end, which left permanent improvisation as the main characteristic of governance in
the occupied Netherlands. Although he does not discuss education at all, Kwiet does, very
briefly, make one other telling comment worth considering. In his discussion of the SS’s goals
during the early stages of the occupation, he notes, quoting a letter from Ulrich Greifelt to
Himmler as evidence,22 that the goal of the SS, “more or less was to Germanize” the Dutch.23 If
nothing else, this suggests that Kwiet views the Germanic project in the Netherlands as little
more than window dressing for the real goal of Germanization, despite characterizing the
German goals in the rest of his study as “nazification” and “Germanicization.”24
N.K.C.A. in ‘t Veld takes up this very same question in his own work, discussed in more
detail below, and notes that Greifelt’s wording, which included “Germanization” as one of the
SS’s goals in the Netherlands, was likely an effort on Greifelt’s part to secure for the SS a base
of power in the Netherlands, which at that point, was still militarily resisting the German
invasion.25 After the Reichskommissariat had been founded, however, the SS’s focus was
squarely on Germanicization, a position that was formally authorized by Hitler with order 54/42
when, in August 1942, Himmler was given authority over all “Germanic-völkisch groups in
Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands.”26 But as in ‘t Veld notes, this order was
typical of Hitler’s practice of granting a “formal allocation of power … once those powers have
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in reality long since been usurped.”27 In other words, Greifelt’s claim of “Germanization” as a
goal in the Netherlands can be understood not as a set policy of the SS but as an attempt to grab
power using the already existing authority of Himmler as the Reichskommissar für die Festigung
deutschen Volkstums. Such an understanding also fits perfectly within Kwiet’s larger argument
that the multiple competing power centers within Nazi Germany—what Gerhard Hirschfeld
would later term the “fundamental polycracy” of the Nazi regime28—caused a large amount of
confusion as to the actual policies that should be implemented in the Netherlands.
More than a decade would pass before the next general study of the German occupation
in the Netherlands appeared in the form of Gerhard Hirschfeld’s 1984 Fremdherrschaft und
Kollaboration: Die Niederlande unter deutscher Besatzung 1940-1945, which was translated
into English in 1988 as Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German
Occupation 1940-1945. Much like Kwiet, Hirschfeld pays little attention to the regime’s
educational policy.29 He does, however, have rather extensively drawn out thoughts on the
question of the Nazis’ Greater Germanic project in the Netherlands, which he views as little
more than propaganda for a more traditional, nationalist imperialism in which a victorious
Germany would dominate the smaller Germanic nations after the war.30
According to Hirschfeld, the only concrete plan the Nazis had for the future of the
Netherlands was that it was to be nominally independent, in order to preserve the Dutch
relationship with their colonies in the Far East, yet otherwise completely subservient to the
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Reich. Economically, of course, the Germanic nations of North and Northwest Europe were to be
tightly integrated with Germany, but politically, Hirschfeld argues that
the “blood-related peoples” of the West … would have the “honour” of being integrated into a “Greater
Germanic Reich” under the military, economic and political leadership of Germany. However, political
integration presupposes at least a minimum of partnership; Hitler was neither prepared for, nor capable of,
such a relationship. After the victorious campaign against France, he asserted that “success” could only be
“maintained by the powers that had achieved them, thus by military force.” This was more than just a
rejection of all political methods of achieving German claims to mastery. At the same time, it exposed
Hitler’s “Germanic policy” for what is really was: well-calculated propaganda to conceal the fact that Hitler
had no prospective programme for the reorganisation of Europe.31

At the same time, however, Hirschfeld grants that the SS did have a concrete idea of its
plans and also notes that the SS was dominant in the latter two phases of the occupation,
beginning in April 1943. Moreover, these phases “differed from the earlier stages in the radical
consistency with which it [the SS conception of the occupation] was planned.”32 Hirschfeld then
proceeds to recount how, in fact, the SS conception of the future of the Germanic Reich reached
back at least to late 1941, and that SS supremacy was enshrined by order 54/42 in August 1942.33
Hirschfeld’s basic argument, then, is essentially similar to Kwiet’s in that German domination in
the Netherlands was hampered by political infighting between Seyss-Inquart, the SS faction, the
German Nazi Party as represented by Commissioner-General Fritz Schmidt, and the two wings
of the NSB. He differs from Kwiet in that he gives much less credence to the notion of a Greater
Germanic Reich as a foundational principle guiding the occupation regime, but even then,
backtracks on this view by allowing it a central place in the occupation’s ideological goals from
late 1941.
The most important recent, general study to come out regarding the Netherlands under
German occupation is Johannes Koll’s 2015 Arthur Seyß-Inquart und die deutsche
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Besatzungspolitik in den Niederlanden (1940-1945).34 Part biography and part examination of
Nazi policy in the Netherlands, Koll’s work is the most substantial general inquiry into the
German occupation since De Jong’s Het Koninkrijk was completed almost twenty years prior.
Unlike Hirschfeld and Kwiet, Koll does spend some time on the educational policy of the
occupiers, but his discussion of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands is not given very
much coverage.
On the question of education, Koll does not offer any advances beyond what previous
authors had already argued, except that he is clear that the impetus for the many changes came
directly from the top, that is from the Reichskommissar himself or his German subordinates.35
While Koll notes that many of the “reforms” instituted by the Germans were also changes that
van Dam had desired, Koll makes it clear that van Dam’s desires only mattered when they were
in concert with those of Seyss-Inquart and his German deputies, whether it was the reduction in
clerical salaries, the appointment decrees, or the maintenance of “peace and order” in the
schools. He does not go into enough detail to note those cases where van Dam’s views won out,
however.
A perfect example of this came with the reduction in clerical salaries in February 1941.
Seyss-Inquart, reacting to recent anti-German preaching on the part of the Catholic Church, had
wanted to dismiss all clerical teachers outright, but van Dam managed to persuade him otherwise
noting the strain that would likely cause, which was somewhat ironic given van Dam’s own
previously stated position that clerical teachers should be dismissed. Either way, Seyss-Inquart
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settled on a reduction in clerical salaries by a draconian forty per cent.36 Similarly, Koll does not
discuss in detail the introduction of German language instruction in primary education, but it too
serves as an example of van Dam being able to push through his own specific designs, as van
Dam was able to counter Schwarz’s desire to introduce German language instruction in the third
year of primary school, instead introducing the new subject in the seventh year.37 But these are
minor points in the grand scheme of things, as Koll is correct that in the overwhelming majority
of cases, van Dam’s successes were the result of the similarity of his own views with those of his
German superiors. Indeed, this is one of the reasons van Dam was picked for the top post in the
Education Department in the first place.38
Regarding the Nazis’ Germanic project, Koll notes that it was the preferred policy of the
SS faction within the Nazi leadership, both in Berlin and in the Netherlands, although he also
points out, like Kwiet and Hirschfeld, that Hitler’s own thoughts were characteristically vague.
He further notes that Seyss-Inquart could, generally, be counted on to further this policy within
the Netherlands, and, in fact, this assurance was one of the reasons that Himmler supported his
appointment to the position of Reichskommissar, a view Koll sees as further evidenced by the
relatively cooperative relationship between the two men.39 At the same time, like Kwiet and
Hirschfeld, Koll notes that Seyss-Inquart was in a relatively weak position politically in the
Netherlands, despite his legal supremacy. As a result, Seyss-Inquart spent his time trying to play
the various power groups off each other, supporting whichever group seemed most likely to
strengthen his own position at any given time.40 So, while he was generally supportive of the SS
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faction’s goal of creating a Greater Germanic Reich after the war, Seyss-Inquart’s political
double-dealing, especially early in the occupation before the ascendancy of the SS faction, was
foundational to the larger dysfunction of the occupation regime more generally in the
Netherlands.
Of the major works that focus on the nature of the occupation more generally, all agree
that the ultimate fate of the Netherlands under Nazi leadership was to be some sort of
incorporation of the country into the Reich, although the exact outlines of that relationship are
not always agreed upon. De Jong and Warmbrunn both favored a simpler annexation model,
while Kwiet, Hirschfeld, and Koll argue for a more complex understanding that focuses on the
variegated power structure among the Nazi leadership, with the Germanic empire a preferred
goal specifically of the SS faction. The latter three scholars also recognize that the SS faction
was especially strong in the Netherlands, if not before the August 1942 order 54/42 granting
Himmler authority over Germanic peoples in Europe, then certainly after it. Given the strength of
the SS in the occupied countries, several scholars have focused explicitly on that particular facet
of the occupation regime.
By far the most important, both within the general historiography and for this inquiry is
N.K.C.A. in ‘t Veld’s 1976 De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935-1945. In ‘t
Veld was the first scholar to take seriously the role of the SS in the Netherlands and its
implications for the future of the country had the Germans won the war. The work itself covers
nearly the entirety of the SS’s activities in the occupied country, everything from the pre-war
split within the NSB between the Mussert and völkisch factions, to the buildup of the various
Dutch SS units and recruitment for military service in the Waffen-SS. Also important for this

17
study, in ‘t Veld’s work also contains complete copies of 656 documents the author has pulled
from the archives that offer the reader context for in ‘t Veld’s analysis.
For in ‘t Veld, even within the SS, the view of a Greater Germanic Reich was not always
clearly articulated. At different points, Rauter, and by extension probably Himmler, viewed the
Dutch as essentially German, and so, to a certain extent, the very ideal of the Germanic project in
the Netherlands was somewhat of a fantasy. There was no doubt that the future Germanic empire
the SS wanted to create would look a lot like the present German Empire; its leading language
would be German and Germans, if by nothing more than their making up more than three
quarters of the population, would control the Germanic empire. Moreover, after the war ended,
none of the leaders of the Nazi regime in the Netherlands stuck to the Germanic ideal. SeyssInquart and Rauter both spoke only of Germany at their trials and before their executions. Hitler
and Himmler likely would have also said the same. In that sense, all of the notions of the Greater
Germanic Reich were little more than, at best, a mirage of expected victory, and, at worst,
nonsense.41
But nonsense still matters, especially when that nonsense is the basis of actual policy, as
it was in the Netherlands. As in ‘t Veld notes directly:
The fact that in the history of mankind the driving ideologies consist mainly of unsustainable nonsense has
never taken anything away from the fanaticism with which the supporters have tried to shape reality into
their delusions. The different interpretations of collectively professed nonsense have their own interest and
their own historical power. To say that these views are only idle slogans that cover the true strategic,
economic, territorial or personal aspects of a struggle for power is all too simple. 42

Himmler and his SS subordinates very much believed in the idea of the Greater Germanic Reich,
even if those ideas were not always clear in their own minds and even if the exact nature of the
future Germanic empire changed over the course of the Second World War. Those ideas were,
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after all, always framed from the position of an eventual German victory, in which there would
be plenty of time to iron out the differences between the various competing power centers within
Germany and within the Netherlands. Furthermore, even if the differences between annexation
into the German Reich and the creation of a Greater Germanic Reich were little more than
variations on a theme, the proponents of each variation very much saw and placed importance on
their variation. It would be, as in ‘t Veld notes, like glossing over the differences between
Zwingli, Luther, and the Roman Catholic Church as minor disputes over insignificant doctrinal
questions. The differences are important, however, for they “had major influence on the political
thinking and actions of the German occupiers of the Netherlands.”43
In essence then, in ‘t Veld argues that historians must take seriously the Germanic project
in the Netherlands precisely because the German occupiers themselves took it seriously. The fact
that the Germanic project existed more in the minds of the leaders of the occupation and their SS
superiors in Berlin and that it was not always entirely different in its conception than a pure
annexation of the Netherlands into the Reich is of little importance, especially because those
beliefs informed policy in very real ways.
In ‘t Veld’s work is also important for another development that is germane to this study.
Of all of the authors who have written on the German occupation of the Netherlands, in ‘t Veld is
the one who comes closest to what I argue is the correct understanding of their goals vis-à-vis
nazification and Germanicization. He cogently argues that the purpose of the German occupation
was the “nazification and Germanicization of the Netherlands,” and he correctly notes that those
two actions are not one in the same.44 Germanicization, not Germanization, was a second,
further aspect of the ideological goals of the German occupiers, especially the SS faction of the
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German regime, and they differ in what the end product of the process looks like. Germanization
is the attempt to turn non-Germans into Germans, which certainly was a regime policy in some
areas, especially in the east. Germanicization, on the other hand, was limited to the Germanic
peoples of North and Northwest Europe, and had the goal, not of turning those people German,
but of reminding them of their ancestral connections to their past and their shared future with
other Germanics, even if the idea was confused in the earliest days of the occupation.45
More recently, Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel has published several stimulating
works on Dutch “pioneers” in Eastern Europe, one of the main policies that resulted from the
Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands.46 The recruitment of Dutch farmers was meant to
help repopulate those areas of Eastern Europe that were being depopulated through the Nazis’
program of genocide. Focusing as it does on the Nederlandsche Oost-Compagnie and the
colonization of Eastern Europe, Künzel’s work does not overlap with this inquiry directly and is
more in conversation with other works on the colonization of Eastern Europe.47 It is, however,
important as a representative of the latest scholarly work on the Nazis’ Germanic project and its
direct effects on the Netherlands. The use of Dutch farmers to colonize the east was one facet of
creating the Greater Germanic Empire and is evidence of the Nazi occupiers’ efforts to realize
that end, even if that effort, too, ended in failure. Even if the Germanic project had been little
more than a political ideal of the SS that was either entirely imaginary and used for
propagandistic purposes (Hirschfeld) or limited in its effects because of the eternal power
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struggle among the Nazi leadership in the Netherlands (Kwiet and Koll), the Germanic project
had concrete effects on German policy, in this case through sending thousands of Netherlanders
east to help build the European New Order, some of whom would never actually make it home.
All of the previously discussed works touch on this inquiry in some way, mostly through
their discussions, or disavowals, of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands. There have
been, on the other hand, several works that have focused more or less on educational policy in
the occupied Netherlands that are more directly related to this inquiry. The most important is J.
H. C. de Pater’s 1969 work Het Schoolverzet, which focuses on the Protestant School Resistance
during the occupation.48 De Pater’s work is, by far, the most in-depth study of the Nazi
occupiers’ education policy in the occupied Netherlands to date, but its true focus is on
confessional education, not public education, and then, it looks most closely at the efforts of the
various resistance groups, especially the organized protestant commissions that aimed at
defending their constitutional rights against encroachments by the German occupiers and their
Dutch helpers. He also includes an especially useful study of the various school inspectorates.49
De Pater’s focus contrasts with this study in two ways. First, this inquiry is more
interested in public education, although, like de Pater, it does occasionally stray into the other
form of education (in this case, confessional education, in de Pater’s case, public education)
when appropriate, especially when it concerns the Appointment Decrees. Second, this inquiry is
more interested in the Germans’ designs for public education than in the resistance waged
against those policies. In both ways, the current study is the mirror opposite of de Pater’s work,
as this inquiry is more interested in the Germans’ designs, especially as they relate to the future
of Europe after German victory, and their efforts to secure that future through public, rather than
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private, education. That being said, it must also be noted that, in many ways, the findings of both
inquiries are similar. In both public and private education, the Nazis’ efforts were complete
failures, primarily as a result of resistance waged at the local level. On the other hand, de Pater
also notes that Seyss-Inquart and Schwarz were supporters of the Greater Germanic ideal and
mostly accepts that these beliefs were sincere and influenced policy, but he himself does not see
much difference between the Germanic project in the Netherlands and more pedestrian
nazification or Germanization.50 In that way, this inquiry offers a fresher perspective on the
Germans’ designs, by taking seriously, in the vein of in ‘t Veld, the Nazis’ Germanic ideal and
its consequences for the educational sphere.
In addition to de Pater, four other works cover the educational sphere in the Netherlands
during the Nazi occupation. Two deal exclusively with German educational institutions, that is
the NIVO and the two Reichsschulen. The other two deal more with the Education Department
and the person of Jan van Dam respectively. On the NIVO and the Reichsschulen, the more
important work is David Barnouw’s Van NIVO tot Reichsschule: nationaal-socialistische
onderwijsinstellingen in Nederland.51 Barnouw’s work is a close examination of the history of
three specific schools, the NIVO Koningsheide and the two German-created Reichsschulen,
which were meant to be the Germanic equivalent of the National-Political Educational Institutes
created by the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s. The second work is a popular piece written by the
journalist Paul van der Steen entitled Keurkinderen: Hitlers elitescholen in Nederland.52 Van der
Steen relied heavily on Barnouw as well as unpublished notes by de Pater on the two
Reichsschulen that de Pater assembled when he conducted his research for Het Schoolverzet. As
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a result, van der Steen does not offer much new material in terms of the larger questions I am
interested in for this inquiry, although his research did lead him to some pertinent details
regarding the daily life at the schools that are not included in Barnouw. In both cases, the authors
recognize that these educational institutions were aimed at creating the future elite of the Greater
Germanic Reich.53 Because this is one area in which substantial research had already been
conducted, I rely heavily on both works for that section of chapter four that touches upon these
three institutions.
The final two works deal directly with the Department of Education, but in slightly
different ways. The first is Hans Knippenberg and Willem van der Ham’s Een bron van
aanhoudende zorg: 75 jaar Ministerie van Onderwijs (Kunsten) en Wetenschappen, 1918-1993,
which is an institutional history of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Arts, and Sciences.54
Designed as a history of the ministry since the constitutional reforms of 1918, the work covers a
much broader period than this inquiry. Moreover, it treats the German occupation as a sort of
interregnum in the otherwise steady development of the Dutch state and educational apparatus
over the previous three quarters of a century. Despite that, the work is most useful for its insights
into the work inside of the department during the occupation, including issues of personnel,
budget, and housing.55 Knippenberg and van der Ham’s work is, for example, the only work that
gives significant focus to the work in the department after its move to Apeldoorn in early 1943,
at which point officials there, including the leadership of the department, focused more on
holding down the fort than on actual oversight and governance of the educational apparatus in
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the country.56 Because the perspective of the authors is that of the overall changes in the
ministry, they pay little attention to the overarching goals of the occupiers in their efforts to
institute educational “reform.” The authors certainly do note that certain elements were inspired
by the Germanic ideal, especially historical instruction which they briefly cover, but overall,
these initiatives are subsumed under the larger, and more traditional, concept of pure
nazification.57
The final work on education is actually a collection of works by the Dutch scholar Peter
Jan Knegtmans, who specializes in the history of the University of Amsterdam, among other
topics, and so has written several chapters for larger publications on one of that institution’s most
important scholars during the occupation, Jan van Dam.58 Knegtmans’s works are most useful
for his research into the academic and ideological thought of van Dam. Van Dam was, in
Knegtmans’s view, first and foremost a scholar of language. His views on race were much less
pronounced and he even regretted the growing influence of race within his field. Regardless,
however, he welcomed the increased emphasis on Old Germanic languages, culture, and history
that accompanied the Nazis’ “seizure of power” in Germany in 1933. This, combined with the
otherwise apolitical van Dam’s amazement at the success of the Nazis’ governing style,
especially compared with the failures of the Weimar government that van Dam witnessed in his
youth as a lecturer at Bonn in the early 1920s, made him a sympathizer with the Nazi movement
in Germany. At the same time, he was steadfastly opposed to the Dutch national socialist party,
the NSB, which he considered to be a club for brutes and ruffians. This odd combination of
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political sympathies made van Dam an especially useful choice for the German occupiers to fill
the role of Secretary-General, even though one of van Dam’s colleagues at the University of
Amsterdam, Geerto Snijder, had been the Germans’ first choice.59
As a result, when he became Secretary-General during the occupation, but before he grew
disillusioned with the Nazi regime in the latter half of the war, van Dam pursued policies that, on
the one hand, were clearly aimed at Germanicization, that is increasing the importance of the
Germanic element and the place of the Dutch within that world in school instruction, but, at the
same time, sometimes actually worked against the overtly racial elements of the Nazis’
occupation policies.60 In other words, for van Dam, the Germanic project was a cultural project,
not a racial project, even if, for the SS leadership in both Germany and the Netherlands, race was
the key element. Further, Knegtmans recognizes that van Dam was a politically weak character,
but does not go so far as, for example de Jong, to argue that he was little more than a German
lackey.61 Van Dam had clearly outlined policy initiatives, and in some cases, he was able to
inhibit the efforts of the Germans, especially when it came to the imposition of forced labor
among students and van Dam’s protection of culturally significant Jewish Netherlanders. In this
way, van Dam was a good, but not exactly perfect, collaborator for the German occupiers. In
those areas that he and his German superiors agreed, which was more often than not, van Dam
proved to be an able administrator, despite his occasional relapses into “humanistic” tendencies.62
In contrast to the works just discussed, this inquiry in most focused on the Germans’
goals in the field of education during the occupation, especially in Dutch schools, which Schwarz
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called the indirect path to the Greater Germanic ideal, and to a slightly lesser extent, the German
schools, otherwise known as the direct path to the Germanic Reich. Like in ‘t Veld, this study
takes seriously the SS leadership’s view of the Germanic element in the Netherlands. Although
this goal was somewhat confused during the initial months of the occupation, as many scholars
have noted, that does not take away from its development by the end of the 1940 into concrete
policy, supported by Seyss-Inquart, at least to the extent that it did not interfere with his own
personal base of power. This is especially true for the education realm because all of the
important individuals in the upper echelons of the education sector were supporters of the
Germanic project and hoped to further the Germanic ideal among Dutch youth. But before we
can turn to that directly, a brief overview of the role of education in the modern Dutch state is
necessary. Developments that occurred in the education field in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century are indispensable for understanding the competing interests among Dutch
collaborators as well as one of the primary reasons that the Germans’ educational initiatives were
very likely doomed to failure from the outset.
Background - Pillarization and The School Struggle
In contrast to its neighbors to the east, the history of the Netherlands over the course of
the nineteenth century is one of relative disunity. At the same time that the German speaking
states of Central Europe were slowly becoming more unified both economically and politically
under Prussian leadership, the Netherlands, especially its northern half, found itself floundering.
This process began when French Revolutionary armies invaded and set up a French puppet state
in the 1790s in the Northern Netherlands, while the Southern Netherlands—present day
Belgium—was incorporated directly into the French Empire. The Batavian Republic, as the
French puppet state in the Northern Netherlands was initially known, brought an end to the
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federal nature of the Seven United Provinces, replacing it with a centrally administered state
along the French revolutionary model.63 Along with this change came the separation of church
and state and, as a result, state control over education, which had been, up to that point, under the
purview of the churches. After the final defeat of Napoleonic armies, at the Vienna Congress the
victorious allies decided to incorporate the northern and southern portions of the Low Countries
into a single United Kingdom of the Netherlands, with the son of the last Dutch Stadholder
taking the throne as King Willem I.
Willem’s government would continue along the path of centralization but found few
supporters in either the north or the south of the newly united nation. Further, Willem’s
government was overtly pro-Calvinist and worked to legalize much of the already persistent antiCatholic discrimination in his new realm.64 Unity proved short-lived, as the majority-Catholic
southern half of the country pushed for independence from the majority-Protestant northern half,
a goal which was achieved after the great European upheavals of 1830, when in 1831 Leopold I
was proclaimed King of the Belgians by the Belgian National Congress, although the final
settlement would wait until the 1839 Treaty of London.65 Having lost its more industrialized
southern half, the newly truncated Kingdom of the Netherlands found itself permanently in a
position it had not been in for several hundred years—politically marginalized and militarily
weak.66 While the Netherlands, in any of its various political forms, had never been a large
military power in its own right on the European continent, it had commanded much respect
among the European great powers because of its immense economic strength. At its height, the
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county of Holland was one of the richest, most developed locales in the world, bankers and
merchants in Amsterdam controlled a significant amount of world trade, and the ships of the
United East Indian Company ruled the seas. But that was no more. Its status as an imperial
power with colonies in the Far East and the Caribbean did continue to afford the Netherlands a
certain respect among the European Great Powers into the twentieth century, but there was no
mistaking the fact that the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic had long since passed.
This worrying military and geopolitical decline was mirrored by intense changes at home.
The second half of the nineteenth century saw a flowering of cultural innovation in the
Netherlands.67 Political reforms instituted after 1848 gave the Netherlands a modern, liberal
constitution, while the supremacy of Dutch liberalism was cemented during the parliamentary
upheaval surrounding the resignation of Prime Minister Count van Zuylen van Nijevelt in 1868.
Socially, it was in the last decades of the nineteenth century that a particularly unique feature of
Low Country society first emerged—pillarization.68 Pillarization was the process by which the
people of the Netherlands slowly, but surely, coalesced into at first three, and then four, major
interest groups. The process began with the two major religious blocs—the Calvinist church on
the one hand and Catholic church on the other.69 The two religious blocs created large support
networks designed to help their co-religionists in need. These networks included schools,
hospitals, health insurance cooperatives, trade unions, professional organizations, public
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associations, and, of course, political parties to support it all.70 A third pillar grew up around the
more secular, liberal segment of the Dutch population, and as the country more fully
industrialized toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the
growing workers’ movement coalesced into a nascent fourth, socialist pillar, although it was shut
out of the political process until 1939.71 With universal male suffrage in 1917 and female
suffrage three years later, this process of social stratification became firmly entrenched in the
political arena as well. In theory, the pillars were the supports that held up the roof of Dutch
society. In reality, the pillarization of the nation helped to create a series of stable governments
controlled, by and large, through coalitions between the three established pillars. This resulted in
a spirit of compromise among Dutch leaders in spite of often diametrically opposed interests
claiming the status of immutable “truth” for their own positions.72 Unlikely as it is that a
political scientist would design such a system, it was surprisingly effective at preventing
instability and keeping the population content, at least to the extent that extremist, antidemocratic, and revolutionary ideologies such as fascism or communism never managed to gain
much support among the populace as a whole.
This does not mean, however, that the Netherlands did not have social problems to work
through on the domestic front. Chief among these was the issue of control over education, which
had been simmering in the background ever since the French invasion a century prior. At the
time, the revolutionary spirit of the age called for a decrease in the influence of religion in public
life, and especially in the schools.73 The Education Act of 1806 set up the basis for two types of
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schools in the Netherlands.74 The first were public, secular schools, mostly funded and
supervised by the localities in which they were found. Although they were ostensibly neutral in
matters of confession, there was no denying the overtly Protestant nature of many of the schools,
especially in the Protestant-majority northern part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.75
The second were the so-called “special schools,” which were private, confessional schools
organized by the Catholic and Protestant churches.76 But because the creation of these schools
had to be approved by local authorities, the creation of specifically Catholic schools was
considerably more difficult in the Protestant-majority north of the country.77 Moreover, despite
the guarantees in the 1815 constitution for state financial support of both Protestant and Catholic
private confessional schools, the vast majority of the funds, which both blocs thought were
insufficient, went to Protestant institutions, further exacerbating the north/south divide in the
nation and contributing to the Belgian revolution in 1830. With the death of Willem I, and the
ascension to the throne of his more tolerant son Willem II in 1840, minor concessions were made
to Catholic communities.78 For their part, the public schools were mostly seen, according to the
educational theories that ruled the day, as poor relief, and to the extent that they instructed in
religion, it tended to be of the Protestant variety, which generally pleased the Protestant elites of
the period.79 This began to change, however, with the ascendancy of the liberal state in 1848
which saw public schools take on an increasingly secular nature.80
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In 1848, as other parts of Europe were embroiled in revolution, Willem II calmly initiated
the constitutional reforms that would keep revolution at bay.81 This new constitution, which was
passed by both chambers of the States-General, was in many ways the founding document of the
modern, liberal, democratic Dutch state. It was also a watershed moment in the development of
both public and private, confessional education in the Netherlands.82 Among many reforms, it
again guaranteed partial public financial support of confessional education and removed many of
the obstacles facing Catholics in the establishment of their own private schools. Most of these
constitutional reforms were implemented through the new Education Law of 1857, which also
increased teacher pay and qualification requirements while calling for a supervisory regime to
hold everyone accountable.83 The further expansion of state funding for confessional schools,
however, was not passed, being killed on amendment.84 Twenty years later, however, the
liberal/Catholic political alliance that had made many of the 1857 reforms possible broke down.85
In its place was a liberal bloc, overtly secular in nature, on the one hand, and a conservative
coalition with its base of support in the confessions on the other.86 Despite this political
realignment, however, the liberal state continued its encroachment upon the classroom with a
new education law in 1878 that greatly increased the power of the central government over that
of the local towns and provinces.87 It did this by legislating further pay increases for teachers,
even higher training requirements, and capital improvements to school buildings and grounds
that were so expensive that many towns could no longer afford the costs, necessitating the
financial intervention of liberal ministers in The Hague. This allowed the central government to
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increase its supervision of the schools and more firmly to enforce the secular nature of the
schools that had been in place, in theory but not at all universally in practice, since the French
invasion eighty years prior. The law further drew back some of the churches’ gains as regarded
the establishment of new private confessional schools, which now became nearly impossible to
newly found. About a decade later, the political tide turned and the confessional coalition came
into power and, in 1889, passed yet another education law that relaxed most of the restrictions on
the confessional schools. Their establishment was no longer curtailed as it had been in 1878.
Further, and for the schools themselves most importantly, the 1889 law allowed for increased
state funding of confessional schools, up to about one third of their costs. This was, in every
respect, a political defeat for the liberal parties, and one that led to an exodus of students from
the public schools for confessional schools, further exacerbating the pillarization that was then
beginning to stratify Dutch society.88
The final blow came in 1900 with the introduction of compulsory, universal primary
education. Long simmering in the background, the question of the state’s role in education came
crashing to the fore. The sides in what would come to be known as the School Struggle were
split between a liberal/socialist camp that favored secular, public education completely free of
religious indoctrination, and the two confessional pillars, which angled for full state financial
support of their private confessional schools. 89 The impasse would finally be resolved, after
decades of back and forth debate over the subject, during the Great War. While the rest of
Europe was engaged in total war, the Netherlands remained neutral, preferring a more cautious
approach of wait-and-see. A government of national unity was formed with the support of, but
not including, the socialist party. With the great conflict raging to the south, the internal strife
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surrounding education took a back seat. At the same time, full democratization was gaining
steam, with the increasingly important Social-Democratic Workers’ Party demanding universal
suffrage. In December 1917, the government promulgated constitutional reforms. In a political
compromise of enormous proportions, the liberal/socialist camp, which was against public
funding of confessional schools, traded their support for the former in exchange for the support
of the confessional parties for universal manhood suffrage, followed three years later by
universal adult suffrage.90 And so, the century long struggle surrounding education that had
begun with French invasion was ended through political compromise, with everyone winning.
Except for the liberals, who, thanks to universal suffrage, saw their share of the electorate decline
precipitously in favor of the socialist and confessional parties. This political compromise was
put into law with the Primary School Law of 1920, which officially equalized both the status of
and the state funding for public, secular schools and their private, religious counterparts,
although the private confessional schools retained significant influence over their curriculum,
with only minimum standards enforced by the central government.91
Although the Primary School Law of 1920 ended the “School Struggle,” that was not the
end of attempts to reform education. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, a not insignificant
sector of the extreme right wing of Dutch politics was the inheritor of the liberal position of the
nineteenth century. These individuals viewed the stratified nature of Dutch education as
anathema to national unity and wanted, through various schemes, to do away with private,
confessional education and put all schools under the purview of the state. For many of these
individuals, Jan van Dam among them, the German invasion in May 1940 would offer a new
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opportunity to reverse the gains made by the confessional blocs over the course of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Luckily for these extremists, their new German overlords were of
the very same mindset.
Reichskommissariat Niederlande
In the early morning of May 10, 1940, German troops invaded the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and France. Case Yellow, as the plans were known, was meant to knock the
French Republic out of the war and set up the necessary conditions for the Wehrmacht to invade
the United Kingdom. Against all odds, the Dutch resisted German advances as best they could.
Out-manned, out-gunned, and lacking in the necessary training in modern warfare, the Dutch
military was quickly overwhelmed by the Nazi war machine. Only three days after the invasion,
on the advice of her ministers and military commanders, Queen Wilhelmina, her family, and
government ministers fled to the safety of the United Kingdom, leaving the country in control of
the Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces, General Henri Winkelman. That evening, German
troops made it past the Grebbelinie—one of the flooded “water lines” the Dutch had erected to
defend the country from foreign invasion—near Utrecht and moved into “Fortress Holland,” the
heart of the country. At the same time, German troops advanced in the southwest of the country
towards the major port city of Rotterdam. With German troops on the south bank of the Meuse
River just south of Rotterdam and unable to overcome stiff resistance from the Dutch defenders
on the north side of the river, Hitler ordered that resistance be crushed.
The following day, Luftwaffe bombers obliterated the medieval city center of Rotterdam.
Eighty thousand Rotterdammers lost their homes, twenty-five hundred shops, twelve hundred
factories, five hundred cafes, seventy schools, twenty-one churches, four hospitals, and two
concert halls were either destroyed outright or went up in flames as a result of the bombing.

34
Initial estimates of lives lost ranged as high as thirty thousand individuals, although by the time
the dust settled, somewhat less than one thousand actually died.92 Only hours after the news of
the fate of Rotterdam reached the high command, the Germans issued an ultimatum regarding
Utrecht, promising that should the Dutch military not surrender the fortifications surrounding the
city, it too would suffer the “fate of Warsaw.” Faced with the threatened destruction of Utrecht
and fearing the Germans would not stop there but continue on to the other major cities of the
country, Winkelman ordered the complete surrender of the Dutch Armed Forces later that day.93
Full Dutch resistance to the invasion had lasted only five days, although sporadic fighting
continued in the southwestern province of Zeeland for a few days longer.
In the first few days of the occupation, a German military administration was put into
place headed by General Alexander von Falkenhausen. Falkenhausen’s authority lasted about
two weeks, however, as the Nazis decided to install a civilian administration, headed by the
Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who was appointed on May 18 by Hitler to the position of
Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, a position he would actually
assume on May 29.94 It appears that the decision to install a civilian administration was made at
the last minute, as pre-war plans for the occupation of Western Europe envisioned both a much
longer struggle for control and the continued presence of the Dutch royal family and
government. On the twentieth of May, Hitler discussed with Jodl a complete victory that would
end in a peace treaty that would “return the territory that had been stolen from the German
people 400 years prior.”95 It was this anticipated peace, along with the absence of the Dutch
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government that allowed Hitler to use the threat of a political power vacuum in the Netherlands
as an alibi vis-à-vis the Wehrmacht leadership in order to implement a civilian administration.96
His alibi to the Wehrmacht was of little importance, however, as he had already drafted the order
implementing the Reichskommissariat and naming Seyss-Inquart to the position of
Reichskommissar two days prior.97 And it should be noted, that the very name of the occupation
regime again betrays the Germans plans, as Gerhard Hirschfeld has noted. The German term
conveys a dual meaning of implicit connection to the Reich itself while also exposing the overtly
temporary nature of the current form of governance - kommissarisch being a German term for
temporary.98 Like its counterparts in Northern and Eastern Europe, the Reichskommissariat
Niederlande was to be eventually incorporated into a Greater Germanic Reich.
Arthur Seyss-Inquart was born in 1892 in the Moravian town Stannern, located inside a
German Sprachinsel in what is the present-day Czech Republic, to Emil Seyss-Inquart, a school
administrator, and Augusta Hirenbach.99 Unusually, his sisters were brought up in the
Evangelical church, per the tradition of his mother’s family, while Arthur and his brothers
followed his father’s family and were baptized Catholic. In 1908, after his father’s retirement,
the family moved to the small town of Baden, near the imperial capital of Vienna. It was here
that Arthur began running in more nationalistic, völkisch, and antisemitic circles.100 After
graduating from high school in 1910, the younger Seyss-Inquart began attending the University
of Vienna to study law. Shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, the increasingly
nationalist-minded Seyss-Inquart volunteered for Army service. His wartime service did not
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hinder his personal or professional development, however, as he married in 1916 and eventually
graduated with a doctorate in jurisprudence in 1917. In 1918, he was decommissioned from the
Austrian army after a successful wartime service in which he was wounded several times.
His political activities in the 1920s are difficult to ascertain for lack of source material,
but it is clear that he had begun drifting ever further to the extreme right wing of Austrian
politics. By 1931, he had joined the Steierischer Heimatschutz—a right-wing, anti-democratic,
antisemitic paramilitary organization that would be officially absorbed into the Austrian branch
of the NSDAP in 1933.101 He would continue his political work throughout the 1930s, agitating
principally for the incorporation of Austria into the German Reich. In these efforts, he was
counted among the more moderate circle of the extreme right wing in that he preferred for the
incorporation to be handled legally, without resort to street terror or revolutionary activities.102
After joining the Austrian Staatsrat in 1937, he was appointed, through the insistence of Hitler,
to the position of interior minister in February 1938.103 On March 11, 1938, again under pressure
from Nazi Germany, Austrian president Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart to the position of
Chancellor. The very next day German tanks crossed the border into Austria. On March 13,
Seyss-Inquart signed the legislative acts that effectively abolished the Austrian state and legally
incorporated it into the German Reich. It was at this time that Seyss-Inquart, who had long since
felt himself tied politically and emotionally to the Nazi party, officially joined the NSDAP and
the SS, reaching the high rank of SS-Obergruppenführer by the eve of the German occupation of
the Netherlands. After the Anschluss, Seyss-Inquart remained as the de-jure head of the newly
renamed Ostmark as Reichsstatthalter, although he was forced to share power with a newly
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appointed Reichskommissar für die Ostmark.104 After the German invasion of Poland, he was
briefly transferred to work there under Hans Frank, in a largely ceremonial role that he despised
so much that he requested, via Himmler, to be sent to the front where he could truly be useful.105
Despite his request, however, Hitler decided on May 17, 1940 (formally announced the
following day), to transfer Seyss-Inquart to The Hague to take up the newly created position of
Reichskommissar in the Netherlands.106 In his farewell address in Krakow, Seyss-Inquart
famously remarked that “in the east, we have a national socialist mission, over there in the west,
we have a function. Therein lies something of a difference.”107 This difference, as the course of
the occupation would show, manifested itself in the racial make-up of the local population. In the
east, the Nazis were dealing with Slavic “sub-humans,”108 while the west was populated by their
Germanic brethren.109
The regime that Seyss-Inquart was to head was simply placed on top of the already
existing Dutch governmental apparatus, forming a sort of “supervisory administration,” not
entirely dissimilar to the occupation regime in Denmark.110 When the Queen and her ministers
fled to England, the government left instructions to the permanent Secretaries-General—the
highest ranking non-ministerial bureaucrats—of the various ministries to continue in their work
as usual. At the summits of these ministries, the Germans installed their own functionaries to
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oversee the work of the Dutch bureaucrats via a political and administrative organ known as the
Reichskommissariat.111 The German administration was split into five sections. A
Präsidialabteilung was to look after questions of personnel, budgets for the departments of the
Reichskommissariat itself (as opposed to the individual Dutch ministries), and all other issues
that required the direct attention of Seyss-Inquart.112 In addition to the Präsidialabteilung, there
were four overarching departments known as Generalkommissariate that were installed on top of
the existing Dutch ministries.113 In addition to these five top-level departments, Seyss-Inquart
appointed special Beauftragten for each province, one each for the major cities of Amsterdam
and Rotterdam, and for certain institutions, such as the Netherlands Bank.114 Following the
Nazis’ vaunted leadership principle, these representatives acted as petty despots in their own
administrative domains, reporting directly to the Reichskommissar himself. Finally, on top of the
official occupation apparatus, various other organs of the Reich tried to establish branches to act
as bases of political support in the Netherlands, including the German Foreign Office, the Office
of the Four Year Plan, the Economic and Armaments offices, the SS, and the Nazi Party itself.
Complicating matters significantly, many figures had dual roles that completely clouded the
chain of command, allowing for the creation of petty kingdoms inside of the occupation regime
itself. Far from being a smoothly operating machine, however, this political settlement left the
various actors too much room to maneuver, and it would, in time, expose many of the principal
figures responsible for cultural development and education policy as weak political operatives.
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Upon his appointment by Hitler, Seyss-Inquart was allowed to hand pick two of the
deputies that would head the Generalkommissariate, while the other two were appointed by the
Nazi leadership in Berlin. For his choices, Seyss-Inquart chose Hans Fischböck as the
Generalkommissar für Finanz und Wirtschaft115 and Dr. Friedrich Wimmer for the position of
Generalkommissar für Verwaltung und Justiz.116 Wimmer also had the distinction of being
Seyss-Inquart’s principal deputy whenever Seyss-Inquart was away from The Hague. Both men
were old friends of Seyss-Inquart’s from their time in Austrian politics and could be trusted to
maintain political loyalty to him.117 Although he was head of the Generalkommissariat for
Finance and Economy, Fischböck was seldom present in the Netherlands from 1942 onward,
preferring to commute occasionally from Berlin.118 Moreover, his position was closely watched
by his superiors in Berlin, as the economic health of the Netherlands was given high priority,
first because of their status as “ethnic kin” and later because of the need for resource extraction
in the name of the war effort. Further, because of his position overseeing finances and economic
matters, he had little direct influence in the cultural sphere.119 Wimmer, on the other hand, was
nearly constantly present in the Netherlands from his appointment in May 1940. This is
moderately surprising because he had initially been unsure whether he desired to take up work in
the Netherlands, as he felt at home in his previous post in the Bavarian city of Regensburg,
where he was involved in local administration. Despite his reservations, Wimmer answered
Seyss-Inquart’s call to action and, for his trouble, found himself in a position of relative
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autonomy vis-à-vis occupation policy. Unlike his colleagues, Wimmer had only “weak”
ministers in Berlin overseeing his work—he explicitly named Wilhelm Frick (Interior Ministry)
and Bernhard Rust (Education Ministry) as such after the war—which left only his good friend
Seyss-Inquart supervising his work, a veritable free hand given their close relationship.120
At the same time, as a check on the power of Seyss-Inquart and to further his own
designs on the Netherlands, Himmler installed SS-Brigadeführer Hanns Albin Rauter, yet
another Austrian Nazi, as both Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer for the Netherlands and
Generalkommissar für das Sicherheitswesen.121 In this position Rauter was simultaneously
subordinate to Seyss-Inquart as Generalkommissar and subordinate only to Himmler as the
highest ranking SS officer in the Netherlands.122 As a result, Rauter’s external power base proved
be a near constant source of conflict with Seyss-Inquart throughout the occupation and source of
political support sufficient to make his office, and therefore also his control of police and SS
forces in the Netherlands, practically autonomous from the Reichskommissariat itself.123 Further,
because of his position as the highest SS officer in the country, Rauter was in direct control of all
SS efforts in that realm in the Netherlands.
At the same time, Martin Bormann, the future head of Reich Chancellery who was still at
the time chief of staff to Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, was able to install Dr. Fritz Schmidt, the
only German Nazi at the upper echelons of the new administration, as the Generalkommissar zur
besonderen Verwendung.124 Schmidt was, among other things, to represent the interests of the
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Nazi Party directly, a task he was more able to accomplish once he was appointed by Hess to the
head of the NSDAP Arbeitsbereich Niederlande, the successor organization of the Nazi Party’s
Foreign Organization in the Netherlands, in October 1940.125 His office was also primarily
responsible for the forced coordination of Dutch society. In this role, Schmidt tended to support
the interests of the otherwise weak Dutch Nazi Party, the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging.
This support of Dutch Nazis, whose goals for a Greater Netherlandic Empire were often at direct
odds with their German overlords, would prove a constant source of conflict within the
Reichskommissariat.126 Additionally, Schmidt was responsible for public enlightenment and
non-economic associations, but, importantly, excepted from this mandate were questions of
education policy, which was to remain under the auspices of the education ministry.127 Schmidt’s
influence in the Netherlands would thus be minimal. With his actions constrained by the
leadership in Berlin, and his political position in the Netherlands deteriorating, he was killed in
1943 when he was thrown—or possibly jumped—from a train. While the exact circumstances
remain unclear, rumors circulated at the time that he had actually been assassinated by the SS.128
Given that the chain of command in the occupation regime resembled a wild web of
interconnected and contradictory commitments with built-in conflicts rather than an orderly tree
diagram with clearly defined roles—the characteristic fundamental polycracy of the Nazi
system129—it is unsurprising that Seyss-Inquart was not really able to rule single-handedly as he
had hoped or his position theoretically allowed him. Technically, he was indeed the highestranking authority, having received his commission directly from and reporting directly to Hitler
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himself.130 But this did not change his true position as a mid-level bureaucrat in the Nazi regime,
leaving him constantly susceptible to the machinations of those higher up the Nazi totem pole
and their various representatives in the Netherlands. His comparatively recent party membership
and staunch Catholicism did not help his cause either; the latter aspect of his personality actually
engendered mistrust in some circles.131 Seyss-Inquart’s only recourse was to appeal directly to
Hitler himself, an option that could not be used constantly and which, even when successful,
betrayed his own weakness, for that option relied on Hitler siding with Seyss-Inquart over the
likes of a Himmler, Göring, or Bormann. Even so, because of Rauter’s close relationship to
Himmler and Himmler’s closeness to Hitler, it is likely that Rauter actually had more direct
access to the Führer. Nor was this uncommon in Nazi occupied Europe, as Werner Best, the
ambassador plenipotentiary in Denmark, noted after the war that the SS leaders were always the
most powerful in their respective territories.132 For his part, Hitler never seemed to take much
interest in the actual administration of the Netherlands and was otherwise reluctant to intervene
between squabbling subordinates in such cases. This left Seyss-Inquart’s best option for
maintaining influence in playing (or pretending to play) the role of an honest broker between
competing factions. This was a role that would appear to be amenable to the otherwise moderate
Seyss-Inquart, but it turned out to be a role he was singularly unprepared to play.133 By and
large, however, Seyss-Inquart can be counted as belonging to the SS segment of the regime; he
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himself was a member of the SS, and he definitely saw the future of the Netherlands, both out of
personal persuasion and through the orders he received from Hitler, as a constituent part of the
Greater Germanic Reich.134 But, in order to protect his own base of power in the occupied
country, he still tried to balance equally the political forces around him, whether Rauter,
Schmidt, or the various wings of NSB.135 The mutual antipathy between Seyss-Inquart and
Rauter and between Seyss-Inquart and Schmidt, did not help his cause in the slightest.136
For the most part, the organizational structure of the Dutch government remained intact,
with the Germans only perching themselves at the summit, save for one major change in the
cultural sphere. On November 25, 1940, the pre-war Dutch Ministry of Education, Arts, and
Sciences, which had been situated under the auspices of the Commissariat-General for
Administration and Justice was split into two departments under the Reichskommissariat: the
Department of Education, Sciences, and Cultural Administration and the Department of People’s
Enlightenment and Arts, the latter designed to be a near-carbon copy of Goebbels’s Propaganda
Ministry in Berlin. This new department, which was meant to be a Dutch governmental
equivalent to the Hauptabteilung Volksaufklärung und Propaganda137 of Dr. Fritz Schmidt’s
Generalkommissariat zur besonderen Verwendung, was responsible for the press, radio, and
film, non-academic literature, art and art installations, theater, architecture, and the fight against
degenerate art.138 Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, an ardent, völkisch NSBer, was picked to lead the
new Dutch propaganda department. Goedewaagen was a good choice for Seyss-Inquart’s
purposes, as Goedewaagen was supported by Geerto Snijder, one of the leading Groot-Germaans
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thinkers in the Dutch national socialist scene, although Snijder was not yet a member of the
NSB.139 Further, Goedewaagen himself, while close to Mussert (he had previously served as
Mussert’s deputy and spokesman and it was Mussert who first suggested Goedewaagen to SeyssInquart), was also more amendable to Greater Germanic thinking than the Dutch Nazi Leider.140
He was a member of the NSB but was not seen as a “typical” representative of that group, which
had a not entirely unjustified reputation as a collection of brutes, for Goedewaagen was well read
and well spoken, a philosopher and aesthete.141
Under the purview of the other newly created department, the Department of Education,
Science, and Cultural Administration, were all schools, public and private, adult education,
teacher training, scholarly books and libraries, scientific publications and conferences, physical
education, youth development and care, museums, memorials, and nature conservancy.142 Chosen
to head this newly formed department was the Dutch Germanist professor Jan van Dam, who
was appointed as Secretary-General of the Department by Seyss-Inquart shortly after its
formation. Van Dam did not report directly to Wimmer, however, as his department was situated
under the Main Department of Education and Churches, headed by Dr. Heinrich Schwarz, one of
several sub-departments organized under Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat.
Born in 1903 in Berlin, Schwarz was, like Hitler and many other Nazis, an aspiring artist,
but unlike Hitler actually encountered some success, putting forth multiple artistic exhibitions of
his own work both before and after, but not during, the Nazi period. Despite his artistic
sensibilities, he ended up pursuing a legal education, receiving his doctorate in jurisprudence in
1931. After a short career in various legal roles, he joined the German Education Ministry in
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1934, then the SS in 1937, and finally the NSDAP proper in 1940. In 1939, he was drafted into
the Wehrmacht, where he served briefly during the invasion of Poland. In 1940, he was recalled
from the front and sent to the Netherlands to serve under Wimmer. Wimmer later claimed that
Schwarz was only a middling bureaucrat, but he was chosen directly by Nazi leaders in Berlin
for his position, at the explicit request of Seyss-Inquart for an education specialist to take up the
role.143 Although quite late to join the movement, Schwarz became a committed SS-man and was
instrumental in the development and implementation of occupation policy in the education
realm.144 In this role, he was also a supporter of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands,
noting repeatedly in his reports back to Berlin that his efforts in the education field were aimed at
implanting the Germanic ideal into Dutch youth.145 His reach extended to almost all areas of
education policy in the Netherlands and he distinguished himself by his fierce opposition to the
educational goals of the Dutch Nazis and the role of the confessions.146 For example, it was
Schwarz who was most influential on the German side in the effort to extend state control over
confessional education, helping to provoke the Protestant School Resistance Movement in the
process.147 Together with his direct subordinate Jan van Dam, Heinrich Schwarz had more
impact on Dutch education policy than any other individual functionary during the entire course
of the occupation.
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Periodization of the Occupation
Historians traditionally break the German occupation of the Netherlands into four distinct
phases. The first came directly after the installation of the Reichskommissariat and included a
German focus on what Seyss-Inquart liked to refer to as “self-Nazification,” in which the
occupiers tried to win the hearts and minds of the Dutch people for Nazism.148 In his initial
appeal to the Dutch people, dated May 25, 1940, Seyss-Inquart noted that he would do what he
could to make sure that “Dutch people, who are close to the Germans by blood, do not fall into
less favorable living conditions than are necessary” in order to win the war, and he hoped that
both peoples would be able to “treat each other with respect.” It was an attempt by the new
Reichskommissar to offer an outstretched hand by repeatedly noting the close relations between
the German and Dutch peoples.149 Seyss-Inquart did not say it at the time, although he would in
his post-war trial, but this order to treat the Dutch well and use force only if absolutely necessary
came directly from Hitler.150 By and large, the repression apparatus was quite limited in nature
during the early stages of the occupation, with the Nazis’ brutal methods being reserved mostly
for Jewish people and those actively engaging in resistance. But anti-Jewish measures especially
galvanized the Dutch populace until, in February 1941, the public engaged in a series of strike
actions aimed at protesting the Germans’ street raids in the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam.
The second phase began after the February Strike of 1941 and saw a more forceful effort
at coordination that relied on the disbanding and reestablishment of institutions along Nazified
lines.151 Although the tenor of the first two phases was different—the latter being more violent
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and less accommodating of increasing resistance on the part of the Dutch populace—the ultimate
goals of both phases were similar. This was period when the process of Gleichschaltung, the
adoption of institutions of the Reich in the Netherlands or the creation of Dutch counterparts
along with the coordination of public life along Nazi lines, was most intense. It was also during
the first two phases of the occupation that the majority of the work aimed at creating a new
Dutch, Germanic identity took place in the educational sphere. On the other hand, from the
Dutch perspective the first two phases of the occupation were somewhat different. By and large,
the initial phase, up until the February Strike, was marked by what Johannes Koll calls a “waitand-see attitude” on the part of the populace, while the second phase, which began with the
Germans showing their true colors through anti-Jewish repression, saw a slow but steady uptick
in resistance activity in all of its forms among Dutch Gentiles.152
The third phase of the occupation began in April 1943.153 Because of resistance activity,
which the German leadership blamed—not entirely incorrectly—on former Dutch military, the
Germans attempted to recall all soldiers, who had been released after the initial capitulation of
the Netherlands as a sign of German leniency, in order to send them to Germany as prisoners of
war. The resulting strikes, known as the April/May Strike of 1943, marked the beginning of a
much more repressive German regime and a corresponding uptick in resistance activity on the
part of the occupied. It was, in effect, a negative feedback loop in which greater repression
engendered greater resistance which caused even greater repression. This increasing repression
marked the tenor of the occupation for the rest of the war.154
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The fourth and final phase began in September 1944 when the first Allied troops entered
the southern provinces and liberated those portions of the population that lived south of the great
rivers.155 Fundamentally, for those portions of the country still under German rule, the nature of
the occupation did not change, except that repression became even harsher as the “Germans now
assumed they were occupying enemy territory.”156 Shortly after the liberation of Maastricht in the
far southeast of the country, Dutch railway workers struck in an effort to support of the Allied
Market Garden operations to secure rivers bridges over the Rhine at Arnhem.157 When the
operation failed, the German reprisals against the Dutch populace included the imposition of a
forced famine, known as the Hunger Winter, that led to the starvation of tens of thousands,
including about twenty thousands who starved to death.158 This final phase of the occupation
would last until the last German troops were pushed out of the country by Allied troops on May
5, 1945.
When it comes to the educational sphere, these broader chronological categories still
hold, but are not quite as useful. The February Strike of 1941 did not significantly alter the
occupiers’ efforts in the education realm. The officials at the Education Department did not take
part, while Dutch university students, along with many of their professors, had preceded the
February Strike with their own strikes protesting anti-Jewish measures already in November
1940, which led to the closure of Leiden University, the oldest and most respected institute of
higher education in the country.159 Nor did the April/May Strike of 1943 significantly affect
education. By that point, higher education had, for all intents and purposes, already come to a
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standstill, while primary and secondary education continued on as it mostly had.160 Finally, the
last major turning point, the beginning of the nine-month liberation of the nation by Allied troops
did not, in and of itself, affect the education realm any more than it did the rest of Dutch society.
The Education Department was still, for all intents and purposes, in disarray, and higher
education was still at a standstill. In primary and secondary education, the failure of the German
occupiers and their Dutch helpers to adequately enforce their decrees meant that most schools
continued on as they always had, only encountering disruptions when the authorities came to
investigate. By the later years in the occupation, these investigations become less and less
frequent, as the officials in the Education Department become more and more detached from
their work, which allowed most schools to continue on as they always had, ignoring the
“reforms” that had been mandated from on high. Only at the very end of the occupation, as
warfare engulfed the towns and villages of the country in the wake of the German retreat, was
education significantly disrupted, as were all facets of life during those often-turbulent weeks.
Because the traditional periodization of the occupation does not fit the educational sector,
this work will take a slightly different approach. Chapters Two and Three focus on the period
before the occupation began. Chapter Two looks at German views of the Netherlands, reaching
back into the nineteenth century and moving forward through the Nazi “seizure of power” in
January 1933. Specifically, it discusses the ways in which various influential Germans viewed
the Netherlands as a sort of lost territory of the German Reich as well as the growing field of
Dutch Studies in German universities that was significantly, but not entirely, infiltrated by a
völkisch understanding of the Dutch nation. Chapter Three looks at the Dutch side of this
equation. It focuses first on the history of Dutch fascists and national socialist movements, with
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particular emphasis on the largest and most successful group, the Nationaal-Socialistische
Beweging in Nederland (NSB). Many of these groups had surprisingly differing views on what
the contours of the future relationship between the Netherlands and Nazi Germany would be. All
believed that a close relationship would ensue as a result of German victory, and most supported
a Greater Netherlandic ideology which saw a Nazi ruled Dutch state that encompassed not just
the modern Netherlands, but also Flemish portions of Belgium and all of the former colonies of
the Dutch Empire.161 In this view, the relationship between this new Dutch Nazi state and Nazi
Germany would be one of equals, with Germany, by nature of its power and size, representing a
primus inter pares. Alternatively, there was a small, but increasingly influential group that
adhered much more closely to a völkisch view in which the Netherlands would be a junior
partner, or even constituent part, of a larger Germanic Empire.162 Finally, the chapter covers the
educational policy of both the NSB and the history, career, and educational policy of Jan van
Dam, who was appointed by the Germans to lead the Dutch Education Department in late
November 1940. In this latter section, I argue that the educational philosophy of the NSB was
more in tune with the currents of Dutch history, especially the School Struggle, while van Dam’s
conceptions of reforms, which were favored by the German occupiers, were out of touch with the
overwhelming majority of Netherlanders, and were, as a result, doomed to failure almost from
the moment of their initial implementation.
Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven form the heart of the inquiry. Chapter Four focuses
on Schwarz’s “direct route” toward the Greater Germanic Reich. In his reports back to the Office
of the Deputy Führer/Party Chancellery, Schwarz emphasized that there were in essence two
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routes toward winning the Dutch over to the Germanic ideal.163 The “direct route” went through
German educational institutions in the Netherlands. The effort here was to increase the amount
and quality of specifically German education in the country. This would, according to Schwarz,
stand as an example for Netherlanders, and their schools, to follow. These efforts spanned the
entire occupation, beginning shortly after Schwarz came to the Netherlands and ending only in
late 1944, as the war effort took all precedence from domestic initiatives.164
Chapter Five looks at educational “reform” efforts in Dutch Schools, what Schwarz
called the “indirect route” at winning over Dutch youth. Here the goal was to win Dutch students
and parents over to the methods of national socialist Germany.165 This included the introduction
of new subjects, such as physical education and German language instruction, as well as a
reorganization of Dutch schooling to decrease the influence of the churches while increasing the
influence of the state. By and large, these efforts were a failure, for although the occupiers were
successful in introducing new regulations, they encountered significant success on the ground, as
Dutch teachers and school administrators often simply ignored the new laws.166
Chapter Six continues the look at the indirect path, but focuses intently on attempted
changes in historical instruction, which was viewed by the Germans and many of their
collaborators as especially important for the creation of a new Dutch identity along Germanic
lines.167 Although the Germans and their Dutch helpers were not entirely successful in
introducing a new historical curriculum into the schools, through a close reading of several
textbooks created for use in Dutch education, it is easy to see that the occupiers’ overriding goal
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in historical instruction was to inculcate a Germanic identity among Dutch youth to prepare them
for the eventual incorporation of the Netherlands into a Greater Germanic Reich after the final
Nazi victory in Europe. Much like those changes discussed in Chapter Five, the introduction of a
new historical curriculum was hampered both by resistance at the local level and structural
challenges, not the least of which was the pace of writing and publishing these works, the first of
which only appeared in January 1943.168
Chapter Seven sharpens the focus on the local level directly, looking at the ways that
Dutch youth in the schools, as well as their teachers, reacted to German hegemony and how
Netherlanders viewed their Nazi and German oriented colleagues, whether teachers or students.
Throughout the occupation, the government was concerned with maintaining “peace and order”
in the schools, which it largely defined as the suppression of anti-Nazi teachers and punishment
of anti-Nazi students.169 Because the focus is on students themselves, and because the source
material does not tell us what, exactly, students thought about, for example, the introduction of
German language instruction or the censorship of school textbooks, the focus here necessarily
remains on students’ (and to a lesser extent teachers’) outward displays of patriotic activity and
harassment of their German-friendly and NSB colleagues. These actions, which were pervasive
throughout the country, show a strong antipathy among young Netherlanders for the German
occupation regime. Moreover, even when it is impossible to determine the exact motives for
harassment of NSB or German-oriented students, the mere fact that students often chose to focus
on regime-friendly individuals shows a much wider understanding among students that any
connection to Germany was perceived as negative. In such a climate, it would have been
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exceedingly unlikely, and I argue nearly impossible, that students and teachers would have been,
on the one hand, favorable or even indifferent to the various “reforms” their Nazi occupiers
wanted to introduce, but, on the other, aggressively antagonistic towards the local representatives
of those same occupiers. For this reason, despite a lack of direct evidence that explicitly states
that Dutch youth were against the Nazis’ designs in the educational sector, their overall opinion
of these efforts was very likely quite negative, even if that negative view was based only on its
association with the German occupation.
Chapter Eight serves as a conclusion by focusing on the ignominious end of educational
“reform” in the Netherlands. As the war turned against Germany in 1943 through defeat on the
battlefield, the German authorities in the Netherlands, under pressure from their superiors in
Berlin, turned to ever greater repression of the populace and extraction of resources to support
the war effort. This turn of events set into motion a negative feedback loop in which greater
repression led to greater resistance activities on the part of ordinary Netherlanders, which then
led to even greater repression. The downward spiral led the leading collaborator in the education
realm, Jan van Dam, to question the value of the Nazis’ Germanic project and eventually resulted
in the collapse of almost all efforts at educational “reform” for the rest of the war.
The efforts of the Germans and their Dutch collaborators in the Netherlands were a
thoroughgoing failure. When the war ended and democratic rule was reestablished, almost all of
the changes instituted by the occupation regime were reversed. But this inquiry is not as much
about what succeeded during the occupation as it is about what the German occupiers hoped to
accomplish. The goal was the establishment of a fundamentally new Greater Germanic Reich,
and the Nazi administrators of the Netherlands during the Second World War correctly
recognized that in order to make this Greater Germanic Reich succeed, they would need to win

54
the next generation for their Germanic project. This was the overarching goal in all of the actions
the Germans took, regardless of whether their Dutch collaborators agreed with these efforts or
not. It was a goal that meant bringing the Netherlands back into the Germanic fold from which it
had strayed some three hundred years prior.
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Chapter 2 - The Netherlands in Modern German Thought
When the end of the world comes, make your way to Holland. There everything happens fifty years late! Unknown, often attributed to Heinrich Heine
Some old-fashioned lords introduced the countryside, some fat mayors introduced the cities, the Princes of
Orange introduced themselves and the people did not introduce themselves ... The people made cheese and butter,
got coffee and sugar, and sprouted with the Baltic corn, took three thousand and a few hundred percent from pepper,
plundered the east, pillaged the west, filled their bags with ducats and worried just as little about the administration
as about the defense of the state. - L. Weinbarg, Buch über Holland, 18331

The Nazis were not the originators of the idea of a German-dominated state that
encompassed the territory of the Low Countries. In fact, that idea predated the Nazi “seizure of
power” by more than a century. The idea of a German super-state made up of the individuals that
inhabit the current day Low Countries goes back at least to the Napoleonic period and the
nineteenth century German nationalist thinkers who looked back to the French domination of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.2 Over the course of the nineteenth century,
German intellectuals such as Fichte, Arndt, List, Jahn, Riehl, Treitschke, and Langbehn all made
important contributions to the concept of a German state that incorporated the Netherlands as a
constituent part. The Nazis, with their Germanic project in the Netherlands, were very much the
late inheritors of this legacy, as their efforts in the Netherlands represent the ideological
fulfillment of this older German view of the Netherlands as little more than a breakaway
province whose natural place is within a larger German(ic) state.
The views of German intellectuals toward the Netherlands cannot be divorced from the
rise of the German nation over the course of the nineteenth century. As German-speaking Central
Europe fought for liberation from French domination, integrated first economically and then
politically, and eventually became the leading industrial and military power on the continent,
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German historians and thinkers viewed the Netherlands through the lens of these developments.
Especially critical for many of these thinkers was the Rhine river and the need for free use of that
river for commerce. Control of the Rhine, whether by France or by the Netherlands, was often
seen as a hindrance to German unity and the attainment of a future German state’s rightful place
in the world. At the same time, the narrative of an increase in German strength was correlated
with an opposite narrative of Dutch decline. In the Early Modern period, the Dutch Republic had
been a commercial and military power that obtained its independence and created a separate
national identity, at that same time Germany was little more than a collection of small, mostly
weak states. By the nineteenth century, however, the places of both nations had reversed such
that any discussion of German views on the Netherlands must keep this larger political,
economic, and military landscape in view.3
By the early twentieth century, German intellectual thought concerning the Netherlands
had entered into the academy with the slow growth in Dutch Studies, or Niederlandistik, and the
larger, interdisciplinary field of Westforschung, or “western research.” Neither of these new
academic disciplines were overtly völkisch in their outlooks, but both had relatively large
contingents of völkisch thinkers who took up their cause. Regardless of the political ideologies of
the scholars involved, each helped contribute to a larger understanding within Germany of the
Germans and Dutch as ethnically, culturally, geographically, historically, and linguistically
related.
This chapter thus serves as an intellectual history of the precursors in German thought to
the Nazis’ eventual invasion of the Netherlands. In it, I argue that the Nazis were the inheritors
of a long intellectual history which viewed the Netherlands as essentially German, or at least
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Germanic. These thinkers, especially those infused with a völkisch understanding of the world,
saw the Dutch as more similar to the Germans than dissimilar, and often argued that the true,
rightful place of the Netherlands, whether for geographic, political, economic, or cultural
reasons, was bound to its German neighbor in a single state. Although I do not mean to argue, in
any way, that the intellectual and political leaders of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
led, automatically, to the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands, I do argue that the Nazi
ideologues internalized many of the same arguments these earlier thinkers made regarding the
place of the Dutch state within the larger European order. In this way, the Nazis’ Germanic
project in the Netherlands was a sort of culmination of a much longer strain of German history.
The conception of the Netherlands as a constituent part of the German nation dates back
to the very beginning of German nationalism. Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 1808 Addresses to the
German Nation represent the “central political-philosophical foundation of the German national
idea.”4 In his Fourth Address to the German Nation, Fichte argued:
The first and immediately obvious difference between the fortunes of the Germans and the other branches
[i.e., the French] which grew from the same root is this: the former remained in the original dwelling places
of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter emigrated to other places; the former retained and developed the
original language of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter adopted a foreign language [i.e., Latin] and
gradually reshaped it in a way of their own. 5

The most important of these qualities was the retention of the ancestral language,6 “the
importance of which lies solely in the fact that this language continues to be spoken, for men are
formed by the language far more than language is formed by men.”7 Later, in his Thirteenth
Address, he notes that borders, that is
the first, original, and truly natural boundaries of States are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those
who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself,
long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make
4
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themselves understood more and more clearly, they belong together and are by nature one and inseparable
whole. … From this internal boundary, which is drawn by the spiritual nature of man himself, the marking
of the external boundary by dwelling-place results as a consequence; and in the natural view of things is it
not because men dwell between certain mountains and rivers that they are a people, but, on the contrary,
men dwell together—and, if their luck has so arranged it, are protected by rivers and mountains—because
they were a people already by a law of nature which is much higher.8

It is, of course, unlikely that Fichte was addressing the Dutch along with the German
nation. He certainly never explicitly states that the Netherlands and the Dutch people are part of
the German nation he envisions, nor does he give a concrete idea of where, exactly, the “internal
borders” are manifested in the natural world.9 But when one considers it, the Dutch do fit all of
the qualities Fichte mentions. Like the Germans, the Dutch remained in their ancestral lands.
Like German, the Dutch language was not heavily influenced by Latin. Dutch, like other West
Germanic languages, exists in what was once a dialect continuum that stretched from the North
Sea south and east into present-day Austria, only breaking down in the modern period through
the standardization of Dutch and German into separate languages, although they retain a very
limited mutual intelligibility even to this day. In Fichte’s time, this mutual intelligibility would
have been much greater, that is, a Dutchman and a German, especially a German from what
would become Northern Germany above the Uerdingen Line, very likely would have been able
to “understand each other.” 10
Although Fichte’s arguments about “truly natural boundaries” likely did not include the
Low Countries, his student, Ernst Moritz Arndt was of a completely different mindset. Arndt
argued that the true and correct borders of a future German national state should encompass all
of the territories that were inhabited by Germanic language speakers, that is, in the south the
border should stand “at the Alps of Italy and at the Ardennes of France … in the west, the North
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Sea encompasses [the border].”11 According to Arndt, it was the wars of the French Revolution
that “snatched away the magnificent lands around the Rhine, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the
Scheldt, [the] original and ancient land of the German tongue, of German freedom and the
national tribe.”12 All too easily Germans had let these territories be lost to the future national
state, as they were unaware of the territories’ value, meaning, and the importance.13 For Arndt,
the value and meaning of these lands was self-evident, as
the long history of the Fatherland proves, that the Rhenish lands, Swabia, and Westphalia are the heart and
core of the German people, that from there all of the best and most genuine that is German has begun …
Here the original Germany, formerly the center and the strength of the empire, is still the center of German
life and German custom, here is an inexhaustible treasure of German custom, language, and history.14

The ultimate goal in Arndt’s writing is clear: “the two shores of the Rhine, and the surrounding
lands and people must be as German as they once were; the stolen land and people must be
reconquered to the Fatherland.”15
If the Rhine and our torn-off lands are regained by the help of God, and added to the German Reich, so it is
desirable that the mighty German princes, Austria, and Prussia, especially Alsace, the Netherlands, and so
much else of Habsburg and Burgundian heritage [are too].16

He would continue on this path for some time. In his 1815 work Ueber Preussens
Rheinische Mark und über Bundesfestungen Arndt notes that “the Rhine delta is shielded by
Holland and Belgium, which are nothing more than outposts of Germany, being a bastion of the
same, and which must always stand or fall with Germany.” By 1831, Arndt was dedicating entire
works specifically to the place of the Netherlands and surrounding territories in the future
German national state. In his Die Frage der Niederlande und die Rheinlande he argues, just as
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before, that the Low Countries were once and should be again a part of a future Germany and
that he was not alone in this thought either; rather, the political classes, the scientists, linguists,
and historians were all said to be united in the idea that the people of the Low Countries were
“almost more German than Germans.”17 To his credit, by this point in his life he was willing to
allow that the people of the Low Countries were somewhat different from the Germans
themselves, although he was not yet willing to admit that it really mattered:
We said: Of course, the Burgundian lands [i.e., the Low Countries] have become somewhat strange to us in
more than one way, they have not felt themselves a part of Germany since long before the French period …
but they should and must become more German-like.18

Fichte and Arndt were two of the first German intellectuals to define Germany not only
by physical borders but through the people that inhabited it—the Volk. Men like Fichte and
Arndt “conceived of the volk in heroic terms … [it] symbolized the desired unity beyond [the]
contemporary reality” of dynastic states.19 In a very similar vein to these two thinkers was
Friedrich Jahn. Jahn is best known as an early proponent of gymnastics and student fraternities.
In both of these areas, Jahn would profoundly influence later generations of völkisch thinkers,
who adopted almost wholesale many of Jahn’s beliefs about the importance of “Germanic unity”
as exhibited through the youth and healthy bodies.20 Like Arndt, however, Jahn also notes in his
1810 Deutsches Volksthum, that of the many German peoples, the four that were most different
from the rest were the Swiss, Dutch, Prussians, and Austrians, suggesting that he, too, saw the
Dutch as merely another variant of the German people.21 Recounting the importance of the
“shameful Peace of Westphalia,” he further notes that “it was unlucky because the Dutch
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Republic and the Swiss Confederacy completely removed themselves from us. The Rhine then
ceased to be the old German Schutzstrom because at its source and mouth there lived in these
lands of nature henceforth only German half-brothers.”22
The view of the Netherlands as a[n errant] constituent part of Germany was not limited to
romantic writers like Fichte, Arndt, and Jahn. Rather, it was more widespread among the German
intelligentsia. In his 1841 Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie, Friedrich List, who
was certainly a German nationalist, but not usually counted among the romantic predecessors of
later völkisch intellectuals, argues that “by spirit and custom, by the descent and language of
their inhabitants, as through political connection and geographical location, Holland, Flanders,
and Brabant were parts of the German Reich.”23 Although he freely admits that the Dutch had
made themselves an independent nationality by the time of his writing, he was not very happy
about it, even if only from a utilitarian, economic, and power-political point of view:
If Charles V had thrown off the crown of Spain as one casts a stone that threatens to draw us into the abyss,
what a different destiny would have arisen for the Dutch and the Germans! As Regent of the United
Netherlands, as German Emperor, and as pilot of the Reformation, Charles possessed all of the material and
spiritual resources to found the most powerful industrial and commercial empire, the largest naval and land
power ever to exist—a naval power stretching from Dunkirk to Riga would have united all the sails under a
single flag! … If Holland, united with Belgium, with the drainage basin of the Rhine, and with Northern
Germany, had built a national territory, it would have been difficult for England and France to succeed in
weakening its naval power, its foreign commerce, and its internal industry in the manner that it happened.
… Holland, therefore, fell because a piece of the coast, inhabited by a small number of German fishermen,
sailors, merchants, and ranchers, wished to form a national power for itself, and regarded the hinterlands,
with which it constituted a whole, as a foreign land.24

List does not limit himself to what could have been, either. He fully argues for a national unity
between the Dutch and German peoples of his day:
However, from our national point of view, we say and assert that Holland is, according to its geographical
position as well as its commercial and industrial relations and the descent and language of its inhabitants a
German province that was separated from Germany in times of national discord, [and] without its
reincorporation into the German confederation, Germany is comparable to a house whose door belongs to a
stranger. Holland belongs as much to Germany as Brittany or Normandy belong to France, and as long as
Holland wishes to form her own independent empire, Germany can only have as much power and
22
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independence as France would have been able to achieve if those provinces had remained in English hands.
… Holland, as it has descended from its heights as a commercial power, because it—the mere part of a
nation—wanted to allege itself as a whole, because it sought its advantages in the suppression and
weakness of the productive forces of Germany, instead of basing its greatness on the prosperity of the
hinterlands, upon which every riverine state stands or falls—because it sought to become great through
separation from Germany instead of union with the same—Holland can only bloom again through the
German Union and with the closest connection to the same.25

List’s work on political economy was written only one year after the Rhine Crisis of
1840, which saw French prime minister Adolphe Thiers threaten to invade the Rhineland in
order to secure France’s “natural borders” after a French diplomatic setback over France’s
support of Egypt’s Muhammad Ali Pasha, who had attempted to carve out a personal empire
within the Ottoman realms. The crisis awoke among German nationalists a renewal of antiFrench resentment that had pervaded the earliest decades of the century.26 Patriotic songs, such
as Die Wacht am Rhein and the Rheinlied, were written by German poets to contest France’s
threats of hegemony over the Rhineland. But perhaps the most famous of all such songs was Das
Lied der Deutschen, written in 1841 by August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben. In the
song, Hoffmann von Fallersleben includes in the territory over which Germany would prevail
lands in the West “from the Meuse,” which necessarily included large sections of the Dutchspeaking Low Countries. A few years later, the German poet Johan Wilhelm Wolff published a
short poem in De Broederhand noting the close ethnic ties between the Germans and the Dutchspeaking Flemish:
Because German and Flemish are closely related
As close as right and left hand
And German is German, whether high or low
That rings from the Scheldt to the Danube and back. 27

The Rhine Crisis also spurred Wolfgang Menzel, a conservative historian of the age, to
publish Die westliche Grenzfrage, which was originally incorrectly attributed to the elder Helmut
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von Moltke.28 In his 1841 essay, Menzel supports the notion that the language border is the only
true, natural border, rather than the geographical borders that France had attempted to gain for
centuries. He notes that the language border between French and German stretches from Calais
mostly eastward to about Maastricht until turning back southwest to encompass large parts of
what is today Eastern Belgium and the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.29
Everything now west of the designated borderline speaks either Welsh or French; everything that lies to the
east of it speaks German, and this language boundary has preserved itself, with hardly any noticeable
changes, as far as the memory of history reaches, for over a thousand years. ... If one starts from the
national point of view and makes the language the natural border of the nations, then the whole Rhine with
its whole left and right bank belongs to us, because in the whole river area of the Rhine German has been
spoken for fourteen centuries.30

In the same issue of the Deutsche Vierteljahrs Schrift that Menzel’s essay appeared, a later essay
by an author who gives his or her name only as E.D. argues that Holland had ripped itself away
from Germany with its education and visions of gold and hegemony across the seas, and it had
wisely raised its “provincial dialect [into] a written language.”31 The following decades would
see the language border that was so important to men like Fichte, Arndt, and Menzel put onto
maps by cartographers like Johann Kutscheid, Heinrich Kiepert, and Richard Böckh. These men,
using statistics, determined where, exactly, the line between the French west and south and the
German north and east lay.32 The Netherlands were, of course, considered to be part of the
“lower German language area.”33
The idea of the Low Countries as a German territory would only pick up momentum
among German nationalists as the nineteenth century progressed and the völkisch movement
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came into its own.34 It was, in fact, Arndt’s student Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl who could be called
the intellectual father of the völkisch movement in Germany, for it was Riehl’s ideas, more than
any other individual of his age, that would be subsumed into the corpus of völkisch thought.
Riehl was especially concerned with landscapes and the ordering of society, for it was in nature
and a close connection with the land that society found its fullest expression. Naturally enough,
this meant, for Riehl, that the ideal society was that of the Middle Ages, connected as it was to
agriculture and working the soil. The social division of society into peasants and aristocracy was
as natural as the division of the land between the forests and the fields. The question of the newer
estates, the middle-class burgers and especially the workers, was more problematic for Riehl.
The merchants and tradesmen of the middle classes were problematic for disrupting the idyll of
the volk’s connection to the land. But even they were afforded a place of honor within the volk if
they could trace their heritage back to one of the small German hometowns. Similarly, workers
who lived and worked in harmony with their employers could also find an honored place, in
much the same way that the medieval guilds had operated with apprentices, journeymen, and
masters all, at least theoretically, forming a sort of harmony among themselves. It was this sort
of mental gymnastics that allowed Riehl to praise Robert Owen’s utopian socialist settlement at
New Lanark—in Riehl’s eyes Owen was a sort of happy patriarch and the workers his children—
while at the same time saving his disdain for the rootless proletariat of the large cities. These
workers, unlike those who were connected to the land and thus the volk, were disconnected from
the land and therefore an enemy to be destroyed.35
Riehl, of course, also viewed the Netherlands as a constituent part of the German nation.
In his 1854 work Land und Leute, Riehl notes that “the history of Holland is a piece of German

34
35

Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 17.
Ibid., 19–24.

65
history,” but that “Holland has a shorter memory than the German people.”36 But it is in his 1869
Wanderbuch that the Netherlands receives its fullest treatment.37 Quickly in the first chapter,
Riehl gets to some of his most important points. Holland and Germany are different, and one can
see this quickly as one crosses the border. He takes as his comparison the neighboring towns of
Nijmegen and Kleve, which are:
hardly three miles apart, but in character of their people lie a world apart, although the villages of Prussian
Geldern and Kleve are remarkably related to the neighboring Dutch villages. This state is explained by the
fact that the original national character, as the peasant most faithfully preserves, was a common one,
whereas the course of political culture culminating in the cities had torn Holland and Germany apart for
three centuries.38

But this separate political culture that the Dutch created for themselves was a result of German
weakness. In the future, the German peoples would reunite into one giant state, including all its
constituent parts:
It is therefore not necessary to think of a conquest of Holland and German Switzerland. A nation like
Germany, once it has regained its full strength and health, will once again attract the formerly detached
elements ethnographically and then politically. We are and will remain destined to become a federated
people, and since the old federation is broken, I can only imagine a great German future in the form of a
larger and more powerful new federation in which the Nordbund, the Südbund, German Austria, German
Switzerland and Holland form the organic limbs. 39

Similar to the villages and people themselves, the Dutch language is, and is not at the same time,
a German dialect, according to Riehl:
The Dutch language also leads us out to sea, legitimizing itself solely in the face of the sea. I want to be
more explicit about this phrase, which sounds strange. It is a bone of contention between Germans and
Dutchmen, whether the Dutch language still today can be regarded as a mere Low German dialect, albeit
very independently pronounced and firmly established, or as its own national language, which has long
since broken through the former barriers of a mere dialect. The literature, as a preliminary point the poetic,
does not decide in favor of the Dutch. The fame and importance of the Dutch poets is rooted only in their
narrower homeland, and they share the lot of dialect poets, who are studied abroad at most for
ethnographic, cultural and linguistic interest, but who are not translated and read because they are poets
[one] must read. Neither in poetry nor in the art of prose did Holland gain a place in world literature … But
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across the ocean the Dutch language was attested by trade and shipping and colonialism, and by being
spoken in the East Indies and in South Africa, and indeed new territory conquered recently.40

Riehl’s stated goal in his Wanderbuch was to “lose his way” as he traveled the
countryside between the German and Dutch frontiers, for it is in these intermediary, otherwise
uninteresting small towns and villages, places like Kleve, Geldern, Goch, and Kevelaer, “these
regions of transition and apparent indifference that first teach us to recognize countries and
peoples as organisms, connected with limbs; they are the first that open for us the correct
understanding of the totality of the life of the volk.”41 It was during these wanderings that Riehl
recognized “how inseparable even today Holland has grown together with Lower Germany.” But
to even flesh out the full roster of connections between the two peoples and lands would require
a full scale ethnographic, geographic, and cultural history of Northwestern Europe, including
Belgium,
for one cannot fully show how German Holland is, if one does not at the same time show how German the
greater part of Belgium must be considered even to this day. … It is not nature that separates us, but
politics. From the centers of both countries, it is easy for everyone to notice the difference that has been
made over the centuries. On the periphery we find—and this is more difficult—the natural context. All true
statesmanship should return to nature: the first stage of this journey is the is lived experience of land and
people through wandering.42

Riehl’s work on the relations between the Netherlands and Germany was meant to stress
the close relationship between the Dutch and German peoples, and in it, a mostly complete
völkisch view of that relationship is exhibited.43 Through shared language, social customs,
religion, and industry—Riehl even takes time out to discuss wooden shoes, that archetype of the
Netherlands, and their cross-border use44—the two countries are separated not in spirit but only
in politics. But this is, in Riehl’s view, an artificial construct, for the statesmen of the day,
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whether in the Prussian capital of Berlin or the Dutch administrative capital of The Hague, did
not conduct the right kind of politics. Divorced from nature as they were, these politicians could
not see the forest but for the trees. But as Riehl opined, one day, in the future, that would all
change, for the natural custom of the German people was federation, best conceived as an
organism in which the various branches of the Germanic family are little more than limbs of a
body.
In addition to his ethnographic work, Riehl was also important for his influence on
educational reform. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, German educational reformers
pushed for and succeeded in introducing the subject of Heimatkunde into German schools. Not
easily translated, but vaguely meaning local studies, Heimatkunde called for education to
emphasize the German people’s connection to the earth as well as the notion that their customs
came ipso facto from that very connection.45 Although Heimatkunde did not always necessarily
emphasize a völkisch view of the world,46 in practice it often did.47 Over the course of the last
two decades of the nineteenth century, the very idea of the Heimat, its glorification through
historical societies, museums, and the study of local folklore, was made into a “mediator
between the local place and the nation [that] … in imperial Germany transformed into an actual
representation of the nation.”48 The idea of Heimat was an “invented memory” that transformed
German towns into a state of timelessness, ever connected to the past. Responding to the rapidly
changing society they saw around them, “Germans manufactured Heimat as a set of shared ideas
about the immemorial heritage of the German people in local and national history, nature, and
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folklore.”49 And although the creation of this idea of Heimat and the push for its study in schools
was not necessarily anti-modern,50 it certainly did hark back to what many perceived to be a
simpler time and age in a similar way to Riehl’s völkisch ideas during the mid-century, with its
emphasis on the land and people who inhabited it. Like the physical education exalted by Father
Jahn, Heimatkunde would become a central element to the educational and pedagogical
philosophy of National Socialism in the second quarter of the twentieth century.
In the 1860s and 1870s, as the German nationalist dream of a German nation-state
became a reality, little changed in the nationalist wing of German politics as regarded the place
of the Netherlands. The towering figure of the age in the German historical discipline was
Heinrich von Treitschke. Treitschke, like many other intellectuals before him, had much to say
about the Netherlands. In his 1869 essay, Die Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande, Treitschke
notes that the Netherlands:
This great power without land was and remains an anomaly; it fed on the misfortune of the neighboring
peoples; it possessed only the rapidly dwindling vitality of a small state, not that happy gift of rejuvenating
itself, with which great nations victoriously pass through all the storms of history. … The country, which
united the commerce of all the world in its hands, saw a natural enemy in every nation that awoke to strong
self-confidence, but its most dangerous rivals were the two Protestant powers [Great Britain and Prussia].
Germany's weakness was Holland's strength; the position of the small state at the head of Protestant Central
Europe immediately swayed as soon as an independent Protestant power rose up.51

As far as Treitschke was concerned, the Netherlands was an unnatural state that could only
survive through the weakness of more natural states like Great Britain, France, and Germany. Its
very status as an independent state in the first place had been as much a result of the chaos in
Germany during the Thirty Years’ War as it had been its own drive for independence from
Spain.52 Its second independence, this time from French hegemony in the wake of Napoleon,
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was the result, not of Dutchmen liberating themselves—that was a fairy tale—but of Germans
(and Russian “Cossacks”) doing the work for them.53
But that was all in the past. The future held a different place for the Netherlands,
according to Treitschke. The following year, in his famous work Was fordern wir von
Frankreich, Treitschke laid bare his thoughts about the contemporary Dutch state:
It is not the object of this national policy to force every strip of German soil which we ever gave up in the
days of our weakness, back again into our new Empire. … We have no desire to interfere with the separate
life of that branch of the German stock which has grown up in the Netherlands into a small independent
nation. But we cannot permit a German people, thoroughly degraded and debased, to serve against
Germany, before our eyes, as the vassal of a foreign power.54

He stopped short of calling for outright annexation of the Netherlands, but it was clear that the
Low Countries must, in his eyes, serve Germany’s interests, not those of other states. Moreover,
his pamphlet began to sound similar to Arndt—whom he quoted regarding the Rhine being a
German river but not Germany’s boundary55—when Treitschke claimed that the new German
state should have its “western frontier indicated to it by the language and manners and life of the
rural population.”56 He was, in this instance, discussing Alsace and Lorraine but it would not
take long for Treitschke to set his eyes on the place of the Netherlands. This was, in fact, only a
step along the path to Treitschke’s final destination: the incorporation of the Netherlands into the
German Empire.
In a lecture given to his students at the University of Berlin sometime in the 1880s or
early 1890s,57 which was copied down and published in 1897, Treitschke could not have been
clearer on his view of the Dutch people and their little nation:
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Holland was transformed from a tribe into a nation through a political struggle in which we unfortunately
left it in the lurch and made its sailor’s dialect with full consciousness a literary language. ... Thus, in the
West a number of outposts [i.e., the Netherlands and Switzerland] of the empire have developed into
independent states. That at least Holland once again returns to the old fatherland is [both] possible and
urgently desired.58

The culmination of a century of German thought regarding the place of the Netherlands,
from Fichte through Arndt, Jahn, Menzel, Riehl, and Treitschke, can be found in the writing of
the völkisch, nationalist German historian Julius Langbehn. All of the previously discussed
intellectuals saw, for either reasons of language and culture or for reasons of state, the need for
the Netherlands to be a part of Germany, but Germany was always to be the senior partner.
Langbehn, in his work Rembrandt als Erzieher, turns the tables entirely and views the
Netherlands, not as a breakaway German province needing reincorporation into Germany, but
rather as the source of nearly all that is good and decent in the modern world. To be certain,
Langbehn desires a union between Germany and the Netherlands, but he sees the benefit for
Germany not in control of the Rhine or the North Sea coast, but in the infusion of all things
Dutch and the advantages that would bring. Lying where the North Sea “kisses” Germany,
Holland is a true Heimat of which to be proud, for it is a nation of farmers connected to the land,
where earth and the smell of sludge permeates the life of the people. Even the capital was until
recently little more than a village. “The Dutch are from a special batch; they are sea farmers, as
the Greeks once were; therewith they are both closely related and at the same time foreign to the
continental Lower Germans.”59 The conservatism of Northern Germans would do well with an
injection of Dutch liberalism. But this was a specific German type of liberalism that included
“the fight for ancient rights … [which are] individual and not doctrinaire, national and not partypolitical.” A combination of Dutch liberalism and Prussian conservatism would “lead to true
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freedom.” Furthermore, the Dutch, more than any other branch of the German family tree, have
succeeded in state-craft and commercial activity precisely because they understand freedom in
the correct way—the preservation of their völkisch character.60
Not only that, but the Dutch had already had an immeasurable impact upon Prussia,
according to Langbehn. In the olden days, Prussia was partially settled by Dutchmen, and this
showed even in Langbehn’s time. The Prussian royal house was partially of Dutch origin; even
Frederick-William the Great Elector was partially educated in Holland, and he brought back
Dutch technology with him to Berlin. The Great Elector was a constant testament to the “lasting
connection to the ethnically related Lower German states.”61 King Frederick-William I also had
a deep connection to the Netherlands. His favorite city, Potsdam, “the most Prussian of all
Prussian cities,” was built in a Dutch style, and even its name was, according to Langbehn, a
tribute to Amsterdam.62 What was true of Potsdam, was also true of many other northern
German cities, including Hamburg, Danzig, Dresden, and Magdeburg; even Berlin once had
canals just like Amsterdam. “All of northern Germany is filled with a spirit that was directly
descended from, or closely related to the Netherlands.”63
In his work, Langbehn exhibits a love affair with the Dutch people and their state, and
like any true love, he hopes that the relationship will end in marriage. This marriage between
Prussia and the Netherlands was necessary for “such a marriage would carry long-lasting and
beautiful fruits. Orange blood is the wedding jewelry; the tried and true saying ‘Oranje boven’
would be with a—political—wedding between Germany and the sea, the appropriate wedding
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jewelry.”64 If, as Langbehn desired, Prussia were to return to the soil as farmers, then they might
as well also submit to “Dutchification.”65 Just as the royal house has been, so too should the
German volk be “Dutchified.” Even better yet, “Germany could best put an end to Holland’s
fears of annexation, by letting it be annexed by Holland.”66
Although Langbehn was, by far, the most enthusiastic of German intellectuals, whether
völkisch-minded or not, regarding the relationship between the Netherlands and Germany, he
was by no means the last. Toward the end of the century, völkisch thinkers adopted the concept
of Lebensraum from the German academic Friedrich Ratzel. Ratzel’s views of the nation-state do
not fit squarely into the völkisch mold. Like many previous thinkers, Ratzel viewed the nationstate as needing space to grow and succeed. Those states without such room were destined to
fail. In this need for space to grow and thrive, Ratzel also argued, like his more völkisch
colleagues, that nations were living organisms, but for Ratzel, the most important element of any
volk was that it was spatially contained, ethnicity and character were nice, but not necessary.67
As nations grow, their living space must also grow for the nation to remain healthy. On the
radical-nationalist wing of German politics, Ratzel’s ideas about the need for expansion in living
space were most vociferously championed by the Pan-German League. The League was most
heavily focused on Germany’s eastern borderlands, where Slavs often outnumbered Germans,
and, after the First World War, the large numbers of Germans who lived in the successor states
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of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. But the League members did occasionally also
turn their attention to Germany’s western borders.68
Pan-German League member and former German General Staff officer Friedrich von
Bernhardi notes in his 1911 Deutschland und der nächste Krieg that:
The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms and struggles of the past. The
Germany of today, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the Emperors; it
comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large number of German fellow-countrymen have been
incorporated into other States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have developed into a
separate nationality, but in language and national customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany
has been robbed of her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most characteristically
German river, the much-lauded German Rhine, lie outside the German territory. 69

Perhaps the most direct threat against the independence of the Netherlands (and Belgium) by a
League member came from Heinrich Class’s 1913 work Wenn ich der Kaiser wär. In it he goes
on at length about the future decision the two small states would have to make regarding a
coming European war. Of course, he believed, they would make “the same mistake” that
Hannover, Electoral Hessen, and Nassau made in the 1866 conflict between Prussia and Austria,
that is take the wrong side, but “they cannot be surprised, if the consequences [incorporation into
the German Reich] are the same.”70 But Class did not base his opinions only on the ethnic
relations between the people of the Low Countries and Germany, in fact, he disregarded that
aspect entirely, arguing that the independence of these peoples and the cultures they had
developed would be a detriment to Germany’s future.71 Rather, it was pure strategic calculus that
led Class, for the Rhine river must be in German hands. He thus determined that Germany should
offer the Low Countries the free choice of either siding with the Reich or against it:
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If they [Belgium and the Netherlands] decide for us, accepting reason at the last moment, they save their
state independence in the sense in which the individual states of the German Reich possess it; If they strike
for the other side, they will be annexed.72

Of course, their colonies would also suffer the same fate, with the administration of those distant
lands falling to the bureaucrats in Berlin.73
Thus, already by the beginning of the First World War, there was a long-standing history
in Germany of viewing the Netherlands as a sort of lost child ready to be returned to its
Germanic family. The reasons for this generally came from either the ethnic, völkisch point of
view or from questions of pure strategic calculus, but either way, they were relatively common
views in German nationalist circles.74 Officially, the Netherlands remained neutral during the
Great War, but that did not keep German planners from including the Dutch into their hoped-for
post-war settlement. Although it was to remain independent, German Chancellor BethmannHollweg argued early in the war, when German victories were still fresh in recent memory, that
the Netherlands must remain politically independent, yet completely dependent in all other ways
upon the German Reich, including a customs union and the stationing of German troops at key
points, such as the mouth of the Scheldt River in the Province of Zeeland. Belgium, for its part,
was to be become “economically a German province,” with some areas to be annexed to the
Reich directly.75 Of course, these plans for the Low Countries were never realized as the war
effort turned against Germany and forced its surrender to the Allies in November 1918.
Defeat in war would not remove Germans’ interests in the Low Countries, however.
After the end of the First World War, two largely new developments emerged in the academic
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world—the academic subject of Dutch Studies and the larger, interdisciplinary field of
Westforschung. Both of these developments marked a sharper concentration among academics
and independent scholars regarding the relationship of the Netherlands and its people to
Germany specifically and the relations between the peoples and nations of Western Europe and
the western German borderlands more generally. Research in both Dutch Studies and the
Westforschung included, but was by no means limited to, völkisch thinkers, although several of
the völkisch thinkers who worked in these areas would go on to participate in cultural projects in
occupied Western Europe during the Second World War.
The study of the Low Countries, as an academic discipline, had its roots in the pre-war
period; it was only following the end of the Great War that the study of the politics, ethnography,
geography, history, and culture of the Low Countries—subsumed under the name
Niederlandistik—would actually become established, albeit not firmly. Johannes Frank began the
modern study of the Netherlands in German universities in the late nineteenth century, but
focused mostly on language, publishing works such as a modern Dutch dictionary and a
grammar book. He was followed at Bonn, after his death, by Theodor Frings, who was promoted
to Ordinarius in 1919, although Frings moved on to Leipzig in 1923. Dutch Studies was not
picked up again by a Professor Ordinarius at Bonn until 1964. The only other Professor of Dutch
Studies in Germany was located at Frankfurt am Main in the person of M.J. van der Meer, a
Dutchman. Van der Meer was appointed Professor Extraordinarius in 1920 and then in 1921
became head of Holland Institute, but never attained the rank for Ordinarius before his death in
1931, shortly after which the Holland Institute dissolved. Otherwise, there were no professors of
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Netherlandistic in all Germany, although lecturers could be found at Berlin, Hamburg, Münster,
Göttingen, Kiel, and Cologne.76
At Cologne, there were actually two lecturers, Dr. Edda Tille-Hankamer and Dr. Karl
Menne. After Tille-Hankamer left Cologne for a position at Wellesley in the mid-1920s, and in
an effort to increase his own standing, Menne, along with his friends—the lawyer Franz
Schönberg and Robert Paul Oszwald, who worked for the Prussian archive in Potsdam—agitated
for the creation of an institute similar to the Holland Institute at Frankfurt. The result was the
Deutsch-Niederländische Institut.77 Proposed originally in 1927, it was only opened in 1931
through the financial support of the university, the city of Cologne (the university there was a
public university governed, in part, by the city), and the Dutch government. According to the
original founders, the purpose of the institute was to be overtly political. As Schönberg put it to
the Rector of the University of Cologne in 1927:
As a North Sea-Baltic state, it [Prussia] is called upon to seek the state unification of the entire Germanic
cultural area encircled by the Germanic Mediterranean [the North and Baltic Seas] under the leadership of
mainland Germany. Of all the continental Germanics, only the Dutch have developed their own written
language deviating from the common German written language and have thereby separated themselves
from the rest of Germandom. Today it is idle to bemoan this fact. It must be accepted as fact. The Dutch, of
all Germanic peoples most closely related to and direct neighbors to the Germans, represent the bridge
leading from Germandom to the Germanic nation. If Prussia, if Germany wants to politically unite the
Germanic cultural sphere under its leadership, then the approach to and alignment of the Dutch nation must
begin.78

Because of opposition on the part of the Dutch government, the original desire to include
a research focus on the Flemish portions of Belgium was dropped from the program, while
opposition from anti-völkisch participants in the venture, not the least of whom was the then
Mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, an explicitly völkisch orientation was also avoided.

Marta Baerlecken and Ulrich Tiedau, “Das Deutsch-Niederländische Forschungsinstitut an der Universität Köln
1931–1945 und der Aufbau des Faches Niederlandistik in der frühen Bundesrepublik,” in Griff nach dem Westen:
die “Westforschung” der völkisch-nationalen Wissenschaften zum nordwesteuropäischen Raum (1919-1960)
(Münster: Waxmann, 2003), 855–56.
77
Ibid., 856–57.
78
Quoted in ibid., 857–58.
76

77
Nonetheless, from the very beginning of the institute, two groups of scholars coalesced there,
one of which was led by Menne and disseminated an ardently völkisch-oriented research
program.79 Menne came down with an illness in the mid-1930s and passed away in 1936. He
was replaced by Dr. Franz Petri. Petri was really the more successful scholar and managed to
assemble around him a larger cohort of students and like-minded thinkers receptive to his
völkisch understanding of Dutch and Belgian history.80
Over the life of the institute, the völkisch tendencies of the faculty would wax and wane
as scholars joined and left the institute. By 1937, the Nazi government started to exert more
control over the activities of the institute, forcing the chair to resign because of his “non-Aryan”
wife. Although the newly installed director, Dr. Hans Kaufmann, was sympathetic to the nonvölkisch side, the appointment of Petri to the position of managing director more or less balanced
the two groups out. With the appointment of Dr. Walter von Stokar to a professorship in Ancient
History at Cologne, the affairs of the institute became even more closely watched. Stokar, who
was trained as an apothecary, gained his position at Cologne due to his close contacts with SS
functionaries in Berlin.81 His professorship at Cologne was not directly tied to the institute, but
because he himself was interested in the Netherlands, he involved himself with the activities of
the institute, much to the chagrin of the non-völkisch group of scholars resident there.82
With the outbreak of the war in Poland, the institute briefly closed when its rooms were
turned into a hospital for wounded soldiers. By the time that the institute reopened, the focus was
placed on preparing appropriate experts for their future roles as occupiers in the Low Countries,
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even though the invasion had not yet taken place. Several months later, when the Germans did
invade the Low Countries, the largest portion of the völkisch group were installed in Belgium as
occupiers. Petri, for example, was responsible for university education and cultural nazification
in occupied Belgium under the military government that was formed there. Back in Cologne, Dr.
von Stokar was tasked with leading the institute, until he too was sent to the Netherlands for
occupation work, where he worked in Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat.83
Although the institute at Cologne was the only specifically academic organization that
focused exclusively on Netherlandistic, it was part of a much wider network of scholars and
independent researchers who focused on the Western borderlands of Germany, subsumed under
the title Westforschung. The Westforschung did not focus exclusively on the Netherlands, nor
was it limited to particular research methods. Rather, it was entirely interdisciplinary and
evolved in the early 1920s at various German universities, especially at Bonn and Cologne, when
scholars there began to collaborate with each other and their colleagues in other countries with
the help of significant support given by the Weimar and later Nazi governments.84 Scholars
associated with the Westforschung as a whole spanned the political and ideological landscape,
but significant numbers aligned themselves with the völkisch wing of German politics.85
So for example, Dr. Eduard Schulte, an archivist at the City Archive in Münster,
researched the relationship between the Germanic nations of Sweden, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland and their relationship to the Holy Roman Empire through a specifically völkisch
lens, specifically as they related to the 1648 Peace of Münster that, among other things, marked
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legal recognition of Dutch independence.86 At the same time, the historian and archivist Robert
Paul Oszwald published his Deutsch-Niederländische Symphonie, which focused on the close
cultural and linguistic ties of between Germans, the Dutch, and especially the Flemish as groups
of a larger Germanic peoples.87 Alternatively, some scholars started out with more völkisch
beliefs, but through their research came to questions these understandings of Western European
peoples. Such was the case for Josef Schmithüsen, whose studies of the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg eventually caused him to distance himself from his original belief regarding
Luxembourg’s place within the larger German nation, although not enough to argue against its
incorporation into the Reich during the Second World War.88
Conclusion
When the Nazis came to power, they stepped into a world in which the German
nationalist and völkisch right, supported in many cases by German academics, already saw much
of Western Germany’s neighboring peoples as “Lower German” rather than independent
nationalities. It is, therefore, little surprise that the Nazis kept moving in the very same direction.
Hitler made his plans clear to his chief architect, Albert Speer shortly before the 1937 Party
Congress: “We will create a great empire. All the Germanic peoples will be included in it. It will
begin in Norway and extend to northern Italy.”89 Expansion started, first, with the annexation of
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Austria in 1938 and the annexation of the Czech portions of Czechoslovakia the following year.
On April 9, 1940, Hitler remarked to his subordinates, “Just as the German Empire emerged in
1866, so will the Greater Germanic Reich emerge from the present day.”90 The invasions of
Denmark and Norway began that very morning, and after their respective defeats, the Nazis
turned on the Low Countries and France in May. In each case, the decision to attack their
“Germanic” neighbors was made for military strategic reasons. Norway was vital to the security
of Swedish iron ore shipments, while Denmark protected the Baltic Sea and was a stepping stone
to the rest of Scandinavia. The Netherlands was invaded preemptively, as the Germans expected
the British would use Dutch airfields against industrial targets in the Ruhr, while Belgium was
the main route into the heart of the primary enemy of the May campaign, France.
Despite the military strategic impetus behind the invasions of the four countries,
however, the Nazis very much planned to incorporate them into a Germanic Reich. In describing
the sacrifice these populations would have to make, Hitler directly compared their fate to the fate
of the formerly independent German states that made up the Kaiserreich and to the fate of the
recently annexed Austria:
I understand that it may be hard for a young Dutchman or a young Norwegian to find himself called upon
to form a common unit, within the framework of the Reich, together with men of other Germanic
connections. But what is asked of them is no harder than what … was asked of the countries that have
formed the Second Reich, and to what we recently asked of the Austrians... When speaking to the
Germanics of the northwest and north, one must always make it plain that what we're building is the
Germanic Reich, or simply the Reich, with Germany constituting merely its most powerful source of
strength, as much from the ideological as from the military point of view. 91

Himmler’s goal of creating an empire made up of the Germanic peoples of Europe was similarly
expressed, albeit in a direr fashion, several years prior in a speech to SS officers: “I really intend
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to gather Germanic blood in the whole world, to rob and to steal. … What lies ahead for
Germany is either the Greater Germanic empire, or oblivion.”92 During the occupation, SeyssInquart put it slightly differently, but still effectively the same:
The German national state idea found its fulfillment in 1938 in Greater Germany. Self-evidently Greater
Germany is for natural reasons the core of the Germanic Empire, [but] this empire is not a mere
enhancement of the Greater German Reich, but it is a [new] order that is designed for the sake of the entire
race and [which] must be borne by the entire race.93

Had he lived a century prior, Seyss-Inquart very well may have described the Greater German
Reich just as Riehl had done, as a “new federation.”
In this chapter, I have argued that the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands had a
long pre-history in German thought. Since at least the Napoleonic period, German nationalist
agitators have argued for the incorporation of the Netherlands into a German state. While the
specific focuses of German thinkers and their reasoning behind their desires for an intimate
relationship between the Dutch and German peoples often varied, these thinkers, especially those
who espoused völkisch beliefs, nonetheless represent the foundations upon which the Nazi
occupiers of the Netherlands would build during the Second World War.
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Chapter 3 - Dutch Fascists, National Socialists, and their Educational Policies
It is not our intention to break down the good that education in our country undoubtedly contains. However, it is
necessary to carry out a radical revision, because the educational system in its honorable form is flawed with very
large defects. - Anton Adriaan Mussert, 19381
To this end, [students] must be educated in a spirit whereby the Dutch element is accentuated with all proper
emphasis, but which does not obscure, the relationship with other peoples, in particular the German people. - Jan
van Dam, December 1, 19402

During the interwar period, several thinkers and agitators assembled around themselves
like-minded individuals and formed the first fascist and national socialist oriented political
parties in the Netherlands. Although there were several native, Dutch antecedents to these
movements, by and large, the bulk of the ideologies espoused by these nascent fascist and
national socialist groups came from abroad, especially Italy and Germany, for it was in those
countries that much more organized and powerful interests had coalesced into large mass
movements that had, whether in the early 1920s or the early 1930s, actually succeeded in
attaining power and thus became models for emulation. Each of these Dutch groups combined, to
a greater or lesser extent, elements from the Dutch (and Belgian) past with elements from their
Italian and German models to create broadly similar political platforms in which ideological
content differed more in degree of emphasis than in content. The relation of the Netherlands to
Germany was one such area in which the various national socialist parties in the Netherlands
differed in emphasis. Indeed, all Dutch Nazi parties agreed that the future of the Netherlands was
bound up with that of Germany in some way, but the nature of that future relationship differed
according to each party.
Most Dutch Nazi parties, including the largest and most influential, the NationaalSocialistische Beweging in Nederland (NSB), saw the future of the Dutch nation in the form of a
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Greater Netherlands, that would encompass Dutch speaking peoples and their descendants
around the globe, and that would work in concert with Germany as an equal partner in the new
European order. Significant minorities, however, supported a more intimate relationship with
Germany. This was especially true of a loosely organized group of Dutch völkisch thinkers and
intellectuals who were, while not necessarily members of one of the organized Dutch Nazi
parties, nonetheless supporters of many of the larger cultural and political goals of German-style
National Socialism.
In the education realm, by far the most important of these more independent thinkers was
the Dutch, völkisch-oriented University of Amsterdam professor Jan van Dam. After the
Germans established their hegemony in the Netherlands in spring and summer 1940 and began
their project of remaking Dutch society along more Germanic lines, Seyss-Inquart appointed van
Dam to lead the newly created Department of Education, Science, Cultural Administration. In
this role, van Dam would exercise the single greatest influence of any Netherlander on education
during the German occupation. Although van Dam ultimately enjoyed the support of both the
German occupation administration and several influential Dutch, völkisch thinkers, his
conceptions of educational reform were strictly at odds with those of the NSB.
The focus of this chapter is two-fold. First it traces the history and trajectory of the
smaller national socialist groups in the Netherlands, beginning with their precursor groups and
working toward the establishment and fortunes the NSB, which would, after the Germans
established their control, become the only legal political party in the occupied Netherlands. But
the success that the NSB experienced prior to the outbreak of war, as well as the model that
German Nazism offered it in the 1930s, brought change and instability to the party. The
established parties closed ranks against it and rival factions vied for supremacy from within the
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NSB itself. On one side was the larger wing of the party that supported the Greater Netherlands
ideology led by the party’s founder Anton Adriaan Mussert, while, on the other, was an
increasingly influential völkisch bloc that was much more closely aligned with the German
occupiers, and especially with the SS faction thereof.
The second focus of this chapter is on the educational policies of the NSB and of Jan van
Dam. Consistent with its overtly nationalist message and desire for a measure of Dutch
independence from the German Reich, the NSB program called for a specific mode of education
known as the Three Pillars system that factored in the unique nature of Dutch history.
Alternatively, van Dam favored a more unified educational apparatus that was much more in line
with the type of education preferred by the German occupiers. Although their policies shared
broad outlines, I argue that given the history of education in the Netherlands, especially the
School Struggle of the nineteenth century, the educational “reforms” proposed by van Dam were
almost certain to fail in the face of stiff opposition on the part of the Dutch populace. At the
same time, the educational designs of the NSB, while also very radical in nature, were more in
line with the peculiar nature of Dutch society. The German occupiers would, however, favor van
Dam’s vision for the future of Dutch education, putting their efforts at a significant handicap
from the outset.
Native Dutch Fascist and National Socialist Movements during the Inter-War Period
Extreme ideologies gained a foothold in many European countries during the inter-war
period. In the midst of a Russian defeat during the Great War, communist revolutionaries
overthrew the Russian provisional government, instituted a dictatorship of the proletariat, and
established the world’s first socialist state. Germany, Hungary, and Italy all saw similar, albeit
far less successful, communist uprisings after the war ended, while uncertainty and fear over the
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perceived threat of a future communist uprising could be found in all nations across the
continent. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Communist party, the precursor of which had split from
the Social-Democratic Workers’ Party3 in 1909 partly over issues of educational reform, never
managed to gain a significant foothold among the electorate and was, for all intents and
purposes, ignored by the established parties.4 The threat of communism was distant and the local
working-class population appeared to have little interest in communist politics.5
Anti-democratic movements could also be found on the extreme right wing of European
politics. In 1922, fascist revolutionaries attained power in Italy under Mussolini. In 1933, the
Nazis attained power in Germany, while a number of reactionary, authoritarian regimes
established themselves in various countries in Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe. The
Netherlands was not immune to this trend, but unlike many of their neighbors, the Dutch people
never gravitated towards these extreme ideologies in large numbers. To be certain, the
Netherlands did have its share of anti-democratic activists, especially following the expansion of
the vote to all adults in the second decade of the twentieth century. There could also be found in
the Netherlands agitators who experienced the general malaise surrounding the societal and
cultural changes that became prominent in fin-de-siècle Europe.6 While these early fascist
parties were certainly reacting to events in the Netherlands, it was, first to Mussolini’s National
Fascist Party, and then later to the German Nazi Party, that early Dutch fascists looked for

3

The forerunner of today’s Partij van de Arbeid, the Dutch Labor Party.
Kossmann, The Low Countries, 512–513, 621. The 1909 split actually created the Dutch Social Democratic Party,
which renamed itself in November 1918 as the Communist Party Holland. The Communist Party Holland changed
its name again to the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) in 1935.
5
The Communist Party never managed to get above four seats in the Dutch Second Chamber and at its height, had
about eleven thousand members in the country. This is compared with the Social-Democratic Workers’ Party which
averaged ten seats in elections to the second chamber before universal suffrage was introduced and twenty-two seats
after universal suffrage was introduced. SDAP membership, when its related organizations are included, ranged as
high as five hundred, fifty thousand. Ibid., 607, 621.
6
De Jonge, Het nationaal-socialisme in Nederland, 9–15.
4

86
inspiration. But to the extent that fascism and National Socialism were native movements in
Italy and Germany, respectively, fascism as a distinct political philosophy in the Netherlands
must be seen, primarily, as a foreign import.7
Another aspect of German National Socialism was also, mostly, a foreign import into the
Netherlands—biological racism. Much like Heine purportedly claimed of all things Dutch,
scientific racism came late to the Netherlands and was not as quickly adsorbed by the academic
community in the Netherlands as it was in other European countries and the United States. To be
certain, eugenics did gain some traction in the Netherlands among a small subset of academics,
but it was never seriously considered as governmental policy. Moreover, even among researchers
and intellectuals, the eugenics movement, to the extent that it existed in the Netherlands, focused
more on alcoholism and other hereditary conditions, not racial factors. Nor was there a large
following for the idea of a greater Germanic community as was more common in Germany
during the first part of the twentieth century. There were some proponents, such as the folklorist
Dirk Jan van der Ven and Jan de Vries, professor of Old Germanic Languages at Leiden
University, but they and their supporters were a very small minority, even among conservative,
far-right, and fascist oriented individuals in the Netherlands. Much like fascism, the racist,
völkisch ideology so prominent in Germany over the previous century, was primarily a foreign
import in the Netherlands.8
Historian A. A. De Jonge, in his history of National Socialism in the Netherlands, points
to four groups that, while not proto-fascist themselves, did hold some views that would later be
championed by Dutch fascists, and to that extent, could be seen as a native precursor to the
movements of the 1920s and 1930s. The first of these groups were the more conservative
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elements of the classical liberal bloc, personified by J. H. Valckenier Kips. Valckenier Kips was
an editor of a provincial newspaper in Utrecht and professor at the Technical University there,
where he was able to spread his ideas among his engineering students. These conservative
liberals personified by Valckenier Kips feared the growing influence of socialism toward the end
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. For this reason, they opposed the
further expansion of the vote, which they believed would further increase the pace of creation of
the nascent welfare state. As his politics evolved over the first decades of the twentieth century,
Valckenier Kips argued for a removal of the liberal, democratic state and a return to governance
by the monarch, who would appoint the government without consulting the Estates-General, as
in the days of old. These appointed ministers could then work from outside of the party apparatus
and on behalf of the entire people, thus returning the legislature to nothing more than an “organ,
through which the government keeps in touch with the people.”9 Like many conservative
liberals who became disaffected by parliamentary democracy and the increasing influence of the
Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, Valckenier Kips eventually embraced fascism completely,
joining first the NSB and then the Zwaarte Front in the 1930s.10
A second group could be found surrounding the Leiden University Professor of
Philosophy G. J. P. J. Bolland, who would later be described as the forefather of Dutch fascism.
Bolland’s political views were very complex. His philosophy was Hegelian at its base, and he
supported a form of state absolutism in which the individual could only be fulfilled through the
state. Further Bolland was a convinced anti-Semite and opponent of Free Masonry. Had he
continued living, he himself might have played a more significant role in the fascist movements
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of the 1920s, but his 1922 death meant that only his students could carry on his ideals.11 It also
bears noting that Bolland was part of a much larger strain of Dutch culture that had always
looked to Germany for new ideas in various aspects of life, but especially in politics and
philosophy. Whether liberal, radical, anti-revolutionary, or confessional, political operatives in
the Netherlands often found inspiration in their neighbors to the east. The cultural dynamic
between German-speaking Central Europe (and later the German Empire) and the Netherlands
was similar in nature to, although not as strong as, the cultural relationship between France and
Belgium. Regardless of the cultural influence that Germany, its thinkers, and its politicians have
had upon the Netherlands, however, the cultural dependence of the Netherlands upon Germany
should not be overstated, for while Dutch thinkers might have initially looked to Germany for
inspiration, German culture and politics never dominated the Netherlands in the way that French
culture and politics, and even the French language, dominated Belgium.12
The third group de Jonge sees as a forerunner to Dutch fascism was a group of more-orless bohemian, highly chauvinistic characters surrounding Erich Wichmann. Wichmann’s
political philosophy was overly concerned with the loss of the “heroic” in Dutch society, and as
such, he was against anything that he saw as contrary to the “heroic,” including universal
suffrage and gender equality. He founded the anti-democratic Rapaillepartij13 in 1921 before
moving to Italy in 1922 to witness the first fascist “age of heroes” first hand. After returning in
1924, Wichmann again assembled around himself a group of like-minded activists, and his group
even managed to win some small local elections in Amsterdam in the mid-1920s, but the group
fizzled when its founder passed away on New Year’s Day, 1929.14
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The final branch on the family tree of Dutch fascism came in the form of certain elements
within a larger Catholic youth movement. The Dutch Catholic youth movement of the early
twentieth century had at its core a generational conflict. In short, the majority of adult, Catholic
Netherlanders, who had grown up during the School Struggle and only experienced full
emancipation in 1918, were, in the minds of the younger generation, still living in the society of
the past, a society that was foreign to these young people who had come of age only in the very
late 1910s or 1920s. The chief unifying element of these youth was their opposition to the
politics of compromise that had been so essential to their parents’ generation in preference for an
integration of Catholic principles into the state and society of the Netherlands. But the political
goals of the Catholic youth movement as a whole were also diverse, and only some Catholic
youth supported anti-democratic politics, indeed other elements within the Catholic youth
movement were more concerned with the hierarchical, authoritarian organization of the Church
itself. Many of the anti-democratic youth had similar intellectual backgrounds to the bohemians
surrounding figures like Wichmann, and their anti-democratic sentiments often stemmed from
similar ideas, but their prominence within the Catholic youth movement specifically, gives them
a slightly different flair from the bohemian chauvinists of the third group. Moreover, were it not
for the significant numbers of individuals who would later make their way to overtly fascist
parties, this final group would not so easily be characterized as a forerunner to fascism.15
In addition to these four precursor groups, there was a current within nineteenth century
Low Country Catholic culture that advocated for closer cultural ties among Dutch language
speakers. Chief among such individuals is the Catholic novelist and poet Joseph Alberdingk
Thijm. Born in Amsterdam in 1820, Thijm came of age during the 1830s, a decade that began
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with the Belgian revolution and ended with Dutch recognition of Belgian independence. When
he founded the journal De Dietsche Warande16 in 1855, the events of the revolutionary decade
and their roots in religious prejudice, would have still been well within living memory. In his
journal, he attempted to bridge the divide between Catholic Flemish and Protestant Dutch
authors, artists, and other important members of the cultural elite.17 Although the impetus behind
these efforts lay more in combating the social exclusion faced by Catholic Flemish speakers from
their Protestant Dutch counterparts in the middle of the nineteenth century, not in racialist ideas
regarding an inherent connection between the two peoples, the shift from conceiving of the
people in the Low Countries as being united by language, rather than divided by confession,
should not be overlooked.18 By the early twentieth century, notions of an inherent connection
between Flemish Belgians and their Dutch counterparts had gained somewhat more ground. One
of the leading figures in this regard was a Dutch born, Flemish nationalist, Protestant pastor
named Jan Derk Domela Nieuwenhuis Nyegaard. Nyegaard predicted, already in 1916, that a
new William of Orange would come forth to unite the Dutch speaking peoples in a larger
Germanic brotherhood. As Paul Arblaster notes, however, “the Führer turned out to not to be
quite what he had in mind, and during the Second World War, he was imprisoned for insulting
officers of the German Army.”19
After Mussolini’s “March on Rome” small, fascist groups sprang up throughout the
Netherlands, but only one gained any sort of prominence on the national stage. The first of these
early fascist groups was the Verbond van Actualisten,20 founded in 1923 by students of Bolland’s
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at Leiden University and supported by business magnate Alfred Haighton. It petered out in just
over four years. Haighton and one of the co-founders of the League, Hugues Alexandre Sinclair
de Rochemont, went on to form the Vereeniging De Bezem21 in 1928, another fascist party that
saw about as much success as the League of Actualists—that is to say very little. In 1932 Jan
Baars founded the Algemene Fascisten Bond,22 and he was followed by Arnold Meyer, who
founded the Zwart Front23—unique only in that it focused its energies specifically in Catholic
circles—in 1934, as a sort of successor organization to the General Fascist Union after the latter
disbanded earlier that same year.24 These earlier fascist parties had varied membership rolls,
including students, workers, managers, and intellectuals. Their politics were also diverse, with
agreement limited only to the most basic fascist tenets, such as the need for immediate and
decisive action, fear of decadence and modernity, anti-democratic and anti-communist agitation,
racism, the need for national unity, and the need for a great leader to reverse the downward spiral
the nation found itself in.25 Their movements, and the intellectuals who led them, tended to focus
more on utopian fantasies, those “wishes, dreams, and idea that were the fascist ideology,” rather
than the more concrete political issues of the day.26 And as a result, they remained on the fringes
of Dutch politics, with vote totals of the most successful such party, the Jan Baars’s General
Fascist Union, ranging only up to about seventeen thousand votes nationwide in the 1933
election.27
The only other minor fascist party of note in the pre-war Netherlands was the National
Socialist Dutch Workers Party (NSNAP), which was founded in December 1931 by Adalbert
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Smit. In contrast to the NSB, which mostly copied the form of the NSDAP but had its own
distinct ideology, the NSNAP was conceived of as a direct copy of the German Nazi Party. The
small party was defined primarily by its extremely pro-German position, but its unity was short
lived. Within the first six months of the party’s existence, it had split into three factions. The
“original” faction, led by Smit (NSNAP-Smit), was eventually fused with Haighton’s De Bezem
group in 1933 and was distinguishable from the other NSNAP groups through its strong support
of Greater Netherlandic ideology.28 The second group, originally led by Albert de Joode,29 was
taken over in short order by former Dutch army major C. J. A. Kruyt. The NSNAP-Kruyt, as the
group is known to historians, was little more than a club for extreme anti-Semites, even by Nazi
standards. Although all of the NSNAP groups espoused antisemitism to one degree or another,
the antisemitism of the NSNAP-Kruyt was especially prominent, and it ran so deep that the
organization was openly hostile even to Italian fascism, which it decried as an outgrowth of a
Jewish and Masonic conspiracy in its party newspaper De Nederlandsche Nationaal-Socialist.30
The final NSNAP group was the splinter party formed by Dr. E. H. Ridder van Rappard
(NSNAP-van Rappard). Of the three it is most notable because it rejected the idea of a Greater
Netherlands and even Dutch independence in favor of direct incorporation of the Netherlands
and Flanders into the Greater German Reich, using argumentation that sounded strikingly similar
to Hitler’s own private pronouncements regarding the Netherlands and other Germanic nations in
Northwest Europe. In his Table Talks on April 5, 1942, Hitler noted that:
Mussert expressed himself in a rather curious fashion, in my presence … That's why I asked him whether
he supposed it was in sheer lightness of heart that I divided my Austrian homeland into several Gaue, in
order to remove it from separatist tendencies and incorporate it more easily in the Germanic Reich. Has not
Austria, too, her own history—secular five times over—a history that truly is not devoid of highlights?
Obviously, in discussing these problems one must remain very careful, when confronted by Dutch and
Norwegians. One must never forget that in 1871 Bavaria would never have agreed to become part of
28
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Prussia. Bismarck persuaded her only to agree to become part of a great association linked by kinship—that
is to say, Germany. Nor did I, in 1938, tell the Austrians that I wanted to incorporate them in Germany, but
I insisted on the fact that Germany and Austria ought to unite to form the Greater German Reich. Similarly,
when speaking to the Germanics of the North-west and North, one must always make it plain that what
we're building is the Germanic Reich. 31

Eight years prior, in a 1934 pamphlet, van Rappard argued in a very similar manner that:
The German-Germanic people of our day is formed from tribes, a portion of which, after a long separation,
reunified in 1871 in the Second German Reich. Around this middle point and nucleus, there are a number
of other tribes, including the Netherlands and Flanders, which through location, blood, and the shared
interests of the people are fused to the nucleus, and are predestined for the German Socialism of the Third
Reich.32

Van Rappard does not appear, however, to have made the distinction that Hitler and the German
occupiers would later make between the Greater German Reich and a Greater Germanic Reich.
For van Rappard, the goal was not just incorporation of the Netherlands into the Third Reich,
rather, he argued not only that the Netherlands should be reincorporated into Germany—after all,
centuries prior the Low Countries had been a part of the Holy Roman Empire—but also that the
Dutch were really just like Swabians or Bavarians, that is, essentially German.33 This stance was
closest in outlook to that of the SS faction of the German occupation and made the NSNAP-van
Rappard unique among the various NSNAP groups as well as the broader mass of Dutch fascist
parties.34 But like the other two National Socialist Dutch Workers Parties, the NSNAP-van
Rappard was never popular among the Dutch public and found the majority of its members not in
the Netherlands, but across the border in Germany.35
Unlike the NSNAP-van Rappard, the rest of the various fascist and national socialist
parties of any significance all were supporters of the Greater Netherlandic ideology, often called
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Diets—an academic term referring to the Middle Dutch language but appropriated by these Nazi
movements as a propaganda tool emphasizing the connectedness between the two peoples. The
heart of the Diets ideology was that Dutch speaking peoples across the globe should be
assembled into a single imperial system ruled from The Hague. This would include not just the
Netherlands proper, but Flemish portions of Belgium, Luxembourg, and all former and still
extant Dutch colonies. Diets thinkers saw a future world order in which the Netherlands would
sit as an equal at the table of world powers and at which Hitler’s Germany would be, at most, a
primus inter pares. It is important to note that none of these ideologies as articulated by the
Dutch Nazi splinter parties would have been acceptable to the German occupiers, above all to the
SS faction of the occupation regime. The SS strove for the eventual creation of a Greater
Germanic Reich made up of the various Germanic peoples of Northwest Europe, not the
incorporation of the Netherlands into Germany, and certainly not for the creation of a larger,
more powerful Dutch state with more relative equality to Germany.
The distinction between the creation of a Greater Germanic Reich and incorporation of
the Netherlands into Germany proper may seem minute but the difference in terms of ideology
was profound.36 Incorporation of the Netherlands into Germany would not serve the purpose of
winning over the population to the Germanic ideal. If anything, such heavy handed geopolitics
would have aroused suspicion and angst among the Dutch, a point which Hitler himself noted in
his Table Talks.37 Rather, the German occupiers correctly understood that any attempt to
incorporate the Netherlands into the Greater Germanic Reich must be handled delicately, as
evidenced by Seyss-Inquart’s initial mandate to win the hearts and minds of the Dutch people for
National Socialism, what is often described as “self-Nazification.” Given that most Dutch Nazi
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parties remained firmly in the Diets camp and none espoused an ideology that meshed
completely with that of the German occupiers, Seyss-Inquart continued the pre-invasion German
policy of supporting the largest and most influential of these parties, the NSB.38
Founded in the central city of Utrecht in 1931 by Anton Adriaan Mussert and Kees van
Geelkerken, the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Nederland (NSB) would become the most
influential and important native Dutch Nazi movement.39 This was Mussert’s first foray into
fascist politics, although Geelkerken had been active in fascist circles since the 1920s, having
been a member of Sinclair de Rochefort’s De Bezem group, and before that a member of the
Dutch Orange Nationalists, an extremely nationalistic drinking club that recruited from the
garrisons in Utrecht and Amersfoort.40 Mussert, who was by far the more powerful and
important member of the duo, was a well-respected civil servant working for the Department of
Bridges and Waterways who had gained a national prominence in the mid-1920s through his
opposition to the Dutch-Belgian border treaty of 1927.41 During the great unrest of the early
1930s, Mussert parlayed his fame from the treaty opposition movement into a new political party
aligned along fascist lines. Unlike the more ephemeral fascist parties of the 1920s, Mussert’s
movement was well organized and showed the growth to prove it. Already numbering one
thousand members by the end of its first year, the movement grew fiftyfold over the next five
years, growing to over fifty-two thousand members by 1936. In the 1935 provincial elections,
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the movement garnered some eight per cent of the vote, giving it two seats in the upper house of
the Dutch parliament and causing concern among the more established, democratic parties.
Almost certainly, much of this support can be attributed to its propagandistic efforts and
the economic crisis. Mass meetings began first in the “city of the movement” Utrecht, but by
1932, these meetings were being held across the country, attracting many listeners. In 1933, the
party held its first Landdag, or party congress, in Utrecht. It was at this congress that the
marching storm troopers of the party’s Defense Unit first emerged. Earlier that year, the party
also published its first edition of the weekly party newspaper Volk en Vaderland.42 The poor
economy of the Netherlands also likely contributed to support for the NSB. The great depression
wrought havoc upon the Dutch economy, destroying the savings of the middle class and putting
working men and women out onto the street. Just as in Germany, economic crisis proved helpful
for the electoral campaigns of Dutch anti-democratic parties. But unlike in Germany, once the
established, democratic parties saw the growing influence of the NSB, they closed ranks
completely, labeled the NSB a fifth column promoting foreign interests above those of the Dutch
population, and subsequently shut the party out of the political process entirely.43 As a result,
1935 would prove to be a high-water mark for the movement in free and open elections. In the
1937 parliamentary election, the NSB’s vote share was only half of that two years earlier,
placing it at about four per cent and squarely in the same range as the otherwise wholly
uninfluential Communist Party. Around the same time its membership rolls began to decline,
although it would retain a small core of hardened activists numbering about thirty-two thousand
clear through to the German occupation.
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The Mussert Movement was, in many ways, a carbon-copy of the German original.
Mussert founded the party after the success of the German NSDAP in the September 1930
German elections. Its uniforms, symbols, and general organizational structure were copied
almost entirely. Nominally, Mussert was the party’s Leider, although he would never command
the respect within the ranks that Hitler or Mussolini enjoyed in their respective parties. The
party established a Weerafdeling (WA) to mimic the SA and a youth group, the Nationale
Jeugdstorm (NJS) to mimic the Hitler Youth.44 To help spread their message and refine their art,
Mussert and other early leaders of the party traveled to Germany during the early years of the
NSDAP regime to see their inspirational fore-runners firsthand and to collect propaganda and
instructional materials for use in the Netherlands.45 They instituted mass meetings and party
congresses meant to be every bit the spectacle they were in Germany. With each change the
Nazis instituted in Germany, the NSB happily cheered along. First came the destruction of the
Weimar democratic system, then economic and agrarian reforms. Especially popular was the
Reichsarbeitsdienst, a Dutch version of which Mussert hoped to create to spur development
along the Zuiderzee. In the international sphere, the NSB championed Germany’s attempts to
counter French hegemony on the continent and bolstered the Nazis’ status as a bulwark against
Soviet Bolshevism. But the more that the NSB cheered on the successes of Hitler’s Germany,
the more the established parties labeled them foreign lackeys and, thus, the more the NSB
became alienated from the majority of the Dutch populace, leading to their declining share of the
vote after the 1935 elections.
Despite this close organizational association to German National Socialism, however, the
NSB was a distinct political movement with significant philosophical differences from German

44
45

Defense Unit and National Youth Storm, respectively.
Orlow, The Lure of Fascism, 35–39.

98
Nazism. The relative lack of importance placed on the leadership principle is one such
difference. But much more important was the lack of a racialist element in the early days of the
party, a characteristic of the movement that the NSB attempted to promote as evidence of its
independence from the NSDAP. Mussert himself was not an avowed anti-Semite, although he
certainly held racist views of the colonial subjects of the Dutch Empire. He claimed to have
never heard of the so-called “Jewish Question” nor to have read Mein Kampf before he formed
(i.e., copied) the original NSB program in the early 1930s. This is even more clearly shown by
the fact that the NSB admitted Jewish members, and Mussert himself would be instrumental in
saving many of these individuals from deportation to the east later in the war.46 Further major
policy differences between the NSB and the NSDAP included the NSB’s support for the Diets
model of a Greater Netherlandic Empire which the Germans simply could not accept47 and the
NSB’s limited support for the system of verzuiling of the Dutch populace.48 Fascist oriented
parties in general decried the pillars as obstacles to national unity and as emblematic of the
failures of democracy to strengthen the nation. The NSB was no exception in this regard, but its
rejection of the system of pillarization was not so complete, especially as it related to the
influence exercised by the Churches. Mussert and his supporters were not happy with the
increasing pressure the Hitler regime placed upon the Church in Germany and saw no
contradiction between being both an ardent national socialist and devoted Christian, whereas
German Nazis tended to be much more suspicious of Christianity as a possible competitor for the
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souls of the masses. Further, the NSB supported an educational system in which parents could
continue to send their children to confessional schools as had been allowed since the School
Struggle of the early part of the twentieth century. This sort of influence on the part of clerics in
the education of the youth simply could not be allowed in the eyes of German Nazis and went
directly against the grain both of the reforms the Nazis instituted in Germany in the 1930s and
those they would eventually institute in the Netherlands during the occupation.
Much like the occupation regime with which the NSB would collaborate, the Mussert
Movement was not a completely united organ throughout its existence. By the late 1930s, the
movement had split into two main camps, with the defining difference being the projected place
of the Netherlands within the German orbit. Like most Dutch Nazi parties, the NSB was
originally a supporter of the Diets model and a Greater Netherlandic Empire. But in the mid1930s the racist influence of German Nazism began to gain traction among the movement and a
second wing developed around the völkisch Dutch agitator, Meinoud Rost van Tonningen. Rost
would join the NSB in 1936, after he returned from a long stay in Vienna working as the League
of Nation’s representative following the Austrian financial turmoil of 1931. It was in Vienna that
Rost first got involved in politics, originally with the Austrofascist Fatherland Front of Engelbert
Dollfuss and then, from 1934, with Austrian National Socialism.49 Despite his joining the NSB,
Rost felt himself more ideologically at home in one of the smaller, more explicitly racist Nazi
movements, such as the NSNAP-van Rappard. His reasons for joining the NSB were very likely
purely pragmatic; if he were to have any success in politics, the NSB was the only available
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vehicle to get there. The various NSNAP factions were far too unimportant to matter on the
national political scene.
Once he did join, he rose quickly through the party ranks, not least because of his already
close contacts with Austrian Nazis. It was, for example, through Rost’s connections in Vienna
that Mussert was able to get his first meeting with Hitler. The year after he joined, Rost
successfully stood for election to the Second Chamber of the States-General and became one of
only four NSB members of the Dutch Lower House.50 Later the same year, Mussert appointed
him editor of Het Nationale Dagblad,51 a daily NSB oriented newspaper with a wide readership
among movement members and second in importance to the party only to the older, weekly,
party publication Volk en Vaderland.52 In 1939, he founded the Mussertgarde,53 which was to be
a more völkisch oriented counterpart to the Jeugdstorm, but was ultimately unsuccessful as a
separate faction, was disbanded, and its members were mostly subsumed into the Dutch SS,
much to Mussert’s consternation.54
Shortly after the invasion, Rost was tasked by Seyss-Inquart with the liquidation of Dutch
Marxist parties, a task which became moot when all non-fascist political parties were outlawed
by the occupiers in July 1941.55 By September 1940, Rost, who by that point could be fully
considered as Himmler’s Dutch protege, was the third in command of the NSB, behind only
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Mussert and Geelkerken.56 The following spring, Seyss-Inquart appointed him to the position of
Secretary-General in the Department of Finance and to the leadership of the Netherlands Bank,
making him, after Tobie Goedewaagen and Jap Schrieke, only the third NSBer to be appointed to
the chief bureaucratic post in a Dutch ministry.57 In 1942, he founded the Dutch East Company,58
which aimed to settle Dutch farmers in the newly depopulated areas of Eastern Europe
conquered by the Nazi war machine.59 Finally, in 1944, after completing his military training
with the Dutch Waffen-SS unit Landstorm Nederland, he was promoted to the rank of
Untersturmführer in the Waffen-SS. During this entire time, Mussert floundered. He was
singularly unable to push through his own designs, even after the NSB was the only legally
permissible political party, with his single political victory being his appointment by Hitler as
Leider of the Dutch volk in 1942—a meaningless title that offered him no further authority than
that which he already commanded.
It is unclear when, exactly, Mussert began to realize that Rost was leading a fifth column
against him. Musset’s support for Rost in the late-1930s and his post-war admission that he had
not recognized Rost as a Trojan horse clearly evidence his initial ignorance regarding Rost’s
motives. Only at the end of 1944, when defeat was all but certain, did Mussert, who was
undoubtedly thinking of his own future in a post-occupation Netherlands, gain enough of an
upper hand vis-à-vis Rost that he was able to dismiss him from his leadership positions in the
NSB. Despite his ultimate failure to wrestle control of the NSB from Mussert, Rost was
successful in dividing the movement and positioning himself as the party leader most closely
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aligned with the German occupiers, especially with the SS faction of the occupation regime.
When Himmler visited the Netherlands in early June 1940, he met with Seyss-Inquart and Rost,
while Mussert was excluded from the meeting entirely. It was during this meeting that it was
likely decided to appoint Rost as the Commissioner for the Marxist Parties (officially announced
in July 1940), and it was also there that the first discussion regarding the formation of Dutch SS
units and the recruitment of Dutchmen for the Waffen-SS took place.60 Rost then proceeded to
rub Mussert’s absence from the meeting in his face the following day, as indicated in Mussert’s
diary.61 His appointment as Secretary-General of the Department of Finance must be seen as
further evidence of the occupiers’ favor toward the völkisch faction, as would the appointment of
Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, a völkisch NSBer, to the position of Secretary-General of the
Department of Public Enlightenment and Arts, especially given Seyss-Inquart’s general
reluctance to rely on the NSB for personnel.62 A full-fledged split within the movement was
already clear at this early point of the occupation. As Rost wrote to Seyss-Inquart shortly after
the latter’s installation as Reichskommissar, the NSB was made up of two factions: a “bourgeois,
fascist, Christian” faction led by Mussert and a smaller, völkisch, national socialist core.63 This
split mirrored, in many ways, the split within the occupation regime itself between the power
centers surrounding Seyss-Inquart and the NSDAP on the one hand and Rauter and the SS on the
other. Just as the influence of the SS in the Netherlands increased over the course of the
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occupation, the more völkisch wing of the NSB also gained prominence over the life of the party,
and this only changed as defeat became inevitable and the war drew to a close.
Already by the eve of the invasion then, Rost had become a figurehead for a much more
explicitly pro-German, völkisch wing of the NSB. This völkisch wing’s rise in popularity over
the late 1930s within the Mussert Movement as a whole contributed to the growing sense among
the wider Dutch public that the entire movement was made up of little more than German
puppets, thus exacerbating the movement’s already strained public image. The split between the
Diets and völkisch wings of the NSB also helped contribute, at least in part, to the eventual
appointment of Jan van Dam to the position of Secretary-General of the Education Department.
It was the closeness of the NSB to Nazi Germany that the democratic parties had used as a stick
with which to, quite effectively, beat the Mussert Movement since the middle of the 1930s.
While the Diets wing of the party had never proved especially popular among the Dutch public,
the völkisch wing was even less so. Placing such individuals in positions of power carried risks
of public backlash, something the occupation regime was trying to avoid during the early “hearts
and minds” period. Yet it was the völkisch wing whose ideology was most closely aligned with
that of the German occupiers. Under the circumstances, it is no surprise then that the German
occupiers would select a völkisch thinker with no direct connection to the NSB to lead the
education department. Van Dam, it would turn out, was the man for the job, but his vision for
education was not the only vision competing for influence. The NSB and Mussert specifically
also had very concrete ideas about the reform of Dutch education along more national socialist
lines, as the NSB defined them, but which allowed for a certain particularly Dutch twist born out
of the unique history of public education in the Netherlands.
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The NSB’s Plans for Educational Reform
“As the son of a school head,” Anton Mussert would have been very familiar with the
School Struggle of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it was with that history
in mind that he would develop his Three Pillars system for educational reform.64 Dutch fascists
in the inter-war period were confronted with an inherently problematic situation regarding
education. On the one hand all of the fascist groups opposed the system of pillarization. These
fascist movements all saw the pillars as obstacles to national unity and as such, believed they
should be done away with. The NSB was no different in this regard. But at the same time, one
would have to have been incredibly obtuse to introduce an educational reform proposal that
attempted to undo the political compromise surrounding confessional education that had been a
century in the making. Politically inept as he may have been compared to those surrounding
him, Mussert was clearly not so foolish as to believe he could persuade, or force, the religious
segments of Dutch society to give up their hard-fought victories in the education realm. Instead,
he developed an educational policy known as the Three Pillars system, which he outlined in an
article in the party newspaper Volk en Vaderland,65 and published as the expanded pamphlet
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Grondslagen voor het lager- en middelbaar onderwijs in den nationaal-socialistischen staat.66 It
was this system that would be the preferred official policy of the NSB during the occupation. 67
In the forward to the pamphlet, Mussert explains that many falsehoods have been spread
about National Socialism in the Netherlands. Among these were the claims that the NSB stood
for the “degradation of education, [the] elimination of parents and churches from education,
[and] state absolutism.”68 With his pamphlet, Mussert hoped to “arm [his readers] against the
threat” these falsehoods posed to the party and the Dutch state and to inform them of the real
goals of the NSB in the realm of education.69 The problems Mussert saw in the Dutch
educational establishment were multiple. There was too much fragmentation in the education
sector, classes were too large, and teachers, who were paid via perverse, anti-social
compensation systems, were reduced to little more than serfs under the not-always-helpful
patronage of school administrators and religious clerics. Dutch education was too “antinational” and even “a-national”; it was not focused strongly enough on the character building or
physical education of the youth so necessary for creating future citizens. And to make matters
worse, compulsory education ended too early, with students able to leave school as early as
fourteen years old.70 And all of this was the case, despite the immense sums the Dutch
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government—both the central government and the provincial and local governments—disbursed
for education, which amounted to about one hundred, thirty million guilders per year.71 What
was necessary was “a new powerful current, animated by faith in God, love for volk and
Fatherland, respect for labor and a great sense of social justice,” which the NSB, in consultation
with parents and clerics, would institute after their eventual assumption of power.72
The soul of Dutch education, Mussert explained, must be “national in character.”73 By
this, he meant that the greatness of Dutch culture would be emphasized, without whitewashing
the evils the Dutch had committed. This was no blind nationalism, rather, education in a national
sense would promote the greatness of the small volk by the sea, its “great past and great future,”
without ignoring the crimes committed in its name.74 As regarded other cultures, students were
to be taught that those cultures too had a right to exist and that the future the national socialist
state would work toward is one in which all cultures of Europe would collaborate to defend their
unique and collective interests.75 Further, Mussert imagined that his national socialist state
would stay out of religious instruction completely; that was to remain the realm of parents and
church clerics, not the state. However, the state would do what it could to help the Churches in
their missions. The starting principle, Mussert explained, was that “Catholic parents should have
the complete freedom to educate their children in schools with a Catholic atmosphere and

71

Ibid. The Dutch governmental Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek puts total government outlays for education in
1939 at €119 million, or about 3.5% of total government spending. This was a significant increase over previous
decades, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total government spending, with the largest spike coming in
the 1920s, no doubt the result of the full public financing of confessional education. Since 1990, the average outlay
has been about 5.5% of total government expenditures. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, “Government:
Expenditure on Education and Student Grants, Loans since 1900,” Statistics Netherlands, November 16, 2016,
http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLEN&PA=80509eng&D1=0-2,5,8,1112,15,18&D2=0,10,20,30,39,50,60,70,80,90,95,100,105,110,113-115&HD=1704011819&LA=EN&HDR=T&STB=G1.
72
Mussert, Grondslagen, 4.
73
In nationalen zin. Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid., 5.

107
Catholic character, wherein religious instruction is given by people designated by the Catholic
church.”76 The same was to hold for Protestant parents and students. For those parents who did
not wish to send their children to religious schools, a new Volksschool was imagined that would
not give religious instruction at all, although the Christian character of the Dutch people would
still be emphasized.77 In all cases, Mussert maintained that greater emphasis should be given to
character building and physical education. While the focus on those subjects was to be increased
during the regular week, Saturday was set aside entirely for character formation and physical
education, to be promoted by an as yet non-existent organization created specifically for that
purpose.78
Under Mussert’s plan, education and caring for children up to six years of age was the
responsibility of the parents, although the national socialist state would provide optional
kindergartens for children ages three to six so that their mothers could work. From age seven,
children would enter a five-year primary school, which they would complete in their eleventh
year. From this point, the system split students based on their abilities, save for the disabled,
who will have been provided for separately.79 Most students would attend a three-year finishing
school80 where the subjects of reading and writing, mathematics, history of the Fatherland,
geography and the basic sciences would be taught. But the emphasis would be placed upon
physical education and character building.81 As Mussert explained, students at this age
(generally their twelfth through fourteenth years) need lots of physical movement, so subjects
where students sit for long periods should be less emphasized. In their stead should be subjects
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like hand-working for boys and home-crafts for girls. These reforms were essential, Mussert
argues, because those years “are the three most fruitful years for education.”82 After graduating
from the finishing school, these students would enter an apprenticeship for the next four years
before serving labor service and military service in their nineteenth and twentieth years
respectively, only reaching adulthood and full inclusion into the national socialist state during
their twenty-first year.83 The remaining ten to twenty per cent of the student population would
not attend the finishing school, but, rather, were destined for secondary education. The larger
portion would attend a series of three-year schools from their twelfth through eighteenth years,
before performing their labor and military service. The final group, those bound for higher
education, would attend a two year “expanded primary education” school before moving on to a
college preparatory secondary school, which itself came in three variations—the gymnasium, the
lyceum, and the hogere burger school,84 depending on whether the student was likely to follow a
path in the natural sciences or the arts.85 In the pamphlet, Mussert leaves all of these reforms
open to possible changes in the future, noting that only three elements are absolutely critical.
First, allowing children to work before their fifteenth birthday is tantamount to child exploitation
and should be banned, which meant that, second, education should be compulsory through the
end of a child’s fourteenth year. Finally, the nineteenth and twentieth years should be reserved
for civilian and military service, only after successful completion of which could a young person
fully enter Dutch society.86
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The administrative organization of the educational system was to be carried out along
corporatist lines, and it was here that the NSB’s educational plans most starkly contrasted with
those of the later German occupiers. Primary education would be split into three corporations—
one for Catholic education, one for Protestant education, and one for public, secular education—
the members of which would be made up of parents, teachers, and representatives of the state.
The specific inclusion of clerical input into the two religious corporations was promised, but the
actual mechanism was not addressed, only stating that their input speaks for itself. Making
allowances for the pillars of Dutch society by segregating children into schools reserved for each
pillar was both the most significant difference between the NSB’s proposed educational system
and the one element that was certain to make its adoption a non-starter during the occupation. It
is difficult to say whether Mussert’s plan was based on a sincere desire to accommodate the
peculiar differences within Dutch society or a more tactical proposal designed to make his
system more palatable to the average Dutch parent. Either way, as a sort of middle ground
between a completely unified, national educational establishment as favored by the German
occupiers and their more völkisch Dutch collaborators and the more stratified educational system
already in place favored by the majority of Netherlanders, the likelihood of the Three Pillars
system actually being adopted were very slim indeed.
The heads of each corporation, known as Directors-General, were to be nominated by the
corporations themselves, but appointed and dismissed by the state. The schools would be larger,
incorporating kindergartens, primary schools, finishing schools and expanded primary education
schools in a single complex, rather than smaller individual institutions, so as to be able to assign
teachers according to their abilities, rather than to have only a handful of teachers who
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functioned more as generalists than specialists.87 These reforms, Mussert insisted, would
produce the necessary results of ending the fragmentation of education, removing teachers from
positions of serfdom to their administrators, reducing costs, reducing teacher unemployment, and
increasing results, all while guaranteeing the influence of the Churches in their respective
spheres and ensuring the sound education of the youth along lines acceptable to the national
socialist state.88 After spending several pages explaining how he would pay teachers based on
their familial status—married teachers earned more than single teachers, teachers with families
earned more than teachers without, etc.—Mussert concludes his pamphlet by arguing that the
outlines he has drawn for educational reform would restore justice to the Dutch volk, including
all its constituent parts, parents and children, church and state.89
He spends little time discussing secondary education, and almost no time discussing
higher education. The reason for this, he states, is that the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth
years of life are the most important of a child’s development, and it is during those years that all
children receive education, so it is there that he focuses his attention in his short brochure. This
explains the amount of space dedicated to describing his proposed finishing school, designed
explicitly for students of those crucial ages, which Mussert argues would be attended by between
eighty and ninety per cent of that age cohort. To the extent he does discuss secondary education,
he notes only that the broad outlines he has painted regarding primary education—aspects like
the teacher payment schedule—would be duplicated for secondary education.90
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Mussert’s pamphlet would remain the only significant contribution to the question of
education reform on behalf of the NSB before the German invasion. But once Gerrit van Poelje,
the Secretary-General of the Education department at the time of the invasion, was arrested,
Mussert saw his chance for action. He assembled around him the brightest educational minds the
NSB had to offer to determine their strategy. Most immediate was the need to organize NSB
oriented teachers into a coherent bloc in order to flex their muscle. The same month, the NSB
founded the Opvoedersgilde,91 and placed the Belgian-born jurist Robert van Genechten as
head.92 Mussert appears to have believed that if he could nominate the head of such an
association to succeed van Poelje, he was more likely to encounter success with the German
occupiers—a belief what turned out to be wholly incorrect. Van Genechten had no experience in
educational matters but was a competent administrator who took his position seriously. The
growth of the guild reflected this seriousness, growing to about one thousand members by the
end of 1940 and doubling each of the next two years, reaching a height of four thousand four
hundred members by the Spring of 1943. By and large, members were made up of two groups,
committed national socialists and hangers-on hoping for a teaching position or promotion.93
Membership in the guild was not an especially poor path for a young teacher hoping to find a job
either. Vacancies were regularly published in the organization’s publication, and as the
influence of the guild specifically and the NSB more generally grew, primarily through placing
their members in important administrative positions, such as mayors and education inspectors,
their ability to further influence the hiring and firing of teachers grew commensurately. But as
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with so many other aspects of occupation policy, the NSB’s aspirations were always much larger
than their ability or popularity would allow.
In early 1943, van Genechten, who had always been an ardent NSBer and proponent of
the Diets ideology, came into conflict with his German overlords who were increasingly
beholden to the ideals of the SS. He was fired from his day job as Procurer-General in The
Hague in February and promoted elsewhere. After attempting suicide in May, van Genechten
spent the rest of the war in isolation, ostensibly working as a professor at Leiden University, a
job that gave him precious little to do, since the university had been closed by the occupiers in
1940 and would not reopen until after the war ended.94 Although the newly installed head of the
guild, J. Jeswiet, attempted to infuse new life into the movement, it fizzled anyway. Coercion
was attempted next, with some NSB mayors making attendance at Opvoedersgilde events
mandatory for teachers in their towns, while other mayors allowed for the introduction of
Opvoedersgilde propaganda placards in the schools. None of the efforts were successful. The
following year saw a reboot of the guild, with a complete reorganization initiated. It too did not
have the desired effect.95 The fact of the matter was that, by mid-1943, the tide had turned in the
war effort, and the once grudging acceptance of German authority turned to a willful resistance
on the part of much of the Dutch populace. The education sector was not immune to these
forces. The most hardened core of NSB oriented educators remained true to the end, however,
with some following Mussert and other high ranking NSB functionaries over the German border
just ahead of Allied troops.96
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The guild was never an especially strong force among the more than thirty thousand
teachers working in primary education, let alone the entire educational establishment. It did
attempt to influence events, however. It held annual meetings highlighting the work of the guild,
and it recruited for teacher retraining seminars held in Germany at Oldenburg, the completion of
which would allow those teachers a position at a school in Germany, which given the high
unemployment rates for teachers was not an insignificant incentive. It also was mostly
successful at infiltrating the Avlon, the German-created, state-sponsored teachers’ union,
although the value of that infiltration is questionable beyond the monetary gains it afforded the
guild.97 Its most influential work, however, was the publication of a weekly journal Opvoeding
in volkschen geest.98 It was in this journal that the educational ideology of the members was put
on full display.
Given the frequency of editions that were published during the war and the numerous
authors that wrote articles for the journal, it is difficult to assign an overall tenor to the writings.
Most authors believed that the fundamental building blocks of human society were a set of
communities, and it was only through these that the individual could achieve his or her
maximum potential. The smallest and most important community was the family, but a close
second in importance was the volksgemeenschap,99 although who, exactly, constituted the
volksgemeenschap varied depending on which author was writing. Most authors in the journal
argued that only the citizens of the Netherlands themselves were members of a specifically
Dutch volksgemeenschap, while others pushed for a Diets understanding of the idea, while still
others spoke of a Germaansche or Groot-Germaansche100 ethnic community that spanned the
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Germanic nations of Europe. Sometimes there was a mixture of ideas, such as when one author,
who stressed the importance of physical, spiritual, and political education for the formation of
the youth who would one day be the “carriers of the blossoming Diets culture [that is] an
essential part of the Greater Germanic and European development.”101 But whichever
understanding of the volksgemeenschap an individual author supported, all agreed that the
education of the youth must be based squarely on the firm foundation that was the ethnic
community. Further, education of the youth was the primary function of the ethnic community,
for it was only through the youth that the ethnic community could perpetuate itself. For this
reason, “all education must then also be in the first place social development.”102
As might be expected, the writings regarding the volksgemeenschap took on a völkisch
flair. The social formation of the student into a fully-fledged member of the ethnic community
was possible through emphasis on particular subjects in the educational realm. Consistent with
the educational emphases of other fascist movements elsewhere, the writings of Opvoedersgilde
members stress the importance of physical education for the youth. Physical education created
healthy bodies and sound minds. Healthy individuals, together, constituted the living, organic
whole that was the ethnic community, a type of larger social organism.103 Part and parcel of this
idea of an organic whole was the need to protect the soil from which the people had sprung, for it
was only in nature that healthy bodies and sound minds could be formed. A healthy body would
exist in harmony—harmony between body and spirit and harmony between man and nature.
Some of the more explicitly völkisch leaning writers introduced directly the German Nazi
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concept of Blut und Boden into the pages of the magazine, arguing that humanity’s connection to
nature had two aspects. Not only did the people spring from and most completely fulfill
themselves in nature, but that the ethnic community was a natural unit based on the racialistscientific understanding of the period.104
Historical education, too, was supposed to help the student feel part of the larger organic
whole that was the ethnic community. Rather than focusing on facts or names and dates—that
was too intellectual—historical instruction should teach students love of the Fatherland, respect
and honor for one’s ancestors, and love for the volk, which is really just “a big family, without
partitions of confession and class.” Or, when more honestly put, the NSB’s vision of history was
one in which “we pick out the facts that are best suited to serve in the development of a national
and social youth with a firm character.”105 Much like historical education, political instruction
was necessary to “cultivate a specific mentality” not of critical thinkers, but of a strong youth, in
both the physical and spiritual sense, for politics “forms the basis and the synthesis, of the entire
public life, which our boys will also one day have to face.”106
Perhaps most exciting to the journal’s authors was the subject of heemkunde.107 The idea
of heemkunde was not new in the Netherlands, it had been a particular wish of educational
reformers prior to the outbreak of the war as well, dating back to the late-nineteenth century as a
school subject (Heimatkunde) in Germany, and to the political, völkisch thought of Riehl at midcentury.108 In the Netherlands, the subject was valued for its integrative nature, and like in
Germany, was not solely supported by völkisch or racist elements.109 A field trip to a local
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agricultural site, for example, would offer teachers the opportunity to instruct students on the
local flora and fauna, farming, local history, basic principles of economics, and geography, all
while taking part in physical activity. In the eyes of many pre-occupation reformers, such an
integrative school subject was superior in form, if not content, to the more traditional lesson
hours in individual subjects while sitting behind a desk in the classroom. The authors of
Opvoeding in volkschen geest saw in heemkunde the same methodological advantages, but added
to them an ideological element that was, for all intents and purposes, lifted from German
völkisch thinkers and their fore-bearers dating back to Wilhelm Riehl. Heemkunde was able to
fuse various subjects into an organic whole, much as the individual was part of the organic ethnic
community. In this way, all of the elements of the NSB’s educational ideology, such as it was,
could be inculcated among the students all at once, in a more natural setting.110
Taken together, these major strains of education would produce total education. This
total education was meant to foster a greater appreciation for the volksgemeenschap in all of its
aspects, with all elements of the teaching program working together to produce a sum greater
than the combination of its parts.
Everything had to do with everything else … Harmony of body and soul, of blood and soil, of individuals
and the volk, of leader and follower, of ancestry and progeny, of intellect and emotion, of nature and
culture. Everything that was different threatened to disturb the beautiful, pure harmony; thus, threatening
the volksgemeenschap itself.111

The articles found within the pages of Opvoeding in volkschen geest, as a whole, betray a
lack of significant theoretical or practical educational expertise on the part of the authors. Those
ideas that could be found in the journal were almost wholly lifted from elsewhere. Policies
tended to be either generally hoped for educational reforms with a particularly NSB bent, such as
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the introduction of the subject heemkunde, or they tended to be taken from the writings of more
famous German educational theorists—Hans Schemm and Ernst Krieck were both especially
popular.112 Originality was not the strong suit of the guild. As Henk van Setten notes in his
study of the guild, the members of the movement, even the leading members, were often scholars
and educators of the second or third tier.113 The heavyweights of the Dutch academy were, by
and large, absent from the pages of the journal and the membership rolls of the guild.
The NSB and the writers of Opvoeding in volkschen geest owed a significant amount of
their educational theory to German Nazis, which is not entirely surprising given the history of the
organization. The focus on physical education, the “ethnic community,” historical instruction,
the nature of the community as a sort of “social organism,” the individual’s connection to the
environment, national unity, and even the subject of heemkunde were all elements of educational
reform stressed by the Hitler regime across the eastern border. Indeed, many of these elements
could rightly be understood as explicitly German-style reforms with only a local flavor added to
them. At the same time, much of the NSB’s educational ideology was based upon Dutch history
and pedagogical theory, albeit with different emphases compared to their non-Nazi Dutch
colleagues.114 The sole exception here is the Mussert Movement’s focus on the Three Pillars
system of allowing for separate education for the pillars of Dutch society. Unlike the rest of its
educational program, which was either an absurd reworking of Dutch educational theory or a
foreign import, the Three Pillars system showed that Mussert and the NSB were well enough in
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tune with the majority of the Dutch populace to know that re-litigating the School Struggle of the
nineteenth century was political suicide.
The Opvoedersgilde and the NSB more generally were mostly unsuccessful in pushing
through their agenda on the national stage. As will be discussed in later chapters, many of the
reforms championed by the guild and outlined above would be implemented during the
occupation, but not because of the efforts of the NSB or its educators’ guild, rather because those
particular reforms found a broader consensus within the Reichskommissariat, especially in the
persons of Heinrich Schwarz and Jan van Dam. The real weakness of the NSB and the guild is
shown when one sees the many “reforms” that Mussert and the NSB opposed, but that were
implemented anyway.115 While the party and the Opvoedersgilde never managed significantly to
influence education policy on the national level, they did have some success at installing their
members into important positions within the education department.
The first major success the NSB encountered was when, on November 15, 1940, SeyssInquart appointed the NSB secondary school teacher Piet van Rossem as the Gemachtigde van
den Rijkscommissaris voor het Toezicht op de Orde en Rust in de Scholen.116 Van Rossem was
tasked with maintaining peace and order in the schools, which was a euphemism for removing
any anti-German or anti-NSB elements in primary and secondary education. For this purpose, he
was allowed two colleagues, J. J. Valkenburg and P. Dijkema, both of whom were also NSBers.
Although he was working in the education field, administratively, he was placed directly under
Commissioner-General Wimmer, making him not responsible to the Secretary-General of the
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Education Department, at least in theory. The extraordinary inspectors were extremely diligent
in their work, so much so that they quickly engendered much anger and resentment not just
among the teaching corps, but even within the Reichskommissariat itself.117 Van Dam, who was
appointed Secretary-General after van Rossem’s installation quickly decided that he needed to
first contain under his own authority, and then finally to remove van Rossem and replace him
with a less objectionable figure, a coup he was able to accomplish in mid-1941 when van
Rossem was sacked from his position as extraordinary school inspector and replaced with van
Dam’s old friend and colleague, Dr. D. G. Noordijk.118
Shortly after van Rossem was appointed, G. F. Vlekke was appointed on December 1,
1940 to lead the First Main School Inspectorate, which encompassed the provinces of
Gelderland, North Brabant, and Limburg in the east and southeast of the country. This position,
which was within the already existing School Inspectorate did allow for a certain influence on
the part of NSB circles on teachers in those provinces, and, in fact, Vlekke suggested that his
appointment was a sign of the times to come during his first meeting with the local school
inspectors.119 But Vlekke’s appointment would actually mark a stall in the aspirations of the
NSB, for the next major functionary the party managed to install would not come until the
appointment of Noordijk in May 1941. Noordijk was a figure who was both professionally and
personally close with van Dam and as such, his appointment did not really represent an upswing
in the fortunes of the NSB itself.
The appointment of W. Terpstra, Mussert’s brother-in-law and a prominent figure of the
Opvoedersgilde to lead the Sub-Department of Primary Education in summer 1942 did, however,
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represent an upsurge in the NSB’s influence. Especially in the latter half of 1942, Noordijk and
Terpstra managed to install eleven NSB school inspectors, out of a total of only forty-nine across
the country. But that would mark the high-water point of the influence of the NSB within the
education realm. Additional attempts to appoint NSB functionaries to prominent positions such
as school inspectors would be blocked by van Dam, with the support of Schwarz.120
Despite the relative success the NSB enjoyed in the second half of 1942, by and large,
when the interests of the NSB or its members came into conflict with the interests of the German
occupiers or their chosen proxy in the education realm, Jan van Dam, the NSB ended up on the
losing side. Sometimes this was because of power-political reasons, as was the case with van
Rossem. Van Dam refused to allow an extraordinary school inspector to remain outside of his
control and so worked to both bring van Rossem within his control and eventually to have him
sacked.121 But in other cases, the difficulty for the NSB and its members lay in the fact that there
were sometime substantive policy differences between the NSB proper and the goals of the
occupation regime or its local proxies. This was the case in the education field as well. In
contrast to the highly nationalistic education policy of the NSB, which made room for the
peculiarities of Dutch society, van Dam’s reform proposals, which he released before his
appointment, were much closer in spirit to the efforts of the Nazi occupiers directly, even though
van Dam would be loath to admit as much.122 Where the NSB hoped to strengthen the Dutch
nature of the Netherlands, despite his denials, many of the “reforms” van Dam would propose,
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when taken together, appear much more like a policy of educational Germanicization.123 In one
of the first major defeats of the NSB in the education field, the German occupiers chose the
forty-four year old University of Amsterdam Professor of Ancient Germanic Languages and
Literatures Jan van Dam over the NSB’s preferred candidate and Opvoedersgilde leader Robert
van Genechten to lead the newly reformed education department. Part of the reason van Dam
was chosen was explicitly because he was pro-German, but anti-NSB.124
Jan van Dam and the Reform of the Dutch Education System
Jan van Dam was born to a middle-class family in Amsterdam in 1896 and after attending
primary and secondary school, where he was by all accounts an exceptional student, van Dam
moved on to the University of Amsterdam in 1914.125 Originally intending to study natural
philosophy, at the urging of his German professor, Dr. Jan Hendrik Scholte, van Dam chose
instead to study German and Dutch language and literature. After successful completion of his
studies, he stood for and passed the necessary state exams to become a secondary school teacher
and spent the 1919-1920 school year as a German teacher in the towns of Haarlem and
Amsterdam. After only a year, again at the urging of Scholte, van Dam moved to Bonn,
Germany and began his graduate studies there at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität.
After two years in Germany, van Dam returned to Amsterdam, continued his graduate studies at
the university there, and earned his doctorate a year later in 1923. His dissertation, which
focused on medieval German literature in the Rhineland was well received and, for his trouble,
van Dam was appointed as lecturer at the University of Amsterdam.126 By the end of the decade,
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he would be promoted to the position of Professor for Old German Languages and Literatures
and cemented his reputation as one of the most well-respected academics in his field.127
In addition to his academic work at the university, van Dam kept a dizzying pace of
various professional side projects. Because only three Dutch universities of the day even had
modern German language professors, the oversight and examination of teachers-in-training in the
German language fell to those few professors. Additionally, van Dam was a board member of
several Amsterdam secondary schools and a member of the Commission for the Oversight of
Secondary Schools, through which he had some influence on the curriculum at those schools.
He also spent his Saturday afternoons instructing teachers-in-training.128 Finally, van Dam spent
the 1930s assembling around himself a group of like-minded Dutch Germanist thinkers. In part,
he managed this by publishing two periodicals aimed at promoting German language, literature,
and culture. The first, Het Duitsche Boek: tijdschrift voor de vrienden van het Duitsche boek in
Nederland,129 found little success from its inception in 1930 and folded after only a few years.130
Despite the failure, however, van Dam was able to find a new publisher for the magazine, newly
titled De Weegschaal: maandblad voor de vrienden van het Duitsche boek131 in 1934 and would
continue his work promoting German language, literature, and culture for the remainder of the
decade and beyond.132
Up to this point, van Dam had shown little interest in politics and had never joined a
political party.133 Certainly, he was already well known as a Germanophile and he made little
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secret of his fondness for the German people and their culture, but politically he remained aloof.
Scholars debate when exactly van Dam’s politics began to lean more toward the still nascent,
völkisch, nationalist wing of Dutch politics, but by the late 1930s, he was firmly entrenched in
those circles, and when he was recommended to Seyss-Inquart by Snijder for the position of
Secretary-General, Snijder’s recommendation specifically stated his politics were based in
National Socialism, but that he was not connected to the NSB.134 It is possible that his
transformation dates as far back as his time in Bonn, when he was present for some of the worst
years of Weimar’s democratic instability.135 More likely, his transformation was a result of the
circles in which he moved in the 1930s. His periodical Het Duitsche Boek was not overtly
political and contained essays by authors of various political affiliations on various topics,
including topics that would have been impossible in Germany proper, such as extolling the
virtues of the German expatriate writer and noted anti-Nazi activist Thomas Mann. Once that
periodical was reformed as De Weegschaal, however, the number of openly national socialist
authors increased while essays by authors who had been condemned by the Nazis became scarcer
and scarcer, until they stopped appearing entirely. It was around this time in the mid-1930s that
van Dam became the chairman of the Amsterdam branch of the Nederlands-Duitse
Vereeniging,136 an historically and still ostensibly politically neutral organization that had
abandoned almost all pretenses of neutrality in favor of a strongly pro-Nazi attitude after Hitler’s
“seizure of power.” Also, in the late 1930s van Dam joined the Amsterdam branch of the
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Nederlands-Duitse Werkgemeenschap137 as well as the Amsterdam Waagkring,138 both of which
functioned as salons for the intellectual creme of the Dutch, völkisch, but not necessarily NSBoriented crop.139
Van Dam’s meteoric rise was nearly capped off in January 1940 when he was invited to
work as a guest professor for the 1940-1941 school year at Harvard University in the United
States.140 Van Dam appears to have desperately wanted to go to Massachusetts, no doubt because
of the prestige such an appointment would have afforded him, but fate had other plans for the
still young scholar. Having seen the writing on the wall, the Dutch government ordered a
general military mobilization at the end of August 1939 and van Dam, who was a reserve captain
in the artillery, was forced to limit his professional activities in favor of military training. With
their star professor’s academic activities already curtailed because of his military responsibilities
and faced with losing him entirely for a whole year, his superiors at the University of Amsterdam
initially refused his request for leave to work in the United States in April 1940. Although
several important and powerful individuals intervened on his behalf, including the Minister of
Education and the Minister of Defense, the curators of the university were only willing to allow
van Dam a three-month sojourn to America, and then, only beginning in March 1941.
Administrators at Harvard were unenthusiastic about the timing, which would place van Dam’s
arrival directly in the middle of the spring semester, but the point became moot, as so many other
matters did, only weeks later when German tanks crossed the border.141
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By the time of the invasion, then, van Dam was a nationally known and respected
professor of Germanic languages and literatures with a growing international reputation. He was
intimately connected with the secondary school establishment in the Netherlands through his
work in Amsterdam as well as his work in teacher training and he also had important connections
in the academic world both in the Netherlands and in Germany. He was a well-known
Germanophile, but, importantly, was not a member of the NSB, the members of which he mostly
considered brutes and ruffians, and therefore carried little of the stench generally associated with
the Mussert movement.142 His affinity for the cultural aspects of National Socialism—especially
the Nazis’ emphasis on their Germanic past, which was van Dam’s chosen academic
specialty143—had been on public display for several years through his publications, but at the
same time, any affinities he did have for National Socialism as a governing philosophy resulted
from its apparent successes in Germany and Austria in the 1930s, not in any particularly strongly
held political beliefs. As he stated after the war, one
got the impression that the [Hitler] regime had done much good and that the communists would be the
bosses had Hitler not won. Immensely important was the abolition of unemployment. You could also see
this in Austria. My wife and I were there the summer of ‘37—everywhere misery, and in the summer of
‘38, after the Anschluss, everyone had work again.144

Despite his initial mostly only pragmatic embrace of National Socialism as a governing system,
van Dam was in complete agreement with other völkisch, Nazi-oriented thinkers in seeing a great
need for the reform of the Dutch school system along more nationalist lines. In essence, he was
ideologically a supporter of Greater Germanic concept, with a much lesser emphasis placed upon
the racial elements of that ideology. For van Dam, it was culture alone that was most
important.145 As part of his task to coordinate public life in the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart asked
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University of Amsterdam Professor of Archeology and noted völkisch thinker Geerto Snijder to
begin that process sometime in late Summer 1940. For reasons that remain unclear, Snijder was
not keen to take a leading role in the occupation regime, preferring an equally important, yet far
less public role.146 Instead, Snijder asked his colleague and friend Jan van Dam to formulate his
ideas on education reform. Van Dam put his thoughts into writing—in German, no less—on
September 2, 1940 and released his Gedanken und Vorschläge zur Neugestaltung des
niederländischen Unterrichtswesens147 on seven typed pages. He then released a slightly revised
version of the same document entitled Reform des niederländischen Unterrichts148 later that
month.149 The “reforms” that van Dam suggested in these works can be broadly classified into
three categories: strengthening the national character of education, eliminating rampant
intellectualism, and fostering the unity and national self-consciousness of the Dutch populace.
First and foremost among the changes van Dam suggested implementing was a
strengthening of the national character of education.150 To accomplish this, he proposed a much
greater emphasis be placed upon Dutch language instruction. The importance of Dutch language
instruction was somewhat of a hobby horse for van Dam and a cause for which he had agitated
already in the 1930s, a fact that is unsurprising given his position as a language professor.151 He
suggested doubling the hours given for Dutch language instruction; the creation of a Dutch
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language institute that would work on spelling, grammar, and the creation of a Dutch language
dictionary; and the introduction of newer teaching methods.152 In addition to an increased stress
on Dutch language instruction, German language instruction was to receive greater emphasis as
well, not just through an increase in lesson hours dedicated to German language in the higher
grades, but also through the introduction of German language instruction at the lower levels.
This greater emphasis on Dutch and German language instruction was to be combined with a
greater emphasis on certain aspects of historical instruction, the majority of which was to focus
on the Germanic nature of the Netherlands and its connection to other Germanic peoples,
especially Germans and Germany proper.153 Beyond emphasizing the völkisch and Germanic
character of the Netherlands and the Dutch people, historical instruction was to be reduced to the
major outlines of Dutch history. With an eye toward producing better future citizens, van Dam
proposed strengthening physical education and suggested that schooling generally should
emphasize the joy of working and the dangers of negativity and non-conformism. As a final
measure toward this end, van Dam proposed the introduction of the Führerprinzip154 into the
educational establishment.155
To make room in the curriculum for the new emphases he proposed, van Dam suggested
a reduction in scientific instruction. Lesson hours in mathematics, physics, and chemistry were
to be reduced, while bookkeeping was to be eliminated altogether. Instruction in the French
language, which had up to this point enjoyed the status of being the primary second language
taught in Dutch schools, was also to be a further victim of van Dam’s “reforms.”156 But the
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reduction of subjects deemed to be overly intellectual was not limited to the student curriculum.
Recognizing that it would to little good to change the curriculum if the teachers giving lessons
were not on the same page, van Dam also suggested “reforms” of the teacher training system.
Here the emphasis was on turning out teachers of a more “proletarian”—that is less
intellectual—character and this was to be accomplished by emphasizing the same subjects in
teacher training colleges as in primary and secondary schools. Additionally, van Dam proposed
the dismissal of Christian clerical instructors and Jewish instructors. While the latter were not
terribly numerous in the Netherlands, Christian clerics held teaching positions in many Dutch
schools and their elimination from the teaching corps would, van Dam proffered, free up much
needed funds that could be earmarked for increasing the salaries of the newer, proletarian
teachers coming on the job market.157
While these changes would be sure to arouse opposition, it was van Dam’s planned
“reforms” of confessional education that showed how truly out of touch he was with the majority
of Dutch society. Unlike Mussert and the NSB which supported the Three Pillars system, van
Dam argued that all education must be unified under the purview of the state. The separate
system of confessional schools, financed by the state, but with little government oversight into
the curriculum, was, in van Dam’s eyes, anathema to national unity.158 Only through a unified
elementary education, to be accomplished by the replacement of public and confessional primary
schools with a single type of Volksschule, could national unity be strengthened and the
corrupting influence of the churches diminished. To his credit, van Dam recognized that this
final step was too far, too fast, and as such suggested as an initial salvo in that direction, that the
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state reserve the right to appoint and dismiss teachers at confessional schools as well as the
ability to shutter smaller schools incapable of maintaining adequate enrollments. In addition to
incorporating confessional schools under the umbrella of state control, van Dam proposed a
reorganization of secondary education for males between three main branches: gymnasia; a new,
middle school that would incorporate elements from both the gymnasia and hogere burger
school; and a third professionally oriented school designed for future middle managers and
shopkeepers. Women were to be excluded from this third professional school in favor of a
school form that van Dam had not yet determined, but one what would be more oriented towards
the female psyche. Taken together, the two papers could easily be misinterpreted as job
application for the position of a school reformer.159 Van Dam does not appear to have had his
eye on the position of Secretary-General of the education department at this early point. Rather,
in his second piece, he described the position he would prefer, one that was situated directly
under the Reichskommissariat itself, and in which he would work hand in hand with the
Secretary-General, but also one which would give him the final say.160 Regardless of the
position he was to receive, however, what is abundantly clear is that, given the history of
education in the Netherlands, his proposed “reforms,” which in some ways echoed both the
criticisms of and proposals for education made the liberal faction during the School Struggle,
were certain to engender opposition among the Dutch populace and educational establishment.161
Van Dam would not have to wait for very long to start down his proposed path. Already
in late September 1940 van Dam was appointed by the then acting Secretary-General of the
Department of Education, Arts, and Sciences to lead a commission tasked with “cleansing” (i.e.,
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censoring) school texts books of anti-German passages or passages that could be understood as
potentially detrimental to the occupation authority, such as those praising the House of Orange or
those written by Jewish authors.162 Continuing to display what can only be described as an
incredible work ethic, van Dam’s textbook commission managed to work through some nine
thousand works in only two months, striking anti-German passages from many and outright
banning over four hundred from use in school instruction. During the interim period, the
occupation authority decided to split the pre-war Dutch Department of Education, Sciences and
Arts into two separate departments. As van Poelje had been arrested on September 2 for taking
part in celebrations of the Queen’s birthday, both new departments were in need of bureaucratic
leaders.163 The top position in the newly formed education department was initially offered to
Geerto Snijder, but Snijder again declined a public role. For its part, the NSB hoped to install
Robert van Genechten, the Belgian-born head of the Opvoedersgild, in the post, but SeyssInquart and Dr. Heinrich Schwarz, head of the Hauptabteilung Erziehung und Kirchen in
Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat, both hoped to limit, not expand, the influence of the deeply
unpopular movement, and especially not that of the faction led by Mussert.164 Shortly after
Snijder’s decline, D. G. Noordijk, a German teacher, NSB and Opvoedersgilde member, and old
acquaintance of van Dam recommended the latter to Wimmer for the position of SecretaryGeneral. Around the same time, Snijder passed along van Dam’s two writings on school reform
to Schwarz as well as a written recommendation noting that van Dam was much involved with
German-Dutch language and cultural relationships as well has had a great interested in Germanic
cultural history.165 A consensus quickly formed that van Dam was the man for the job.
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There were many reasons that Seyss-Inquart’s choice of van Dam to lead the new
education department was well advised. He was well known in the academic world, with direct
experience in secondary schools, higher education, and teacher training. He was one of the best
known Germanists in the Netherlands and was supported by various important players on the
völkisch wing of Dutch politics. Further, his interest and specialization in Old-German language
and literature fit in very nicely with the Germanic ideal promoted by the SS. He could be
reliably counted on to promote the interests of the German occupiers, but at the same time, he
was not tied to the deeply unpopular NSB and, even more importantly, did not subscribe to the
educational reforms the Mussert Movement hoped to achieve regarding confessional education.
His approach toward “reform,” aimed at eliminating confessional schools entirely, was preferred
by both Seyss-Inquart and the deeply anti-clerical SS-man Schwarz.166 Jan van Dam contained
within himself all of the qualities the Nazi occupiers could have hoped for in a local proxy, and if
there were any reservations on the German part, it was only because van Dam was not radical
enough, although Snijder was able to convince Seyss-Inquart that, at least in this case, discretion
was the better part of valor.167 Van Dam’s suitability for the role was likely reinforced from the
German perspective when, a year after his appointment in September 1941, van Dam joined the
Germanic SS as a patronizing member, making it absolutely clear where on the ideological
spectrum between the NSB and the SS he stood.168 For his part, van Dam was initially unsure
whether he should take the job. After asking several colleagues and friends for advice, van Dam
decided that Germany’s influence in the Netherlands would remain after the war ended, whether
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by German victory or negotiated peace.169 Given this apparent fact, and his own mastery of the
German language, knowledge of German culture and society, and his already expressed interests
in pacifying the unrest in the schools, van Dam saw himself as a perfect middle-man, able to
work with both the Dutch populace and the German occupiers to the mutual benefit of each.170
With van Dam’s willingness assured, and despite Mussert’s disapproval, his appointment to the
position of Secretary-General of the Department of Education, Sciences, and Cultural
Administration was made public on November 25, 1940.171
A week later, on December 1, van Dam delivered the first of several nationally broadcast
radio addresses to the Dutch people. The address, which was also transcribed and published by
newspapers across the country, was partly a formal defense of the coming “reforms” and partly a
directive against agitation.172 He began by attempting to reassure the populace that although the
present era of war and occupation was difficult, all societies face difficulties and that history had
shown that all such difficult times eventually pass. But in contrast to previous periods of
difficulty, the difficulties of the present moment were not of a material nature, but of a “spiritual
nature.”173 This spiritual deficiency was also manifest in the schools, and its symptoms,
“restlessness, confusion, lack of concentration, agitation surrounding rumors, [and] voluntary or
involuntary misinterpretation of policies and regulations, [were] the order of the day.” While
noting that these symptoms must be combated, he assured Dutch parents that education would
“accentuate the Dutch element,” and that the lines between the Dutch and other peoples,
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especially the German people, were not blurred: “We are all Dutch and want to remain so.”174
The Germans, van Dam explained, also wished that educational instruction was given in a
“Dutch sense,” and he assured his listeners that the occupiers would not prevent the
implementation of these “reforms.” Further, he attempted to assuage fears regarding the
censorship of school textbooks, about which misunderstandings and rumors were running
rampant. Denying that any books had been banned, he instead noted that some books had only
been “taken out of circulation” and some of those only because they had not yet been inspected.
Only those books that contained passages that were “unfit for the present situation,” by which he
meant books that “contained offensive passage against the German people or their leaders” were
actually removed, van Dam insisted.
At the same time, van Dam interspersed his speech with dire warnings for teachers and
students that they should not do anything to endanger their position, and by extension, the future
of the Dutch volk. Teachers were warned not to allow instruction to spread enmity or falsehoods
about the German people or its leaders. Students in elementary schools should avoid speaking
about politics or the other events that were unfolding around them on the streets and in the public
sphere. Rather, these students should spend their time discussing their daily lives (as though the
invasion and occupation had had no impact upon them!) or engaging in physical education and
sporting activities. Secondary school students should quit dividing themselves into groups by
political persuasion and they should recognize that those students who incite other students to
enter the conflict in any way do those students and the entire nation a disservice. Rather,
secondary students, van Dam explained, should take their colleagues with differing opinions by
the hand and be friends. Van Dam left his strongest language for university students. Their
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protest activities had already led to the closure of some universities, and should the situation not
change, he assured them that more closures would follow the winter break when classes
resumed.175 These closures were harmful, he warned, not just to the students themselves, as they
would prevent the students from continuing with their education, but also to the nation as a
whole, as the closures prevented the students from entering adult society and thereby
contributing to the future of the nation. Van Dam allowed that in different times, he would
support the students’ right to air their grievances through protest, but not now. Rather, he
exhorted the nation that “this is a time in which much work must be done. Therefore, discipline
is necessary; and the best form of discipline is self-discipline.”
The only actual point of policy he introduced to his audience in the entire speech dealt
with his hobbyhorse, the importance of Dutch language and literature instruction. He hoped that
instruction in such subjects would be “substantially expanded and renewed,” eventually to be
incorporated into a new subject of heemkunde. This new heemkunde was to include, in addition
to the expanded and renewed Dutch language and literature instruction, lessons in cultural and
art history, geography, and ethnic studies. All of this combined would prepare young Dutchmen
and women “to spread the knowledge of the treasures of Dutch culture” around the world.176
Although the concept of an integrative subject like heemkunde was already supported by
educational reformers before the war as a methodological innovation, its support ended there.
Van Dam’s overtly nationalistic conception of heemkunde, which he intended to use to extol the
virtues of the Dutch nation and people, however, was more in line with the ideas that would, later
during the war, be promoted in the pages of the Opvoedersgilde’s journal.177
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Taken together, van Dam’s writings on school reform and his radio address to the nation
show van Dam’s overriding concerns regarding the national character of education, the
maintenance of order in the schools, and the importance of the relationship between the
Netherlands and Germany.178 He continually framed his “reforms” as necessary for the renewal
of the Dutch people and any opposition, whether on the part of parents, teachers, or students, was
a danger not only to themselves, but to the very existence of the Dutch nation. The threats were
multiple and manifest. Whether by the internal, spiritual degeneration of the nation or through
external reprisals by the occupiers, resistance to van Dam’s changes to education was tantamount
to a strike against the very people those resisters ostensibly aimed to help. Instead, Dutch
teachers, parents, and students should move forward with their lives, heads held high, into a new
future brought about by the near certain German victory and guided by van Dam’s steady hand.
Van Dam would spend the next three years attempting to guide the Dutch education system into
this new future, but his efforts were ultimately a failure. Some scholars, such as Loe de Jong,
have argued that this was a result of van Dam’s political ineptness, but this negates the fact that
many of the changes that were implemented during the occupation in the education realm came
directly out of van Dam’s early wartime writings.179 While van Dam did experience an
increasing political opposition to his position within the occupation apparatus as the occupation
went on, focusing only on that later period of the occupation ignores the many successful
“reforms” he was able to push through in his first years atop the education department. He might
not have operated like a seasoned politician, but there is no good reason to dismiss the real,
tangible effects of his efforts.
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At the same time, other scholars, and van Dam himself in his trial, have argued that he
had always had the best interests of the Dutch people at heart and that he had only worked to
protect the Dutch nation from German aggression.180 In this view, van Dam gradually lost
confidence in the German occupation and slowly settled on passive resistance himself. There is
some evidence that this was the case. Van Dam was, for example, instrumental in helping to
save a number of Jews from deportation. These individuals were usually highly acclaimed
persons, artists, academics, and others working in the cultural sphere, some of whom were,
through the intervention of van Dam personally, spared by Seyss-Inquart from deportation “to
the east.” Although these Jews were eventually deported first to the transit camp Westerbork and
then to Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia, they were spared from the more usual and lethal
deportation destinations of Bergen-Belsen and, worse still, Auschwitz. At least partly because of
van Dam’s intervention on their behalf, many survived the war.181 Scholars are uncertain what
motivated van Dam to help save these individuals from deportation. Van Dam does not appear
to have been a committed anti-Semite, despite his völkisch leanings, and it is possible that his
desire to help stemmed more from the perceived loss to the Dutch nation that the murder of these
esteemed individuals would cause. Whatever the case, this single act, commendable as it was,
cannot negate the overwhelming evidence showing that van Dam not only supported the efforts
of the German occupiers, but that in many instances, the eventual changes instituted by the
occupiers and the designs he spelled out in his Thoughts and Suggestions and Reform pieces in
Fall 1940 were substantially the same.
Regardless of van Dam’s political ability, the “reforms” he instituted were met with stiff
resistance by teachers, parents, and students. This resistance to education reform was combined
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with an ever-increasing resistance to the German occupation more generally as the war carried
on into its third and fourth years. By mid-1943, at the very latest, the goals of the German
occupiers had shifted from a more stable, less repressive occupation aimed at incorporating the
Dutch into the wider Germanic world to a much more repressive occupation aimed at resource
extraction in support of the ever-worsening war effort. It was also at this time that van Dam
appears to have mostly stopped performing everything but cursory duties over the department.182
As the German occupation got more repressive, Dutch resistance activity increased at an inverse
proportion, creating a violent, negative feedback loop that threatened to, and eventually would,
spiral completely out of control.
Conclusion
The systems of education that were preferred by the NSB and Jan van Dam had several
important similarities. Both held that education should be given in a “national sense,”
emphasizing the Dutch character, physical education, history instruction, and the importance of
the individual’s relationship with the volksgemeenschap. In both reform proposals,
intellectualism was to be reduced in favor of an education that focused on the emotion and
feelings of unity among the Dutch people. Intellectualism was seen as a barrier to national unity,
and as such, the higher sciences and even French language should be replaced in emphasis with
subjects more likely to foster love and appreciation of the fatherland, the volksgemeenschap, and,
at least in van Dam’s case, the larger Germanic race.183 For the mass of Dutchmen and women,
fostering a greater national unity required a reduction in the educational niveau of the populace.
Overt intellectualism included too much individualism, too much critical thinking, and too little
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unquestioning acceptance of proper authority. As one writer in Opvoeding in volkschen geest put
it:
We see the school much less as a learning institute, where almost exclusively the intellect is developed, but
we place, much more than usual the emphasis on emotional life; one always feels oneself bound to the volk,
[one does] not “think” oneself bound to the volk.184

The irony, of course, was that van Dam, Mussert, van Genechten, and many of the other leading
educational thinkers among the NSB and the völkisch wing of Dutch politics were, themselves,
intellectuals. Van Dam, who was trained as a specialist on ancient Germanic languages and
literatures and who had spent his entire adult life in academia, was the very model of a successful
intellectual, while Mussert and van Genechten were both university trained, the former as an
engineer, the latter as a lawyer. The leaders of the German occupation regime, at least those who
oversaw educational policy, were similarly well educated, with Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, and
Schwarz all possessing doctorate degrees.
But there were also significant differences between the educational reform proposals
adopted by van Dam and the NSB. Van Dam was much more in favor of specifically German
elements, such as the introduction of German language instruction into primary education and
was himself a believer in the völkisch ideal of a Germanic community of peoples, whereas
Mussert and the majority of the NSB were simply too nationalistic in their outlook to allow for
anything that even resembled Germanization or Germanicization.185 But, by far, the most
important difference between Mussert and the NSB’s proposals for education and those of van
Dam was the question of unity in education versus allowance for separate confessional
education.
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Mussert and the majority of NSB members favored the Three Pillars system of
educational organization which allowed for separate, confessional “special schools.” This system
was very much in line with the peculiar nature of Dutch education that had formed over the
previous century and that became firmly established as a result of the victory of the confessional
pillars in the School Struggle. Although the NSB, more generally, was not in favor of the
pillarized nature of Dutch society, Mussert and the thinkers in his faction of the NSB were all too
aware of the dangers of trying to undo the gains the confessions had gained and so made an
exception for their interests in the educational realm. Yes, the ultimate leadership of each
educational pillar would be in the hands of the state, but relative independence would be granted
under Mussert’s scheme.
Alternatively, van Dam, much like the eventual German occupation regime, saw
confessional education as anathema to national unity and thus believed it must be done away
with. It is difficult to say from where van Dam got this notion. Given his education and
experience, he must have been familiar with the School Struggle of the previous century, and he
came of age during the height of the struggle in the second decade of the twentieth century. But
he was also raised in a non-religious household, and it is possible that his anti-clerical opinions
as regarded confessional education found their genesis there.186 Moreover, before the Second
World War, he had generally voted for one of the liberal parties, and so it is equally possible that
his support for unified public education first surfaced during his young adult life.187 His plan for
educational reform, after all, had significant overlap with the liberal agenda of the nineteenth
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century as it related to confessional education—namely the elimination of separate, confessional
schools and the unification of all education under the direct purview of the state. Either way, his
background suggests that his opposition to confessional education was not a direct result of his
adoption of völkisch politics in the 1930s.
The position of the German occupation leadership is more difficult to determine. SeyssInquart, more generally, tried to minimize direct confrontation with the Dutch churches, knowing
that they would provide stiff resistance and could not as easily be pushed aside as, for example,
the political parties.188 At the same time, however, when the Catholic Church began preaching
against the NSB in spring 1941, Seyss-Inquart decided it needed to be punished and chose the
issue of confessional schools as his weapon of choice, yet again showing that his political power
base was the Catholic Seyss-Inquart’s chief concern. It was only through van Dam’s sage advice
against reigniting the School Struggle that the most extreme measures were not taken.189
Wimmer, on the other hand, was somewhat more favorable, at least personally, toward
Catholicism specifically, as he was and always had been a practicing Catholic. In fact, this was
one of the downsides Rauter saw in him when Himmler requested an evaluation of Wimmer in
reference to a possible promotion within the SS. According to Rauter, although politically
Wimmer supported the Greater Germanic concept, he was, in terms of his Weltanschauung,
purely Catholic.190 Schwarz for his part, was a true believer in the SS world and, as was typical
in SS circles, strongly anti-clerical.191
For the most part, however, it was van Dam and Schwarz who would become the driving
forces in the education realm, working together and forming a relatively friendly relationship
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over the next several years. While their feelings regarding the place of the churches in education
likely stemmed from different origins, they were generally in complete agreement about the need
to remove clerical influence from education entirely, even if, as it would turn out, they were
largely unsuccessful in doing so. In fact, most of the “reforms” that the pair attempted to institute
would fail over the course of the occupation, but before we can turn to the reactions of the Dutch
populace and the ultimate failure of the educational “reforms” implemented during the
occupation in chapters seven and eight, we must look more closely at the specific “reforms”
themselves, who supported which “reforms,” the goals of those “reforms,” and their
implementation, often uneven, at the local level. It is these topics to which we turn in the next
three chapters.
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Chapter 4 - The Direct Path to the Greater Germanic Reich
The overall mandate of the Reichskommissar [is] to induce the Dutch people into a positive cooperation in the
Greater Germanic area. … [to] win young people to the Reich. For this there [are] two ways, the direct: to win the
Reich and thus to win National Socialism, and the indirect: to win National Socialism and thus to win the Reich.
Both paths must be taken. - Heinrich Schwarz, March 22, 19411

In the field of education, there were two paths that the German leadership saw for the
creation of a Germanic identity among the Dutch, each with its intended audience and each
necessary for the creation of the Greater Germanic Reich. The first path, described as “indirect,”
involved Dutch youth, and put succinctly, was to win the youth over to National Socialism, and
then their acceptance of the Greater Germanic Reich would follow naturally. The second method
involved German educational institutions in the Netherlands, especially the German Schools and
the Reichsschulen, which were attended by German and German-friendly Dutch students. This
process, described as the “direct route,” involved German educational institutions as models for
other schools in the nation; they were to become the goal toward which Dutch schools would
strive. Winning the battle through the German Schools in the Netherlands would mean a
strengthening of the Reich, and with that strengthening, National Socialism would conquer.2
This chapter focuses on the “direct path” toward the Greater Germanic Reich as practiced
in the educational realm in the Netherlands. It begins with a brief look at educational practices in
Germany during the 1930s, before moving to German institutions in the Netherlands prior to the
Nazi invasion. These schools had been present in the Netherlands for many decades, but with the
Nazi “seizure of power” in 1933, they began focusing more explicitly on imparting Nazi values
to their students. With the invasion and occupation of the Netherlands by Germany, these schools
were significantly expanded, increasing the total number of students, both Dutch and German,
who were educated along explicitly German lines. The education provided to these students
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would, in theory, stand in stark contrast to the overly intellectual education students received in
Dutch schools and would, by their very nature as superior institutions, slowly bring Dutch
educators and parents over to the Nazi side.3
The chapter then moves on to the establishment of three separate educational institutions
meant to instruct the future elite of the Nazis’ pan-Germanic, European empire. The first of these
projects was the NIVO, or Dutch Institute for Völkisch Education, which was established by the
occupiers as a Dutch counterpart to German National-Political Educational Institutes (Napola).
Owing to infighting between the German leadership, as well as staunch opposition from Dutch
Nazis to the NIVO project, the Germans scrapped it after the first year and turned to the
establishment of German style Napolas in 1942, although for political reasons, they were called
Reichsschulen, instead of National-Political Educational Institutes. These schools, one for boys
and one for girls, would last until fall 1944, when both schools, which were located in the
southern province of Limburg, were evacuated to Germany in advance of the Allied onslaught
expected to come later that fall.4 As with so many other efforts at “reform,” the turning tide of
the war meant and end for the Germans’ efforts.
Education in Nazi Germany
Education as a tool for the social formation of the next generation has a long history in
Europe. Most, if not all, Western European states attempted to use their school systems in the
nineteenth century as “instruments of nation-building,” that is, the training of a loyal citizenry.5
The Nazis were no exception to this trend, and when they came to power in Germany, they made
a concerted effort to use education to influence the next generation toward the ideals of National
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Socialism.6 Hitler directly stated as much in one of his rambling “table talks” with his
subordinates: “In the same way as the press, the school also must be used as an instrument for
the education of the people.”7 This process, in and of itself, is not nefarious so much as it is
universal to formal education. The Nazis, who certainly attempted to use education to build the
next generation of Germans, did not invent this idea; it was common to the other major political
parties in Germany during the early part of the twentieth century.8 Moreover, the Nazis’ efforts
were not limited to the creation of better Germans, but were also aimed at turning the Dutch,
whose almost three hundred years of independence from their “ethnic kin” in Germany had
allowed for the creation of a separate culture and national identity, into the Germanic brothers
and sisters Nazi racial theorists saw in them.9 Central to my overarching argument, however, is
the realization that the goals of the occupation regime in the field of education in the occupied
Netherlands went beyond the Nazis’ corresponding efforts in Germany, to include the
redefinition of what it actually means to be Dutch and the creation of a new national identity
based on their Germanic past. In order to make this larger point, however, a short survey of the
Nazis’ educational goals in Germany in the 1930s is necessary.
Like many aspects of German life, the Nazis saw the Weimar period’s influence on
education as extremely problematic. Instead, Nazi educational theorists looked back to cultural
critics from the previous century, especially Lagarde and Langbehn, who criticized industrial
society and the developments that led to it, especially the Enlightenment, liberalism, socialism,
and parliamentarianism. These völkisch thinkers instead romanticized about a pre-industrial,
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agricultural past, with its unquestioned norms and, ostensibly, charismatic political leadership.10
These thinkers professed a racial unity between the volk and the land, and among society as a
whole, based upon racialist lines. Indeed, it would be the influence of race that stood at the center
of Nazi educational policy.11
The prevailing trend in Weimar education, on the other hand, was that of
decentralization.12 Because educational policy was determined by the sates, new types of schools
became common under Weimar, including Montessori schools; “worldly schools,” secular
schools that usually also had a pedagogical reform element included; and schools promoting
“democratic” reforms (i.e., schools giving students a greater say in their own education). For its
part, the central government did promote guidelines for education that suggested education
should be of a “German-National” character, in which the individual was subordinate to the
larger nation—a concept that dates back to the Romantic era and notable thinkers such as Fichte
and Hegel13—but the government had little ability to enforce these guidelines among the various
states. As a result, there was a large proliferation of new schools and pedagogical techniques
under the Weimar Republic, a proliferation the Nazis and other conservative, nationalist, and/or
völkisch elements found distressing. Despite Weimar’s encouragement of educational reforms,
however, the overwhelming nature of the German teaching corps remained conservative, “antidemocratic, anti-liberal, authoritarian, and sexist.”14 The nationalist and völkisch parties, the
Nazis among them, fought these reforms tooth and nail. For the extreme right wing of German
politics, education in Weimar was too formulaic, focusing too much on intellectualism and
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bookishness to the detriment of the nation. Instead, these right-wing parties, the Nazis included,
preferred an education that was based more on cultivating the spiritual and physical
characteristics of the student in order to make them loyal to the German nation. Learning,
according to the most völkisch elements of German society, was to be rooted in one’s
connectedness to the soil that allowed for the spirit to flourish, rather than the production of
intellectual automatons.15 These characteristics of Weimar education, which the Nazis
consistently labeled as “liberal” and “Marxist,” were to be rejected completely in favor of a
national education that would produce a future Aryan ruling class in Europe.
When the Nazis came to power, they immediately began to shape education in Germany
in a more national socialist mold. In doing so, they were building on an already long tradition of
using education as a method for forming and inculcating particular sets of values among the
youth. Already in the nineteenth century, German education theorists recognized that education
was an effective, even necessary, vehicle for transmitting specific values to the next generation.
Educators such as Friedrich Froebel, the mid-nineteenth century founder of the kindergarten,
argued that education must start in the home and that it should be intimately tied to education in
the school. For Froebel, who saw the family as the basic building block of society, the child’s
understanding of the unlimited love of a mother for her child, and understanding the virtue of
that love, was paramount. Only then could the child grow up to exhibit the ideal purity of heart
and mind that was so important to Froebel’s conception of proper society.16 Later, in the Weimar
period, reflecting the republican individualism of that period, works of youth literature such as
Emil und die Detektive emphasized the individual’s (in this case the child’s) ability to overcome
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great odds in the big city to prevail over injustice, while at the same time completely ignoring the
systemic causes of poverty and crime that shape the main character’s world.17 Once they gained
power, the Nazis were, in some ways, simply following in the footsteps of their Kaiserreich and
Weimar forbearers.
Almost immediately after Hitler established his dictatorship in March, 1933, the Nazis
took the first steps in their institutional coordination of the German education apparatus. Shortly
after assuming power, the regime identified those individuals determined to be undesirable
elements and then dismissed, transferred, or demoted them from positions of authority in the
schools. Through laws such as the Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und
Hochschulen18 and the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums,19 both from April
1933, put limits on the number of Jewish students who could attend schools and gave the
government the authority to remove public servants, including school faculty, administrators and
education officials, for reasons of “race” or previous political activity. These dismissals had
significant impacts on the German educational establishment. Although they varied by region
and province, the numbers of dismissed or demoted teachers, school administrators, and state
education officials could range upwards of twenty-five per cent, and this does not count those
who resigned or those who, for reasons of self-preservation, joined the NSDAP to prevent their
previous political activity from counting against them. When some administrators ignored the
laws regarding the dismissal of undesirable elements, they themselves were dismissed. Naturally,
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these politically or racially undesirable elements were mostly replaced with regime loyalists,
especially the so-called Alte Kämpfer.20
In addition to the removal of politically and “racially” undesirable elements, the Nazis
took aim at entire educational institutions. Chief among these, in the early days of the regime,
were schools that promoted new pedagogical techniques, such as the “democratic reform” or
Montessori schools. The “worldly schools” and even schools with a history of political activity
among their teaching corps and students were also targeted for closure. In Berlin, some fiftythree schools were closed, their teachers and administrators either dismissed or transferred to
other schools, while their students were divided up among neighboring schools. When closure
was not an option, personnel changes were in order. The numbers of teachers who were harassed,
dismissed, demoted, of forcibly transferred is in some cases absolutely astonishing. In Hamburg,
one of the main centers of the school reform movement, as many as fifty-five per cent of school
directors were dismissed and replaced with party loyalists, as opposed to the comparatively
paltry fifteen per cent who were forcibly removed from service in Berlin (the other major center
of such reform movements). In some cases, dismissal was not enough, as the now unemployed
former teachers and administrators continued to face discrimination in future employment,
harassment by the SA, and even outright murder. But pressure on teachers and administrators
for conformity was felt even by those who were not dismissed. Evaluations by their superiors,
the constant threat of being labeled “suspicious” by party loyalists, and the enforced declarations
of one’s independence from political organizations opposed to the regime were all methods used
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to keep otherwise apolitical teachers in line, to say nothing of those teachers and administrators
witnessing the dismissal and persecution of their erstwhile colleagues who did not fall in line.21
Running in the opposite direction was, contradictorily enough, the establishment of
schools specifically for Jewish students on the one hand and various forms of “elite” schools for
the creme of the Aryan crop on the other. Some of these Jewish schools had existed for some
time, just as confessional schools of all stripes had, but others were newly established to accept
the influx of Jewish students and teachers who were increasingly leaving the state run public
schools because of harassment but could not forgo school altogether because of the universal
schooling requirements. The percentage of Jewish students in “regular” schools decreased by
some fifty per cent by 1935, and then by another third in 1936.22 After the November Pogrom of
1938, all Jewish pupils were required to attend Jewish schools until they were banned from
school attendance altogether in 1942 in favor of deportation “to the east.” At the same time that
the Nazis were expelling Jewish Germans from public education and relocating them in
segregated classrooms, they were establishing other segregated schools for the future elites of the
elites. They took two forms: the Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten23 (Napola) and the
Adolf-Hitler-Schulen.24 The goal of these schools was to train the next generation of German
leadership, although they targeted different groups. The former were meant to educate those
students who would enter the civil service and serve the state, while students at the latter were
meant to enter into leadership positions within the party and its connected mass organizations.25
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Reorganization of the schools was another change that the Nazis instituted. Even before
the Nazis attained power, nationalist, völkisch, and conservative elements had been pushing for a
reduction in the numbers and types of public schools found in Germany, which in all of their
variations numbered more than a dozen types of secondary schools. Although it must also be
noted that the impetus behind these desired reforms differed among groups, with völkisch
thinkers espousing a more populist, revolutionary ideology aimed at national unity. In 1938, a
school reform was instituted that allowed for three basic types of secondary school: the
Oberschule, the Aufbauschule, and the Gymnasium.26 The Oberschule, which returned to the
system of separate education for boys and girls that had been abandoned by some schools
promoting new pedagogical techniques during Weimar,27 was by far the most attended, with
more than eighty per cent of German students attending these schools during the Nazi period.
Conceived as a “unity school,”28 the Oberschule was to focus on those core subjects necessary to
the creation of a German (history, German, physical education, etc.), as opposed to the more
universalistic, humanistic, and, therefore, un-German education given to Gymnasium students,
the attendance at which was restricted to males.29 The increased importance placed on the “core
subjects” of history, physical education, and German language, combined with a reduction from
nine to eight years of compulsory education, lest students become too intellectual, allowed these
new schools to be “instruments of nationalism” that “pushed humanistic education into the
background.”30 At the same time, even the humanistic education given at the Gymnasium was
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rolled back as Latin and Greek, long-standing features of humanistic, continental education, were
removed from the required courses list, betraying the radical, populist nature of the reforms.
The make-up of the civil service and student bodies were far from the Nazis’ only
concern. Further regulations were issued along similar lines that encompassed wide-ranging
topics related to schooling, such as the replacement of non-aryan and politically suspect parental
representatives with candidates whose political inclinations could be trusted, that is until they
were abolished altogether in 1934 as too democratic.31 Under pressure from the regime, most
educational associations were also incorporated into the already existing National Socialist
Teachers Union32 by mid-1933, and although some groups, such as religious associations, were
able to hold out somewhat longer, they too were eventually forcibly “coordinated.” Some groups,
which for political reasons refused to join the NSLB simply dissolved themselves. The pressure
to join the NSLB was intense, and the participation rates prove this, as by the end of the Nazi
period, some ninety-seven per cent of teachers and administrators were members; of those a full
quarter were members of the Nazi Party itself, a higher percentage than in most other sectors of
the civil service.33 Other “reforms” that touched upon school life, but not yet on the curriculum,
included the replacement of holidays that celebrated democratic institutions, such as the
Verfassungsfeiern34 with those more directed towards Nazism and its ideals, such as new
holidays celebrating Hitler’s Birthday, the Tag der nationalen Arbeit,35 or Mother’s Day.36
Further, laws allowing for punishment of teachers and administrators for their political affiliation
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with Nazism were repealed, while laws promoting the wearing of symbols and uniforms of
national movements (i.e., the NSDAP and its affiliated groups, such as the Hitlerjugend and
Bund deutscher Mädel37) and the introduction of the Hitler greeting were promulgated.38 These
new holidays helped engender a sense of community by their very simultaneity, by the mere fact
that students and teachers were participating in them, regardless of whether specific individuals
actually believed the message these reforms imparted.39 Centralization of German education
followed in 1934 with the establishment of Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung, und
Volksbildung40 and the appointment of Bernhard Rust, formerly the head of the Prussian
education ministry, as Reichsminister. This process of Gleichschaltung was completed the
following year when the various education ministries of the German provinces were incorporated
into the Reich Education Ministry.41
In addition to laws dealing with the coordination of educational institutions and
associations, the Nazis introduced changes into the actual curriculum as well. Although many of
the changes were decreed early in the regime, their introduction was cemented through the
control and regulation of school textbooks. As the regime solidified control, fewer and fewer
publishers were allowed to publish school text books, until, finally, in 1941, only the official
publishing house of the Nazi Party, Eher Verlag, was allowed to publish school texts.42 By and
large, these changes can be grouped into four major categories: introduction of the leadership
principle and its accompanying effects, an increased emphasis on physical education, a complete
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reevaluation of history, and the racialization of instruction and content. Each of these can be
directly traced back to Mein Kampf.43 The Führerprinzip, or leadership principle, was one of the
defining characteristics of National Socialism. It called for complete subordination to one’s
superiors, especially the decisive actions of the Führer himself, creating a hierarchical society in
which decisions were made at the summit and were to be carried out by those below. Like many
Nazi ideas, the authoritarian roots of the leadership principle have existed previously in German
schools, but the Nazis took the concept to an entirely new level. Its extension to the classroom
made the teacher a petty-tyrant and the school director a not-quite-as-petty-tyrant, and it
proceeded up the chain until it reached the Führer at the summit. Already instituted in 1933, the
inclusion of the leadership principle affected almost all facets of education, ranging from a
deemphasis on actual classroom instruction in favor of character development or physical
education, to curriculum changes and the grading of exams. The ban on corporal punishment
passed by the Weimar government was repealed on Jan. 31, 1933, the day after Hitler took
power, putting discipline squarely back in the hands of the teacher. Further, as part and parcel of
the co-optation of Mother’s Day by the regime, school teachers were instructed to use the
holiday to counsel students on the importance of the German mother and the value of respect and
gratitude to their parents, the parents being the petty-tyrants of the German family. School
administrators, especially, gained new powers with the introduction of the leadership principle.
Whereas school directors had been first-among-equals under the Weimar government—a change
that was in itself instituted in the immediate post-war period—the Nazis gave school directors
complete authority over their schools, from administration to teacher evaluation to student
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discipline. At the same time, the influence of the faculty on the operation of the school was
reduced to an advisory role at best, insignificance at worst.44
An increase in the importance of physical education was another of the most prominent
elements of Nazi educational reforms. The overriding goal here was the creation of future
mothers and future German soldiers.45 Only by perfecting the human body could the future of
the German nation and people be preserved, and so physical education was seen as paramount to
the future success of the German volk. As with the leadership principle, the roots of the Nazis
fascination with physical education can be traced back, at least, to the beginning of the
nineteenth century with Friedrich Jahn’s gymnastic associations. Even the militarization of
physical education predated the Nazi seizure of power, but the Nazis, again, took it further.
Physical education instruction in the schools was increased both in primary and secondary
schools from their Weimar levels and a new emphasis on sport, especially team sports, was
introduced. In secondary schools, the number of periods spent on physical education in a given
week amounted to a more than eleven per cent increase, while in primary schools, the time spent
on physical education doubled.46 Further, the centralization of physical education teacher training
was implemented in 1936 through the Reichsakademie für Leibesübungen,47 which was founded
in the Berlin suburb of Spandau in 1936.48 Importantly, however, the promotion of physical
education was not limited to formal education, but was included in the informal educational
system of youth associations such as the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls. In terms
of physical education (and many other aspects of Nazi youth socialization), these organizations
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served alongside the regular school system as creators of a future national socialist German
ruling class. Further, the informal system of physical education instruction extended beyond the
student’s school years when, at least in the case of young men, students were encouraged to enter
into voluntary work service49 and then into the German army, what Hitler referred to as “the
highest school of patriotic education.”50
If proper physical education was the highest priority for the body of the next generation
of Germans, then a proper understanding of the national socialist view of history was the most
important for the minds of the next generation. Of all the traditionally academic subjects students
encountered in the nazified classroom, the study of history, or more accurately the study of the
politicized notion of history held by the Nazis, was the most important to Nazi leaders. Like so
much of Nazi ideology, historical instruction in the schools was to be reorganized around racial
lines. According to Hitler, in Mein Kampf, “It is the task of the national state to see to it that a
world history is finally written in which the race question is raised to a predominant position.”51
And so historical instruction was remodeled around these lines with little regard for any sort of
objective accuracy. Of primary importance for history instruction was pre-history. The Prussian
education ministry published a set of “guidelines for history books” in August 1933 that give an
overview of just how important the Nazis saw race.
According to these Richtlinien für die Geschichtsbücher,52 the differences between the
races were already formed in pre-history and were evidenced through the superior handicrafts,
whether made of stone or bronze, that they left behind. From Europe, the Nordic race spread
throughout the Near East, North Africa, and South-Central Asia already some five millennia
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before the time of Christ. This, of course, meant that the Ancient Egyptian and Sumerian peoples
were originally Nordics, or, at least, conquered by Nordics who would have then installed
themselves as a ruling class; the author of the document, most likely Prussian Education Ministry
official Wilhelm Stuckart, was not entirely sure which was correct. The Greeks and the Roman
patricians (but not the plebeians) were also Nordic, the former having died out because of a low
birth rate, the latter dying out because of infighting and, eventually, intermixing with the plebs.
All that was good and decent in the Middle Ages was the result of the spread of Germanic tribes
throughout the continent, which allowed for a fresh infusion of the Germanic blood that had been
nearly wiped out by Roman intermixing. With the coming of the early modern period and the
rise of nation-states, the importance of the German state begins to take center stage. But here, the
emphasis is on the degradation of the German people and state through foreign influences. It is
against these foreign influences that the Nazis were fighting by trying to build up an explicitly
nationalist, German Weltanschauung among the German population, the history of which was to
be especially emphasized in history textbooks.53 In reality, Nazi history texts were
overwhelmingly concerned with the “great men” of German history (and only German history),
especially Frederick II. “Old Fritz” was the exemplar of a heroic military leader whose only
desire was to serve the state. The intended parallel with Hitler is patent. That he was a
Francophone lover of Enlightenment philosophy was shunted aside.54 The purpose of all of this
historical revisionism was to inculcate an extreme sense of nationalism among the next
generation of Germans. In his summary of German history texts, Gilmer Blackburn accurately
sums up the Nazis’ use of history: “The central theme of the history written by the National
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Socialists [was] to arouse in the student a sense of Germanness [Deutschtum] in accordance with
the most exclusive definition of the term, which would kindle the urgent desire to secure
Germany's permanent hegemony in the world.”55
Following closely behind the importance of history in Nazi educational policy was the
introduction of disciplines such as Rassenkunde, Vererbungslehre, and Rassenhygiene.56 In these
classes, which were required from 1935 and given greater precedence at the expense of
mathematics and foreign languages, students learned about heredity, racial hygiene, racial
demography, and the importance of the family for the continuation of the German people and
Aryan race.57 The goal of this instruction was to educate the student of his or her proper place in
the hierarchy of races, as well as to warn them of the dangers of intermixing with “inferior races”
and/or the so-called Minderwertigen.58 Further, Rassenkunde was a prototypical exercise in
community building (and exclusion), by showing German students that they belonged (or not) to
a racial community, the vaunted Volksgemeinschaft, that stood at the pinnacle of human
society.59 Central to the notion of race, as the Nazis conceived it, was German blood. It was in
German blood through which the soul of the German people was passed down, and it was the
threat to that same German blood that made other races and the physically and mentally disabled
so dangerous in the Nazi mindset. Although these new subjects were mostly meant to be
included in biology classes, especially in the higher grades, in truth, racial ideology spread
throughout the curriculum at all levels. So, for example, an arithmetic textbook for elementary
students had problems that asked students to determine how much the state pays extra, per
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person, for physically and mentally disabled students versus their non-disabled peers.60 The
intended lesson is clear.
Although the preceding is but a short summary of the most important changes the Nazis
implemented in German education during the 1930s and ‘40s, it bears emphasizing that the
importance of German blood, German culture, German history, and the German state are front
and center. Education in Nazi Germany was geared, explicitly towards all things German, to the
complete detriment of anything deemed “foreign,” including liberalism, Judaism, and Marxism.
As will become clear in later chapters, the Nazis’ efforts in the occupied Netherlands were, in
many ways, very similar to their efforts in Germany, right down to the creation of elite schools
for future leaders of the Greater Germanic Reich.
But there is an extremely important difference: the Dutch are not German, they are
Dutch. Despite many leading Nazis’ views on the Dutch as nothing more than Germans with a
funny sailor’s dialect, the preceding three centuries of Dutch independence had led to the
creation of a distinct culture that was separate from their German neighbors. Even if Dutch racial
theorists agreed with their German counterparts about the ethnic relationship between the two
peoples, and there were several who did, Dutch culture was clearly distinct from that of their
Teutonic neighbors. When the Nazis were extolling the greatness of the German people and
Nordic race to German students, they were not attempting to completely overhaul German
culture so much as to elevate certain aspects while silencing others. Alternatively, in the
Netherlands the Nazis were forced to try and inculcate an entirely new concept of what it meant
to be Dutch. Therein lies something of a difference.
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The Deutsche Schulen in den Niederlanden before the Nazi invasion
The German presence in the Dutch educational system predated the Nazis’ arrival in the
country by more than forty years. Being neighbors, the Netherlands hosted a large German
expatriate community. As is not uncommon when large communities of foreigners are collected
in a single region, schools were erected to cater explicitly to that community. By the 1930s, there
were eight such Deutsche Schulen in den Niederlanden ranging from the major western cities of
Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, clear across to the German border, in border adjacent
towns such as Steyl and Vlodrop.61 Because of a unique twist in the history of Dutch education
policy resulting from the School Struggle, these schools were partially subsidized by the state,
but mostly financed through tuition fees levied on the students.62 Although the Dutch
government maintained legal oversight of the German schools, which was necessary to maintain
the mutual reciprocity of diploma recognition between German and Dutch schools that had been
established under Dutch law in 1906, by the time the Nazis attained power the majority of the
administration and curriculum was determined with significant input from Berlin, although
meddling by Dutch authorities in the administration of the schools was a constant concern.63 In
the words of one German school inspector, these schools acted as an “outpost of Germandom” in
the Netherlands, and, according to Wimmer, would become, during the occupation, models for
the reform of Dutch education and the strengthening of Germandom in the Netherlands.64
Schwarz, who would come to directly oversee the German Schools during the occupation was of

61

Bundesarchiv-Lichterfelde (BAL) R83/29. German [International] Schools in the Netherlands
BAL R4901/6624.
63
BAL R4901/6623, R4901/6624, R4901/6626, R4901/6627, R4901/6628. Regarding the 1906 law, see Staatsblad
van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Nr 229, August 22, 1906.
64
For “outpost” see BAL R4901/6628. For their model status, see BAL R83/29
62

160
a similar mindset, arguing that the German Schools played a central role in what he described as
the “direct route” of winning the Netherlands over to the Greater Germanic Reich.65
In the pre-Nazi period, the purpose of these German Schools was two-fold. On the one
hand, they acted as one of several nexuses for the German expatriate community in the various
towns in which they were located, and on the other, as a form of cultural foreign policy in which
the German state attempted to mold the expatriate community into a bastion of “Germandom” in
the Netherlands.66 As Dr. Jungbluth, the head of the German secondary school in Rotterdam,
noted in 1927:
The more flourishing and powerful a colony, the more developed and powerful their school system. The
florescence and esteem of their schools is, to a certain degree, the gauge of the importance and prestige of
the German colony itself.67

Unfortunately for the German administrators of these schools, there were significant obstacles to
attaining these goals. First, the language of instruction in the primary schools was usually Dutch,
owing to the Dutch state’s financial support and legal oversight. Moreover, most of the teachers
were also Dutch because Germans with the necessary Dutch state teaching certificates were
difficult to locate. This was especially prevalent at the German Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule in
Amsterdam, where, beyond the school head Rector von Diepenbroek, only a single teacher was
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German after the end of the First World War.68 These factors called into question the entire
nature of these schools as purely German schools in the first place.69
Secondary schools, which in some cases were part of a larger school that also included a
subsidized primary school, were not required to adhere to the same restrictions as their primary
school counterparts and thus were supervised by German authorities through the Foreign Office.
The lack of Dutch governmental supervision meant that the German secondary schools could
have a higher percentage of German teachers, as they were not required to have Dutch teaching
certificates, although most of the schools still employed Dutch teachers to a greater or lesser
extent. This also freed the German Schools to organize their curriculum along more German
lines. But the lack of Dutch state financial support brought with it financial constraints, as these
secondary schools were only partially funded through the German Foreign Office, albeit at a
higher level than many German schools in other countries,70 requiring them to get the majority of
their financial support through tuition fees. This was not always an easy task, as the economic
situation in the Netherlands, during the 1930s especially, was unfavorable, with high
unemployment, including within the German colonies there. This meant that some parents were
not able to pay the full tuition fees, creating additional financial hardships for the schools.71 As
a result, some of the schools switched the status of certain classes, such as when the German
School in Rotterdam first removed the two highest classes of the nine-year primary school from
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Dutch oversight in 1914, only to return them to Dutch school oversight in 1919 because of an
intense need for Dutch state financial support.72
Financial constraints were compounded by the fact that many Germans in the
Netherlands were not members of the school associations and did not send their children to
German Schools when they were available, choosing instead to send their children to Dutch
schools. There were many reasons for this. For starters, many Germans, especially those who
had married Dutch partners, had no intention of returning to Germany, but rather intended for
their families to remain in the Netherlands, and for those parents, sending their children to Dutch
schools was the more appropriate choice.73 Other times the choice to send one’s children to a
Dutch school was based on more mundane factors. The location and amenities of the German
Schools were not always the best. This was particularly evident in Amsterdam, where the
German School there was located in a run-down building in a poor neighborhood. Similar
mundane factors plagued the German Schools in The Hague and Rotterdam.74 It stood to reason,
the German leadership thought, that if the facilities could be improved, it would lead to higher
enrollments and greater success in strengthening both the German colony and the German nature
of the student bodies.75 Finally, financial constraints on the part of parents cannot also be
overlooked, especially during the economically turbulent period after the New York stock
market crash of 1929. Taken together, all of these factors contributed to an overriding fear in the
German expatriate community of its members becoming “Dutchified.” As Jungbluth noted,
Dutch culture and language was so essentially similar to that of Germany and that even
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“educated Germans are easily ‘Dutchified.’”76 German Schools were meant to prevent just this
problem from infecting the larger community.
With the assumption of power by the Hitler regime in Berlin, the focus on the German
nature of the German Schools in the Netherlands only grew in importance. From 1934, the
supervision of the German Schools in the Netherlands was removed from the Foreign Office and
was placed under the purview of the newly created Reich Ministry for Education, Science and
Culture, headed by Bernhard Rust. Consequently, a third goal would be added to these first two
functions—the use of the schools as a tool of political indoctrination such that students attending
German Schools would become appropriately acquainted with and bound to the political outlook
of the new Germany. It was a process that was relatively quick and seamless.77
As part of its oversight, the Education Ministry sent German education officials to help
administer the final exams of the graduating students at each of the German schools annually. At
the same time these officials filed detailed reports that betray the Nazis’ overriding concern with
entrenching Germandom in the Netherlands. Most of the reports began with a notation on the
make-up of the student body. In the reports, the students were divided between Reichsdeutsche,
Volksdeutsche, Netherlanders, and foreigners. Included among the foreign element were any
Jewish students who happened to be attending. So, for example, at the German School in
Amsterdam, officially known as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule, in 1934, of the 290 students, 205
were Germans from the Reich, 53 were Dutch, 9 were Jewish (“israelistisch”), and the remainder
were of other nationalities. By 1941, the ethnic makeup of the school had grown significantly
more German, with 308 Reichsdeutsche, 153 Volksdeutsche, 117 Dutch, and 5 of other
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nationalities; Jewish students disappeared from the roster completely.78 Similar demographic
changes occurred in the other German schools.79 Somewhat ironically, in the very earliest years
of Nazi rule in Germany, the number of Jewish students actually increased at the German
Schools, likely a result of large numbers of Jewish emigrants from Hitler’s Germany who wanted
their children to maintain some connection to their country of origin, although this increase was
short-lived as the number of Jewish pupils began to decline by the later 1930s because of the
increased stress laid upon racial factors at these schools.80
Beyond their pure statistical value, these numbers show a large increase in the student
body of these schools which can be, on the one hand, attributed to a larger number of Dutch
parents deciding to send their children to German schools, presumably for the benefits it would
grant their children in the new Nazi-controlled Europe, and, on the other, because of a greater
attendance by the children of the German community in Amsterdam, which numbered more than
seventeen thousand individuals. Both of these factors were of intense interest to the inspectors
sent from the German Education Ministry, although in differing ways. The inspectors were
generally very pleased with the increase in German students, as their attendance at the German
schools would prevent their “Dutchification” in Dutch schools, a severe threat to the status of
Germandom in the country. This was doubly important as, in the estimation of the inspector who
wrote the 1935 report, far too many German adults in Amsterdam had been, essentially,
“Dutchified,” weakening the German nature of the entire community. At the same time, the
increase in the number of Dutch students offered the possibility that the school would be unable
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to succeed in its work of strengthening Germandom in Amsterdam.81 For the German leadership,
the appropriate ratio was about one-third Dutch, and two-thirds German, which they believed
sufficient to maintain the German nature of the student body, but also not so low as to remove
any possibility the German schools’ influence upon the wider Dutch public.82
In addition to the ethnic make-up of the student body, the inspectors were particularly
interested in the cultural disposition of the students and teachers, among the latter of which both
Germans and Dutch could be found. This is unsurprising, as the stated purpose of the schools
was to foster the “life and spiritual being” of the students, which directly affected future
generations of Germans. As one 1938 advertisement for the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule, noted:
A German child who doesn’t attend a German school is inevitably lost to Germandom. Even if he succeeds
in preserving the German language, he nevertheless grows up without the educational, spiritual, and
emotional values that make up the German people. A language without these contents, however, is like an
empty glass. Only a German school is able to convey these values, only here do these values flock to the
child through daily and hourly lessons from all subjects, mainly from German lessons, reading lessons,
history, geography, music and religious instruction.83

Among the students, membership in national socialist organizations was also consistently
noted, whether the students were members of youth organizations such as the Hitler Youth, the
League of German Girls, and the youth branch of the Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft84; the
freiwillige Arbeitsdienst85; or in some cases, after 1939, even the German army. 86 Importantly,
the focus was always on the students’ participation in German national socialist organizations;
the participation by Dutch students in national socialist organizations such as the Nationale
Jeugdstorm87 was given little attention. In addition to their participation in German Nazi
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organizations, the school inspectors consistently noted whether the students appear to be
accepting of the new national socialist ideology slowly being implemented in the various
German schools. For example, in the 1934 report on the German School in Steyl, near Venlo in
the eastern part of the Netherlands, the report’s author, Dr. Klemmer, notes that the students at
the gymnasial section of this catholic school were surprisingly well versed on Hitler's Mein
Kampf, the basic principles of National Socialism, the history of the Nazi movement, and the
changes introduced in the first year of Nazi leadership in Germany. The teachers in the primary
school section had not yet begun teaching the tenets of National Socialism in earnest, but both
the teachers and students were interested and willing to learn, all the more surprising to the
inspector because of the confessional nature of the school and the suspect nature of the teachers
whose loyalty, according to Klemmer, was to the Catholic church first and foremost and only
secondarily to the German people and the national socialist state.88
The cultural disposition of the teachers was also extensively noted in the reports,
regardless of whether the teachers were German or Dutch, including their membership in
national socialist organizations, although, as with students, only German organizations—whether
the NSLB, the German Labor Front, the Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft, the NSDAP, and even the
SA—were considered.89 In the 1934 report on the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule in Amsterdam, the
author, Senator für das Bildungswesen90 Dr. Richard von Hoff, notes that, while both the
Germans and Dutch teachers appear effective educators, he was unable to ascertain the Dutch
teachers’ positions as regards the new Germany. Regardless, however, the advanced age and
imminent retirement of many of these teachers and the school director offered a chance to
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strengthen Germandom with the introduction of younger teachers more in tune with Nazi
government’s educational and cultural policies, a change the school board and Education
Ministry did not miss.91 By the time the Second World War began, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule
began experiencing shortages of German teachers, with many of the teachers having been called
up for service in the armed forces. As Senator von Hoff notes in his 1941 report, the Dutch
teachers who have replaced the departing Germans all seem to be oriented toward Germany, and
although they were “undoubtedly keen to teach and work in the German sense to the best of their
ability,” they simply could not replace German teachers in their entirety.92
In 1934, Ministerialrat Billen commented that students at the Kolleg St. Ludwig in
Vlodrop exhibited “unrestrained enthusiasm for the völkisch state and its leader,” and further
noted, “the school is a real German oasis in an otherwise not entirely scenic green belt.”93 A year
later, his praise was even more emphatic:
One feels [this to be] as an outpost of Germandom in the frontier region, and indeed as an outpost of the
völkisch-unified Germandom of the national socialist state. The German Greeting [Nazi salute] is a matter
of course, and I have seen images of Hitler in classrooms as well as in the reception rooms. I have not had
the impression that in these uncomplicated people, the denominational attachment affects a national
socialist way of life and life guidance. 94

To be certain of his assessment, he interrogated several students away from their
teachers, and came away from the encounters with the impression that all of the students in
Vlodrop would be “excellent assistants in the further development and expansion of our völkisch
state.”95 Such was the concern about the internal mindset and political persuasions of the
students and teachers that when, in his 1938 report on the Kolleg St. Ludwig, Ministerialrat Liep,
who had written the two previous reports on that school, omitted any lengthy discussion of the
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political orientation of the students and faculty regarding National Socialism and the new
Germany, the Reich Education Ministry replied to him specifically requesting it.96 Liep
responded noting that the reason for his curtailed mention was that they were still being educated
in the same manner as the previous years and he did not think it necessary to repeat the
information again. Nonetheless, he proceeded to do just that, and in much more detail than his
previous reports. As far as he could see, and he believed he was getting an accurate portrayal of
the situation in Vlodrop, the teachers tried in earnest to impart a national socialist worldview to
the students. All of the secular teachers were already members of the National Socialist
Teachers League, and several were party members. Additionally, among the entire student body
and faculty, even the clerical teachers, members of various national socialist organizations could
be found, including the German Labor Front, the Sturmabteilung, the Hitler Youth, and the
League of German Girls, among others, while many of the students who had been drafted into
the German Labor Front appeared to have enjoyed the experience.97
According to the 1936 report on the German school in Rotterdam, the teachers, both
German and Dutch, were all very much oriented toward the new Germany, with many students
and teachers who were members of national socialist organizations. Hoff, who wrote the 1936
report, noted however that the school board did have some reservations about the school director
of the primary school, who was Dutch. Two years later, the school board decided that the
primary school director needed to be replaced with a German more closely oriented with
National Socialism. The preferred candidate was already a teacher in the seventh grade of the
primary school, although his promotion would create a vacancy that would need to be filled,
naturally only with a German. The solution the school board came up with was a complete
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reorganization of the school such that the seventh grade was removed from the primary school
and attached to the secondary school. This was not entirely unproblematic, as it would mean that
the primary school no longer conformed with Dutch education law, thereby putting state
subsidies at risk. Regardless, the school board desired to go through with the changes because it
would help to better foster the new German consciousness among the students in Rotterdam.98
At the St. Michaels Gymnasium in Steyl, Dr. Huhnhäuser reported in 1937 about his gratification
regarding the positive opinions that could be found among the student regarding the “racial
question.” This was a result of the inner stances of those at the school, especially the teacher of
Rassenkunde.99
The political and cultural disposition of the students and teachers, with which the Nazis
were so eminently concerned, was furthered through many curriculum reforms the Nazis
instituted in these schools during the 1930s. In contrast to schools in Germany, where the Nazi
government had free reign, the German schools in the Netherlands had to perform a delicate
balancing act resulting from the dual oversight of both the Dutch and German governments. On
the one hand, the German schools in the Netherlands were, legally, Dutch schools that happened
to cater to the German community in the Netherlands, not entirely dissimilar to confessional
schools that catered to religious families.100 On the other hand, some level of de facto oversight
by the German government was necessary in order to, from the German point of view, guarantee
the integrity of the education provided to the students, many of whom both governments
recognized would return to Germany for higher education or work after their schooling in the
Netherlands was completed. This system of dual oversight had functioned successfully for at
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least twenty-five years before the Nazis came to power. When they did achieve power and began
implementing educational reforms in Germany, the Dutch Education Ministry started taking
note, for the Dutch government had little desire to finance the importation of National Socialism
in the Netherlands via the German schools there.101 This necessitated a certain amount of caution
and outright secrecy on the part of the Nazis in implementing their educational reforms in the
German schools in the Netherlands. So, for example, when Dr. Usadel, the inspector for the
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule, arrived in Amsterdam in April 1935 to administer the final exams, he
was warned by the school director and head of the German colony to say nothing in his speech
before the German community—formal gatherings in honor of the school inspectors were
usually held so that the inspectors might get to know the members of the local community—that
might upset the Dutch education officials who were also in attendance. Highlighting the doublespeak that he employed in his speech, Dr. Usadel noted to his superiors in Berlin: “In this way it
was possible, without the use of the word ‘National Socialism,’ to explain the nature of the
national socialist Weltanschauung before this extraordinary public, which also included
Dutch.”102
Despite the secrecy that was necessary to avoid arousing the suspicions of the Dutch
government, the Nazis proceeded with the curriculum changes in the Netherlands they felt
necessary to help strengthen Germandom in that country and educate the next generation of
German Nazis. On the one hand, there was the introduction of new subjects that more closely
aligned with the mindset of Nazi Germany. These included Rassenkunde, and neuzeitliche
Biologie,103 among others, and often their implementation came at the expense of other subjects,
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such as Greek language or mathematics.104 Moreover, traditional topics began to take on a
specifically national socialist bent. Geography lessons emphasized themes such as “blood and
soil,” “living space,” the “races of Germany,” while history lessons focused on the history of the
national socialist movement, Mein Kampf, and the changes that Hitler’s regime had introduced in
Germany since it came to power.105 In some instances, these changes took place relatively
quickly after similar changes were introduced in Germany. For example, the September 1933
directive of the German Interior Ministry mandating Rassenkunde in schools in the Reich was
followed by the introduction of “racial studies” and “contemporary biology” at the Kolleg St.
Ludwig in the 1934-35 school year.106 Given institutional hurdles of changing the lesson plan
during the school year, a quicker adoption of such nazified subject material is hardly
conceivable.
By the time of the German invasion, the German Schools in the Netherlands were largely
in lock step with their counterparts in Germany. This already existing system would provide
Schwarz with one of the main tools he thought useful for the spread of the Germanic ideal in the
Netherlands. All that was necessary, in Schwarz’s eyes, was the expansion and consolidation of
this system throughout the country, a task he was largely able to accomplish. In fact, the
expansion of the German Schools in the Netherlands was so dramatic that growing pains ensued
as a shortage of qualified teachers quickly became a problem, leading to the creation of teacher
retraining seminars held in Germany aimed at producing Dutch teachers with the proper
ideological mindset and pedagogical training to teach the next generation of German and proGerman Dutch students.
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Deutsche Schulen in den Niederlanden after the Nazi invasion
Shortly after his arrival in August 1940, Schwarz gained control over the German
Schools in the Netherlands. Up to that point, they had been the purview of the
Reichserziehungsministerium since 1934, and before that, of the Foreign Office, but from
October 1, 1940, they fell under the jurisdiction of the Reichskommissariat, and within that
institution, under Schwarz’s Hauptabteilung Erziehung und Kirchen.107 Although control of the
schools changed, their purpose largely remained intact—to protect the German community in the
Netherlands from the influence of the Dutch.108 At the same time however, two new entirely
purposes were added: the education of the next generation of Dutch leadership under a largely
German curriculum in a German context and the establishment of these schools as models for
their Dutch counterparts.109
When Schwarz arrived in the Netherlands in August 1940, he found eight German
schools that educated, in total, about eighteen hundred students.110 These included three
secondary schools in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, as well as mixed school in
Haarlem, and four primary schools in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, and Venlo.111 The
expansion of these German schools was of unmitigated importance to the German leadership in
the Netherlands, such that they subsidized the schools making them tuition free for students.
Already by March 1941, they had expanded the German School system in the Netherlands to
twenty schools, when they went on a founding spree and increased the number of German
schools to forty-three by the end of July. A year later, in July 1942, that number had increased to
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forty-nine schools serving nine thousand students in all areas of the country—only the province
of Zeeland lacked a German school—although a large proportion of these were concentrated on
or very near the German border.112 The number of German schools topped out at fifty such
institutions and ten thousand students in Schwarz’s last report in November 1943.113 At least
part, but certainly not all, of this increase was due to German occupiers sending their own
children to German schools; Dorothea Seyss-Inquart, the Reichskommissar’s younger daughter,
attended the German School in The Hague.114
Because of the increase in the number of schools, there was a constant need for teaching
personnel. Already at the beginning of the occupation, there was a shortage of qualified teachers.
By and large, the teachers at these schools in the 1930s were Dutch, as Dutch law required that
teachers in schools in the Netherlands have Dutch teaching certificates, although there were also
many Germans who had the necessary qualifications and thus also taught at these institutions.115
By 1940 however, that had changed as the Germans placed emphasis on recruiting German
teachers in these schools in order to strengthen their specifically German nature. They did this by
bringing in young teachers from Germany and placing them in these German schools on a
temporary basis. No matter the nationality of the teaching staff, however, there was a constant
shortage at most schools that needed to be addressed.116 There were two primary methods for
solving this problem. The first was trying to incentivize more German teachers to teach at the
German Schools, and when, necessary, to force their travel to Holland using the German
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government.117 The other method was to train Dutch teachers, primarily those who already had an
affinity for Germany and German culture, in the proper German way of doing things.
Already in October 1940, Dutch teachers were offered the option of taking retraining
courses in the German town of Oldenburg, after the completion of which, they could be placed as
teachers in German schools, both in the Reich proper and in the German Schools in the
Netherlands.118 Initially, these seminars were meant to, on the one hand, decrease the high
unemployment rate of teachers in the Netherlands, and, on the other, to increase the quality of
instruction offered by Dutch teachers at the German Schools in the Netherlands. At Oldenburg,
Dutch teachers were taught an array of subjects that would make them, in the eyes of their
German supervisors, more capable teachers of German students, including German educational
theory; racial studies; German language, history, poetry, geography, and ethnic studies; music;
and physical education.119 The re-education seminars, which admitted both men and women,
graded each of the teachers in the various subjects. Even by 1941, it is clear that the shortage of
teachers at German schools and in Germany was causing reductions in quality among teachers.
At the July and October 1941 sessions of the teacher training seminar in Oldenburg, most of the
students received, on a one to five scale, where one is excellent and five is inadequate, threes,
fours, and fives. Only a few of the students received a two in any subject, and none received a
one. The refrain that strict supervision of these teachers was necessary was quite common.120
The shortage of teachers in German Schools in the Netherlands was a constant theme
throughout the war period, especially as those young German teachers who had been brought to
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the Netherlands returned to Germany or were called into military service.121 Although one might
expect that the teacher training seminars in Oldenburg would have been heavily attended, at least
initially, once van Dam introduced his “reforms” for the education sphere in February 1941 that
partially aimed at reducing unemployment at Dutch schools, the impetus for young Dutch
teachers to go to retraining seminars in Germany declined. In the first year of the German
occupation, about one hundred Dutch teachers went through the teacher re-training course in
Oldenburg. The following year, only twenty did so, despite the fact that teachers at German
Schools were better paid and that service in such schools still counted as government service for
the purpose of Dutch state benefits.122 Moreover, the disappointing quality of these Dutch
teachers remained a constant source of concern in the upper levels of the Reichskommissariat. As
a result, the German leadership was left to trying to recruit teachers from Germany. They were
offered additional pay in the form of a per diem for German teachers willing to relocate to the
Netherlands. When this proved insufficient, they resorted to begging German government
officials in various locales for the release of teachers from their service in Germany and their
transfer to German schools in the Netherlands.123 These efforts were largely ineffective because
Germany was also experiencing a shortage of teachers as a result of the war effort, especially
after the invasion of the Soviet Union began, which only worsened as the war went on.
By 1942, Wimmer was forced to beg old colleagues in leading positions in Austrian
Reichsgaue for help with teaching personnel, but he met with only mixed results. The Gauleiter
of Styria, Siegfried Uiberreither, responded that of the 480 male teachers in his district, 300 had
been called into the military, necessitating the combining of classes and even entire schools, and
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thus sending Wimmer any teachers would be impossible. Friedrich Rainer, in Gau Kärnten,
responded that he was more of the mind to ask Wimmer for teachers than to send his own to
Holland. Baldur von Schirach (Vienna) and Albert Reitter (Salzburg) both responded that they
might be able to send some teachers later, but not now, and that they would get back to Wimmer
at some later date (they never did). Only August Eigruber, Gauleiter of Oberdonau, was able to
answer Wimmer’s request affirmatively, making four teachers available for service in the
Netherlands. Eventually, the shortage of teachers became so dire that, in 1943, the German
secondary school in Rotterdam, the oldest German school in the country, was forced to close
down. The following spring, the German secondary school in The Hague was threatened with the
same.124
Despite the setbacks that the Reichskommissariat encountered with the German Schools
in the Netherlands, the German leadership there was determined to press on. German Schools
were seen, not only as defenders of Germandom in the Netherlands, but as competitors for
students. According to Schwarz, if the niveau of German Schools could be raised, it would create
a positive feedback loop in which Dutch schools tried to keep up, thereby making the political
task of the Germans that much easier.125 Wimmer felt similarly regarding the importance of the
German Schools:
The German schools have the task of pushing forward the development of the Dutch school system. The
advantages of the complete education of the German school stand out clearly from the Dutch school, which
is generally good in practice, but too intellectual, so that every new German school establishment can act as
a new example in the sense of our schooling and education principles. … This influence of the German
schools, which follows from the very fact of its existence alone, but which is strengthened by constant
contact of the German teachers with Dutch teachers, will be steadily increasing, the better and more
exemplary the German schools are being developed.126
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The examples that both men discussed relate to not just the niveau of the schools, but also
the content of the courses taught within. In most German Schools, the subjects taught were more
similar to those taught in the Reich than in the Netherlands. Physical Education, for example, had
long been a component of the curriculum at German Schools. With the Nazi seizure of power,
subjects like “racial studies” became prevalent as well, as did the teaching of politics and history
along Nazified lines. Because Seyss-Inquart decreed that the schools should be made up of two
third Germans and one third Netherlanders, this content was certain to seep into the general
population eventually acting as a further influence upon the Dutch populace, especially as the
schools grew in importance and size.
Furthermore, the content that was being taught at these schools was clearly aimed at
conditioning the students to see the world through the lens of the Greater Germanic Reich
already coming into being. For the 1942 Reifeprüfung (the secondary school exit examination) at
the German secondary school in Rotterdam, which was at that time located in Bad Wörishofen,
Bavaria as a result of the Kinderlandverschickung, the graduating students were tasked with
writing an essay on the developments in the Netherlands since the occupation began. The student
respondents, who both received positive marks for the content of their essays but who also had
several grammatical errors, were clear in the purpose of the German occupation:
The Führer sent the Reichskommissar to the Netherlands with the clear and unambiguous assignment to
prepare the Netherlands for integration into the Greater Germanic living space. … I am firmly convinced
that we are on the correct and best path toward the realization of the Führer’s great mission and that the
Netherlands in the not too distant future will [become] a worthy member and strong cornerstone in the
Greater Germanic living space.127

The other student was of a similar mindset:
… From all these attempts, a people will be formed, ready to occupy its natural place, intended for it in the
Greater Germanic living space, and to see [itself] as an outpost of a firm block on the North Sea. For if
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Europe, or rather the Germanic race, wants to persist, it must not mutilate itself and waste valuable blood,
but must join forces to resist the attacks of the rest of the world in a strong and powerful way.128

As examples for the future of Dutch education, the German Schools in the Netherlands
experienced both success and failure. They had trouble with recruiting enough staff, but that was
a problem that was encountered throughout Germany as well and was not specific to German
International Schools. The huge increases in the student body of these schools and the
establishment boom that took place under Schwarz could only be, and in fact were, viewed quite
positively from the German perspective. It is more difficult to say what effect they had directly
on the Dutch system, however. While many of the changes that took place at the German schools
were carried over into Dutch schooling, this was not explicitly because the Dutch leadership of
the Education Department saw the examples set by the German Schools and wanted to emulate
them, rather it was because the Nazis were ultimately in charge of Dutch education. Whether
they would have eventually provided the desired example, as Schwarz and Wimmer predicted
they would, remains pure speculation, although, given the generally negative view of the German
occupation held by most Netherlanders, it seems highly unlikely. In either case, neither man
believed the change would happen overnight and so the short period of German dominance
proved too short to have a lasting influence, and in that sense, they were a failure. Regardless,
the German Schools in the Netherlands were not the only schools that were representative of the
“direct route” that Schwarz discussed in his reports back to the Party Chancellery. The other type
of schools were also German institutions, but unlike the German Schools, were meant
specifically and only for the future elite of the proposed Greater Germanic Reich—the NIVO and
the Reichsschulen.
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Nederlandsche instelling voor volksche opvoeding (NIVO)129
On August 12, 1941 in a nationally broadcast speech van Dam announced several major
changes to Dutch education. A short paragraph toward the end of the speech that had not been
contained in any of the draft versions was inserted which announced the formation of so-called
Nederlandsche instellingen voor volksche opvoeding, or NIVO (Dutch Institutes for Völkisch
Education).130 The reason for its late addition to the speech is unclear, but was likely because this
was one development of which van Dam did not personally approve, although this was only
because the NIVO, in many ways, was an attempt to circumvent van Dam’s personal authority in
the Education Department.131 Van Dam did not personally support the creation of the NIVO;
what work he did on its behalf was, apparently, merely because Schwarz presented the NIVO to
him as a fait accompli.132
The development of the NIVO as one possible “direct route” toward the Germanicization
of Dutch youth had been under consideration for the better part of a year by the time it was
announced to the public.133 The idea was that the Dutch, as ethnic and racial kin to the German
people, needed an institution similar to the Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten (National
Political Education Institutes, or Napola) that had been operating in Nazi Germany since shortly
after the Nazi seizure of power.134 The goal of the Napola was the select education along national
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socialist lines of the next generation of the German bureaucratic elite and had as their spiritual
forefathers the British public school system, the military cadet academies of the Kaiserreich and
the Landerziehungsheimen.135 Where the military cadet academies were to produce future
officers for the German military, the Napola was to produce the leadership in the political war
for the future. Like the British public school, the Napola would produce the ruling elites of the
coming generations, and like the country education homes, the Napolas were boarding schools
that placed a special emphasis on one’s connection to the land. All in all, they were models of the
Nazi view of what ideal education in a national socialist world would look like.
Education in the German Napolas had a similar focus to the various later “reforms” that
would be implemented in the Netherlands by the German occupiers and their Dutch
collaborators. There was an increased emphasis on those subjects thought to be most beneficial
to the creation of future Germans such as history, racial studies, music, physical education and
sport, politics, German language, biology, and geography. At the same time, other subjects were
deemphasized, including mathematics, foreign languages, and religious instruction. The schools
offered a “complete education,”136 and in many cases, offered additional courses such as
horseback riding, automobile driving, and sailing, that lent them the veneer of elite schools for
the sons of the wealthy, even though they drew students from all social classes.137 This was made
even more prominent by the focus of the Napolas upon education in a camp-like setting, rather
than in school buildings. Especially as the war went on, and the Germans resorted to sending
children to the countryside to escape bombing raids in the Kinderlandverschickung, which many
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Napolas took part in, the ability to fuse education via the Napolas with political acculturation via
service in the Hitler Youth allowed students to receive the type of “total education” most revered
by Nazi educational theorists.138
Like many aspects of Nazi bureaucracy, the Napolas were the center of a power struggle
between the regular government, in the form of German Minister of Education Bernhard Rust,
and the institutions of the party, especially the mass organizations such as the SS.139 Whereas the
Nazi party had managed to establish the Adolf-Hitler-Schulen, that would prepare the next
generation of party leadership, the SS had no such direct institution, so it was little surprise that
Himmler attempted to co-opt the Napola for his own purposes. Rust, however, was mostly able
at least initially to keep the SS at bay and maintain his own authority over the Napolas, of which
there were more than forty throughout Germany by the later war period.140 By 1936, however,
with the appointment of SS-Obergruppenführer August Heissmeyer as Inspector of the Napola,
the SS began to make inroads into the institution and turn it ever more into an institution of racial
and ideological indoctrination, although, formally, the Napolas remained under the control of the
German Education Ministry.141
A similar dynamic threatened to play out in the Netherlands with the creation of the
NIVO. There were, for all intents and purposes, three sides in the mix. The first was that of the
Reichskommissariat itself, including especially Wimmer and Schwarz who were mainly
concerned with maintaining their own authority over educational installations in the occupied
Netherlands. The second group was that of the SS in Germany, in the form of Heissmeyer, who
also had Himmler’s support and who hoped to control the Dutch institutions via his power center
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in the Reich, while the third side was that of the NSB, specifically the Mussert wing of the party,
which was entirely against the idea for fear of it being an institution of Germanization, which
was at odds with the Diets ideology of the Mussert wing of the party.142
The initial impetus for the creation of the NIVO lay with Wimmer, who took up contact
with Heissmeyer in November 1940 suggesting the creation of a Napola-like institution for the
education of the elite of the next generation of Dutch youth.143 The question was, however, how
to go about erecting such an institution while keeping all of the players satisfied with the
eventual outcome. There were several potential options that were considered. First was the
establishment of a Napola in the Netherlands but that was generally ruled out as a violation of
Seyss-Inquart’s sole authority over the political indoctrination of the Dutch people. Moreover, it
was feared that the creation of such a school might engender fears among the Dutch about the
annexation of the Netherlands into the Reich. The second was the creation of an NSB-oriented
institution, but that too was ruled out because the NSB’s conception of education was at odds
with the Germans’ goals.144 The third option was the creation of the NIVO. The NIVO could be a
singularly Dutch institution, funded by the Reichskommissariat but whose mission was
essentially similar to that of the Napola in Germany. By mid-1941, this third option had been
decided upon and work began for the creation of such a school.145
After much back and forth, the former Koningsheide Sanatorium in the village of
Schaarsbergen near Arnhem, which had been first occupied and then relinquished by the German
military, was chosen as the site for the first NIVO. Over the summer of 1941, advertisements
were spread out across the country in order to recruit the appropriate youth to attend the school.
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While their previous academic qualifications were taken into consideration, the most important
selection criteria for the some 500 hundred applicants were their physical state and their racial
qualities.146 In the end, after two rounds of selection in which applicants were put through various
tests to determine their qualifications, only twenty were chosen to attend the first class at the
NIVO Koningsheide, although they were accompanied by a smaller group of German students
from the Napola Bensberg, near Cologne, in order to ensure that the right cultural values were
maintained in the school.147 The school officially opened in September 1941, with trials for the
second and third cohorts held in November.148
For their part, the teachers were chosen carefully. Schwarz had been on the search for
appropriate Dutch teachers for most of 1941.149 Those he selected were sent to various Napolas
in Germany for several months so that they could be trained in the appropriate educational
methods by their German colleagues. There were seven Dutch teachers in total, six of whom
were chosen from the ranks of the NSB, but importantly, all were believers in the Greater
Germanic ideal and did not stem from the Diets wing of the party. The sole exception was a
teacher from the NSNAP-van Rappard, the most extreme of the minor Nazi parties which
advocated for a direct re-incorporation of the Netherlands into the German Reich. Both the
school head and the head of instruction were Dutch.150 In addition to these seven Dutch teachers,
several teachers from the Napola Bensberg were sent to NIVO Koningsheide, including the chief
of staff who stood as second in command of the institution.151
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The fate of the NIVO Koningsheide was not what the Germans had hoped for. As it
would turn out, the various political entanglements between the German and Dutch sides proved
too great to overcome.152 Although it had originally supported the idea of the NIVO, the NSB
soon resorted to an active anti-NIVO propaganda campaign, similar to the way their campaigns
against the German Schools in the Netherlands had been orchestrated.153 In short, these
institutions went against everything that the Mussert wing of the party stood for in the realm of
education and so could not be supported by the Mussert Movement.154 The Germans, especially
the SS faction, wanted the school to be controlled from Germany so as to make the NIVO as
similar to the Napolas as possible; the NSB wanted to control the school themselves. The Dutch
side wanted a school for only Dutch students, but the Germans, especially Heissmeyer and his
lieutenant Wilhelm Kemper, who had temporarily run the Napola at Bensberg and was sent to
the Netherlands to get things in Koningsheide in order, wanted a school that included German
students from the Reich. The NSB saw the German language as, at best, the first foreign
language, while the Germans wanted German to be the language of instruction.155
Moreover, Seyss-Inquart was dissatisfied with the quality of the education being given to
the students. This was, according to Seyss-Inquart, a result of the lack of political awareness of
the Dutch teachers, which is not terribly surprising given that their training had consisted of little
more than a couple of months at German institutions. In one example of such inappropriate
political indoctrination, a student asked the school head and P.E. teacher Bossong, whether a
person should give his seat in a full tram to a Jewish woman. After polling the class as to the
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correct answer, Bossong, replied that, of course one should give up their seat in such a
situation.156 This was, obviously, not the politically acceptable type of instruction expected at
such an august institution.
Finally, the problems of the NIVO were exacerbated by a lack of demand on the part of
Dutch students to attend the NIVO, as those same students could get many of the advantages of
attendance of the NIVO by attending one of the, by this point, several dozen German Schools in
the Netherlands. Yet, by February 1942, Seyss-Inquart was in contact with Himmler regarding
the establishment of actual Napolas in the Netherlands that would be based on the Greater
Germanic ideal. By the end of April, shortly after the Easter holiday, the school was shut down,
with the building reverting back to Luftwaffe control and the majority of the students being sent
to the Napola in Bensberg.157
The Reichsschulen
When the NIVO experiment ended in failure because of opposition from all sides, the
German regime in the Netherlands and their counterparts in the Reich turned to a new
educational institute that would better serve their purposes—the Reichsschulen. This time, there
would be no mistakes. Because the NIVO had been created through the apparatus of the Dutch
state, several sides, including van Dam and the NSB were able to attempt to influence the
institution. The Reichsschulen were created directly by the Reichskommissariat itself, completely
outside the purview of the Dutch government and securely under German control.158 The very
name of the institutions signified this explicit connection to Germany and disconnect from the
Netherlands. Although the Reichsschulen were supposed to be near carbon copies of the German
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Napola, Himmler and Seyss-Inquart, with Hitler’s blessing, chose the name “Reich School”
because they felt that National-Political Education Institute should be reserved for institutions
within Germany, but also wanted to signal that the education provided at these schools would
serve the future elite of the Greater Germanic Reich.159
As with the NIVO, there was some concern within the German side who, exactly, would
be in control of the institution. On the one hand, there was the question of which entities in the
Reich would control the Reichsschulen, with both Reichserziehungsminister Rust and Himmler
vying for complete control. The result was a sort of reversal of the status of the Napola in
Germany, with Himmler directly controlling the Reichsschulen and the German Education
Ministry offering support, while in Germany the Napolas were controlled, technically, by the
Education Ministry with the SS offering support.160 On the side of the Reichskommissariat, the
exact opposite happened, with the schools being technically under the jurisdiction of Wimmer’s
Generalkommissariat für Verwaltung und Justiz, but with any and all SS oriented issues going
through Rauter’s office.161
There were two such institutions, one for boys in Valkenburg and one for girls in
Heythuysen, both in the southeastern province of Limburg, although Himmler had wanted to
create a third school in 1944, but a lack of funds and the Allied invasion prevented the
establishment of this third institution.162 On June 23, 1942, the Deutsche Zeitung in den
Niederlanden published a lengthy report on the plans on its front page calling for applicants. The
newspaper noted that these schools were “not intended for the broad masses, rather [would] take
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in students, who are able to demonstrate their special spiritual, temperamental, and physical
aptitude in a strict selection procedure.”163 The “Reichsschulen want to educate their students
into strong, active, self-sufficient boys and girls, that the new Europe urgently needs.”164
Moreover, selection would not be based on the material means of the parents; any qualified
student would be admitted regardless of financial ability to pay. The education would be similar
in nature to a regular Dutch secondary school, but “but beyond that, they [the Reichsschulen]
give and demand significantly more.” After successful completion, students would be free to
choose any course of study at any university or enter any occupation they saw fit. The call for
applicants asked for boys between the ages of ten and eleven and girls between ten and
thirteen.165
The purpose of these institutions, and their connection to the Napolas in Germany was
spelled out explicitly:
The idea that was decisive in founding the Napola [in Germany] was to secure the next generation of
leaders for the Greater German Reich created by Adolf Hitler. After this war, however, it will be a matter
of securing the next generation of leaders for the Greater Germanic Community in the new Europe. For this
reason, the establishment of the Reichsschulen in the Netherlands on the model of the Napola is justified,
since the Netherlands will be a constituent [part] of the Greater Germanic-European community. This all
the more justifies the entitlement of the Reichsschulen in the Netherlands to take over the education of
German children as well as the education of Dutch children, since the Dutch should also be represented in
this ideologically, temperamentally, and spiritually uniformly trained leadership class. 166

Seyss-Inquart was of a similar mind about the purpose of these schools. In a letter to Himmler
during their initial discussions regarding the replacement of the NIVO with the Reichsschulen, he
noted that
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language, for example, so that Dutch is the native language, but German is the overall Germanic language
of spirit and mutual understanding. 167

Or, in the words of Heissmeyer, who oversaw the two Reichsschulen in the Netherlands, the
purpose of the Reichsschulen was to strongly bind the “Germanic tribes with the Germanic
heartland—and that is Germany.”168 There can be no mistaking that these schools were meant to
produce the leadership of the future Greater Germanic Reich.
The Reichsschule for boys was located in a former Jesuit monastery, the St. Ignatius
College, which had stood on the site since the 1870s.169 The Jesuits were kicked out of the
monastery in July 1942, when the local SD commander, with several SS officers and German
soldiers in tow, came to occupy the grounds. The friars were given only a few hours to prepare
their belonging before being sent via truck to their new locations. The official reason given was
that the buildings were a military necessity. The next month, the preparations for the conversion
of the former monastery into the Reichsschule for boys began.170
It formally opened in September 1942 with a not insignificant carryover from the NIVO
Koningsheide in Schaarsbergen. Wilhelm Kemper, Heissmeyer’s assistant who had significant
experience with the NIVO and was previously an interim head of the Napola at Bensberg, was
tasked with leading the new institution, although because his presence in the Hague was
necessary, an adjutant was put in place as chief-of-staff.171 This was E. Debusmann, who had
previously served in the same role at the NIVO, and who, prior to his work at the NIVO, had
worked at the Napola in Bensberg as well. There was a total of nine teachers, two of which had
previously served at the NIVO and had been sent with those students to Bensberg in spring 1942.
Most were members of Germanic organizations, including three who were members of the
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Waffen SS. All, save one, were proponents of the Greater Germanic ideal, rather than the Diets
ideals of the NSB. The lone outlier, the art teacher, seems to have been a complete fluke. It was
only when he arrived at Valkenburg that he realized he was working at an explicitly Nazi school,
but he stayed on because if he left and was unable to find other work, he could be sent to
Germany as part of the forced labor drafts.172
The student body was mixed, with sixty-six Germans and fifty-seven Netherlanders,
which was slightly below the desired two-thirds German preference.173 Of those sixty-six German
students, thirty-eight had been transferred from the Napola in Bensberg in order to strengthen the
German element, especially because the majority of the Dutch students had difficulty with the
German language, which was the sole language of instruction.174 The number of Dutch students
actually climbed the following year such that they became a majority, threatening the German
nature of the school.175 The education these students received was also heavily German, that is,
German language instruction was given the heaviest emphasis in academic subjects. In addition
to German language and physical education, the students also received instruction in music, art,
Dutch language, mathematics, history, geography, and English. French language and the hard
sciences were not taught at all, while Dutch language was given second footing, with only two
lesson hours per week, compared to the five hours given to German language instruction.
Physical education, which was also given top billing next to German language, was divided into
several different specialties, including light athletics, gymnastics, and even shooting, although
shooting was reserved for the higher classes.176
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Great emphasis was placed upon the military element at the school, which was supposed
to foster a sense of community. The students did everything together. They woke together and
went to the flag raising in the morning in columns. The students would then eat together,
participate in sports together and, of course, go to class together. In the evening it was again a
community experience as the flag was lowered together. Even at night, students marched to their
dormitories in columns. Military precision was key. In addition, the students were given
extraordinary tasks in which they looked after the school and each other. For example, one
student would be in charge of making sure that the lights went out at night and that the other
students were actually resting during the lights out period. Older students took charge of younger
students as well. Even the teachers were included in this, for they too lived on site, and were
required to be available at any and all times. The teachers were to act as models for the good
behavior of the students, especially those who were at any given time tasked with supervising the
daily operations of the school and the students, a position which rotated among the teachers
every couple of days.177
Once the children got older, they were expected to go out into the world and fulfill a
Landdienst,178 which was a requirement of the upper levels of the Napolas in Germany as well. In
the last year of the Reichsschule for boys, the highest levels, those students who were seventeen
and eighteen, were actually sent to the Warthegau to help with the harvest. So confident were the
German supervisors that they sent the boys not to politically reliable farmers, but to those who
were politically suspect, believing that the hard-working boys of the Reichsschule would bring
their suspicious hosts around to the proper way of thinking.179
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The parents, too, were largely happy with the education provided for their children,
establishing a parents’ committee that raised additional funds for the school. Of course, part of
this was also likely because their children no longer had to endure harassment at regular Dutch
schools by their fellow students and teachers, as all of the children at the Reichsschule were proGerman.180 In fact, the school was so highly thought of that it received visits from all of the
major players of the Dutch occupation. Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, Schwarz,
Reichserziehungsminister Rust and Heissmeyer all paid visits to the school. In February 1944,
even the Reichsführer-SS himself, Heinrich Himmler, visited the school. By nearly everyone’s
estimation, the Reichsschule in Valkenburg was a stunning success.181
But the glossy picture painted by the Reichskommissariat and the SS was hiding deeper
problems. As might be expected, the NSB largely opposed the school. Its opposition only grew
when, after the initial class was matriculated, the majority of those students who had previously
belonged to the NJS were recruited to the Hitler Youth. This was all the more problematic
because Hitler Youth membership had previously been limited to German students, so the
inclusion of Dutch students, which Debusmann had advocated for, angered the NSB even
more.182 Van Genechten, who had been opposed to the use of German language as the primary
instruction language at the NIVO was equally opposed to the Reichsschule for the same reason.
He was not wrong that it was causing problems, for many of the Dutch students did not have the
necessary command of the German language, and it was feared that their education was being
hurt as a result; his objections were ignored.183
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There were also concerns on the German side that the SS was not influential enough,
despite the fact that the head of the school was himself an SS man. Heissmeyer wanted to make
sure that all decisions regarding students and teachers went through the SS-Hauptamt in Berlin,
while all other matters went through his own office, and not through the Reichskommissariat,
which was footing the bill. In his reply, which seems to have satisfied Heissmeyer, Klemper
noted that the question of choosing teachers and selecting students was run through the handselected deputy of Rauter, who himself was Himmler’s personal representative and protege in the
Netherlands. Despite the strict selection criteria that were used in the selection of teachers,
Debusmann, the school’s chief of staff, complained in his initial report to The Hague that the
teachers treated the students as a junior officer might treat raw recruits. One teacher even
resorted to punching and kicking children to get them into line.184
Despite the difficulties that the school faced initially, it did manage to function
adequately for two full years. It probably would have continued to function except that by
summer 1944, Allied armies were firmly established in Northern France. Valkenburg, situated as
it was in the very south of the Netherlands, was quite exposed to Allied forces, and so the
Germans decided to evacuate the students and teachers to Germany. Before the beginning of the
1944-45 school year, the school was evacuated in its entirety first to Napola Bensberg, and
eventually to the Napola Naumburg am Saale, southwest of Leipzig, where the teachers and
students stayed until further Allied advances pushed them north to the Napola Plön in SchleswigHolstein. It was there that the remaining students experienced the German defeat.185 But in what
must truly stand as a testament to the success of the education the students at Valkenburg
received, at least nine of the older boys opted to join the Waffen-SS in January 1945. Even
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though the noose was clearly closing in on Germany’s neck, true faith in the ultimate Nazi
victory could still be found.186
The Reichsschule at Valkenburg was accompanied by a similarly named institution for
girls at Heythuysen, just to the northwest of Roermond. But if the school in Valkenburg was a
relative success, the girls’ school was an abject failure. For the most part, the blame for this lay
with the person chosen to direct the school, Julia op ten Noort. Op ten Noort was the daughter of
a minor noble house; her brother was also active in Nazi politics and, in addition to working with
the Royal Marechaussee was appointed to head the Sub-Department Higher Education in the
Education Department in fall 1941.187 Julia op ten Noort had a long history in Nazi politics as
well, dating to well before the Nazi invasion. In the split in the NSB that occurred between the
Diets and Groot-Germaans wings of the party in the latter half of the thirties, op ten Noort stood
solidly on Rost van Tonningen’s Greater Germanic side. It had been her, she claimed, that had
arranged the first meeting between Rost and Heinrich Himmler in 1937.188 She had also been
instrumental in to the creation of the Dutch Nationaal-Socialistische Vrouwenorganisatie which
was officially separate from the NSB.189 Op ten Noort hoped to bring this organization around to
the Greater Germanic thinking as well, which would have stood in direct conflict with the NSB’s
Diets ideology, but was unsuccessful in doing so, eventually being pushed out of the
organization in early 1941.190 Finally, along with Rost, op ten Noort attempted to create a
separate youth organization, De Nederlandsche Jeugd, a co-educational organization oriented
along Greater Germanic lines, and even accompanied fifty former NJS members to Berlin in
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summer 1940, but that effort too fizzled out. The children were not as enthusiastic about the
Greater Germanic concept as op ten Noort herself was.191
Later in 1941, as plans were being made for the NIVO, Himmler, who had a soft spot for
the baroness, interceded with van Dam, via Rauter and Wimmer, to get op ten Noort appointed to
lead the planned NIVO for girls. The problem was, however, that she had absolutely no
experience in the education realm beyond the three years of gymnasium she completed as a
child. She had never attended higher education, taught, or directed a school in any way, but she
had good contacts with high ranking Nazis and the right ideological outlook and so she got the
job.192 Because of her lack of necessary experience, she was shipped to Germany to take a crash
course at the two Napolas for girls in order to learn her trade. By the time she had returned, in
February 1942, the NIVO experiment had been scrapped in favor of a Reichsschule, the
directorship of which she also received.193
Plans for the establishment of the school had not gone as well as the school for boys and
so when the first students arrived in fall 1942 in Heythuysen, they were put to work getting the
former monastery—the St. Elizabeth Monastery—ready for use as a school. There were forty
students selected from a larger group of six-hundred, fifty applicants, all of whom were selected
for their health and racial qualities by the same SS-Hauptsturmführer Aust that had been
instrumental in selecting the students for Valkenburg.194 The teachers for the school were
selected mostly by op ten Noort herself, which, given her own background, did not bode well for
the functioning of the school, even though Kemper took part in the process as well. The average
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teacher at Heythuysen was a young woman under thirty who, like op ten Noort herself, had only
a middling education; only two had any academic training.195
In terms of the education provided for the girls, it was essentially similar to that provided
for the students at the Napolas for girls in Germany, and included math, biology, history,
physical education, geography, home economics, agriculture, and German. Additionally, there
were Dutch language courses for the German students, which stood in stark contrast to the
Reichsschule in Valkenburg, where the Dutch students had to learn German.196 The education
the girls received at Heythuysen, however, was clearly directed at their planned future place as
mothers in the coming Greater Germanic Reich. In an advertisement for the school in the NSBconnected magazine Werkend Volk, where education at traditional schools, such as the
gymnasium or the HBS were predicated on little difference between men and women:
Education at the Reichsschule is, on the other hand, is precisely tailored to that difference. … Certainly, we
imagine the wife as a housewife, but then as head of a family in all daily difficulties, as a comrade of the
man whom she promised to follow through life, and who promised to help, to support and to care for her.
…
Sport is also in its entirety adapted to the feminine. Here [there will not be] military exercises as in
Valkenburg, here [there will be] no hardening as with the boys. Here the purpose is much more focused on
the healthy, flexible, [and] resilient body… A school where children are prepared for life in a way that
actually has never been done before…
They will all later play a confident role in society, they will occupy leading roles, but they must be in the
first place spouses and mothers—that is thus “women.” This school will make them such, that is its duty to
the community of the coming Greater Germanic Reich.197

Despite the lofty ideals portrayed by the school, however, it was unsuccessful in almost
every way.198 Unlike in Valkenburg, the parents complained about the education given and the
building was unkempt such that disease was common forcing some girls to be sent home.199 NJS
students were treated as second-class students; op ten Noort took a provocative attitude in stark
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contrast to Debusmann at Valkenburg. Both had favored the Hitler Youth over the NJS, but
where Debusmann advocated mutual respect between the two groups at the school and for the
opening of the Hitler Youth to Dutch students thereby diffusing the tension, op ten Noort
enflamed the animosities between the two groups by obviously privileging the League of
German Girls over the NJS.200 A former teacher at one of the Napolas in Germany, Elfriede
Hiess, was installed as assistant director of the school, and she found that instruction was
lacking; the teachers at Heythuysen were as ill-prepared for their functions as op ten Noort was
for hers.201 In early 1943, op ten Noort followed through in her teachings regarding motherhood
when she became pregnant by an unknown SS officer during a visit to Berlin—it was rumored
that the father was Himmler himself owing to the child, who was born in early 1944, being
named Heinrich. She was sent to a Lebensborn house in Bavaria and would not return to the
school.202 Directorship of the school was handed over to the assistant for the remainder of the
school year, but that was all. When the students were released for summer vacation, plans were
made to transfer the school to the Napola for girls at Reichenau on Lake Constance, but only
nine of the girls actually went to Germany.203
Conclusion
The German International Schools, the NIVO, and the Reichsschulen were the extent of
the “direct route” that the Germans took during the occupation. The German International
Schools encountered undeniable success during the occupation, increasing in both total number
and student population, receiving benefits from the state, and obtaining full legal equality for the
German-style education within the larger Dutch state. On the other hand, this success was
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directly a result of support offered by the Reichskommissariat, not because of any inherent
advantages these schools offered their students. This is all the more surprising because of the
strict opposition of the NSB to these schools, as NSB children would have been a natural fit for
the Dutch element there.204 Had the occupation regime’s support for these schools been less, they
likely would not have encountered the success they did, instead languishing in the state of
relative obscurity and unimportance that they had been in before the occupation began.
For their part, the NIVO and the Reichsschule for girls were both failures, while the
Reichsschule for boys was more of a mixed bag. All three institutions encountered stiff
resistance from the NSB and had little support within the Dutch bureaucracy. These were, for all
intents and purposes, entirely German affairs. But unlike in Germany, the structural support was
not available in the Netherlands. The Netherlands did not have the long history of internment
schools or military academies that served as precursors of sorts to the Napolas in Germany. Nor
did the Nazi regime enjoy the support of the Dutch people in any way similar to the support the
Nazi government in Germany received from German citizens. Given these setbacks, the school
in Valkenburg, in particular, must be seen as a relative success. In two years, the regime
managed to create an institution that was generally well regarded by both the teachers, students,
parents, and the regime itself, which was no mean feat, especially considering the fate of the
other institutions.
But there was one way in which the direct path was entirely ineffective—as models for
Dutch education. This was mostly due to the lack of time involved and the relatively closeted
nature of the various institutions. Most of the German International Schools and both of the
Reichsschulen were located very near the German border, far away from the densely populated
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provinces of the Randstad. And while there were German schools in the large cities of the
western provinces, they were small in comparison to the much larger numbers of Dutch schools.
Furthermore, their ability to serve as models for Dutch schools was limited by the relatively short
rule of the German regime in the Netherlands and, especially, the general antipathy the Dutch
populace displayed toward their German overlords and any local representatives of that regime.
Ultimately, the changing tide of the war brought an end to the direct path toward
Germanicization for both the German Schools and the two Reichsschulen. The overwhelming
majority of the German International Schools closed shortly after the war ended, while the two
Reichsschulen did not even survive that long.
In the next two chapters, the focus turns to the “indirect route” for the Germanicization of
the Netherlands. This path involved the introduction of “reforms” into Dutch schools directly,
with the aim of cultivating a new cultural identity among Dutch students. Unfortunately for the
German occupiers, their efforts in this realm would be equally ineffective, and because of the
increasingly repressive nature of the regime, there would be even less time for the “indirect
route” to become effective than for the “direct route” through German institutions.
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Chapter 5 - The Indirect Path to Germanicization
We Germans, who go through this land with an eye that is sharpened by understanding for the value of bonds of
blood and the decay of blood in a people, rejoice in the Dutch people. We rejoice over the children, we wish, that the
boys here become brave, powerful, and energetic and that the girls become happy mothers in large families. Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart, May 29, 19401

In his speech to the Dutch nation held in the Ridderzaal of the Binnenhof in The Hague
on May 29, 1940, the newly installed Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart told the Dutch
nation, “We do not come here to oppress and destroy a nation, and to take liberty from a country
… We do not want to imperialistically put this country and its people in a tight spot, nor impose
our political convictions on them.”2 This would prove to be a hollow promise. Over the next five
years, the German occupiers in the Netherlands did make a maximum effort to ingrain within the
Dutch populace the notion that they were, like the German nation itself, members of a larger
Germanic community of peoples. This expanded community was to be the future leaders of
Europe with all other peoples, Slavs, Southern Europeans, and minority populations such as
Jews, slated to be, at best, second class citizens in the new Nazi controlled Europe, or, at worst,
eliminated entirely.
In the Netherlands, this process took many forms. In his initial mandate from the Nazi
leadership in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was tasked with winning over the Dutch populace through
peaceful means. As fellow “Aryans,” the Dutch were to be treated relatively well and they were
to be convinced, rather than cajoled, into joining Hitler’s Germanic project or in the words of
Schwarz, “to move the Dutch volk to a positive collaboration in the Greater Germanic realm.”3
As a result, the German leadership in the Netherlands initially settled on a course of relatively
benign stewardship over the Dutch, Christian population aimed at inculcating Nazi values
“Rijkscommissaris Rijksminister Seyss-Inquart aanvaardt zijn ambt,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, May 30, 1940,
sec. Eerste Blad.
2
Ibid.
3
NIOD 020/2047.
1

200
through various initiatives, but, as the Nazis fully recognized, key among these initiatives was
their stewardship of the youth, and key to that was their control of the schools.4 As has been
noted by other historians, this process, in many ways, mirrored the process of Gleichschaltung in
Germany itself.5 But, as I argue, the process of gelijkschakeling in the Netherlands included not
only the process of coordination as found in Germany, but also a second level of cultural
development aimed at turning the independent-minded Dutch nation into members of the Greater
Germanic Reich. It was a process aimed at bringing the Dutch back into the Germanic fold from
which it had ostensibly deviated, as so many German nationalist and völkisch thinkers had
argued for decades prior.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the German leadership in the educational realm saw
two paths toward the Germanicization of Dutch youth via education. The direct path, which
focused on German educational institutions, and the indirect path, which focused on Dutch
institutions. This chapter focuses on the administrative and curricular changes that the Germans
and their Dutch collaborators introduced during the first year and one half of the occupation that
fall along the indirect path that Schwarz envisioned. These included the removal of Jewish
persons from the schools, the school book control commission, attempts at suppressing the
influence of the confessions in education, and attempts to increase the power of the state
apparatus. This chapter further looks at the developments in educational organization, including
the attempted reorganization of primary education and the attempts to introduce new subjects
while changing the weight other subjects were given in the curriculum.
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Depending on the perspective taken, these efforts can be seen as either an astounding
success or a relative failure. The German leadership, especially Schwarz, certainly thought them
to be a great achievement, and stated as much in multiple reports back to the Party Chancellery,
as well as in letters to other colleagues.6 Despite that outlook, however, these attempted changes
to education were only a success to the extent that official rules had been changed. When one
dives further and looks at whether those changes were actually reflected at the local level
through the work of teachers and administrators on the ground, the astounding successes appear
much less amazing. Most of the attempted changes were only partially implemented whether
because of a lack of necessary resources or because of administrative and logistical restraints.
And of course, even when those structural challenges could be overcome, the resistance of
teachers and administrators blocked the occupiers’ path forward.
Because this chapter focuses on the higher-level attempts by the Germans and their Dutch
collaborators to change education in the Netherlands, the focus here will remain on SeyssInquart, Friedrich Wimmer, Heinrich Schwarz, and Jan van Dam. Although these individuals
had significant support from lower ranking bureaucrats and other individuals, this chapter will
not dwell on the efforts of these lower level operatives in detail. A closer look at the events on
the ground at the local level, which will include the efforts of the extraordinary school inspectors
as well as reactions by Dutch teachers, parents, and students, will follow in chapter seven.
Anti-Jewish Measures
The first incursions of the German occupation into the education sphere were not
actually directed at educational institutions specifically. Rather, they were directed at the
Netherlands’ Jewish population and directly affected education only because some teachers,
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administrators, and students were Jewish. Using as an excuse that the legal Dutch government
had fled to London, Seyss-Inquart decreed on August 20, 1940 that the Reichskommissariat
could hire and dismiss civil servants as necessary.7 A similar order the following month, on
September 13, incorporated any institutions that received financial assistance from the state
under the purview of the Reichskommissariat’s hiring and firing authority—confessional schools
were explicitly named as one such institutional form.8 In the interim, on August 28,
Commissioner-General Wimmer sent instructions to the College of Secretaries-General ordering
that no Jewish persons be hired or promoted in the Civil Service, an order that was in direct
violation of several clauses of the Dutch constitution, which was quickly noted by the College.9
When the obvious questions came regarding who, exactly, was to be considered Jewish, circulars
from the Reichskommissariat were dispatched on September 30, followed by an official decree
October 22, that defined anyone with two Jewish grandparents as Jewish. Those grandparents
were considered Jewish if they had taken part in the Jewish religious community.10
On October 17, the occupation authority sent orders, via the College of SecretariesGeneral, to all government departments demanding that civil servants fill out one of two forms,
declaring whether or not they were “aryan,” specifically asking the respondents whether they had
“Jewish blood, ” which, according to the instructions forwarded with the forms meant any person
with a single grandparent who had been a member of the Jewish community.11 Most civil
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servants, whether Jewish or Gentile, signed the forms without recognizing the danger in helping
the occupation create a registry of Jewish civil servants. Despite the willingness of most civil
servants to sign the form, the so-called Aryan Attestation was met with some protests in the
educational sector. Ben Telders, Professor of International Law at Leiden University, appealed
to the High Court in an appeal that went unanswered, while Paul Scholten, Professor of Law at
the University of Amsterdam, organized a petition to be sent directly to Seyss-Inquart in
protest.12 It, too, was ignored. At the same time, the teachers and administrators of the
Amsterdam Lyceum and one Christian school in The Hague refused to sign the forms as a group.
Student groups at various universities across the country sent their own petitions to the
Reichskommissar protesting the Aryan Attestation, some gaining thousands of signatures, but
these petitions had no more effect as Telders’s. Protests were not limited to the educational
sphere, either, as both the Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed churches spoke publicly, from
the pulpit, in protest. But the protesters were, almost always, a minority among a much larger
group of their colleagues all too willing to return the forms back up the chain. Protesting the
Aryan Attestation was one thing, but a willingness to quit in the face of the Germans’ demands
was quite another.13
The Aryan Attestation set the stage for the dismissal of Jewish civil servants, including
teachers and other instructional faculties, from their posts. This was ordered by Seyss-Inquart,
via Wimmer, on November 4, 1940, but, importantly, not as an official decree published in the
Official Register for the Occupied Dutch Territories, as other official decrees had been and
would continue to be. Rather the order came as a circular to the various departments. It was
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almost as if he hoped to slide the order in under the door, where it was less likely to be noticed.14
Almost immediately, in the face of protests from the Secretaries-General, the Germans agreed to
making the dismissals “temporary” and allowed the newly dismissed Jewish civil servants to
retain some of their pay and pensions. Although this concession did bring the acquiescence of the
Secretaries-General, the promises were broken quickly, when in late 1940, the dismissals were
made permanent.15
Public resistance to the dismissals of Jewish civil servants was more widespread than it
had been to the Aryan Attestation of the previous month. In perhaps the most famous event, on
November 26, three weeks after the circular was published to the various governmental
departments, Professor Rudolph Cleveringa, Dean of the Faculty of Law at Leiden University,
delivered a damning speech against the dismissal of a Jewish colleagues. Held in the main hall of
the Academy Building and attended by numerous faculty and students, Cleveringa’s
denunciation of the occupiers’ anti-Jewish measures was transcribed by a student in attendance
and quickly spread throughout the country. In an attempt to disrupt the Germans’ plans, the
students at Leiden erupted in strike shortly thereafter, to which the Germans responded by
arresting Cleveringa and shutting down the university entirely on November 27.16 Although the
Schwarz and Wimmer both hoped to use the closure to reconstitute Leiden University as a
“Germanic university,” their plans for this reconstitution never materialized.17 At the same time,
van Genechten, head of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde wanted to reopen the university as a
“volksche” university, that is an NSB-oriented, nazified institution, while van Dam simply hoped
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to reopen it for reasons of his own prestige.18 But none of these plans came to fruition, and
Leiden University remained closed for the next four years, reopening for classes only after the
end of the war for the 1945/1946 winter semester.19
In contrast to the professors at Leiden, it was the students at the Technical University of
Delft who led the anti-dismissal agitation. A few days prior to Cleveringa’s speech at Leiden and
upon finding the lecture hall of Prof. A.C. Josephus Jitta closed due to his dismissal, one student
leader delivered an impromptu speech to his classmates denouncing the Germans’ anti-Jewish
measures. Later that evening, when other students went to the lecture hall of Professor David van
Dantzig, who had also been dismissed, the present students determined that they would strike the
following Monday. That Monday, November 25, the student body at Delft erupted in a strike that
lasted well into the night and the following day, in what was one of the first public protests of the
Nazis’ anti-Jewish measures in the Netherlands.20 Just as in Leiden, the Germans reacted harshly
with the complete closure of the university. Although it was reopened the following year because
the Germans needed trained engineers, the student leader, Frans van Haselt, was later arrested
and sent to a concentration camp in Germany, perishing there in 1942.21
A smaller protest erupted at Wageningen University but bore little effect, while the
rectors at the universities of Amsterdam and Utrecht successfully prevented the students there
from engaging in desired strike actions, the former by closing early for the winter holidays, the
latter by convincing the students that a more strategically timed action would be more effective,
although that better timing never materialized. Protests against the dismissal of Jewish
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instructors also took place in high schools across the country, from Friesland in the north, to Tiel
in the south, from Amsterdam in the West, to Doetinchem right on the eastern border with
Germany.22 Most of the protests were small, with only a handful of students or instructors taking
part, but they show that even at this early stage some Netherlanders were prepared to resist the
imposition of Nazi values upon their country. Only in Leiden and Delft were the protests large
enough to engender a significant response by the German occupiers, and in each case, that
response was loud and clear. The closure of the oldest and most respected university in the
Netherlands at Leiden and the similar fate of the Technical University of Delft sent a direct and
very visible message to the Dutch populace that the new occupation authority was willing to take
drastic measures to enforce its prerogatives, even in the face of outright revolt and even in this
early phase in which Seyss-Inquart still hoped to win the Dutch over to Nazism. Moreover, it
would stand as a near constant reminder to everyone else in the educational establishment about
the costs of defying the Germans’ plans for Dutch education.23
It would become clear in the near future that the dismissal of Jewish teachers was only a
first step in the Germans’ anti-Jewish persecutions in the educational realm. On January 10,
1941, Seyss-Inquart required that all Jewish persons in the Netherlands register themselves with
the government, decreeing that any person who had a single grandparent who had taken part in
the Jewish community was considered Jewish.24 This was followed, on February 11, by the
introduction of a numerus clausus for Jewish students in higher education and a near ban on new
enrollments by Jewish students seeking post-secondary education, all of whom now had to seek
the personal approval of the Secretary-General for admission.25 The Deutsche Zeitung in den
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Niederlanden, an organ of the German colony in the Netherlands, noted that the decrees were
direct responses to the protest actions in Leiden and Delft two months prior.26
These anti-Jewish actions that affected the educational sector were but a small portion of
the Germans’ larger efforts at isolating Jewish Netherlanders from their Christian co-nationals.
Resentment and agitation on the part of the persecuted Jewish minority boiled over later that
month, when, on February 19, a German police patrol entered a Jewish owned ice-cream parlor
called Koco in Amsterdam. Koco had been a popular locale for both Jews and Gentiles alike, and
owing to that popularity, was afforded a sort of clandestine security by neighborhood youth, who
fashioned improvised weapons and stood patrol. But as minor successes against Dutch Nazis
emboldened them, their attempts at remaining inconspicuous unraveled, leading to direct
German intervention. On that fateful February 19, when the German police entered the parlor,
they were assaulted with ammonia gas. The German police patrol responded by emptying their
guns into the shop and arresting the German-Jewish proprietors.27
Three days later, on Saturday, February 22, the occupation authorities responded even
more violently, as razzia patrols descended upon the Waterlooplein square, in the heart of the old
Jewish Quarter, and rounded up 425 Jewish “hostages,” all of whom were promptly shipped off
to the Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria.28 It was followed by another razzia the next
morning which led to even more arrests. But the Germans had overplayed their hand and had not
expected the response of the citizenry to this ghastly affront. On the very same Saturday evening
as the first razzia, Jaap Brandenburg, Amsterdam district leader of the outlawed Communist
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Party of the Netherlands and witness to the events at the Waterlooplein, used the underground
party apparatus to spread the word of the Germans’ actions among the working-class community.
The following day, other communist functionaries arrived from neighboring towns and agreed to
issue a manifesto calling for a general strike. Two local Amsterdam civil servants and
communist agitators, Piet Nak and Willem Kraan, took the lead. They arranged a gathering of
sympathizers to be held the evening of Monday, February 24, at the Noordermarkt and pushed
the entire party apparatus to help spread the word and get attendees there. At the meeting, Nak,
Kraan, and other CPN leaders whipped the crowd into a frenzy, declaring that they had seen how
the Nazis had acted and that they, the working class of Amsterdam, stood hand in hand with their
Jewish friends.29
During the meeting, the recently drawn-up manifesto was distributed among the crowd,
which numbered several hundred strong, to spread the word that the following day, the workers
of Amsterdam would bring the city to its knees. The next morning, February 25, 1941, the city
erupted in anti-German protests. What had begun with tram drivers in the city center spread to all
sectors of the populace, as hundreds of thousands of enraged, protesting Netherlanders shut
down the city. The strike effort quickly spread to other neighboring cities, but was suppressed by
German security forces, who managed to reassert control over the next two days. The February
Strike of 1941 was the first truly large-scale protest against anti-Jewish efforts in Nazi-occupied
Europe and would mark the end of the initial phase of the German occupation of the
Netherlands.30 Seyss-Inquart had begun his tenure as Reichskommissar hoping to win the Dutch
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over to the German cause through persuasion, but the February Strike proved that this hope was
very much in vain.
Although anti-Jewish measures would ramp up over the course of the first full year of the
occupation, their effect upon the educational sphere was briefly paused simply because the
Germans had not yet specifically targeted Jewish individuals in education. By and large, the only
anti-Jewish action up to that point that had directly affected the education realm was the
dismissal of Jewish civil servants, and then, it disrupted education not because the Germans were
attempting to interfere with education specifically, but because teachers and administrators were
civil servants. Seyss-Inquart turned directly to the place of Jewish individuals in schools in
summer 1941, when he informed van Dam that Jewish pupils were to be removed from public
schools. In an August 16 circular directed at the various community and town councils
throughout the country—marked “not for publication in any form”—van Dam asked local
authorities across the country to reply with the number of Jewish students in their charge so that
he could make the necessary arrangements for the creation of “segregated schools”31 for Jewish
students.32 Later, on August 25, in a new circular, van Dam informed mayors and town councils
that Jewish pupils would no longer be allowed to attend public or confessional schools as of
September 1 and further told them that the goal was to establish segregated schools with such
speed that Jewish pupils miss no more than four weeks of lessons.33 On August 29, the news was
released to the public, but with a propagandistic twist. Instead of saying outright that Jewish
pupils were being removed from public and private schools and forced into their own segregated
schools, the occupiers noted that Jewish students would, as of September 1, receive instruction
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from Jewish teachers. As reported in the Algemeen Handelsblad, “as a consequence, … the
above-mentioned students will no longer be permitted admission in educational institutions,
unless the institutions are intended for these students only.”34
Education at the schools for Jewish students was essentially similar in nature to that of
the public and confessional schools, such that the exams and diplomas they granted during the
war were honored by the post-war Department of Education.35 Dr. Jacob Presser, who after the
war would go on to write the leading work on the Nazi persecution of Jewish persons in the
Netherlands, was a teacher at the Jewish Lyceum in Amsterdam during the period of segregation
and devotes several pages in his magnum opus to that experience. He notes that the organization
matched the public schools, religious instruction was optional, and although there were certainly
shortages of both school material and qualified teachers, they made do with what they had. But
there was one overriding difference that Presser stressed both in his own experience and in that
of his colleagues at other schools designated for Jewish pupils: absent students, a normal event
for any school, but which were especially troublesome for the Jewish schools, because absent
students rarely returned.36 This was, of course, because of the deportations of Jewish individuals
that picked up in the first half of 1942. The waves of deportations began by emptying the towns
and provinces of their Jewish inhabitants and sending them to Amsterdam, which was followed
in the second half of the year by deportations from Amsterdam to Kamp Westerbork in the far
northeast of the country, from whence the inmates would be deported “to the east,” usually
directly to the extermination centers at Auschwitz and Sobibor, although other camps, such as
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Bergen-Belsen, and even the Jewish ghetto Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia were occasional
destinations.
The schools for Jewish pupils in the provinces were shut down as their students were
deported to Amsterdam. Of the two main secondary schools for Jews in Amsterdam, the Joodse
Hogere Burger School was actually a pre-war invention for Amsterdam’s sizable Jewish
community. The other, the Joods Lyceum, was established in September 1941 specifically as a
result of the occupiers’ anti-Jewish measures. Although both schools had high enrollments by
mid-1942, the weekly deportations to Westerbork took their toll on the student population.
Presser reports that by May 1943, only four students remained in his class.37 By September, both
schools sat empty and were shuttered by the government. The education of Jewish pupils had
long since been removed from the authority of the Education Department, however, when, in
November 1942, it was placed under the supervision of the Jewish Council in Amsterdam.38
Education for Jewish pupils continued in Westerbork, in theory if not always in practice, where
there were at least three schools, one of which had been founded during the early days of the
camp when it was an internment camp for German-Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany in the
late 1930s. But schooling in Westerbork was even more difficult on pupils and teachers alike.
The school rooms were often requisitioned for other purposes, and all too often, students arrived
for school in the morning to find that their teachers had been deported the night before. The
regular shipments of new inmates into the camp from Amsterdam, as well as the regular
deportation of inmates further east, of both students and teachers, meant that it was rarely
possible to offer regular instruction. This, coupled with the total lack of teaching materials,
meant that often untrained and unqualified teachers provided lessons to an entirely transient
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student body. In Westerbork, despite camp decrees that children attend regular lessons, all
semblance of normality in education was gone.39 And so it would remain until the last transports
deported the final inmates “to the east” in September 1944.
The removal of Jewish students and teachers from the schools was one of the few
changes the German occupiers were able to fully institute. And this success on the part of the
Nazis was not limited to the education realm. In fact, throughout the country, the Nazis
encountered considerable success in rounding up Jewish individuals and deporting them first to
Amsterdam, and from there on to Westerbork and to other camps in Central and Eastern Europe.
With more than 100,000 Jewish deportees murdered at the hands of the Nazis, out of a 1940
Jewish population of roughly 140,000, the Netherlands saw, by far, the highest numbers of
Jewish Holocaust victims of any Western or Northern European nation, both in real numbers and
as a percentage of the pre-war Jewish population.40 The legacy of the Holocaust in the tolerant,
liberal Netherlands has been a haunting specter over the country for decades, with few satisfying
answers as to how or why the Nazis were so successful there, when they were comparatively
unsuccessful in other Western and Northern European occupied countries, such as France,
Belgium, and Denmark.41
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As yet, there is no overriding consensus on why Jewish people in the Netherlands were
murdered at comparatively higher rates than their counterparts in other Western and Northern
European countries. All of the usual explanations, from the geography of the Netherlands and the
collaboration of Dutch authorities, to the deference of the Jewish and Gentile civilian population
to authority and the near complete registration of the Jewish population of the Netherlands, lack
the necessary nuance to explain why survival rates varied so heavily by particular region. Marnix
Croes, of the Research and Documentation Center of the Netherlands Ministry of Justice, offers
perhaps the most intriguing explanation that does account for these variably rates of survival.
Through the use of statistical analysis, Croes argues that it is likely that significantly larger
numbers of Jewish individuals in the Netherlands went into hiding than previously thought, for
not all such individuals caught in hiding by the Germans were registered as having gone
underground. Croes then argues that the particular success and ferocity of the German
Sicherheitspolizei and their Dutch collaborators at hunting down and finding hiding Jews was at
least partly the cause of the lower Jewish survival rate in the Netherlands, although Croes freely
admits that much more research is necessary to come to a fuller understanding of the entire
phenomenon.42
The “Cleansing” of anti-German School Books
Although the first major incursions into the educational sector had been directed at
Jewish individuals, those efforts were not directed solely at the schools. The extent to which they
had affected Dutch education resulted from the presence of Jewish persons in Dutch schools and
universities. The first direct action specifically into the realm of education actually occurred
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before van Dam was even appointed to the position of Secretary-General, although he was very
much involved in the process, for he was the head of the Commissie van Voorlichting voor
Leerboeken.43
Of all of their goals in the education realm, the Germans put forth the most strenuous
efforts into making sure the published materials fit the occupiers’ ideological outlook. This
started almost immediately after the Dutch surrendered on May 14, 1940. Just a week later, on
May 20, Willi Janke, who would later become the Chief of the Press Department in SeyssInquart’s personal staff, met with officials from various publishing associations to inform them
that the sale of any and all anti-German books, pamphlets, or brochures, as well as French and
English newspapers was now banned. He further informed his audience that that the attitude of
the German authorities would largely depend on the loyalty of the Dutch publishing industry,
bookstores, and libraries.44 There would be no mistaking the Germans’ demands in this matter.
Very quickly after the installation of the Reichskommissariat, the new German civilian
leadership in the Netherlands became aware of anti-German school textbooks. This took many
forms. First and foremost were any books that had negative statements regarding Germany,
National Socialism, the NSDAP or its leaders, or fascism more generally. Already on August 3,
1940, Seyss-Inquart’s representative in the province of Groningen sent a letter to Wimmer
reporting anti-Hitler statements in a school history book.45 In response, on August 8, Wimmer
sent instructions banning anti-German text books from the schools to the then Secretary-General
of Education, Gerrit van Poelje, wondering in the process how such a state of affairs was ever
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left to be in the first place.46 In the same note, he warned van Poelje that any oral transmission of
said views or material by teachers at public or private schools or universities was also banned.
Two weeks later, on August 23, Wimmer sent another letter to van Poelje that was
similar in content but harsher in tone.47 Importantly, whereas in the previous note of August 8
Wimmer had only questioned why anti-German books had not been pulled from use, the harsher
note of August 23 made mention of a larger-scale operation: the “cleansing” of school books:
I would have taken it for granted that the Dutch school inspectorates would, on their own initiative, take
into account the changing circumstances of the occupation in every way and, immediately after checking
the teaching materials of all schools, take every precaution to cleanse all the hints, indications, allegations
and suspicions, that degrade or are apt to degrade the Greater German Reich and its development, regarding
the German people in all of its strains, as well as regarding its national socialist leadership and worldview.48

Moreover, to the extent that any school books discuss:
racial or völkisch, historical, geographic, political, cultural, or economic states of the Greater German Reich
and its people, they should take the form such that a worthy attitude regarding the German occupation is
guaranteed and such that they are suitable for bringing forth a better attitude toward the German people. 49

To make sure that these changes were made, Wimmer further made van Poelje personally
responsible for the implementation of book cleansing and promised to hold him responsible
should the necessary changes not be made.
At the same time, Wimmer sent a circular to the college of Secretaries-General informing
them that similar books should be taken out of circulation where ever they might be found, such
as in departmental libraries, giving the Secretaries-General four weeks to comply.50 Just in case
things were not clear, Albrecht, who worked in Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat, sent along
further instructions to van Poelje listing a few dozen authors whose books were to be removed
from use in the classroom and from school libraries, although he did make an exception for
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certain works by authors who would otherwise be proscribed, such as Marx and Freud, but only
in the case that those works were used for purely scientific purposes, with the further limitation
that they could not be taken off library premises.51 Originally, Wimmer had wanted to make the
individual school heads themselves responsible for removing the newly banned books from
circulation, but van Poelje’s successor as interim Secretary-General of the Education Department
Hendrik Reinink, in consultation with both Schwarz and Albrecht, advised against it. It was
feared that the resulting large influx of letters from school officials asking for clarification would
overwhelm the resources of the department. Instead, they decided to turn direct responsibility
for the physical removal of school books over to the local school inspectors.52
Van Poelje went right to work on this much larger project that Wimmer understood
should have naturally come from the initiative of the Dutch bureaucracy and established a
departmental commission to look into the matter, although it was Reinink who gave the
commission the direct task of censoring school books, as van Poelje was sacked on August 31.
Probably on the advice of Snijder, who was always willing to recommend van Dam to the
Germans as a willing collaborator, Wimmer appointed van Dam to lead the commission.53 Van
Dam got to work quickly as he and the seventeen other members of the commission went
through thousands and thousands of school books, removing more than four hundred from
circulation in 1940 alone. By summer 1941, that number had climbed to more than seven
hundred. Lists of authors were handed down whose works were to be removed.54 Of course,
Jewish authors were prominent on the lists, but others, such as the now highly regarded Thomas
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Mann, who was an outspoken critic of National Socialism, and the rest of his family were also
included.55 By 1942, the list of banned literature included any and all books by Jewish, Marxist,
anti-German, and or anti-national socialist authors, while later that year, many books that were
considered “liberal” or “democratic” were added to the lists of banned books.56
This ended up causing several problems, as questions began coming in to the department
in droves. One secondary school director in Tiel noted that almost all history books were not
directly based on national socialist ideals and questioned whether those could be considered as
“anti-national socialist.” Moreover, he questioned what, exactly, “literature” entailed. Van Dam
replied by noting that banned literature written by Jewish authors was meant to include those
works that exhibit a “Jewish spirit,” although he did not define, what, exactly that meant, while,
at the same time noting that his commission had cleansed the extant history books such that they
should not cause any problems.57 In another case, a historical atlas that included a Jewish coauthor was simply recommended by van Dam to have that author’s name stripped and replaced
by a non-Jewish coworker.58 Similar questions were often posed regarding socialist and/or
Marxist authors, such as one school director questioned whether a history book on Renaissance
art written by a known Marxist fell under the ban (it did not). The questions were so common
that the replies took on the appearance of a form letter.59
In some cases, the removal of the book was not desirable, if for no other reason than the
offending passages being short and not entirely germane to the rest of the work. Or, especially
as the war went on and paper shortages became more pronounced, it would have been a waste to
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replace those books that contained only short, offending passages with more suitable new
works.60 In these cases, the book control commission resorted to gluing over the offending
passages and putting more ideologically favorable statements in their place. For example, in one
history book used in confessional schools, a passage regarding Jewish people in the Middle Ages
was replaced with more ideologically fitting material. Originally, it had read, not entirely
innocently: “The Jewish diaspora surely rests upon God’s judgment, but no one is innocent who
persecutes Israel.” The commission replaced it with:
These vagrants were hated and persecuted the world over in the Middle Ages for their rule over money.
Therefore, the diligence of the Church came to convert them, which was always done with great vigor.
Against the authority of the princes and the clerics, they maintained their finely woven ruses; against the
power of steel, the power of silver.61

In another instance, the new government-approved passages took on an overtly political
tone. For example, in one book on recent history, a passage over the inauguration of Queen
Wilhelmina in 1898 was changed to emphasize what the Germans saw as the slow death of the
Dutch Royal House. Originally, the passage read: “Then the entire Dutch people celebrated
enthusiastically. There was joy in the heart of Queen Emma and there was joy in the heart of her
people. Joy—about our first Orange queen.” This was changed to the much less festive, “Now
there were two royal women who survived the last Prince of Orange: mother and daughter. The
Orange tree had almost stopped blooming. Would God allow further growth? …”62 As Loe de
Jong notes, these changes were not limited to historical instruction, but could be found in many
subjects. So, for example, in a textbook for beginning English instruction, in which the passage
had originally read: “Immediately (fill in: after or before) the peace, the Germans began to
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prepare themselves for a new war,” was replaced with “Immediately (fill in: after or before) the
shipwreck the sailors were taken to hospital (sic).”63
In other cases, schools were simply instructed to cut the offending passages from the
books entirely, such that the resulting book had gaps in pages.64 Again, De Jong offers several
examples that range from the obviously political to the not so obviously antagonistic. In one
history book for secondary schools, a passage regarding anti-Jewish measures in Germany since
1933 was removed entirely. Similarly, in a Dutch language grammar textbook for primary
school students, several individual sentences had to be removed, such as one sentence that read:
“The German armies devastated and burned the wealthiest cities and the most flourishing
villages of Belgium,” or another that simply stated: “On Queen’s Day [the national holiday]
everyone wears orange.” In other instances, songs used in musical instruction were removed
from instruction booklets, even those traditionally sung in confessional schools.65
In some instances, van Dam even got help from members of the general public in his
efforts at “cleansing” textbooks. For example, in November 1943, he and Goedewaagen
received a letter from one F. J. Meijer, who was the director of an insurance cooperative, that
noted that one history book used in a primary school in The Hague contained such “true
nonsense” about the Germanics that he lacked for both time and paper to explain it all, although
he did, apparently, have enough time and paper to explain that the teacher of that particular class
found it necessary to exaggerate and claim that the Germanics made hammers from the thigh
bones of their defeated enemies and pendants from collar bones. The archival file does not make
clear how this insurance cooperative director was aware of such claims made by the teacher,
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although it seems likely that he had a child in the class. Either way, he requested an update on
what actions Goedewaagen and van Dam had taken.66
Not only did van Dam’s committee inspect existing books, as of fall 1941 it also censored
newly published works.67 In order to pass the censors, no book could contain anti-German
sentiments, whether about the German people; its leadership; or its past, present, or future. Such
books could also not glorify the House of Orange, pacifism, or Marxism. The League of
Nations, should it be addressed, must be addressed only as a historical artifact. And of course,
no books may be printed (or reprinted) that were written by Jewish or emigrant authors (that is
authors who fled Nazi-controlled Europe).68 Along with these limitations outlined in van Dam’s
guidelines came inclusive points that books should contain. The should “fit into the framework
of the present times” by being “conducive to the pursuit of unity in our people” while also
lacking anything that might “awaken or accentuate disunity”—the latter elements almost
certainly referring to Marxism, democracy, or the pillars. Further, they should “acknowledge the
scope of the developments in the Netherlands and Europe, which are aimed at achieving the idea
of the ethnic community.”69 This was, however, less important after January 1942, when the
publication of most, but by no means all, new school books ceased.70 As will be shown in the
following chapter, some efforts to produce new school books, especially those explicitly
designed by the occupiers or their Dutch collaborators did indeed continue.
Over the course of the occupation, van Dam’s school book commission would censor
thousands of books.71 Given the limits of what was acceptable, it is no surprise that many history
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books fell victim to the “cleansing.”72 Noting that the list of book characteristics that would
make a work inappropriate for use in the classroom was growing ungainly, the commission
began to establish a catalog of books that could be used in instruction and libraries.73 The
catalog, which contained roughly nine thousand titles that were “indispensable” for educational
purposes, included the only books that were allowable after that point. While it was not ordered
that schools must use books from the catalog, all others were to be considered banned from use
in instruction, making the choice to use other works technically impossible.74
Despite the incredible effort of the Commissie van Voorlichting voor Leerboeken, there
was only so much they could do to prevent anti-German books from being used in the classroom.
As with other new regulations promulgated by the occupation regime, the prohibition against
anti-German textbooks was exceedingly difficult to actually enforce. The most offensively antiGerman books were, by and large, successfully removed from the classroom, but those were only
a small portion of banned books. Schools across the country continued to use the same liberal
and democratically oriented books they always had.75 Even when offending passages were glued
over, that was hardly enough to keep students’ prying eyes from looking underneath.
This problem was not helped by the lack of punishment meted out by the government.
When a teacher at the Marnix Gymnasium in Rotterdam continued to use a geography book with
anti-national socialist passages in early 1941, Albrecht only issued a warning.76 Later that year,
at a public gymnasium in ‘s-Hertogenbosch several teachers had continued to use banned books.
As a result, the mayor, whom van Dam tasked with investigating the use of prohibited books

72

De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/342-343.
NA 2.14.38/692.
74
De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/343.
75
Knippenberg and Ham, Een bron van aanhoudende zorg, 225.
76
NA 2.14.37/450.
73

222
there, passed around a pledge that multiple teachers signed stating that they would follow the
rules regarding banned book going forward, which van Dam accepted as a reasonable reaction.77
Similarly, the director of the Catholic boys school in Wijk, near Duurstede, refused to implement
the orders of the van Dam’s book “cleansing” commission. He kept the school library entirely
intact and reportedly told the “willing public” of the area that the new regulations were in
conflict with the constitution and that the occupation authority should not concern itself with
such matters. When questioned by the local school inspector, the head noted that he had not
noticed any books in the library that fell under the ban, although he himself did not supervise the
library—that responsibility fell to another teacher. The inspector saw right through this rather
hollow excuse but declined to press the issue any further than by telling the school head he
needed to get his act together or face actual consequences.78
Because of the unwillingness of the government come down hard on teachers and schools
that violated the rules regarding prohibited textbooks, the work of van Dam’s school book
commission was only half effective. While it managed to censor thousands upon thousands of
books over the course of the occupation, its work was, in many cases, for naught. Even book
publishers did not always follow the rules, likely because they did not want to spend the money
necessary to convert already published books into acceptable versions.79 As would happen again
and again over the course of the first couple of years of the occupation, the German occupation
authority and its Dutch helpers would establish new rules for the educational sphere, rules that
were often simply ignored at the local level.
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Increasing the Influence of the State and the Appointment Decrees
Censoring offensive text books was only the first step in coordinating the educational
sphere. On November 15, 1940, Seyss-Inquart took further action toward bringing the
educational sphere—that is the sector that provided for Dutch Gentile students—to heel with the
appointment of secondary school teacher and NSB functionary Piet van Rossem as “Authorized
Representative of the Reichskommissar for the Supervision of Peace and Order in the Schools.”80
Although van Rossem was a member of the NSB, he was not close to Mussert or van Genechten,
head of the Opvoedersgilde, and was seen, much like van Dam as not being under the influence
of the NSB, and so he could be counted on as reliable from the German point of view.81 Van
Rossem’s appointment carried great authority and he became a sort of all-purpose inspector of
primary and secondary education throughout the country. Along with two deputies, he was
afforded the right of entry into and inspection of all schools, including the right to sit in and
observe classroom instruction at both public and confessional schools; the right to inspect the
files of all school heads, teachers, and other personnel; to carry out any investigations he deemed
necessary in furtherance of his mandate; and he was to be afforded any and all assistance he
deemed necessary by school heads, teachers, and other organs of the state.82 The position of
school inspector, itself, was not a new invention of the occupation regime—such offices had
existed for several decades and served the central government in its efforts to better control
provincial schools. However, van Rossem’s positioning as a representative of the
Reichskommissar himself, outside of the authority of the Department of Education, Arts, and
Sciences, most certainly was a new development.
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Seyss-Inquart had seen in van Rossem a useful tool for the quick nazification of the
Dutch educational establishment, and his appointment was, essentially, an attempt by SeyssInquart to have “two irons in the fire.”83 Van Rossem and his two deputies, Dr. J. J. Valkenburg
and Dr. P. Dijkema, exercised an out-sized influence in the educational sector for the first six
months after their appointment, but the vociferousness with which the three men worked
engendered significant resistance on the part of all sides of the educational establishment,
including van Dam. Van Dam had been angling for some time to gain administrative control over
van Rossem, but those efforts were always rejected by the Authorized Representative. By May,
van Dam had convinced Schwarz that, if van Rossem and his subordinates continued on the path
they had started down, a general revolt of teachers and administrators would follow.84 Schwarz
then convinced Wimmer of the need to sack van Rossem, ordered van Dam to take the necessary
steps, drafted the dismissal order, and personally put it in front of Seyss-Inquart for his signature.
Seyss-Inquart’s reaction to Schwarz’s actions remain unknown, but he signed the dismissal
notice in any event. Van Rossem and his deputies were dismissed on May 26, 1941 and, in
accordance with the instructions Schwarz had given him, van Dam laid the groundwork for a
replacement.85 This new inspector responsible for maintaining peace and order in the schools
would be subordinate to van Dam directly, not to the Reichskommissar, and was filled in late
June 1941 by Dr. D. G. Noordijk, a German language teacher from The Hague who was also an
old professional acquaintance of van Dam’s.86 The actions of the two extraordinary school
inspectors will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven, but it is important to note here that
the first major inroad into the realm of education specifically that the German occupation

83

De Pater, Het schoolverzet, 48.
BAL R83-Niederlande/25; NA 214.37/414.
85
NA 214.37/414.
86
P.S.A. Goedbloed, “Regeling voor den Inspecteur van het onderwijs in algemeenen dienst.”
84

225
authorities made was both direct and far reaching. There would be no mistaking that the
occupation authorities viewed the schools as an area of immense importance for the future of the
Netherlands, and they—the Germans—were more than willing to side-step the traditional
channels in order to carry out their aims in the education realm.
Shortly after van Rossem’s appointment, Seyss-Inquart made direct changes to the Dutch
bureaucracy itself when he split the pre-war Department of Education, Arts, and Sciences into
two new departments - the Department Education, Science, and Cultural Administration and the
Department of Public Enlightenment and Arts.87 As this proved to be the only major
bureaucratic restructuring of a pre-war Dutch ministry, its importance should not be overlooked.
In both new departments, an emphasis was placed upon the development of the Dutch nation for
the future, and this is borne out even in the names of the two new departments. While the prewar department had used the more innocuous onderwijs to refer to education, the new
department referred to education as opvoeding, a term which carries with it the connotation of
social and cultural development. In this way, it is similar to the German term Bildung, which also
can be translated as both education and as cultural development.
Moreover, the new Education Department also received a third titled section, to replace
the lost Arts of the pre-war department, in Cultuurbescherming, or Cultural Administration. The
Dutch term bescherming carries dual meanings, including administration and protection. In this
way, it is a sort of combination of the two German words Verwaltung, which means
administration, and Beschirmung, which means protection. Although the German language
name for this department used the term Kulturverwaltung, or Cultural Administration, the
Germans were not entirely unaware of the dual meaning of the term, such that, occasionally,
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even they used the German term Kulturschutz, which also translates to Cultural Protection, in
their internal paperwork.88 Under the auspices of Cultural Administration, a new Bureau of Folk
Culture and People’s Development was established that was tasked with supervising courses in
folk music, folk dance, and the volksuniversiteiten which were dedicated to adult and continuing
education.89 Additionally, the bureau had oversight of all non-commercial and non-scientific
libraries.90 The new Education Department was accompanied by what was essentially a
Propaganda Department, ostensibly named the Department of Public Enlightenment and Arts,
but which was, in reality, a near carbon copy of Josef Goebbels’s Propagandaministerium in
Berlin. The leadership of these two new departments was entrusted to the völkisch minded Dutch
intellectuals Dr. Jan van Dam and Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen.91
Van Dam’s stewardship of the Education Department, which began on November 25,
1940, would last for the remainder of the war, but it was during the first two and one-half years
in the position of Secretary-General that he had the most impact. He wasted little time in
implementing the “reform” proposals he had outlined earlier in the year in his Gedanken und
Vorschläge and Reform pieces.92 The first major initiative van Dam undertook was directed at
confessional schools. There are several reasons why this would be an initial step, but first and
foremost was that this was seen as a necessary first step by the German authorities themselves. In
his initial report back the office of Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, whose office had been
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responsible for Schwarz’s appointment to the Netherlands, Schwarz noted that, astonishingly,
some two thirds of all Dutch students attended confessional primary schools, and, to make
matters worse, roughly eighty-five per cent of the costs for those schools was paid by the state in
some way, but the state had little control over either the personnel or the curriculum of these
confessional schools. For the deeply anti-clerical Schwarz, as well as for the rest of the Nazi
leadership in The Hague, this situation was untenable.93 In a follow-up report dated March 22,
1941, Schwarz notes that breaking the confessional dominance in the education sector was of
primary importance for the furtherance of his duties in the Netherlands—“to move the Dutch
volk toward positive collaboration in the Greater Germanic sphere.”94
Already in mid-December, only weeks after he took office, van Dam floated the idea at a
departmental leadership meeting of possible ways to increase the influence of the state on
confessional education, which he proposed doing by giving the department the duty to confirm
or veto the hiring choices of school boards and local councils.95 Recognizing that this might
encroach upon the authority given by the Reichskommissar to van Rossem’s office, he suggested
that the various sub-departmental leaders think over their options and get back to him with
suggestions.96 Over the next month, little appears to have actually taken place, however, as
correspondence between Wimmer and Schwarz shows they were discussing the option of simply
taking over the appointment of all teachers directly. Schwarz suggested to Wimmer that this was,
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ultimately, van Dam’s goal and that this would be the end result over the course of the next
year.97
In the meantime, Seyss-Inquart was making plans of his own. When the Catholic Church
began using the pulpit to agitate against the NSB in January 1941, Seyss-Inquart decided that the
Church needed to be punished and came up with three proposals, each more severe than the last.
He suggested an across-the-board reduction in the pay of clerical school instructors, the firing of
said instructors, or the complete dissolution of clerical schools and their absorption by the state.
Van Dam recognized immediately that the third option was untenable, as it would cause an
outright revolt among the Protestant churches, to say nothing of the reaction by the Catholic
Church, and he was able to persuade Seyss-Inquart of this apparent fact. Seyss-Inquart, however,
saw a mere reduction on clerical teaching salaries as not going far enough, and so decided on the
second option of firing all clerical teachers, a suggestion, it should be remembered, that was
contained in van Dam’s “reform” proposals the previous autumn. But this too would cause many
problems. Given that there were some five thousand clerics teaching at Catholic schools in the
Netherlands, firing them would create huge shortages among teachers at these schools that could
not easily be replaced. Non-Catholic teachers were a non-starter. The whole idea of Catholic
parents being able to choose Catholic schools in which instruction was given by Catholic
teachers had been one of the fundamental demands of the Catholic pillar during the School
Struggle. This meant that an outright dismissal of Catholic teachers would force many Catholic
schools to close outright, thereby shifting much of their student bodies into the public schools.
Van Dam recognized that this might lead to a re-igniting of the School Struggle and would likely
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lead to a unification of efforts among the Catholic and Protestant churches in the field of
education, which would be dangerous for van Dam’s and the Germans’ “reform” efforts.98
During the drafting of the order, protests from within the Education Department grew so
strong that van Dam decided he needed to revisit the issue with Seyss-Inquart. He delivered his
objections to Schwarz, who, along with Wimmer, interceded with Seyss-Inquart. The internal
departmental memos went through various alterations to the proposed changes, but eventually,
on February 14, settled on a final form, or so van Dam thought. Clerics were to be removed as
school heads, while clerical teachers were to receive a forty per cent salary deduction, which
would then be used for other educational purposes, specifically the reduction of class sizes and
the hiring of new, young teachers to help alleviate the unemployment rate in that group.99 This
latter effect was especially welcome in the eyes of Schwarz, who believed that it was the
youngest cohort of educators that could be most easily co-opted for the Germanic cause because
of their miserable economic situation.100 During the resulting meeting, which was attended by
Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, Schwarz, and van Dam, this compromise was agreed to and was made
possible by removing state subsidies that had previously been granted to Catholic schools.101
The decision was somewhat of a political coup for van Dam. Although he had already
suggested in his Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform pieces the previous fall that clerical
instructors should be released entirely to free up much needed funds for other areas, van Dam
correctly recognized that there was a real difference between suggesting such a move to a few
high ranking German administrators and actually carrying out such a change in public. The
salary reduction was the next best option and it still gave him the ability to use those funds for
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other projects. Chief among these other projects was the hiring of more teachers, the
unemployment of whom had been high during the 1930s, and the consequential reduction in
class sizes. Furthermore, because the order had come from Seyss-Inquart, not from van Dam
himself, he was able to distance himself from the new orders that had actually originally been his
proposal in the first place.102 The penalties against clerical instructors were made public on
February 23 during van Dam’s second radio address to the Dutch nation.103 In the speech, which
lasted about fifteen minutes, Van Dam noted that he did not wish to put forward his program for
the educational sector the previous November because he was unsure whether he would be able
to carry it out. During the present speech in February, however, he did feel he could go into more
details, but only about those points which he was confident he could carry out. They numbered
six in total: the place of the Dutch language, the strengthening of state influence upon the
schools, universities, physical education, teacher training, and the position of the occupation
toward education law.
As regarded Dutch language instruction, van Dam noted that lesson hours must be
expanded and its implementation carefully administered via a shortly forthcoming manual on the
topic. Dutch language instruction should be geared toward increasing the student’s love of his or
her mother tongue and the cultural values expressed through it. The Dutch language was now
more than ever exposed to danger and the correct education of the youth must awaken
knowledge of that danger. For this reason, van Dam announced that he planned to establish a
scientific center for the study of Dutch language and heemkunde, that would influence the
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development of the Dutch language and the education thereof. Finally, he noted that, although it
was not an easy task, he hoped to eliminate the differences between the spelling of Dutch taught
in the schools and that used in official documents.104
He went on to note that his second program point would be received with distrust by
some Netherlanders, but that the strengthening of the influence of the state upon education was a
necessity. Van Dam recognized that he was entering a minefield with this part of his program,
but defended it by noting that the state, as yet, had little influence upon education beyond footing
the bill. The current situation of unrest among parents and students, as well as the increasing
political activity of the students demanded, he argued, that the state have other recourses beyond
calling the police. For this reason, he was preparing a decree that gave the state the right of
approval of all appointments, and, as it concerned the universities, the right of the Dutch
administration to make appointments. The universities must, he claimed, have a stronger central
authority so as to prevent a repeat of the situations that occurred in Leiden and Delft, although
van Dam did not state, explicitly, how the decree he was preparing for this would work.105
Regarding the universities specifically, there were two major questions of import. The
first was the position of Jewish students, which van Dam argued was solely the purview of the
German occupiers. Given that, he argued it was better to sacrifice the future attendance of Jewish
students so as to allow current Jewish students to finish their studies and take their exams. The
second was the fate of the universities of Leiden and Delft. Van Dam bemoaned some “fools or
malicious people” who had demanded via an ultimatum that the occupiers reopen the university
in Leiden. This was, van Dam noted, the worst possible way to achieve this goal.106
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Van Dam’s fourth point focused on physical education. Because physical education was
only made a mandatory subject on January 1, he noted that it was important that P.E. teachers
were properly qualified and that he was undertaking the necessary steps to make that a reality.
Whereas currently, a teacher could achieve the right to teach P.E. based on his/her abilities in the
“so-called intellectual subjects, while the examinees [i.e., the teachers being examined for their
competency in specific subjects] are completely incompetent to teach the subject [of physical
education].”107 Finally, all students should know how to swim, not just from a health perspective,
but also as a point of safety.
The last two sections, on the betterment of teachers and their training and the position of
the occupation vis-à-vis the education sector, took up an out-sized proportion of his speech and
testify to the importance van Dam placed in them. The training of apprentice teachers was to be
increased to four years, but the curriculum would not change, such that teachers-in-training
would be able to spend more time learning the material fully. As a result of this lengthening of
the teacher training college study period, there would be no final exams held in 1942.108 Here, it
is important to note that during the 1930s, owing to the Great Depression, a financial crisis hit
the educational sector in the Netherlands. As a result, thousands of teachers, called
kweekelingen-met-akte (“apprentices with certificate”), taught in primary schools for
significantly reduced pay, sometimes even without financial remuneration at all. The problem of
the kweekelingen-met-akte had caused much consternation among the Dutch populace in the
1930s. Van Dam’s changes in the teacher training schedule were meant partially to solve this
problem by temporarily decreasing the number of new teachers, while allowing regular turnover
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to increase the number of vacant, paid positions, thereby reducing the overall unemployment
among teachers.
But this was not a complete solution, either. Van Dam reckoned that he could add some
4150 new positions to the payroll through various restructuring efforts. The holdover of the 1942
cohort of new teachers from the Kweekscholen (teacher training colleges), would open up 1500
new positions. This was in addition to the two thousand positions that currently stood vacant
because of financial constraints at the local level, which were not already filled by the
kweekelingen-met-akte. Moreover, because school boards and municipalities shifted students to
save costs, classes were larger. Once this practice was ended, another 650 positions would open
up, van Dam calculated. These more than 4000 new teaching positions could be, at least
partially, paid for by the forty per cent reduction in the pay of clerical instructors, who numbered
about 5000 throughout the country. He was certain to note that this particular measure had been
ordered directly by the Reichskommissar, omitting, of course, that his own proposal prior to
assuming his office had been to fire them outright. Finally, van Dam explained that he intended
to significantly reduce the teacher training colleges and the use of apprentice teachers, because
once his “reforms” had been implemented, the budgetary crisis that had precipitated their
existence would have been solved, which, he noted, would be regretted by no one.109 Van Dam’s
numbers were somewhat off, as there were, at that time, some six thousand such kweekelingenmet-akte in the Netherlands, and so his budgetary restructuring would not completely solve the
crisis, but it was a good start toward that end. Although it took some time, the use of
kweekelingen-met-akte was finally, completely phased out in January 1943.110
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The entire speech can rightfully be seen as a sort of carrot and stick arrangement. On the
one hand, van Dam meant to overshadow the negative aspects of his proposals, such as the
reduction in clerical salaries, and the recent dismissal of clerical school heads and Jewish school
teachers, both of which went entirely unmentioned in the speech. On the other hand, he hid these
destructive changes with the positives of reducing (non-clerical) teacher unemployment,
increasing teacher pay, reducing class sizes, and getting rid of the teacher training colleges that
had caused such consternation during the 1930s.111 It should also be noted that, although he did
not say as much, these points all came, more or less, directly from his Reform and Gedanken und
Vorschläge pieces written the previous fall, even if, as was the case with the reduction in clerical
pay, he tried to cloak his position as the originator of these policies. This would be the tenor of
van Dam’s first year on the job. He was able to push through various “reforms,” such as the
institution of mandatory physical education, the increase of state influence over the school
system, and the increased emphasis on Dutch language instruction while claiming, in the event
he expected these changes to be negatively received, that he had been forced to implement them
by the occupation authority. But despite his decrees, whether originating from him or from the
Germans, the institution of his “reform” plans were not always successful.
Van Dam scored a political victory with the restrictions on clerical salaries, since he had
been able to push through his own ideas while gaining credit both within the department by
working against Seyss-Inquart’s worst impulses and with the public by noting that he was only
carrying out Seyss-Inquart’s orders. But this was quickly followed up by a major political defeat.
Shortly after his second radio address, the Germans finally got back to him about the question of
teaching appointments.112 He had mentioned in his radio address that a new decree would be
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coming regarding the appointment of teachers, but did not go into any details beyond reassuring
his listeners that there was no intention of making teaching appointments the sole prerogative of
the state.113 He was able to keep that promise in the new decree. The political defeat came from
the fact that he was forced by Seyss-Inquart to issue it himself.114
On April 9, about six weeks after his radio address, van Dam issued the first appointment
decree.115 The order called for the local authorities—whether school heads, municipal councils,
or school boards in the case of confessional schools—to put forth a list of three proposed
candidates to be approved by the Secretary-General or his designated representative. Should the
Secretary-General have reservations about one or more of the candidates, he could strike that
person from the list, making them ineligible for appointment. Should all three candidates be
found undesirable by the Education Department, then a second list of three candidates could be
proposed, and should those three be rejected, then local authorities would have to proceed with
individual nominations. Van Dam gave himself six weeks to reply to any appointment proposals,
meaning that the failure of school boards, local councils, or school heads to propose appointees
who were acceptable to the Secretary-General would cause longer teaching vacancies. The only
apparent loop-hole in the order was that the right of appointment oversight was limited to those
positions that were longer than four months.116
At the same time, van Dam gave himself limited authority over the firing of any school
personnel, which also had to be approved by the Secretary-General or his appointed
representatives. This was, of course, meant to prevent school heads or school boards from firing
those teachers who had shown themselves to be in any way unacceptable to local administrations
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(that is due to their pro-German, pro-Nazi, or pro-NSB attitudes).117 The appointment decree did
not, however, give him the right to fire teachers as he saw fit. Although the department did have
the authority to fire teachers for certain reasons, through the office of the school inspectors, that
right was not absolute. It was expanded, however, in January 1942, when van Dam gained that
right through two new decrees issued by Seyss-Inquart.118 The first of the two new decrees,
known as the second appointment decree, allowed the Education Department to directly appoint
teachers when the first two rounds of suggested appointments were both rejected. The second
allowed van Dam to fire inspectors and teachers, an authority he would quickly delegated to
Noordijk as Educational Inspector in General Service. It was with this new authority, combined
with an already existing authority of the Department to punish schools which did not follow the
orders of the central government that dated back to the early days of the occupation, as well as
his authority to change the curriculum, gained in July 1941, that van Dam gained near complete,
legal control over education, subject, of course, to veto by his superiors in the
Reichskommissariat itself.119
Although the Appointment Decrees gave the government technical control over personnel
questions in the schools, they were, mostly, unsuccessful. Confessional schools, which were the
real targets of the decree, did not take the issuance of the Appointment Decree lying down.120 In
many cases, school boards simply appointed teachers for four-month periods over and over.
When this finally became untenable, they simply stopped sending the lists of suggested
appointees to The Hague for approval. For example, in the 1942-1943 school year, 672 teaching
appointments were made throughout the nation, but only 212 of those were forwarded to the
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Education Department for approval, about thirty per cent of the total.121 Additionally, the
problem arose that the local school inspectors, to whom in practice the suggested appointments
were made, did not always have the local authority to push through their influence. In Assen, in
the province of Drenthe, the local supervising inspector of primary education noted in a report to
van Dam in November 1941, that the appointment decree is understood to be nothing more than
the department “blowing smoke” and that local mayors (who appointed teachers in this town)
would propose a list of candidates, as the law required, but then simply pick which ever one the
mayor had originally intended to hire in the first place, without any input from the school
inspector.122 At least in part, this was a result of the greenness of some local inspectors, who,
being new to the job, were reliant upon the mayor to smooth over any difficulties, which those
mayors then used to their advantage to make appointments as they saw fit. As the supervising
school inspector put it: “the state has little influence on the lists of candidates and appointments
of teachers in the public schools, and absolutely no influence on appointments in private
schools.”123 In a similar vein, the dismissal of clerical school heads was only half effective.
While some forty-eight such clerics were successfully dismissed by the government or stepped
down from their positions as school directors, at least fifty stayed on in defiance of the new
regulations.124
Finally, in spring 1943, an attempt was made to impose a reduction in funding for some
of those confessional schools that had defied the appointment decrees. At first, van Dam wanted
to remove state subsidies from those schools entirely, but his chief of staff De Bloc convinced
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him only to reduce the subsidies, and even then, the reductions were not always implemented.
Later that year, the department, at the Reichskommissariat’s behest, threatened to send teachers
in violation of the appointment decrees to work in Germany as part of the forced labor service.
Again, resistance came from De Bloc, who managed to slip a list of the proposed deportees to
the Dutch resistance, giving those teachers time to go underground.125 When the German
leadership decided to apply further pressure to van Dam to punish the school boards for refusing
to abide by the rules, he turned the cases over to Jap Schrieke, the Secretary-General of Justice,
for prosecution. Although criminal investigators were dispatched to look into the issue, no
prosecutions resulted from the inquiries, despite Wimmer’s demands. Schrieke tried to throw van
Dam under the bus for the failures, but in reality, the Department of Justice simply failed to
adequately engage the issue and Schrieke was not competent enough to oversee the prosecutions
dutifully, and so they never moved forward, sitting in limbo. By August 1944, Wimmer declared
that the instructors who had not been adequately approved were no longer teaching anyway and
that the schools had received enough of a punishment through the reductions in funding.126
Wimmer essentially swept the issue under the rug, which is not terribly unsurprising, given the
approaching Allied armies, which were already in Belgium. By this point, Wimmer had bigger
problems to worry about.
The issuance of the April 1941 Appointment Decree was a singular political defeat for
van Dam in this early phase of the occupation during which he had otherwise enjoyed much
success. To be certain the general idea of the decree was suggested by van Dam himself in his
Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform writings. It was not the content of the decree that made its
issuance a political problem for the Secretary-General, to say nothing of the fact that it was not
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always, and often never would be, followed by municipal councils, school boards, and mayors on
the ground. Rather, the problem lay in the very fact that he was forced to issue it himself, rather
than it being issued by the Reichskommissar. With the other politically problematic decrees that
had been issued thus far, van Dam was able to keep his own name out of the fray, such as with
the dismissal of Jewish civil servants—which van Dam protested in writing along with every
other member of the College of Secretaries-General, including the antisemitic Goedewaagen—or
the regulation cutting the salaries of clerical instructors.127 Because he could argue that he was
merely carrying out the orders the Reichskommissar, even if those orders had originated in his
own writings, in whole or in part, van Dam was able to save face with both his colleagues in the
College of Secretaries-General and with the wider public. He had even passed along the protests
regarding anti-clerical moves up the chain and managed to obtain minor concessions, despite the
fact that Seyss-Inquart’s original intention to dismiss clerical instructors outright was exactly
what van Dam had suggested in his Reform and Gedanken und Vorschläge pieces. These actions
gained van Dam a certain amount of credit among the other Secretaries-General, which would
allow him, after the war during his trial, to argue that he had always had the best interests of the
Dutch populace at heart. But despite these political successes, van Dam was reminded, after cosigning the protest letter against the dismissal of Jewish civil servants, that his position was
tenuous.128 He had been appointed by Seyss-Inquart and was serving at the pleasure of the
Reichskommissar. Should his efforts not be pleasing to the Germans, he could be sacked at any
time. His room for maneuver was thus extremely limited.
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Physical Education
Physical education was one of the many subjects that van Dam laid emphasis on in his
Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform pieces. Of course, van Dam was not the only education
specialist who supported the introduction of P.E. into the schools as a mandatory subject. The
various members of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde were also in support. For many of these völkisch
thinkers, physical education was a completely indispensable part of total education. Physically
fit members of society helped make society a more healthy, organic whole. As such physical
education and sporting activities were fully one half of the “psycho-physical totality” that
encompassed the individual. But health was not the only reason many such thinkers supported
physical education. P.E. gave students concrete knowledge and experience that not all humans
were equal—some simply were better than others, which of course was part and parcel to the
larger racialist thinking of National Socialism. Furthermore, much as in Germany, where
physical education took on a pseudo-militaristic form, völkisch thinkers in the Netherlands also
saw P.E. as a way of solidifying the volksgemeenschap upon which society was based. Finally,
physical education led students to recognize the beauty in their own bodies, and hence their
race.129 Naturally, this was above and beyond the more pedestrian reasons one might support
physical education as a mandatory subject in the schools, such as for personal safety, as in the
case of making certain all students could swim in this nation of seafarers and canals, which van
Dam used as justification during his second radio address to the nation in February 1941.130
Although physical education was not unknown in the Netherlands before the war, it had
never been a core subject in any Dutch schools prior to the occupation. On January 1, 1941, a
little more than a month after van Dam took charge of the Education Department, it was made
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mandatory in all Dutch primary schools. At the same time, the Education Department erected the
new sub-department of Physical Education and Sport in order to oversee the introduction of the
subject and a separate inspectorate was established exclusively for physical education.131 But
despite this, the implementation of P.E. in the primary schools encountered various problems.
First and foremost was the lack of qualified teachers and space. Because it had never been a
required subject at the primary school level, few teachers possessed the necessary qualifications
to teach the subject. As such, many teachers were granted the right to teach P.E. based upon their
mastery of so-called intellectual subjects.
The Germans got right to work on training P.E. teachers. Shortly after the implementation
of the requirement to teach P.E. the Germans established a training seminar in Neustrelitz, in
Mecklenburg, for the training of Dutch physical education teachers along German lines. By June,
it had admitted one hundred applicants. While most of these applicants were simply to return to
their schools to give sport instruction, forty of them were intended to fill out the new role of
inspector for physical education and sport, which would observe instruction in P.E. at Dutch
schools to make sure that those teachers were passing muster.132 The P.E. training seminars in
Neustrelitz continued regularly until at least November 1943, training hundreds of Dutch
teachers in the finer points of physical education in the German sense, when the records of those
seminars end.133 As of July 1, 1941, physical education was also given increased prominence at
the Dutch teacher training institute in Oldenburg, Germany, receiving more hours of instruction
than any other subject, even pedagogy.134
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More problematic was the lack of physical space in which to give lessons in physical
education. Generally speaking, this was not a huge problem for those schools in the countryside
where students could simply go outside to a nearby field to perform their exercises, at least when
it was warm. But no such options were available during the winter months, when it was raining,
or for those students who went to school in the larger towns and cities of the western part of the
country along the coast, where the majority of the population lived. For students in The Hague,
Amsterdam, or Rotterdam, there were no fields near enough to their schools, and given the
population densities, building new P.E. halls was both expensive and time consuming. And this
was before the ban on new school buildings went into effect on June 1, 1942.135
This was coupled with the fact that the department did not give sufficient financial
support for physical education, certainly nothing in proportion to the ideological importance that
völkisch thinkers placed upon the subject. In 1942, about one million guilders was reserved for
physical education and sport, totaling about one-half of one per cent of the total budget. In 1943
and 1944, those numbers shrank significantly.136 Given the initial outlays for physical education,
the timing of the cuts, the very high costs of building new sport fields and gymnasiums, the
effort to train new P.E. inspectors and teachers, and the near universal support for physical
education among the NSB, the German occupiers, and Van Dam, it is likely that the budget cuts
were purely financial. By the latter half of the occupation, there simply was not enough money to
go around when the Germans were most interested in extracting resources from the Netherlands
in furtherance of the war effort. Nonetheless, according to the inspectors for Physical Education
and Sport many schools made do with what they had and did the best that they could.137
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The introduction of Physical Education as a required subject in primary schools was
somewhat of an outlier in the “reforms” van Dam implemented. Unlike many of the other
“reforms” he would implement, it was actually relatively popular among the population as a
whole. It was seen as so useful, in fact, that after the war ended and democratic rule returned to
the country, the newly elected government did not roll back the clock on physical education
instruction, but rather gave renewed support for the further implementation of the subject, and
eventually expanded its mandatory status to secondary schools as well. This stands in contrast to
almost every other change van Dam and the German occupiers implemented in the field of
education during the war, which were thrown out almost entirely by the country’s new
democratic government.
A Change in Course
As noted above, the February Strike of 1941 is often seen by historians as a turning point
in the occupation.138 Protests up to this point had been localized to specific places or sectors of
society—such as the student protests at Leiden and Delft. Henceforth, protests were no longer
regional. The February Strike, which started in Amsterdam but quickly spread across the nation,
shows that large segments of the population were willing to take to the streets to agitate against
German domination generally, and their anti-Jewish measures specifically. Two weeks after the
strike, on March 12, 1941, Seyss-Inquart spoke at a large gathering of the North Holland branch
of the Arbeitsbereich der NSDAP in den Niederlanden139 held in the Amsterdam Concert House.
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In his speech, which lasted almost two hours and was covered by newspapers around the
country, Seyss-Inquart stressed the close relationship of the Dutch and German peoples.140 They
were not to become one people, but rather, on the basis of their racial and blood ties, were to
“build a new community of fate that encompasses all Germanic peoples.”141 The independent
spirit of the Dutch, which had led to the recent anti-German provocations, was a result of
historical circumstance. Whereas the German people was mostly surrounded by “foreign”
elements, the Dutch were not surrounded by those of foreign blood, but rather by their racial kin.
This geographic position, combined with the Netherlands’ large empire, led the Dutch toward a
feeling of complacent self-fulfillment and a desire to maintain peaceful relations at all costs. But
this “Dutch culture” was, essentially, Seyss-Inquart intoned, un-völkisch and a result of the
“liberal-international Jewish-influenced spirit” which dominated in the Netherlands.142 But the
Dutch need not worry, because “while the power of the Reich is expressed through the
Wehrmacht, National Socialism convinces through the power of its ideals.”143 The German
invasion allegedly allowed the Netherlands to be “awoken from a centuries-long dream,” and “it
is self-evident, that the terroristic spirit, which has at the moment broken out in all liberaldemocratic nations against national socialist movements after National Socialism came to power
in Germany, will be broken in the Netherlands.”144 But Seyss-Inquart also noted that, “we do not
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want in the least to remain in the country as the occupying power forever. We want that the
Dutch, from inner persuasion and with their whole being, join in the great work of building of
our Germanic community area and therewith a new Europe.”145
The rest of Seyss-Inquart’s speech touched upon various topics meant to reassure his
listeners in the Concert Hall and those reading the speech in the newspaper the next day, that
Germany had the best interests of the Dutch at heart. Regarding the food supply, he noted that if
the English repeated the blockade of the First World War, the Dutch would have just as much
food as the Germans. Winterhulp—a charity organization aimed at creating a sense of solidarity
among the Volksgemeinschaft and which had been exported to the Netherlands after the
invasion—had, according to Seyss-Inquart, nothing to do with charity, but with the responsibility
of racial comrades and the fulfillment of a higher duty. Germany did not consider Jews to be
members of the Dutch people; they were the enemy with whom there could be neither a ceasefire
nor peace. Industrial orders were being sent from Germany with the aim of increasing
employment and keeping people at work. Taxes had gone up, yes, but because they had been
reorganized along social norms, a household with three children would now pay less than
previously under the “liberal, capitalist, and class-based” system, while the bicycle usage tax was
to be rescinded entirely. And lest anyone fear that these changes were not to last, Seyss-Inquart
reassured his audience that England would not win the war, and Europe would never return to
the situation of September 1939.146
But in addition to these various topics, Seyss-Inquart spent considerable time discussing
education in its various forms. He noted that the Opbouwdienst, the reconstruction service aimed
at rebuilding after the invasion, was really an educational institution meant to foster the “völkisch
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solidification of the nation.”147 It did this by focusing on the “basic element of work on the
ground and in the soil.” But Seyss-Inquart’s reassurances hinted at the Dutch populace’s already
fraught relationship with the labor service. Negative beliefs about the labor service had circulated
in the Netherlands even before it became mandatory for young people to register for the
Arbeidsdienst, the successor to the Opbouwdienst, and only increased after compulsory
registration began in 1942. By the end of the occupation period, more Dutch Gentile youth
would be in hiding from the labor service than Jewish people hiding from deportation “to the
east.” Nonetheless, Seyss-Inquart hoped to reassure his listeners that there was nothing nefarious
about the labor service and that, far from being a negative experience, it would return every
young Dutchman “feeling himself as a young man of his people, for whom an appreciation of
actual work had been instilled.”148 Moreover, it was a training course for future leaders, “because
we cannot give them a right to lead in absence of Germanic substance. The Arbeidsdienst is
really an excellent training for leaders.”149
After justifying the reduction in clerical teaching salaries with the audacious reasoning
that clerics had taken vows of poverty and that there was no use in using state funds to
circumvent the clerics’ own vows, he noted that the reduction in clerical salaries would allow for
the installation of new teachers, a decrease in class sizes, and the ability of young men to start a
family.150 He then moved on to language instruction. Much like the rest of his speech, his focus
on language at first was presented as beneficial, but then showed a truer motive. As he
understood it, there was a great need for spelling reform in the Dutch language,151 and once this
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was completed and the education of Dutch children in the Dutch language and its associated
cultural treasures was guaranteed, it would be possible to teach Dutch children in the German
language, which “is the leading language of the coming Germanic community.”152 He justified
this by accurately comparing the much larger German-speaking population with the
comparatively smaller Dutch-speaking population, but then suggested that instruction in the
German language was for the benefit of the Dutch, because it would allow for future freedom of
movement in Europe, where German would certainly be the leading language, and perhaps even
the entire world. Thus, German, he said, should not be limited to those who were able to attend
higher education or the children of the elites, but rather should be available to all.153 What SeyssInquart did not say, but would become clear soon enough, was that the occupation authority
planned to introduce German language instruction in primary schools.
German language instruction, which was mentioned only as a vague thought in the
speech, was not meant to take away from the Dutch character, however. Seyss-Inquart noted that
his previous praise of Dutch history, colonialism, sea-faring, etc., showed that he truly
understood the Dutch. But he then returned to the complacency that he attacked at the beginning
of his speech, exhorting his audience not to fall for the trap of trying to work through a “socalled Fatherland Front,” by which he meant the Nederlandsche Unie—a conglomeration of the
established parties aimed at reaching a middle ground between collaboration and
accommodation—as had been attempted in Austria.154 The problem with such an organization is
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that it did not give enough weight, and could even act against, the völkisch interests, which were,
Seyss-Inquart argued, the future of the Dutch nation.155
The tenor of Seyss-Inquart’s speech was clear; he stated it directly: “with us or against
us.”156 The Dutch public could not have missed that the Reichskommissar had veiled direct
threats to the Dutch nation with platitudes about its past greatness. But in the event some people
missed it, the free press was quick to remind them. As, for example, the underground newspaper
Het Parool noted, it was:
all lies about the increased prosperity in our country, about our livelihood, the reduction of unemployment,
the “voluntary nature” in which our workers go to Germany, the false representation of our free political
will, which will only be allowed if they adapt to the principles of the most despised people in Holland,
namely the traitors of the N.S.B. We want to be free, [and] to the extent that we have been secured in the
dungeon of National Socialism, we can still move.157

The authors of the illegal paper promised the Reichskommissar to fulfill his previous promise
that the Germans would not leave unless they are cut to pieces. “If you give us no other choice well now, we assure you: then your will shall be done.”158
Where the underground press took a much more combative tone, the Bataviaasch
Nieuwsblad, published for the Dutch community in Batavia and thus outside of the control of the
Reichskommissariat, decided to mock Seyss-Inquart:
He knows the cheese head so much better! Seyss Inquart [sic] held a speech in the Concert Hall this
afternoon in which he varied threats with flatteries, fury, or fear, promises of political freedom with the
announcement of a Dutch incorporation in the Greater German Reich. In summary, the reason was the
impression of great weakness, above all of confusion. 159

If the Reichskommissar had hoped to reinvigorate the process of self-nazification with which he
had begun his tenure in The Hague, then the reaction to his speech must have been disappointing.
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The February Strike had emboldened the Dutch nation and from this point forward, things went
slowly but surely downhill.
German Language Instruction and an Eighth School Year
The most important educational “reform” that Seyss-Inquart had hinted at in his March
12 speech was the future introduction of German language instruction in primary schools. By
May 1941, Schwarz and van Dam were working on that very effort at “reforming” the
curriculum to better meet the needs of the German occupier. In van Dam’s view, German
language instruction was meant to strengthen Dutch interests, which only coincidentally, by
nature of the seemingly secure political position of Nazi Germany in Europe, were directly
aligned with those of the Germans. The introduction of German as primary school subject had,
after all, been one of the central proposals in van Dam’s Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform
pieces the previous fall.160 Regardless, van Dam had two primary concerns. First, he recognized
that he did not actually have the authority to change the curriculum in confessional schools.
Traditionally, the number of hours afforded to any particular subject was left to local
administrators. Van Dam believed that he could persuade school administrators and local
councils to agree to the proposed three hours per week of German language instruction, but
recognized that, in the event that was not possible, a change in the law would be necessary.
Second was the question of teaching material, as there was no such German language instruction
book available.161
On May 12, 1941, a meeting was held with all of the important players concerning the
newest school subject. Seyss-Inquart; Commissioners-General Wimmer, Schmidt, and
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Fischböck; Secretaries-General van Dam and Rost van Tonningen; and Schwarz together came
up with a two-part plan for the introduction of the new subject. As of September 1, 1941,
German would be introduced in Dutch primary schools, while on September 1, 1942, an eighth
school year would be introduced to help further the goal of teaching every Dutch child the
German language.162 With the support of everyone of importance secured, Schwarz proposed to
Seyss-Inquart that the Reichskommissariat produce a German language instruction book
designed for primary school students, the costs of which would be borne by the government. It
had actually been van Dam’s idea for the government to pay for the new book; he hoped the
financial savings would smooth over the adoption of the book when it was, at this point, still not
within his legal power to enforce its use writ large. While Seyss-Inquart agreed on the production
of such an instruction book, he deferred the costs to Dutch parents. The creation of the new
school book would be supervised, on the government’s side, by Dr. Noordijk, the newly
appointed School Inspector in General Service who had been trained as a German language
instructor for secondary schools, while the authorship was left to G. F. E. Blijdenstein and K. E.
König.163
By mid-summer 1941, van Dam’s plans for “reforming” the education curriculum, which
he had been working on during the first half of the year, were finally coming to fruition. In a
radio interview on July 4, 1941, van Dam made public the first of the curriculum changes he
intended to implement.164 Most important were the changes to Dutch language instruction, which
van Dam wanted to increase. Gymnasiums and Hogere Burger Scholen would increase the total
number of hours per week of Dutch language instruction, beginning in the 1941/42 school year
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by at least five and two hours respectively.165 While this would, at this point, surprise no one
listening, given van Dam’s previous pronouncements about the importance of Dutch language
education for Dutch youths, the next change would have been somewhat abrupt. Going against
all tradition in Dutch schools, German language instruction was to be increased at the expense of
French language instruction.
The question was then immediately put to van Dam what might happen with the Dutch
school system’s tradition of learning three foreign languages, to which the Secretary-General
responded that he had no intention of changing this time-honored tradition, only the importance
of those languages traditionally taught. French, which had enjoyed a preeminent position as the
first foreign language in Dutch schools was relegated to third place behind German and English.
German, which had traditionally been the second foreign language, was slated to become the first
taught foreign language. Although these changes in hours were meant to apply to secondary
education only, van Dam also noted that the teaching of French in primary schools would be
ended entirely.166 What he did not say, but would become public about a month later, was that
German would take the place of first foreign language in primary education as well, while in
addition to French, English language instruction in primary schools would also end, although he
was clear to note that this change in the hours afforded certain subjects was not the totality of the
reforms he had planned.167
In addition to changes in language instruction, van Dam noted that physical education
hours would be expanded, which he more or less correctly viewed as a rather uncontroversial
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topic. He then announced that, although he was hoping to have announced his changes earlier, he
did so at this date so that schools could prepare for the following school year by hiring the
necessary teachers of German and Dutch language to make up for the increase in hours.
Recognizing that this could be problematic, however, he noted that the changes would only take
effect for the first two grades of secondary education, with the rest of the higher grades having
their hours increased annually as each age cohort moved up the ladder.168
On July 25, 1941, through an order of Seyss-Inquart, van Dam was empowered to make
direct changes to the curriculum of confessional schools, giving van Dam complete personal
authority, limited only by the superior authority of the Reichskommissariat, over the lesson plan
in all Dutch primary and secondary schools.169 Should school boards try to hinder van Dam in
these efforts, the latter was empowered to appoint representatives who could take control on the
ground, and should that not suffice, van Dam was given the authority to shutter the offending
schools entirely. Van Dam did not wait long make changes to the education curriculum.
About a month after his radio interview, in an address broadcast to the Dutch nation on
August 12 that had gone through the rounds of the Reichskommissariat for approval of various
officials including Wimmer and Schwarz,170 van Dam announced a second round of changes that
would be carried out in the curriculum and applied to both public and confessional schools.171 He
justified these changes as being necessary given the new situation in Europe:
The leaders of the spiritual and political movement of today are aware that for the construction of the
world, which after this war will no doubt be different from the previous one, it will be necessary to have a
young generation, which is conscious of the ideas and ideals which are the basis of this newly constructed
world and who have assumed these as their own viewpoint. I have the difficult, but for the future of our
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volk fruitful, task to steer in this direction the education of the youth, which will, in my estimation, lead to
this goal.172

After noting that he had received from the Reichskommissar complete understanding for the
necessity of these changes, he implored his audience to trust in him that he was making these
changes for the benefit of the Dutch nation, that “we correct ourselves in various points” in order
to achieve the “fruitful future” that he envisioned and which was based squarely on “Dutch
interests [and a] Dutch future.”173
The changes that van Dam planned to make were of a “general administrative-technical”
nature and should not be seen as undermining the freedom of education that was the basis of the
Dutch educational establishment that resulted from the struggles of the previous century. It was
under this guise that he characterized the appointment and dismissal decrees, which he freely
admitted were aimed at confessional education, and which, in his estimation, had caused little
trouble in the intervening months. But these steps were not enough, according to van Dam.
Further changes were necessary in two directions. First was the maintenance of peace and order
in the schools, while the second encompassed changes to the curriculum and school books.
Regarding the former, he noted that Seyss-Inquart has already afforded him significant leverage,
above and beyond the authority previously granted to the Education Department, to enforce rules
in the schools, both public and private, up to the closing of offending institutions should they
refuse to submit to the central authority. As part of this effort, he had appointed Dr. D. G.
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Noordijk as “School Inspector in General Service,” whose aim it was to enforce peace and order
in the schools and carry out the orders of the Education Department in those areas of the country
that were otherwise resistant to van Dam’s “reforms.”174
Noordijk, it should be recalled, was a replacement for the fired P. A. van Rossem, the
former “Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar” tasked with the very same goals
and who had made himself and his subordinates much resented during his six months on the job.
Importantly, Noordijk was subject to van Dam’s authority, whereas van Rossem was, at least
initially, administratively stationed outside of the purview of the Education Department. But van
Dam was clear to stress that he did not desire to use the new powers granted him, especially
those harsher punishments which allowed him to shutter schools entirely. Rather, he appears to
have hoped that the threat of such action would force the offending parties into line.
The announcement regarding Noordijk’s appointment was of secondary importance in
van Dam’s radio speech, however. It was the changes to the curriculum that was the real news of
the day.175 After having noted that much discussion had taken place over the preceding month
following his radio interview in which he announced the increased hours for German language
instruction and physical education in secondary education, he went right in for the kill. German
language would be taught at primary schools in the Netherlands as the first and most important
foreign language. Initially, in discussions with his superiors in the Reichskommissariat, van Dam
had suggested three hours of German language instruction per week in the primary schools, but
when questions arose from Schwarz about whether even more hours could be devoted to German
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language instruction, van Dam suggested that the draft law be amended to read “at least” three
hours per week. Schwarz enthusiastically agreed.176 Schwarz’s desire for increased German
language instruction could also be found in his insistence that the new subject be taught in the
third year of primary education, but in that case too, van Dam was able to convince his superiors
that such an early introduction would be problematic, to say the least.177
Van Dam informed his audience that his reasons for the introduction of German language
instruction in primary schools were multiple. Knowledge of German would allow for greater
contact between the Dutch and the Germans, which of course was necessary given the new order
that ruled Europe (and which was certain, in van Dam’s view, to remain). German language
skills would also alleviate unemployment by allowing Netherlanders to go to Germany for work.
Moreover, it would allow for ease of travel from the Netherlands to Germany. But most
important in van Dam’s eyes was that increased German language instruction would actually
bolster Netherlanders’ knowledge of the Dutch language. He reasoned that, given the similarities
of the two languages and the increasing influence of the German language upon the Dutch
language, which, he argued was growing every day, if every Netherlander learned German, it
would allow the Dutch to maintain the distinctiveness of their own mother tongue, by learning,
via German language instruction, both the similarities and the differences of the two languages.
As he informed his listeners, “this influence can only be combated and put to good use if one
knows the German language.”178
Whether van Dam actually believed that learning German would help Dutch students
with the Dutch language is unknown. On its face, the argument is not entirely implausible,
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although it disregards the totality of effects that his reorganization of the curriculum was aimed
at: a closer cultural association of the Dutch with Germany and the European, Germanic new
order. The Germans authorities, however, were clear in their understanding of the importance of
German language instruction. For example, Dr. Wimmer, Commissioner-General for
Administration and Justice, noted in a letter to various Gauleiters in August 1942, in which he
requested additional teachers to help fill vacancies in the German Schools in the Netherlands,
that:
The Dutch, already very difficult to influence by nature, and made bourgeois by an almost uninterrupted
250-year period of peace and prosperity, are predisposed to conservatism and are hardly amenable to new
developments. In such an attitude, the adult Dutch people are often unable to reach the Reich at all. It is
more promising to deal with the youth; which have not yet consciously experienced the peaceful state of
satiety, nor have they acknowledged it as the inner foundation of their existence. They are also hard to get a
grip on, because … the schools, as the only opportunity to reach the entirely of the youth, have long been
recognized by our political opponents, especially the confessions, as the best source of influence upon the
youth, and therefore are stubbornly obscured against our influence.
We have already done a great deal by regulating the rule of the churches over the schools, by bringing
Dutch National Socialist schoolmasters and teachers to the crucial positions in school organizations and of
the actual education system, and to a large extent cleansed the teaching material.
But it is also a question of instituting reforms in our interests. In order not to enter into an open cultural
struggle, the reforms have to be tackled mainly from the pedagogic point of view, and thus the practical use
for the population must be clearly shown. Toward this end, the introduction of the compulsory teaching
subject in [the] German [language] will have an effect in the primary school, which has already taken place
in the past school year and will be significantly expanded in the coming year. 179

While van Dam might have understood the introduction of German language instruction as a
method to increase the independence of Dutch culture and to bolster the population’s knowledge
of the Dutch language, the upper echelons of the German leadership in the Netherlands had no
such ideas. German language instruction was aimed at converting the independent-minded Dutch
toward German interests, which included the incorporation of the Netherlands into the Greater
Germanic Reich that would rule the future of Europe.
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In addition to the introduction of German language instruction into primary education,
van Dam also announced in his August 1941 speech that primary schools would, through a
massive reorganization, be extended to an eighth year, which was to be introduced for the
1942/43 school year.180 Seyss-Inquart ordered van Dam to begin preparations for the
introduction of the eighth year of primary school in April 1942, and van Dam got right to work
along with his subordinates in the department. After much discussion from within the
department and between van Dam and his superiors at the Hauptabteilung Erziehung und
Kirchen, van Dam released two decrees, dated August 26, 1942, which changed the 1920
Education Law to include both the lengthening of compulsory education through the eighth
school year, although with some exceptions, and the introduction of the new eighth year of
primary education.181
Previously, primary education had stopped after the seventh year, and of those, only the
first six were entirely compulsory, meaning a child could leave school when they turned
fourteen. Van Dam, like Mussert and many educators, saw this as problematic on a fundamental
level. As it stood, there was a significant drop off in attendance for the seventh school year of
primary education, which van Dam reckoned to be between seventy and eighty per cent. Those
students who did not attend the seventh year of primary education either dropped out of school
entirely or went to one of the various secondary schools available to them, whether the
Gymnasium, the Hogere Burger School, or extended primary education, the so-called MULO
schools, which were similar in nature to the German Hauptschule.182 Because of the significant
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drop in attendance rates for the ordinary primary schools, many municipalities concentrated all
students in the seventh year of primary education into a single school for ease of teaching, which,
van Dam proffered, would make the addition of an eighth year relatively easy to accomplish.183
This new school, which van Dam called voortgezet gewoon onderwijs184 was meant to catch
those students who dropped out entirely after the sixth school year and those students who
continued on to the seventh year of primary education but did not attend one of the various types
of secondary schools. Because of the niveau of students that would attend the continuing primary
education school, the focus of these years was to be life skills, but with a special emphasis on the
worker and his wife’s place in the Volksgemeenschap:
The school will thus become an instrument for influencing the Netherlander of the future, in so far as the
education of Dutch self-awareness, the shared community of fate with the German people, and GermanicEuropean bonds will be at the forefront.185

The extension of primary education to an eighth year, along with the consequent
lengthening of compulsory education through a child’s fifteenth year (which would include that
eighth year of primary education for most students), as well as the introduction of German
language instruction into the curriculum meant that there would be a shortage of both teachers
and learning material for this purpose.186 Regarding the shortage of teachers, van Dam gave little
insight into his thinking save to mention that the department recognized it might be necessary for
schools to share German language teachers.187 The latter problem of teaching material could not
be solved by simple means because there was, as yet, no material designed for teaching German
to primary school children and so van Dam announced that a new German language instruction
book would be prepared. In fact, by this point, the preparation for the Deutsches Lehr- und
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Lesebuch für die niederländische Volksschule were well underway under the supervision of Dr.
Noordijk such that the book was expected to be ready for use by the 1941-42 school year for the
7th year of primary school education.188 Van Dam promised that this new book would be free of
any sort of political or ideological indoctrination and would focus purely on teaching the basics
of the German language.189
Only half of van Dam’s expectations came true. The Deutsches Lehr- und Lesebuch was
only first published in March 1942, which meant that German language education had to be put
off until the 1942/43 school year. On the other hand, König and Blijdenstein, the book’s authors,
stuck with van Dam’s promise to avoid any sort of ideological indoctrination. The instruction
book takes a straight-forward approach to teaching German language that focuses on children’s
rhymes, songs, and games aimed at making learning German both fun for the students and useful
for establishing a basic understanding of the language.190 The only content that could be, in
theory, conceived of as ideological, was to be found in the included songs that were suggested
for use in lessons, many of which were religious in nature, especially Christmas songs such as
Stille Nacht, Heilige Nacht, but that would not have been out of the ordinary for the time. Even
so, their inclusion certainly could not be accurately construed as Nazi-oriented pieces.191
Like so many of the other changes to education introduced by the occupiers and their
Dutch helpers, German language instruction and the extension of primary education to an eighth
school year were not entirely successful. German language instruction, while technically
mandatory, could not always be adequately enforced. Teachers could easily keep teaching the
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same foreign languages they always had, as a local inspector noted in Apeldoorn.192 Only a little
subterfuge was necessary to make it appear as though German language was being taught when,
in reality, it was not at all. Part of the problem was that the NSB was against the introduction of
German language instruction, for the party feared that it was a further step toward
Germanization.193 Had it been more supportive of the effort, it is likely that German language
instruction would have, at least, been more successful in those towns controlled by NSB mayors
and in those inspectorates staffed by NSB inspectors. But given that both the populace and the
majority of Dutch collaborators were against it, German language instruction did not really stand
a chance.
As it stood, there were simply not enough inspectors who were both willing and able to
enforce the mandated changes. It was not a question of whether inspectors were falling for
teachers’ ruses. Many local inspectors very clearly knew that German was not being taught. As
the inspector in Helmond noted:
Education in the German language in this inspectorate has become a giant farce … Instruction is for all
intents and purposes not given. Always there are a few sentences and words on the board, but always the
same ones. A few nice, innocent German songs are taught. Everything in case of inspection.”194

Or as Terpstra, the chief of the Sub-Department Primary Education, noted at one school he
visited in ‘s-Hertogenbosch:
there is reason here to surmise that [teaching] is not proceeding with the necessary diligence, by the way of
the school director [who taught the class and] gave the impression even during our visit, that the
educational material interested him so little, that he had trouble keeping his eyes open. 195

Because German language instruction was seen as an imposition by most people, according to
the inspector in Arnhem, “nowhere is [German] taught with enthusiasm, and in almost half of the
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schools in the Arnhem inspectorate, there is simply no German taught at all.”196 Such was the
case throughout much of the country.197
And unwillingness of many teachers was not the only hindrance for German language
instruction. Somewhat counter-intuitively, there were numerous teachers who actually wanted to
teach German language, but these teachers were simply unable, for lack of proper training and
German language skills. The reason behind such an odd situation was the importance placed
upon German language instruction by the government. It exempted German language instructors
from foreign labor service or re-internment as prisoners of war, thus making the position quite
popular among teachers. The inspector in Zwolle summed up the odd nature of German language
instruction after the war:
Very little or nothing came of the education itself ... Yet that measure [German language instruction] of the
occupier is one, perhaps the only one, for which we could be thankful. It did no damage, it did not bring the
Dutch youth a step closer to Germandom, to the contrary. But it did provide an unbeatable opportunity to
indemnify dozens of teachers from re-internment as POWs or from [having to go] underground. 198

Even if the introduction of German language instruction can be seen as at least partially
successful, the expansion of primary education to an eighth year certainly cannot. The necessary
reorganization of the educational system proved too difficult to implement by the 1942-43 school
year. Although the law had been altered to require the introduction of the new continuing
primary education schools no later than September 1, 1942, exceptions were made allowing
those municipalities that were unable to implement the new orders by the beginning of the 19421943 school year to delay its introduction until the 1943-44 school year.199 The problems in
implementation of the eighth school year were multiple. There was a shortage of teachers
qualified to teach the subject even for seventh year students, let alone for eighth year students.
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There was a shortage of classrooms in which the lessons could be taught, which was exacerbated
by the ban on new school construction aimed at saving valuable building resources.200 At the
same time, shortages of paper and other learning materials had begun to be felt within the
department, while, by this time, the confessional schools were in open revolt against the
Education Department and the “reforms,” especially the appointment decrees, it had instituted.
Moreover, the extension of compulsory education through a child’s fifteenth year was met with
significant resistance, especially in the countryside where those students were often expected to
begin working instead of returning to school.201 Finally, and in reversal of their previous position,
Mussert and the NSB actually came out against the lengthening of compulsory education, fearing
that it would, just like German language instruction, lead to an increased Germanization of the
population.202
1942 had been unfavorable for the introduction of an eighth school year, but by 1943, it
was nearly impossible. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941,
Sicherheitsdienst reports show an uptick in belief among the population that the Germans would
eventually lose the war, and the subsequent defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943, where hundreds of
thousands of German troops were captured, meant even greater numbers of forced laborers
would be sent to Germany.203 At the same time, material shortages became worse as almost
anything of value was deemed necessary for the war effort, which included the more mundane
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items, such as paper.204 The entry of the United States into the war in late 1941, coupled with the
German defeat at El-Alamein in late 1942 and at Stalingrad in early 1943 led to a large increase
in resistance activity among the Dutch, which further exacerbated labor shortages by drawing
otherwise working age adults into resistance networks and away from German labor service.
During 1941, it had appeared to most people paying attention that the Germans were the
uncontested masters of Europe and would not be leaving any time soon. This had, of course,
been one of the primary motivations van Dam himself repeatedly gave for his cooperation with
the Nazis, both during and after the war. But by early 1943, German domination of Europe was
not nearly as certain. The resulting increase in resistance activity, along with the loss of the
Dutch East Indies to Japanese occupation in spring 1942 and the ever-increasing need for labor
from the Netherlands following the German defeats of winter 1942/43, led the German occupiers
to increase repression of the Dutch population. The tenor of the occupation had changed
significantly and caught in the crossfire, among many other elements, was the introduction of
German language instruction and the eighth school year.
Stichting Nederlandsche Onderwijs Film
At around the same time that van Dam and Schwarz were making their initial
arrangements for the introduction of German language instruction, in May 1941, A. A.
Schoevers founded the Dutch Educational Film Foundation (Stichting Nederlandsche Onderwijs
Film) in The Hague. The idea of such a foundation reached back at least to January 1941, when
Schwarz put Schoevers put into contact with Dr. K. Zierold, an official at the
Reichserziehungsministerium in Berlin. Ostensibly, the foundation was tasked with using the
new medium of film as a tool for education in the schools, but the propagandistic opportunity
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was hard to pass up. Technically placed under the purview of the Dutch Education Department,
and therefore under van Dam’s authority, the foundation nonetheless received significant support
from the Hauptabteilung Volksaufklärung und Propaganda in the Generalkommissariat zur
besonderen Verwendung, led by Commissioner-General Fritz Schmidt and which was tasked
with the ideological coordination of the Dutch public with National Socialism.205 Regardless of
where, administratively, it was placed within the Dutch bureaucracy, the leadership and control
of the foundation was strictly in German hands.206
The foundation had a dual purpose to fulfill. One the one hand, it was tasked with
importing films from the German Education Ministry for use in Dutch schools. In the first year
alone, it obtained more than four thousand copies of German films used in education for Dutch
schools, in addition to some seven hundred, fifty film projectors. On the other, it was supposed to
create new films on Dutch culture and history that could be used in the classroom. Mostly these
dealt with geography and the natural sciences. It was the latter subjects that the Germans thought
would be most useful for their propagandistic purposes as they could be used to counter the
religious education given in the confessional schools. Schwarz, in one of his many reports back
to the Office of the Deputy Führer/Party Chancellery noted that in the confessional schools,
“every technical innovation [i.e., film] and the clarification of natural laws are treated as the
devil’s work.”207 But as far as Schwarz was concerned, anything that hurt or hindered the
confessions in carrying out their work was a benefit to the Reich.
Despite the benefit the Germans saw in using film in the classroom as an educational
tool, the foundation experienced considerable difficulties in obtaining the necessary materials to
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further its intended purpose. Shortly after its foundation, it ordered forty thousand meters of
blank film for use in copying German films and for shooting new material, deliverable in
monthly installments of ten thousand meters. A year later, it had received only a fraction of that
from the Kodak factory in occupied Paris where the film was produced. This was mostly a result
of infighting among the German administrations in the Netherlands and in occupied France, with
both administrations claiming a higher need for very limited amounts of film. In the end, the
foundation was forced to make due with a monthly allowance of only three thousand meters of
film.208
Despite this, the Dutch Educational Film Foundation managed to produce a relatively
stunning number of films for use in Dutch schools, many complete with teachers’ manuals
designed to help teachers in using these films to their fullest extent in the classroom.209 Entire
film series were produced on topics ranging from geography to traffic management, from botany
and biology to winter sporting activities. Noticeably absent from the catalog of produced films
are any that have to do with politics, history, or “racial studies,” subjects that one might more
regularly expect of an institution with an overtly propagandistic purpose.210 Likely for this
reason, those few works that have looked at propaganda in the schools during the occupation
have left the foundation completely out of their works, or, in a single instance, discounted it as
nothing more than a sideshow with little effect.211 But despite the dismissal of later historians of
the work of the foundation, it is clear from the historical record that the Germans themselves saw
the film foundation as a propaganda tool worthy of their support. Schwarz, for example, lists it in
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every report back to Berlin as one of the accomplishments he oversaw during his time leading
the Main Department of Education and Churches in the Reichskommissariat, while the officials
in the Main Department Enlightenment and Propaganda repeatedly refer to the propagandistic
nature of the foundation in their letters in support of obtaining more film for the foundation’s
use.212 So while more research on this particular area is needed, outright dismissal of the work of
the foundation would be a mistake.
Conclusion
By the end of Schwarz’s first year in office, the situation was looking relatively good
from the German perspective. He noted to a colleague, Dr. Benze of the Deutsches
Zentralinstitut für Erziehung und Unterricht in Berlin in a letter dated March 12, 1941, that the
“reform” of Dutch education along the German model had only just begun, but that he was
hopeful that, in the very near future, these changes would reap dividends.213 In his activity report
dated July 31, 1941 he reported back to the Party Chancellery the state of affairs in the
Netherlands as concerned his Main Department Education and Churches. Among the positive
developments in the realm of Dutch education, Schwarz counted German control of the
curriculum, personnel, and school books; the introduction of German in the 7th and 8th school
years as the first and most heavily taught foreign language; general school reforms along German
guidelines; the introduction of German educational/propaganda films; the introduction of
equivalency between German and Dutch school finishing exams; the lengthening of teacher
training; the removal of anti-German school inspectors and their replacement with Germanfriendly inspectors; the guarantee of peace order in the schools via the introduction of a General
Inspector; the removal of clerical school heads and the reduction of clerical teaching salaries by
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forty per cent; the removal or cleansing of anti-German school books; and the forced relocation
of Jewish students to Jewish schools.214 In previous reports, but left out of the July report, he had
also emphasized the establishment of physical education as a required subject in the schools.
And that was only in the realm of primary and secondary education in Dutch schools.
In Dutch universities, he counted further successes, including state control of private
universities; cleansing of the personnel; the appointment of three German and six Dutch national
socialists as Professors; the establishment of an SS-Kameradschaftshaus (SS-Camaraderie
House) in Leiden and the concentration of national socialist students there; exchanges of Dutch
and German students via the German Academic Exchange Service; the introduction of the Führer
principle in the universities through the strengthening of the curators and rectors; the closing of
new enrollments to Jewish students; and the limitation of Jewish students to no more than two
per cent of the total, all of whom were confined to Amsterdam.215 Finally, he noted great gains in
the area of German Schools in the Netherlands, which had been increased in number from eight
to forty-one, with triple the number of attending students, of whom about a third were Dutch, a
third Reichsdeutsche (Germans from Germany), and a third Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans).216
This was helped by the removal of parental costs for the intuitions (which were now subsidized
by the Dutch state), and the granting of equivalency between German and Dutch schools.
Moreover, a shortage of teachers had been overcome through the hiring of ninety Dutch teachers
for the German schools, many of whom had completed a teacher training course in Oldenburg,
Germany designed for this purpose. Student difficulties with the German language were being

214

NIOD 020/2047. For more on the school inspectors, see Chapter 7.
NIOD 020/2047.
216
For the efforts regarding German Schools, the NIVO, and the Reichsschulen, see Chapter 6.
215

268
overcome through the establishment of special summer courses designed to improve these
students’ facility with German.217
By most measures, these changes must be understood as an astounding success on the
part of the Germans. Schwarz certainly believed them to be, noting in a previous report that
many of these advancements were simply unimaginable given the state of Dutch education prior
to the German invasion.218 The Dutch had, after all, engaged in a long fight amongst themselves
regarding the nature of education, one that lasted the better part of a century and that concluded
with a system that was both varied and mostly out of the control of the Dutch state. The Germans
had managed to completely upend this system in a little over 15 months and without even
encountering the level of resistance they had originally expected.219 But the successes of the
German occupier during the first war were also superficial in nature, as they amounted, mostly,
only to the introduction of new regulations. Only in the removal of Jewish students and teachers
could the Germans claim real success; every other initiative was limited in some significant way,
while the hoped-for introduction of heemkunde was never even attempted.220 As the occupation
went on, the implementation of these new regulations proved ever more challenging at the local
level. Sometimes the hurdles were structural, as was the case with the introduction of physical
education, propaganda films, and the eighth school year. Other times outright resistance on the
part of local officials and teachers was the cause of the ineffectiveness of the new regulations.
This was especially true of the appointment decrees, the use of banned school books, and the
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introduction of German language instruction. In reality, despite Schwarz’s glowing reports, the
successes of the Reichskommissariat and its Dutch helpers were much more limited.
In the following chapter, the focus changes slightly to look at one specific subject—
history. Historical instruction was seen as especially important by the German occupiers and
their Dutch collaborators, which was, for example, why so many history books had been affected
by van Dam’s textbook censorship committee. But removing offensive material was problematic
in two ways. First, so much was deemed offensive to the occupiers that it left few acceptable
history books available. More importantly, however, the occupiers and the local collaborators
recognized that historical instruction could, and should, be used to help them in their goals.
Merely removing material was insufficient from an ideological point of view.221 In order to
infuse a more Germanic view of history into the education of the youth, the German occupiers
and their Dutch helpers attempted to introduce several völkisch history textbooks into the
classroom. Some were more successful than others, but all shared in the same essential purpose
of fostering a Germanic identity in the Dutch.
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Chapter 6 - Changes in Historical Instruction
With this booklet we want to demonstrate on the basis of facts that the Germanics were, neither in [the stone age]
nor long before, “wild, uncivilized, nomadic hordes,” but peasants with a high culture connected to the soil. The
reader can then judge [for] himself about the boisterousness of the inhabitants of these lands at the beginning of our
era, which these days the youth are so often forced to accept. - F. E. Farwerck, Het is anders dan men ons leerde,
19381
One Europe will finally emerge from this war. But was there no Europe [before]? No! There were only a number of
European states. ... Now there will be one Europe, a European togetherness, led by the Germanics. - Anonymous
author of Over Volk en Vaderland - Geschiedenis voor het lager onderwijs, 19442

In the previous chapter, the focus remained on the administrative apparatus of the
German occupation and the Dutch Education Department. Most of the changes discussed there
focused on the higher levels of the administrative state’s attempts to inject a national socialist
and Germanic theme into instruction and school administration. This included attempts by the
government to gain control over confessional education, attempts to remove both Jewish pupils
and Jewish instructors from the schools, the censorship of school books, the introduction of
German language instruction, physical education, propaganda films, and the attempted extension
of primary education to an eighth school year. When the focus did turn to actual changes in
classroom instruction, such as the introduction of physical education as a required subject, the
attempted introduction German propaganda films into the classroom, or the introduction of
German language instruction, it was noted that these efforts were met with little relative success,
despite the Germans’ and their Dutch collaborators’ best efforts. Mostly, this lack of success
stemmed from two major factors. The first were institutional hurdles that the government was
unable to overcome. The fate of physical education and the Stichting Nederlandsche Onderwijs
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Film are prime examples here, as in both cases, material shortages hampered the occupiers’
efforts before any significant traction could be made.3
On the other hand, both passive and active resistance from local administrators and
teachers was the cause of the failure to fully implement the book cleansing regime or to gain
control of confessional education.4 In these cases, it was a matter more of the affected groups, by
and large, not being willing to follow the new rules placed upon them. At the same time, the
extension of primary education to an eighth school year failed as a result of both major factors,
as shortages in classrooms, teachers, and paper were combined with resistance on the part of
confessional schools and even the NSB, such that the eighth school year had to be continually
pushed back as the occupation progressed and was eventually scrapped altogether.5
The Germans and their Dutch collaborators did experience some success with the
introduction of German language instruction, to the extent that it became an official subject, a
book was produced and sometimes actually used, but even here, resistance from teachers, school
heads, and local administrators meant that many, if not most, students received only cursory
instruction in the German language, and certainly nothing at the level that was intended. 6 Only
in the removal of Jewish individuals from the schools did the Germans experience any real
measure of success in their efforts, and in this case, it must be noted, they were all too successful.
But even in this instance, the impetus was not confined to the educational sector, but rather the
effects of the Germans’ actions were felt in the educational sector simply because Jewish people
could be found in the halls and classrooms of the nation’s educational establishments. Indeed,
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throughout occupied Europe, the Germans put great emphasis, sometimes even to the detriment
of the war effort itself, to affect their genocide of Europe’s Jewish population, so it is
unsurprising that they were equally effective in these efforts in the Netherlands.7
But there was one other area in which the government enjoyed comparatively greater
success in its efforts to change classroom instruction—historical education. This chapter focuses
on the question of historical instruction through an examination of history textbooks designed for
school instruction that offered a view of Dutch history from a national socialist perspective.
These works, by and large, were representative of the larger body of Nazi scholarship that
viewed the Netherlands as a Germanic nation whose history and destiny was tied forever to that
of the German Reich and whose people were essentially Germanic brothers. This view as
promoted by national socialist thinkers and, as portrayed in history textbooks intended for
adoption in the schools, was largely incompatible with the type of historical instruction taught in
Dutch schools prior to the invasion. The final section of the chapter focuses on an older historical
textbook that was used prior to and during the early years of the occupation that was specifically
singled out by the occupation authorities as being anti-German and deemed inappropriate for use
in the schools.
Although the introduction of a new form of history education was comparatively more
successful than other attempted “reforms,” it should be noted from the outset that this greater
measure of success was still extremely limited in nature. Significant opposition occurred at the
local level, such that the implementation of the government’s “reforms” was just as hampered as
the occupiers’ attempts to, for example, gain control over appointments in confessional
education. Nonetheless, these attempts at re-forming Dutch history deserve a closer look for two
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reasons. First, attempts to alter history textbooks and introduce replacement texts more
favorable to a Germanic worldview explicitly lay out the occupiers’ plans for the future of Dutch
education and the new national identity historical education was meant to foster. While
bureaucrats like Schwarz could, and did, argue in their writings that their efforts at reform at the
administrative level were aimed at instilling a more völkisch, Germanic mindset in Dutch youth,
beyond their own words indicating as much, there is in many cases little that differentiates their
“reforms” from the liberal efforts of the previous century.8 But in the area of historical
instruction, these differences are much more obvious, and in this case, the end goal of fostering a
more Germanic identity can most readily be shown. Second, unlike many other efforts, the
Germans and their Dutch collaborators viewed historical instruction itself as one of the most
important aspects of their educational agenda, and so put comparatively greater efforts toward its
“reform.”9
A New Historical Instruction
Although van Dam’s censorship committee had done much work on historical texts by
erasing offensive passages, removing certain works from circulation, and censoring new
publications, this was not entirely sufficient. As one complainant noted, almost all historical
works might be considered anti-national socialist in their basic foundations, at least to the extent
that they were not based on the racist and chauvinistic tenets of the ideology. The school book
cleansing commission had been so thorough in their efforts regarding history books that a near
emergency resulted because of a lack of acceptable history texts.10 The German occupiers were
well aware of this problem, as were their collaborators in the Dutch government. As F. J. Los
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noted in the völkisch, Nazi publication Volksche Wacht in 1941, “None of the subjects taught …
needs reform in objectives and methodology [as much] as the subject of history.”11 For this
reason, several attempts were made to write new history books that would more effectively instill
among the student population the national socialist view of history. The most successful of these
was Prof. Jan de Vries’s Onze Voorouders.12
De Vries was a well-known intellectual and member of the Royal Dutch Academy of
Sciences, and as such, was in many ways an excellent candidate for writing a new national
socialist history textbook. He had been a Professor of Old Germanic Literature and Languages at
Leiden University since 1925 and was an active participant in the small völkisch movement in
the Netherlands during the 1930s. With the coming of the occupation, became even more
influential. In 1942, he was appointed vice president of the Nederlandsche Kultuurraad,13 which
was headed by G. A. S. Snijder, and tasked with paving the way for National Socialism in
scientific and cultural life in the Netherlands. Later that year, he was appointed vice president of
the Nederlandsche Kultuurkamer,14 which was led by Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, who was also the
Secretary-General of the Department of Arts and People’s Enlightenment. That body was tasked
with the general cultural coordination of Dutch society. Also, in 1942, he was appointed to head
the Institute for Dutch Language and Folk Culture in The Hague, the Dutch language institute
that had first been proposed by van Dam in his inaugural radio address. He was also one of the
main Dutch intellectuals who worked with the SS-Ahnenerbe research institute, although in some
Ahnenerbe circles, he was seen as insufficiently committed to the cause.15 Regardless of this
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relative mistrust he received by some workers at the Ahnenerbe, his work was continually
financed by the German leadership and he never lost the respect of the higher levels of the
Dutch, völkisch elite in the Netherlands.
The impetus for the book reached back, at least, to December 1941, when van Dam
exchanged notes with Goedewaagen regarding the creation of two history books designed for use
in the classroom.16 Onze Voorouders was the first of the two, and the only one that would make
it to publication. By June 1942, de Vries had finished the work and passed it along to
Goedewaagen, who then sent copies to van Dam to proof so that van Dam could, should he see
fit, test its use in the schools. After seeing the book first hand, van Dam appears to have had
varied reactions. At first, he declined to put it to use in the schools as a textbook, but only as an
instructional manual for teachers. But he quickly reversed himself, noting that the book was
“topnotch,” and decided that it could be made compulsory throughout the education system,
although he wanted to wait and see if any objections materialized. However, he again walked
back that choice as well, noting that because of Article 200 of the Basic Law, confessional
schools retained the right to choose their own school books.17 Of course, he certainly could have
asked Seyss-Inquart to make the necessary changes to the law, but apparently decided against it,
likely for political reasons. Regardless, he did inform Goedewaagen that he would suggest its
use in public schools and would make it required for the two Reichsschulen, but even then, not as
a text book, but only as an instruction manual for teachers. He did not have to wait long for the
response from the confessions to the examples he sent out requesting feedback. Representatives
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of both the Catholic and Protestant communities objected to the book, and it was made clear that
were the book made compulsory, resistance to its use would be palpable. Specifically, the
Protestant side objected to the idyllic portrayal of the Germanic past which, when one read
between the lines, clearly argued that Christianity disturbed this idyll.18
Over the next several weeks, both Schwarz and Wimmer requested copies of the work for
their own perusal, and by the end of November, Schwarz specifically was in agreement with the
current state of the project and its use in the schools, although he did note that he thought it
necessary to create a new history book specifically for primary education, as de Vries’s book was
intended for the middle grades, whether the extended primary education schools or the first
classes of secondary education. By December, van Dam had apparently changed his mind again,
although the cause of this change of course is unclear, it was likely because of pressure from
Schwarz. Regardless, he determined that the book should be prescribed for Reichsschulen, the
seventh and eighth year of extended primary education, expanded primary education schools, the
first years of secondary education, and the teacher training colleges, although, when it came to
confessional education, he only strongly encouraged its use. It was this final version of the
requirement that was published on January 15, 1943.19 Despite this requirement, however, the
publisher of the work wrote to van Dam in May 1944 noting that he still had some 100,000
copies of the book for sale, although at least some of the difference in sales versus expected sales
can be attributed to financial shortages on the part of the various municipalities. Several mayors
wrote directly to the Secretary-General noting that their budgets for school books had already
been maxed out.20 Presumably, many more asked their local school inspectors directly, as would
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be the usual way of making such inquiries. Regardless, given that many schools, by this point in
the war, were controlled by NSB-affiliated mayors, it is likely that usage of the book in schools
was relatively widespread.21
The second work that Goedewaagen and van Dam envisioned for use in the classroom
was to be written by Dr. H. Krekel. Krekel had previously worked for the newspaper Het
Vaderland22 but was fired from his position after making some positive comments about Hitler in
1939, although he was allowed to retake his position after the German invasion, as the paper was
interested in currying more favor with the occupier.23 In the autumn of 1940, Wimmer had
hoped to appoint Krekel, along with van Genechten and Goedewaagen, to professorships at
Leiden University, but their appointments were voted down by the faculty. That plan would
have to wait until the following summer to be pushed through, but pushed through it was.24 An
NSBer, Krekel became a member of the Nederlandsche Kultuurraad, along with both Snijder
and de Vries when that body was established in 1942.
Krekel’s dissertation had focused on English foreign policy during the late nineteenth
century, and so, he was not entirely unqualified to discuss the history of recent events in Europe
after the end of the First World War. Regardless, however, he believed that in order to give a
full recounting of the important events of the previous two decades, it would be necessary to
stretch his history back, at least, to the foundation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in
the immediate aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat. But he did not feel himself entirely up to that
task. By mid-1943, had only completed a rough outline of the material, portions of some
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chapters, and various notes, which, he admitted to van Dam, could not be brought together as a
competent and complete work.25
Moreover, he noted that “no one at the moment desires a purely factual consideration [of
the material]. I can, however, not give any other form of work than factual.”26 Although Krekel
did not spell out, exactly, what he meant by “factual” and how the Germans’ and their Dutch
collaborators’ desires were not “factual,” the difference probably lies in the fact that Krekel was
a supporter of the Diets ideology that called for a Greater Netherlands.27 He had been one of a
number of signatories, over one hundred forty, who had put their name to a “Greater Netherlands
Declaration” in May 1940 that called for “a secure Greater-Netherlandic community in a
reorganized Europe,” although that declaration never managed to gain any traction.28 Given this,
it is somewhat surprising that he was chosen in the first place, although his close connection with
Goedewaagen may have been a factor. Either way, the ultimate approval of the works rested
with van Dam (and necessarily therefore also with Schwarz), which had been one of van Dam’s
conditions for going along with the project in the first place.29 Had the resulting work been too
heavily influenced by a Diets ideology, it could have still been scrapped. As a result of Krekel’s
admitted inability to complete the new history book, van Dam advised Schwarz that they must
free Krekel from the task at hand and find a replacement. Van Dam then turned to his SS
colleague Henk Feldmeijer, the leader of the Germanic SS in the Netherlands, in the hope that he
might know of someone capable of taking up the task of writing an acceptable history book but
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the request was either never answered or the reply went missing.30 Either way, the book was
never completed, whether by Krekel or any other author.
In addition to these two efforts, the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators put
forth several other attempts, as did other organs not directly affiliated with the occupation
regime, such as Nazi-oriented publishing houses. A closer look at some of these works will
show that they are all of a basic type, that is, intended to foster a new Germanic identity among
their student readers.
Onze Voorouders
Although Onze Voorouders was not included in every classroom across the nation, nor is
it entirely possible given the extant records to know in how many Dutch classrooms the book
was used, it can be easily surmised that it found its way into many schools given its mandatory
status, even if those schools were in the minority, which seems likely given the large numbers of
extra copies that remained with the publisher. Regardless, the work is an important example of
how the Germans and their Dutch collaborators hoped to change historical instruction.
De Vries begins his work—which at only thirty-four pages hardly deserves to be called a
book in the first place—by trying to define what Germanics are. He begins with a short
overview of the Germanics in the Roman period, noting that the Romans were well aware of
Germanic peoples living from Eastern Gaul well past the Oder River in Central Europe and
further north into the Scandinavian Peninsula. These Germanics began as a small people on the
southern coast of the Baltic Sea, according to de Vries, and spread out from there until they
covered the major portion of Central and Northern Europe. Quoting Tacitus, de Vries notes that
the Germanics had bright blue eyes, red-blond hair, and strong bodies, which are “to this day the
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characteristics of the Germanics living in Scandinavia and on the North Sea coast; thus these
people have best preserved the old properties.”31 De Vries goes on to note that this Nordic race,
according to classical authors, stretched much further south, and that “they were probably in
these parts the rulers of an older population, with whom they intermixed over the course of the
centuries.”32 He ends his first chapter by contesting the contention made by classical authors that
the Germanics were a wild, nomadic people, which he steadfastly denies. Rather, they were
farmers who “for many thousands of years … have made their living by working the earth with
plows and scythes.”33 Already in the first three pages of text, de Vries hit upon several of the
major themes of völkisch ideology. Blond-haired, blue-eyed farmers, living in concert with the
earth have kept their blood pure and free of mixing with other peoples. They were a war-like
people who managed to hold their own and force the Romans to keep their border at that most
German of rivers, the Rhine. The message the author intended his school-aged readers to take
away from the work could not be clearer.
De Vries spends his second chapter going into further detail about why the Germanics
should not be thought of as primitive barbarians by looking at, in turn, their buildings, clothing,
tools, armaments, and ship building capabilities. In those areas where the Romans contrasted
their more developed civilization with their Germanic neighbors, such as through their urban
lifestyles with large amphitheaters, palaces, and aqueducts, de Vries is sure to note that the
Germanics were every bit as praiseworthy, noting that the Romans’ outlook toward the
Germanics was just as bothersome as the urban dwellers of the twentieth century looking down
on the simple farming life of the countryside. Yes, the Germanics made their houses out of
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wood, not of stone, but that was only because stone was not abundant in Northern Europe. But
their wood dwellings were both large and ornate, proper farm buildings made by skilled
carpenters which caused the Germanics to want for nothing. Where the Romans described the
Germanics as half-naked wild men, in truth, de Vries argued, they had ornate clothing made from
wool and cloth, including belts of woven and patterned bands with hanging tassels, which of
course was a skill not lost over time, as evidenced by the wool working and cloth spinning
industries of the early modern period in the Low Countries. Their tools were also advanced for
the period. Their plow was better than the Roman plow and their wheels were spoked wheels,
which were more modern than the flat wooden disks that were used in Eastern Europe into de
Vries’s own time. Their armaments and ships were also advanced for the period, with the use of
chain mail and sailed ships that could reach speeds of ten or eleven knots. In case the students
reading de Vries’s work were unable to imagine his descriptions, there were several pictures that
had been mocked up to help them visualize these advanced characteristics.34
De Vries’s adulation for the lives of the Germanics continues into his third chapter, in
which he discusses the society of these peoples. Naturally, the most basic unit of society was the
family, but not the family of the modern period, rather larger blood-based kinship groups. These
extended kinship groups often lived together, with the oldest male in the central line leading the
family, which would pass to the oldest son each generation. These oldest men were given the
right to vote upon the future of the community in a democratic fashion, with the leading families,
over generations, turning into a nobility of sorts. From this nobility, in time, a king might be
elected to lead the community in times of war. At the same time, in some societies, powerful
men in leading families might assemble around them an entourage, made up of both family
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members and those from other families, bound through mutual love and devotion. This leading
group could then assert its power over the rest of the community, establishing the leading man as
a sort of prince. Thus, owing to the varied states of community organization over the centuries,
the Germanics experienced all sorts of government forms, from nearly democratic to purely
monarchical. But during all of these periods, the family, tied as it was by blood, was always the
basis of the larger community.35
The rest of the work is of a similar nature. De Vries consistently argues that the
Germanics were not the backward people he assumes his readers have been taught, but rather,
were actually a more advanced civilization, taking on the tone of a pure apology of their society
and culture. For example, in the fourth chapter, which covers Germanic writing and poetry, he
notes that the Germanics did not write on parchment or paper, not because they did not have
access to those technologies, but because they simply had no need of those surfaces for writing.
After noting that the runic alphabet the Germanics used was best suited for wooden and stone
surfaces, rather than the curved letters found in the Latin alphabet, he goes on to suggest that
wooden and stone tablets were perfectly suitable for the short messages the Germanics thought
necessary to preserve. For longer works, such as heroic poetry, these ancient peoples had
professional bards who could, with complete accuracy, recount long poems and songs generation
after generation, until, eventually, they were written down in the medieval period. De Vries does
not appear to see the irony in his own argument, however, when he notes in the very next
sentence, that the poems and songs of the Batavians are now lost to the modern reader and
knowledge of those works is available to us only through written Roman sources.36
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The author moves next to the artwork of the Germanics, arguing that these naturally
gifted artists preferred to take their inspiration not from nature but from their own imagination.
De Vries is careful to note that much of their art is lost to the modern viewer, he assumes
because it was mostly made up of wooden works that have not stood the test of time. And
although he discusses a recently discovered shipwreck in Norway which does contain many
carved animals and figures, after noting the high quality of these artistic representations, he
returns to his contention that the Germans preferred more abstract works, including bronze
carvings with ornate designs. These elaborate patterns, which often took the form of concentric
circles that appeared to be only a “chaos of lines, a confusing entanglement of seemingly
goalless garlands, but behind the chaos, an orderly principle is still hidden, and these artists
indeed have a plan and goal, even if they are covered by whimsical accessory lines.”37
De Vries’s most flattering words for the Germanics come in his chapter on Germanic
virtue. He couches his analysis in supposed objectivity, however. He reminds his readers that
the Romans saw the Germanics as, first and foremost, “dangerous enemies” whose “irresistible
power” was overcome only because they soon lost their resolve during large undertakings. But
this was, de Vries notes, only because, as per the old Germanic idiom, “the brave bide their
time.”38 Foremost among the virtues of the Germanics were, in de Vries’s eyes, their courage,
faithfulness, and gentleness, all of which the Germanics saw as the height of virtue. But lest his
reader think he would paint the Germanic as the ideal person, he then discusses the two main
vices of those peoples, specifically excess and gambling.
As far as excess goes, he limits it only to consuming alcohol, but further notes that this
was most common during festivals and feasts, and de Vries further argues that even in the
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present day, the 1940s, similar features could be ascribed to the rural population, but that “no one
would conclude, that drunkenness was a distinguishing mark of our farming population.”39 As
for gambling, he first notes that this is one tradition that does not persist to the modern period,
but suggests that, despite this, the modern reader should not discount Tacitus’s descriptions of
such a practice as being completely untrue. Rather, de Vries argues, Tacitus likely
misunderstood religious practices, such as a sort of divination practice used by priests to predict
the future and determine how the gods would prefer men to proceed in a given circumstance.40
To the extent that the Germanics had other weaknesses, however, their description by de
Vries is entirely didactic:
The Germanics were not ideal people, but they were a tough and healthy race, distinguished by indomitable
courage, but no less by an iron energy. … Remarkable as well is their open-mindedness, through which
they accepted and used everything that was foreign to them, but which they also independently worked
themselves and further developed. However, there was also a danger that lurked here, to which the
Germanics often fell [victim]. They let themselves be blinded by the exotic and thereby underestimated
themselves. The tribes who lived in our country did this as well; is it not a matter of fact that the Batavian
freedom hero carries the Latin name Claudius (actually Julius) Civilis? Here lurks the danger that many
Germanic tribes had become corrupt.
This is most evident when, during the Migration Period, Germanic peoples settled in the area of the Roman
Empire; after a few generations they had already adopted much from Roman culture. Also, in our own
history, we can see multiple examples of a repeated, exaggerated tendency to follow foreign peoples.41

This is, of course, what in many cases happened to Germanic tribes, especially those that later
settled in the areas controlled by Rome, and who, after the fall of the Western Empire established
petty kingdoms in Italy, France, Spain, and North Africa. It was, according to de Vries, a boon
for the Roman peoples who lived there and who were thus “strengthened by the virtue of a strong
Germanic element.” But these Roman peoples nonetheless managed to maintain their Latin
languages and civilizations instead of adopting that of their conquerors. Regardless of the
benefits afforded to the newly conquered peoples, however, de Vries maintains that for the
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Germanic peoples themselves, this intermixing was, ultimately, the cause of their downfall in
these regions.42
The only part of the text in which de Vries does not bestow greatness upon the Germanics
of the Classical Age is that which concerns their religion. Here he contents himself to describe
the ways in which the Romans compared their own gods to those of the Germans, which he does
by both excusing this practice—he finds it reasonable that Roman authors saw Germanic gods as
their own gods in different names—and by noting that the Romans were not always correct in
assuming a one to one correlation between the two groups. Otherwise, the chapter on the
religious practices of the Germanics is mostly descriptory.43 This is, given the Christian nature
of the Netherlands in the twentieth century, not entirely surprising. Where everything else about
the Germanics showed their greatness compared to both their contemporaries and, in some cases,
even people in the modern age, in their religious practices, he sticks to a purely neutral tone, lest
he offend the religious sensibilities of his readers, or their parents.
The entirety of de Vries’s history of the Germanic peoples, with the sole exception being
his discussion of Germanic religion, is clearly meant to engender respect and awe for these
ancient peoples, and by extension, for the Germanic peoples of the twentieth century, including
the Dutch. The Germanics of the Classical Age were, after all, “Our Forefathers,” and it was
those forefathers whose work resulted in “an important part of what has been achieved in our
continent.” “The awesome colonization work done by the Dutch and the English and the
development of modern technology, which is founded in significant part upon the work of
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Germanic researchers” are but a few examples de Vries cites of the important and lasting
influence that these ancient peoples contributed to the modern world.44
This was the type of history that both the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators
thought was most relevant for school instruction; this was what “top-notch” history looked like.
That van Dam ultimately decided to make it a compulsory text in many classrooms, and
available for use in those schools in which it was not compulsory, reveals the conception of
history that the Nazis hoped to foster in the Netherlands. The focus is on the heroic, ancient
race, which through its virtues created much of what was good in the world. Its downfall, such
as it was, was said to be a result of racial mixing with other peoples, which caused the Germanics
to lose sight of their own culture and be subsumed into that of the Romans. And this is all
polished with the veneer of objectivity. The author is certain to point out certain flaws of the
Germanic peoples, but then consistently notes that they are either not really flaws at all, such as
their excessive drinking, or that they are merely misunderstandings of the Roman writers,
especially Tacitus, whose writings form the bulk of de Vries’s written source material.
Importantly, de Vries’s work also makes clear that the various Germanic peoples of modern
Europe are also the direct descendants of these ancient Germanics. The English, Icelandic,
Scandinavians, Germans, Danes, and Dutch all share the same past and are, therefore, part of the
same larger family. Only in these places was the Nordic Race not polluted with the racial
element of foreign peoples. These peoples, therefore, are the inheritors of all that was good in
the Ancient World as part of a single, Germanic family of peoples.
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Over Volk en Vaderland
Onze Voorouders had been intended for the middle grades, whether the final years of
primary education or the initial years of secondary school. It had not been intended for the
earlier years of primary school, and as such, a new Nazi-oriented history textbook was needed to
reach those students. In 1943, in an effort to rectify this shortage, van Dam decreed that a
competition would be necessary. Under the auspices of the Department of Primary Education
(one of the sub-departments of the Education Department), such a competition was established,
through which a jury of experts would judge submissions for eventual use in the classroom. The
jury, the composition of which was the subject of some debate within the department, ultimately
consisted of Chairman G. F. Vlekke, a Dutch Nazi pedagogue and Chief Inspector of Education
in the First Main Inspectorate, which covered the provinces of Gelderland, North Brabant, and
Limburg; Dr. Paulina Havelaar, a völkisch minded Dutch historian who had appeared in various
Nazi-oriented publications; and Dr. Johan Theunisz, a secondary school teacher in Zwolle who
also had a long history of publishing in national socialist, völkisch publications.45 On February
15, 1944, this jury council met and developed a six-point criteria for the to-be-completed history
book that included: 1) the book should be between one hundred and one hundred twenty pages,
2) a broad view of history, including prehistory, must be presented, 3) it should be, in the first
place, a volksche and not mainly a political history, 4) separate lessons should be devoted to
individuals, who through their character, have influenced the spiritual, moral, and cultural
development of the Dutch volk, 5) the book should not just cover the history of Holland, and 6)

45

Venema, Schrijvers, uitgevers en hun collaboratie, I/64; Schöffer, Het nationaal-socialistische beeld, 114, 331–
32.

288
the book should emphasize the shared destiny of the Dutch volk and the larger Germanic
whole.46
The selection process had specifically excluded the names of the authors and instead
mottos were used to identify the works. For this reason, the ultimate author of the winning work,
entitled Over Volk en Vaderland: Geschiedenis voor het Lager Onderwijs,47 is not known for
certain, although Ivo Schöffer suggests that the author was Dr. M. O. Albers, a historian by
training and frequent contributor to Opvoeding in volkschen geest, the NSB education
periodical.48 Other scholars are not so sure of Schöffer’s contention, while the NIOD archive
that houses the manuscript states only that the author is not known.49 Had the work eventually
been published, that information would have come to light, but as it remained in manuscript
form, the ultimate author will likely never be known with absolute certainty. Regardless, both its
selection by the jury as well as its approval by van Dam strongly suggest that it was considered
an acceptable work for introduction into the school system, even if the jury had suggested that
the manuscript needed to be reworked with expert guidance, as it contained too many
shortcomings and even some unacceptable mistakes.50 In fact, the manuscript itself contains
numerous deletions, additions, and other changes, summarized in a list format at the beginning.
Because it is unlikely that the author would have submitted a manuscript with entire sections
crossed out in red ink or with penciled in marginal question marks, it is likely that many of these
edits were made either by the jury or by an expert on behalf of the jury or van Dam.51 But
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despite these edits, the manuscript never went any further in the development and publication
process. By this point in the occupation, Allied armies had already stormed the beaches of
Normandy and begun the liberation of France, which meant that questions of school textbooks
were simply not a priority for anyone of importance.52 Nonetheless, the stillborn manuscript
offers yet another view into what the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators, in this
case especially those in völkisch NSB circles, had in mind for historical education in the
Netherlands. Furthermore, because this is the only work that was both intended for school
instruction and that covers the modern period, it deserves a closer look.
Over Volk en Vaderland contains seven chapters spread out over 126 manuscript pages,
including deleted sections but not later additions, ranging from the first human inhabitants of the
Rhine Valley clear through to Second World War, and thus spanned tens of thousands of years.
It begins with a short recounting of the “person from Hengelo,” a set of human remains
discovered along the eastern border by excavators building a new canal in that town. Noting that
this person was most likely a forefather of the modern Dutchman, the author then goes into the
life of the people who lived at this period. With vivid imagery, the author relates how these
ancient people would have set traps for mammoths and hunted reindeer, while their womenfolk
and children gathered fruits and greens from the surrounding area. To put emphasis on the
violent nature of this lifestyle, the author stresses “from the very beginning, was conflict.”53
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After noting that there is much that cannot be known about pre-history, the author,
without any hint of intended irony, moves into the development of the Nordic race, which he or
she argues originated in either Denmark or southern Sweden, and which owes it vitality to the
harsh climate which allowed only the fittest to survive. These people, who originated some six
thousand years before the author’s day, were livestock breeders and farmers who kept a variety
of animals and developed various grains. And then they conquered the world!
They spread out from Northern Europe to Persia, Greece, Italy, Egypt, China, and India,
the latter group taking the name Aryans, or rulers. And although these Nordic peoples ruled over
other peoples for centuries, because they were small in number, they eventually succumbed to
intermixing with their charges and thus, the Nordics vanished from most of the world. But they
left behind hints of their greatness, through language, literature, and art, whether in India, Persia,
Greece, or Italy.54 After a short section on stone age peoples, including the Funnelbeaker and
Beaker cultures, the author ends the first chapter by noting that “the Nordic race made great
conquests and laid therewith the way for the later dominion of Europe over the world. The
greatest steps toward the current situation were caused already in pre-history.”55
The second chapter of Over Volk en Vaderland covers the “Germanic period,” which is
roughly defined as the period from 2000 BCE through 1000 CE. The Germanics, according to
the author are the descendants of the Nordic race that remained in their original homeland of
Denmark, northern Germany, and southern Sweden. Like their Nordic ancestors, these
Germanics:
… had excellent qualities of body, head and heart. They were powerful and hardened. They were clever
and resourceful. They were simple, laborious, brave and faithful. We must therefore regard it as a great
honor to descend from such forefathers. In many things they have been the teachers of the world, e.g., in
agriculture, handicrafts and shipping.56
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In their religion, they worshiped the sun, whose most common symbol is the swastika, but
additionally worshiped man-like gods, the greatest of whom was Odin, the father of gods and
men. The daily life of a Germanic person, shown through vignettes about an imagined young
man named Segismund, focuses on hard work as a farmer and sporting events such as racing that
acted as entertainment. Segismund’s father, who stood in for the head of the Germanic
household, lived on a homestead which would pass to Segismund’s older brother. As a result,
Segismund would have to venture off to claim his own homestead, thus expanding the Germanic
presence. As a result, “all of us, without exception, are descended from farmers.”57
But Segismund and the Germanics were not just farmers. They were also warriors who
would conquer man, beast, and nature. Strong Germanics like Segismund marched outward
from their homelands and conquered neighboring peoples. After their conquest, they returned to
the lands of their fathers, gathered their brides and children, wagons and breeding stock and
ventured out to settle their newly conquered homelands. “Thus, the Germanics spread out over
the course of centuries over the North of Europe.”58 And it was these Germanics that soon
encountered the Romans.
The Romans, of course, were also partially descended from the Nordic Race. It was this
Nordic blood that had allowed the Romans to conquer the entire Mediterranean, but by the time
of the fall of the Republic, that blood had been lost, and instead of fighting for themselves, they
let those whom they conquered do their fighting for them. It was this sort of Roman army that
encountered Arminius in the Teutoburger Forest. Arminius, the son of a Germanic prince, was
an officer in the Roman army and so learned their strategy and tactics. And as a result of his
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learning, he was able to lead the Germanics to victory against the Romans, freeing Germania,
“once and for all.”59 Shortly after securing Germania proper, Germanics on the left side of the
Rhine rose in revolt, this time led by the Batavian chief Claudius Civilis. Civilis’s plans started
with great success. He had allied his Batavian people with both Germanics from across the
Rhine as well as a cohort of Gallic peoples, and everywhere they beat back the Romans. But
Civilis’s fatal flaw was trusting his Gallic allies, whom he had instructed to occupy Alpine
passes to prevent Roman reinforcements from Italy reaching Gaul. They failed in this mission
and eventually turned against the Germanics, allowing the Romans to eventually prevail.
Despite the ultimate defeat, which was not even Civilis’s own fault, “we like to consider
Claudius Civilis as the first great hero in our history.”60
This was, however, only a temporary setback, for soon the Roman Empire fell and the
“Germanics conquered the world.” This conquest, which is how the author describes the
Germanic migrations of Late Antiquity, saw the Germanics spread out through all of Europe and
into North Africa. But just as the Nordics of pre-history had intermixed with those they
conquered, so did the Germanics, with only England retaining a pure Germanic character.61 This
was the fate of the great Frankish empire as well. Up through the period of Charlemagne, the
Franks had remained true to their Germanic heritage, but “under his successors, it was
completely different. The memory of the old Germanic life was canceled out as much as
possible and the assembled sagas were destroyed.”62 It was also in this period that Christianity
first became entrenched among the Germanics. Initially resistant, the new religion was forced
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upon them at the point of a sword. Thousands died staying true to their old customs, but
eventually Christianity won out over the pagan religions of old. But in order to put as positive a
spin on it as possible, the author notes that “Christianity could only fully unfold on Germanic
soil. The pure and simple Germanic national character gave the new leather a cleaner and deeper
shine.”63
And then the Germanics conquered the world—again. This time it was the Vikings, with
their various conquests and settlements from England to the Mediterranean to the Russian steppe.
Like the Nordics before them and the Germanics of the great migration period, the Vikings left
their mark, just as the Dutch would do in the future during the age of European imperialism. It
was all one and the same:
But the nature of our fathers lives on in us! Like them, we too will be able to build a new future. Every boy
and every girl must make an effort to do so with all their strength. Our own happiness should not be our
goal, but a glorious recovery of the Netherlands. 64

The section on the Middle Ages, which takes up the third chapter of Over Volk en
Vaderland, contains many more edits than the previous chapters, and is the first to include
additions proposed for it, likely by the editor or the selection jury. After a short description of
the basic tenets of feudalism, which stressed the transformation of farmers into “serfs and
slaves,” the author moves into the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire. He notes, in what
is a gross oversimplification of the Diploma Ottonianium, that Otto, the first Holy Roman
Emperor, forced Pope John XII to swear him fealty, thus making the Emperor supreme on the
continent.65 But this supreme authority waned as generations passed both through the
machinations of German princes, “the old Germanic fault,” as well as rebellions by Italian cities
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and later Popes, the latter eventually coming under the sway of the French throne during the
Babylonian Captivity.66 It is here that the editor inserted the first major addition to the text,
which was clearly meant to highlight the extraordinary character of the Holy Roman Empire as
compared to the other states and empires of the age:
We cannot look at the Reich as a state like others. It had from antiquity an assignment to fulfill in Europe,
as the leading, protecting, and ordering power. Through internal disunity, however, it could not answer this
call. Now it is again awakened to a new strength.67

The following pages take a look at each of the major duchies, counties and bishoprics in
the Low Countries that is mostly traditional in its outlook. Stress is placed upon the major events
in medieval Low Countries history, such as the Hook and Cod Wars in the County of Holland,
the First War of the Guelderian Succession, the slow decline in power of the Bishops of Utrecht,
or the Battle of the Golden Spurs between the French crown and the County of Flanders. This
latter event at Kortrijk induced the editor to make his second major addition, noting that the
battle must be stressed because the Flemish, “as the furthest forward outpost of the Germanics,”
had successfully defeated a Romanesque army.68
The rest of the chapter focuses on the Middle Ages and is cursory in nature. There is a
basic description of the three estates, city life, and a short mention of the Crusades, with
emphasis upon the Third Crusade, led by Frederick Barbarossa and, especially the Fifth Crusade,
led by William I, Count of Holland, which sacked the Egyptian city of Damietta.69 In the end
though, the author sums up the Crusades as “a new series of Germanic heroic journeys,” which
earns a large, marginal question mark from the editor.70 Apparently there was such a thing as too
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much historical revisionism, and this was it. After a short recounting of the Baltic Crusades,
which were really just continuations of the Germanic and the Nordic customs of conquest, the
author notes that by the end of the Middle Ages, the Netherlands had become wholly different
from the German Reich. The Dutch had their own language and felt as a separate people, even if
a feeling of community continued to exist between the two peoples. But then the author notes
that this separation brought no advantage for the Netherlands, far from it:
With a powerful Germany behind us, we would have not needed to fight the Eighty Years’ War against
Spain. With a powerful Germany behind us, we would have been able to retain our later conquests in
North America, Brazil, South Africa, and India. We would have established a lasting world empire. But
then there was no strong Germany. The Empire had become powerless. Our volk had to trust their own
strength. There was no other choice. The power of the united Germanic peoples would be irresistible.71

It is only with coverage of the modern period that the author begins to write his history in
greater detail. So, while the first three chapters had covered Dutch history from pre-historical
times through to the Middle Ages, the fourth chapter focuses only on the Eighty Years’ War,
while subsequent chapters cover the rise and fall of the Dutch Golden Age, the Nineteenth
Century, and the Twentieth Century respectively. The chapter on the Eighty Years’ War is
broken into three main parts. The first part details the early of the Dutch Revolt and takes on a
proudly patriotic veneer. The focus, in tune with the original mandate for the textbook, is on the
actions of particular individuals and their heroism. Naturally, William the Silent, he “of German
blood,” plays a large role, but so too do lesser individuals, such as Jan Haring, whose exploits
during the Battle of the Zuiderzee are given two full pages.72 Other events that receive special
attention include the entire town of Haarlem, which struggled valiantly against the Spanish
during the 1572-73 siege of that city, and Adriaan van Bergen and his crew’s exploits during the
sack of Breda in 1590.73 Although the recounting of events is entirely patriotic in form, which is
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unsurprising given that it is a Dutch history book, it is not as overtly völkisch or politically
charged as previous sections. The editor also seems to have had little qualms about the subject
matter, save for one section he struck that mentions the last words of Balthasar Gerard, assassin
of William the Silent, asking God to take pity on Gerard and the poor people.74
The second section of the chapter focuses on the discovery of the New World and various
Dutch exploration ventures, with extended focus placed upon Willem Barentsz’s exploration of
the Arctic and the creation of the United East Indian Company, before turning back in the final
section to the period of the Dutch Revolt that occurred after 1600. Just as in the first section, this
latter section focuses on the exploits of individuals, in this case Maurice of Nassau, younger
brother of William the Silent and newly installed Prince of Orange. Particular focus is placed
upon his actions at the 1600 Battle of Nieuwpoort.75 In contrast to the first section of the chapter,
in which multiple heroic events are described in great, yet mostly contrived, detail, the second
half of the Dutch Revolt, covering the years 1609 through 1648, is wrapped up in just three
pages.76 The third section ends with a very short explanation of how the southern provinces,
which had originally bravely fought alongside the northern provinces, remained under Spanish
control after the fall of Antwerp in 1585 and Oostende in 1604.77
In the concluding portion, a subsection entitled “Look into the Past and the Future” which
closes each of the seven chapters, the author notes that the Eighty Years’ War and the Peace of
Münster had a dark side. Yes, this was the period during which the Netherlands gained
independence, and this independence would usher in the Golden Age of the Seven United
Provinces, but there were still members of the Dutch volk who were not yet free, specifically
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those of the southern provinces. Moreover, the greatness of the new young republic would be
tested in the coming years through wars with both England and France, and it would be shown to
not be nearly as powerful as it had hoped. What was worse, the German Reich, which had
declined in power since the late Middle Ages, was beset by problems both within and without.
The same treaty that had given the Dutch their independence had ended the Thirty Years War, in
which the population of the Reich dropped from twenty million to six million.78 “But in 1870 a
powerful empire arose again and is now more powerful than ever. The possibility for new
collaboration is present again. The future will certainly lead us in this direction.”79
The following chapter on the Dutch Golden Age and the Eighteenth Century has a dual
focus. On the one hand, it celebrates the greatness of the Seven United Provinces, but, at the
same time, warns against the downfall of the Seven United Provinces before the strength of the
European Great Powers. The Golden Age, the author tells the reader was the result of the
flourishing culture of the seventeenth century. Artists, poets, architects, jurists, scientists, and
smiths called the Netherlands, both the northern and southern provinces, home. But the
greatness of this age was soon eclipsed by the various wars in which the Dutch found themselves
engaged. True, the Dutch acquitted themselves well in the three Anglo-Dutch Wars, and even
against more powerful France, the Dutch Republic fared relatively well in the Franco-Dutch War
and the War of the League of Augsburg, with the author noting repeatedly about the two
outcomes: “He [Louis XIV] sued for peace.”80 At the same time, the Netherlands had heroes
they could be proud of, especially De Ruyter, Tromp, the Evertsen brothers, and William III,
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who later went on to become the King of England, and “one of the greatest of his family.”81 But
the success of these heroes could not prevent the ultimate defeat. By the end of the War of the
Spanish Succession, the outcome was much different: “Peace was concluded in Utrecht in 1713,
wherein the Republic was handled with such disrespect that a French delegate dared to say: ‘We
negotiate for you, about you, and without you.’”82
The rest of the chapter comprises a series of vignettes through which the author attempts
to show the decline of the republic, entitled “rest and decay.” The first such section is nothing
more than a vignette in which a son does not wish to carry on the hard work of his father,
preferring a life of relative comfort that had been provided to him by his father.83 The second
section recounts the defeat by the British in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, which the author
blames squarely on the role of the regents and commercial elites who have neglected the
maintenance of the Dutch military. Try as he might, the Stadtholder-King William IV could not
undo this decline.84 It was, the author argues, a great disappointment:
At the Peace of Münster we were a people in the fullest blossoming of prosperity, science and art. Our
ships sailed all seas, our trade spanned the whole earth. … We were one of the strongest states. We resisted
the united power of England and France. We decided partly on the fate of Europe and of the world. But in
the eighteenth century we had become weak and easy-going, and we were glad if we were left alone.
Obediently our little boat sailed in the wake of England. If foreign powers threatened us, we had to seek
help from our neighbors. We were not able to protect ourselves, as in the past. After all, we ended up in
foreign bondage and there followed a period of French domination. And even after the departure of the
French, the old spirit power has not yet returned soon enough.85

If the eighteenth century had been one of decline and decay, the nineteenth century was
one of absolute disaster in the author’s eyes. It began with the French Revolution based on the
misguided notions of popular sovereignty, freedom, and equality, all of which were wrongheaded, although the author’s strongest invective was used against equality: “It does not work, to
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assign the same rights and duties to a professor as to an idiot, to a breadwinner as to a loafer, to a
powerful man as to a gray beard.”86 And of course, this equality was enforced with the “equality
machine,” which took the heads of thousands.87 But despite these misguided ideas, the French
were successful in imposing them upon Europe during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
wars. This French domination of Europe was especially bad for the Netherlands, the author
argues, as it forced the Dutch into yet another war with the English which led to the temporary
loss of its overseas colonies, including South Africa. But this was all ended when the peoples of
Europe awoke to their desire for self-determination. Strongest in Germany, this feeling of
nationalism, supported by brave soldiers like Blücher, helped cast off the French yoke, even if
their desires for a united Germany were undermined by the diplomats at Vienna.88
One thing that the diplomats did get right, however, was the creation of a United
Kingdom of the Netherlands, even if “it was a pity for us that it was not born out of our own
strength, but only from English self-interest.”89 Despite the new-found unity of the Low
Countries, discord soon broke out as a result of both confessional and economic disunity, leading
to Belgian independence in the 1830s. This, of course, was only possible because of French and
English intervention on the side of the Belgians; the Dutch army had otherwise acquitted itself
wonderfully, but it was no match for the combined weight of the European Great Powers,
especially France.90 But if disunity was bad, what came next was worse: parliamentary
democracy. The 1848 constitution ushered into being political parties that divided the volk and
worked only for factionalism. It was responsible to no one, and certainly not to the entire people.
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That would require a singular ruler, the likes of which parliamentary democracy was unable to
produce.91 And to make matters even worse, parliamentary democracy ushered into being the
rule of the Jew.
Capitalism is, according to the author, the “rule of money” over society: “Money rules
industry, the banks ruled money and ……. the Jews ruled the banks.” But capitalism was not the
only invention of the dastardly Jew, for socialism was its counterpart. Created by Marx, also a
Jew, socialism argued that the worker had no volk, that all workers, regardless of their
differences were brothers in arms against owners. This, of course, made sense, the author
argues, because Jews have no volk and no fatherland to owe homage to, and so resorted to the
class struggle, despite the fact that “volk and fatherland are the highest asset of man.” Luckily,
“National Socialism will improve this. The whole population must take care of all its members
as a family. And every worker must be able to trust that his people will never leave him.”92
Lest the reader think that the entirety of the nineteenth century was disaster and disaster
alone, the author does note that some good came from it. The royal house was stocked with
entirely German blood; it had not been degraded with the blood of other peoples.93 Furthermore,
inventions, such as electric lights, the railway, and the electric telegraph, made life easier for
many people, although he is careful to warn the reader that these inventions have not made
civilization. Rather, civilization, and with it culture, are the result of honoring the inheritance of
one’s forefathers, the land, architecture, literature, music, and art. Moreover, even if things were
bad in the Netherlands, in Belgium, after its independence, the Flemish began to feel their
“Dutch blood” speaking to them in the face of Francophone dominance, and although the
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Flemish movement would not gain any real ground until the twentieth century, it came to life in
the nineteenth.94 The chapter ends, as do all chapters in the book, with a look into the future, in
which the author notes that all of the bad tidings that came from the nineteenth century would be
short lived, for “in 1940 he [the Dutchman] was startled from his slumber by a frightful shock.”95
The final chapter of Over Volk en Vaderland covers the first half of the twentieth century,
and given the short period that it covers, is the most in-depth chapter of the entire work.
Beginning with the First World War, the author recounts a history that very well could have been
written by a German revisionist during the inter-war years. England caused the Great War, a war
it had wanted in order to stave off German commercial advances. On all fronts, the Germans
were without equal, first defeating the Russians, while at the same time driving deep into France.
Only because of socialists in Germany, who had threatened the war effort from behind the lines,
was Germany forced to sue for peace. In the Netherlands too, the English were the villains. All
that was bad, including the food shortage that occurred toward the end of the war, was the result
of English violations of Dutch neutrality. Similar violations by the German military are ignored
entirely.96 The Versailles Treaty that ended the war with Germany was unjust, especially the
“false declaration … that the war occurred completely and only through German guilt.” The
League of Nations was, according to the author and not entirely without logic, doomed to failure
as the international mediation that the League called for could only be enforced through war and
violence, the opposition to which was the express purpose of the League in the first place.97
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The rest of the chapter takes a more topical approach, with subsections covering
everything from the Zuiderzee Works and Afrikaner nationalist Japie Fourie to Christianity’s
place in the Netherlands, National Socialism, and the NSB. Especially telling is a section on the
various political parties of the inter-war years, in which the author briefly describes, and then
lambasts, each of the non-NSB political movements. The party leaders, regardless of party, were
little more than fat cats living off the hard work of the honest man. The socialists wanted to
divide the nation through their focus on class struggle, all the while ignoring the defense of the
Netherlands through minimal, or non-existent, outlays for the military. The Free-thinking
Democrats also neglected the military, while the liberals were too individualistic, thereby
neglecting the nation. The religious parties, for their part, were too interested in only their own
bases in the confessions, and therefore were not supporting the nation as a whole.98
In contrast to the other parties and their leaders, NSB Leider Mussert was a man of true
principle. He had volunteered for service during the First World War, although obviously saw
no combat given the Netherlands’ neutral status. He passed his exams “with praise” at the
Technical University of Delft and quickly rose, while “still a young man” to high station in the
civil service. As a result, “a wonderful career was open to him. Professor, minister, he could be
everything.”99 But, seeing the “ailments from which our volk was so badly ill,” he wanted to
heal his people, “to make his people healthy and strong, united and happy. He wanted to bring
prosperity and joy to all volk comrades, especially to the hundred thousand unemployed.”100 To
that end, he founded, along with van Geelkerken, the NSB in 1931, which soon saw meteoric
growth. The established authorities threw everything they could at the NSB and its leaders, but
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were unable, according to the author, to reverse its fortunes. Their members stayed true to the
cause, and after the Nazis invaded, its membership rolls reached to over 100,000.101
In addition to commenting on politics in the Netherlands, the author also devotes several
subsections to the two major political philosophies of the inter-war period: Soviet communism
and fascism, especially German National Socialism. As could be expected, the Bolsheviks were
the root of all evil in Russia, and even threatened the rest of the world. In Russia, the author
claims the Bolsheviks killed 40 million people in their quest for power, including farmers,
bourgeois, clerics, and officers: “there must be only soldiers and workers.” In those areas
conquered by the Soviets, such as Poland, Estonia, and Finland, they were perpetrating similar
atrocities. And those that they did not kill, they simply robbed of their possessions. Even those
they claimed to want to help were no better off. Workers were made into “state slaves,” while
the people starved. The state itself was controlled mostly by Jews. And because the Red Army
was tasked with conquering the world for communism, Germany and its allies “took up arms and
went to war against Russia.”102
Faced with this threat, most Europeans reacted passively. That is, except Adolf Hitler,
Benito Mussolini, and Anton Mussert. These men recognized the threat and knew the necessary
steps to take to counter it. They understood the need for unity among the people, for strong
leadership, press restrictions, and service to the state unto death. These men formed nationalist
parties that honored their people. They formed socialist parties that recognized that the people
needed to be united, not divided. And they formed workers’ parties, because the well-being of
the volk was most important of all.103
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The Second World War, which allegedly began as a defensive action by Hitler to protect
Germans in Poland, was really a war between National Socialism and Jews, according to the
author. After defeating Poland in just eighteen days, the Germans turned to Western Europe in
order to protect its own flank. This included the Netherlands, which had, under English
influence, worked to undermine Hitler’s regime, and therefore could not be trusted and had to be
occupied. After reaching the coast, Hitler offered peace, but the English refused, instead inciting
others to war against Germany. In 1941, Hitler ordered his armies to invade Russia, but were
turned back by an extraordinarily early and harsh winter, otherwise the Russian campaign very
well might have succeeded that first year. But, at the time of the author’s writing, Germany was
facing a war against the three leading Jewish powers, Russia, England, and the United States.104
The Netherlands itself, in the author’s view, was better off under German rule. The prewar government had been weak, betrayed the country through their flight, and was, ultimately
because of this flight, entirely illegal. They had been, and continued to be, pawns of the English.
And what was even worse, they antagonized the Japanese against the Netherlands, allowing the
nation to lose their last and most important overseas colony, the Dutch East Indies. The
Germans, on the other hand, had treated the Dutch with respect. Hitler had let the POWs go
while handling the civilian population kindly, save for a few rabble-rousers who had been
inspired by the illegal government in London. It was only natural that the Germans had to crack
down on these rabble-rousers.105
Interestingly, the final chapter also contains several sections that were blocked out in red
ink entirely, focusing on the Weerafdeling’s106 resistance to violence by anti-fascist agitators
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before and during the occupation, the Germanic SS, the Nationale Jeugdstorm107 and the Dutch
Labor Front.108 There is no obvious reason, such as marginal notes, why these sections were
blocked out en masse, nor do these sections contain any content that goes against the general
theme of the larger work about the heroic Germanic past, present, and future. The section on the
Dutch Labor Service was most likely scrapped because of the service’s inherently unpopular
nature, while the sections on the WA and the NJS may have been removed simply because they
were NSB formations and the völkisch-minded members of the jury did not want to emphasize
such elements. It is harder to speculate on why the section on the Germanic SS in the
Netherlands was taken out, as it was an overtly völkisch organization that opposed the Mussert
wing of the NSB. It seems likely that such material was simply considered inappropriate for
school aged students, but ultimately, the reason is entirely unclear.
The chapter and book ends, as do all of the previous chapters, with a look at the future.
The “new Europe” that the Nazis would create would be one that was united, in place of the
division of the previous centuries that allowed for English domination. This new Europe would
be led by Germanics. By virtue of their place as the second most populous Germanic nation,
“the Dutch volk will occupy a glorious second position” behind Germany and its ninety million
souls.109 The Netherlands before the war had been little more than a house of cards that collapsed
in on itself. But the war had brought to light the extent to which the state had been weakened
and its people divided. It was now “the task of every true patriot to make every effort for the reestablishment of his people.” There was much to do:
Unity and togetherness.
A strong and decisive administration.
A courageous self-confidence of the entire nation.
Security in your own people.
National Youth Storm, the NSB’s equivalent to the Hitler Youth and League of German Girls.
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Our Fatherland has lost a war. It is now wounded and impoverished. Our youth has the clean task, to set it
up again. The Young Netherlands will have to show that our people have been hit hard but have not died.
Live for your volk! Die for it, if it must be! 110

The message that the author hoped to pass along to his student readers is clear. The
Dutch are a part of a Germanic community, from which all good things in the history of the
world have come. Intermixing with non-Germanics had led to the decline of previously great
civilizations, as has disunity among Germanics. But in the new Germanic community, led by
Nazi Germany, the Dutch nation could expect a bright and successful future. The defeats of the
past had been the result of liberalism, sectionalism, capitalism, and Jews. The future would
include none of those things. In their place, a strong leadership would pull the nation, indeed all
Germanics, together into a new and greater world. Given the triumphalist narrative the author
had created, it is not surprising that the jury accepted it as the best submission. Had the
occupation lasted longer, the work would very likely have been edited, published and introduced
into schools, but the timing simply was not feasible. The enemy was fast approaching and
would, by the end of the very same year, liberate the southern portions of the Netherlands. The
following year, the regime would collapse, and with it, any hope on the part of the occupiers to
introduce the work into the schools.
De Germaansche Nederlanden
A year after the competition that resulted in Over Volk en Vaderland was held, in mid1944, Schwarz returned to the question of historical instruction by asking van Dam to consider a
new book for use in the schools, this time in secondary schools. This new work, entitled De
Germaansche Nederlanden: Duizend jaren Germaansche Geschiedenis,111 was originally
published in Germany by the W. Cruemwell Verlag in Dortmund. Written by Werner vom Hofe,
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Dr. Peter Seifert, and Werner Steinbacher, and translated by J. H. M. Van der Eerden, it
comprises a total of eighteen chapters and one hundred twenty-eight pages that stretch from the
pre-Roman period clear through to the reign of Charlemagne and the first Viking invasions.
Also, unlike de Vries’s Onze Voorouders, which covers roughly the same period and takes the
format of an ethnography of the Germanics, De Germaansche Nederlanden takes a narrative
format, marching ever forward from the recounting of one past event to the next.
Schwarz had wanted to institute its use in Dutch schools directly but did not get the
reaction he had apparently hoped for from the Education Department. Van Dam had two copies
of the work sent to specialists. The answer to one such inquiry by A. C. J. Commissaris, a pastor
in Oosterhout, came back quite negative. He noted that the work was “fragmentary” and not
suitable for use as a regular school book. The uninterrupted heroization of the Germanics would
cause students to poke fun at them. Quoting the French proverb, Commissaris noted, “he who
proves too much, proves nothing.” For his part, van Dam simply copied much of Commissaris’s
comments in his reply to Schwarz. Van Dam was not of the mind to require the book for
historical instruction but softened the blow by noting that he would have the book made
available in school libraries.112
Despite it not becoming required reading in the classrooms, the work is a good example
of what the Germans’ plans for those classrooms included, as the lessons contained within could
not be any clearer. Right from the very first page:
The territory of the Netherlands belongs to the Lower German flat lands, that stretch out of the east without
any transition to the IJsselmeer—the former Zuiderzee—and further to the canal coast. Nowhere does
nature form—not even through ridges—a German-Dutch border. … No, the geographic condition does not
give, and never gave, anyone the right to make separations, where the same people has lived for
centuries.113
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The authors take their argument even further by noting that the very same race (the Nordic race)
inhabited the area that is otherwise politically divided and has done so since pre-history. This
can be seen in the graves, the living structures, the weapons, and even the names of the locales.
The Romans, whose motto was to “divide and rule” did not differentiate between the Germanics
of Northern Europe either. And of course, these peoples themselves recognized that they were
the same as well.114
In their chapter on the Germanics during the period of the Roman Republic, the focus
remains squarely on the heroic Germanic pitted against the treacherous Roman. Population
pressures were constantly forcing Germanic tribes to settle in new areas, which sometimes
included portions of the Roman Empire itself. In some cases, access to the empire was granted
by Roman leaders, but “usually access was refused, or they were held up with false promises or
even treacherously ambushed. Germanic tribes put themselves, in good faith, under the care of
the rulers of the Roman Empire, but they were bitterly disappointed.”115 Caesar, and his exploits
in Gaul, take up a large portion of the chapter. The authors note that Caesar viewed the Belgians
as the bravest of the inhabitants of Gaul and they are quick to note that these people sprang from
the Germanics themselves. Recognizing the braveness of the Germanics, Caesar knew he could
put them to use and so recruited many into his army, and Rome had these Germanic auxiliaries to
thank for a number of favorable results. But the authors also emphasize repeatedly that the
Germanic tribes were honorable people, who were unaccustomed to the treacherous ways of the
Romans.116 They recount one event in which a large Germanic army crossed paths with Caesar’s
army, and after the former sent ambassadors to the latter, Caesar detained the ambassadors and
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“in violation of international law” drove the Germans into the river.117 As if to stress the evil
nature of this “crime against Nordic blood” which “drenched and wasted the Dutch-Lower Rhine
earth with blood in a gruesome way,” the authors note, in the very next paragraph that Caesar
himself was murdered through treachery only eleven years later.118
As if in contrast to the treachery of Caesar, the authors then move directly into the single
longest chapter of the book, which focuses on the great Germanic hero of the Roman period,
Arminius. It is here that the near uninterrupted heroization van Dam’s reviewer noted becomes
most conspicuous. The Romans, who initially portrayed themselves as friendly, quickly showed
their “true nature,” that is their treachery and the harshness of their rule.119 In contrast, Arminius
was an honorable man, whose only duty was to his Germanic fatherland. That he had served in
the Roman legions and attained the rank of equestrian—that is that Arminius himself had
betrayed the Romans—is mentioned but glossed over immediately. Rather, his knowledge of
Roman tactics was nothing more than one of the many reasons a band of only six thousand
Germanics managed to wipe out twenty-five thousand hardened Roman veterans.120 But of
course, the noble Arminius was later betrayed by weak German princes, hoping to gain by the
loss of their own people, and who feared that Arminius wanted to establish his own hegemony
over the various tribes.121 But the authors are clear to note the correct view in a declaration that
could have easily applied to the political situation in the Netherlands during the occupation: “The
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great struggle for freedom, the maintenance of the pure Germanic blood on its own soil, was only
possible with a connection of all the Germanic tribes under the leadership of a few captains with
powerful wills.”122 To close the chapter, in which it is clear that the heroic Arminius, the would
be uniter of the Germanic peoples, deserves the absolute highest praise possible, the authors first
quote Tacitus’s own praise of Arminius, then argue that his story was the likely inspiration for
one of the most foundational pieces of Germanic literature—the Nibelungenlied.123
The following chapter, concerning the early Frisians, takes on much of the same
character as that over Arminius, only lacking a single heroic figure leading the way. The
Frisians were a peace-loving people who had long been in peaceful contact with the Romans,
solemnified via treaty. That is, until the Romans showed their true colors and tried to repress the
Frisians, who, after much patience, rose up in rebellion. The authors quote Tacitus again, this
time regarding the Frisian victory against Lucius Apronius in 28 CE at the Baduhenna Wood.124
Otherwise, the Frisians were a peaceful people, more concerned with farming and sea-faring than
with warring against Rome. The authors also are clear to note that the Frisians, although a major
constituent part of the Netherlands, can also be found in North-Western Germany, and so are yet
another example of the connectedness of the two larger nations.125
The authors then move on to latter-day examples of Arminius, including Gannascus and
Claudius (Julius) Civilis. The pirate Gannascus was turned by the authors into an Arminius of
the Sea, even though Tacitus, the authors’ source for this section, labels him only a deserter from
the Roman legions and a pirate.126 But like Arminius, according to the authors, Gannascus was a
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freedom fighter, fighting against insurmountable odds, insurmountable for a non-Germanic
anyway, against the world empire that was Rome. Alternatively, Julius Civilis was a latter-day
Arminius on the land. His revolt against Rome during the upheaval of 69 AD is marked by the
authors as a reaction to Roman “treachery” against a people—this time the Batavians—that
strove only to live in “peace and harmony” with the Romans.127 Just like Arminius, both
Gannascus and Civilis were former Roman soldiers, and just like Arminius, both united their
people against Roman injustices.128 Although Gannascus is not afforded the honor, the authors
even go so far as to say that Civilis was likely another inspiration for Siegfried of Nibelungenlied
fame.
One of the more striking elements that is completely out of place for an ancient history is
the notion of the fatherland.129 Repeatedly, the authors argue that the Germanics were fighting on
behalf of their fatherland. Whether Arminius or the Frisians, Gannascus or Julius Civilis, the
conflict was always in defense of “the fatherland.” This, of course, was meant to teach the
students that the highest values a member of the Germanic race could uphold was a defense of
the fatherland against foreign enemies. Nor should it be forgotten that the very fatherland as
described by the authors encompasses not just the Netherlands, but rather the larger Germanic
community of which the Dutch were members, stretching from the North Sea coast east past the
Elbe and beyond. But of course, there was no such fatherland for the Germanic peoples at this
time. At best, it could be argued that the Romans’ designation of the territory as Germania
imbued these places with a sense of connection with the people who inhabited them, but the
same cannot be said for the Germanic inhabitants themselves, who largely would not have
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adopted Roman nomenclature for the geographical area between the Rhine and the Elbe. The
authors even admit that many of the groups moved around, crisscrossing the Rhine river or
moving inward from the coasts in search of fertile new lands every generation. As such, the
authors’ repeated invocation of Germanic tribes fighting in defense of their fatherland can only
be seen as an attempt to foster similar ideals in the minds of their young readers. That the enemy
in the history text was the “world empire” of the Romans is even further equatable with the
“international Bolshevism,” the fight against which was at the heart of Nazi propaganda in all
parts of their nascent empire.
Moving into Late Antiquity, the authors note that the time of the small tribes had come to
an end. The battles of the previous centuries had shown Germanic leaders the need to coalesce
into larger groupings, thus ushering in the “Greater Germanic period” which would eventually
culminate in the establishment of the first Greater Germanic Reich by Charles the Great
(Charlemagne).130 The greatest of these confederations, at least initially, were the Franks, and
among this group, the Salic Franks were the most powerful. Quoting from the preface of the Lex
Salica, the authors note that the Salic Franks were beginning to show a “national and racial
consciousness” although it was based upon a societal understanding of the world, rather than a
“völkisch spirit,” when the Lex Salica discusses the “high stature, with white appearance, supple
and hardened … that with their bravery and great power in battle, shook off the hard yoke of the
Romans.”131 It was this great confederation of Germanic peoples, the Franks, that “fulfilled the
Greater Germanic task of organizing and managing Europe, until the German Reich would be
established.”132
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After recounting the heroic return of a Frankish colony to the lower Rhine that had been
established on the Black Sea by the Emperor Probus in the late third century, and which naturally
overcame all sorts of obstacles put in its way by the dastardly Romans, the authors then move on
to the early history of the Saxons.133 Although the exact origin of the Saxons is unknown, they
can be differentiated by the “purity of their blood and the maintenance of their old customs.”134
Presumably originally from the Jutland peninsula, they proceeded to conquer neighboring groups
down the northwest European coast until, in the fifth century, they moved to Britain. It is this
section of the textbook that begins the discussion of the great Germanic migrations of Late
Antiquity that led to the final dissolution of Roman rule in the West. But the authors are clear to
note that this was more the result of the actions of Germanics than of the Romans themselves:
“Now the Roman Empire had been germanicized. Germanic solders, in service to Rome …
named emperors and deposed them.”135
In reality, however, the purpose of these sections is to build up to the high point of the
textbook: the establishment of the Frankish Empire by Clovis and the later history of that polity
down through Charlemagne, albeit with a short interlude to introduce the Germanic endeavors
against the Huns. Atilla and his band of Huns began their conquest in the “East Germanic” lands
along the Volga, Don, and Dnieper before moving on to the Vistula, Oder, and Danube.136 The
Huns were stopped only by Flavius Aetius, “Rome’s last great statesman and general,” who was
“of Illyrian, or perhaps even Germanic blood.” Either way, Flavius Aetius defeated the Huns
with an army of “Germanic-Roman legions and the auxiliary armies of his West-Germanic
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neighboring peoples.”137 The authors end their buildup to the Frankish Empire by noting for the
third time that the actions of Germanic heroes during the fight against the Huns are immortalized
as a central part of the Nibelungenlied, although at least this time, the history of the events is,
more or less, internally consistent with the story itself.138
The highpoint of the narrative, which takes up the final third of the entire work, details
the rise and fall of the Frankish Empire and its replacement with the German Empire. This
begins with the recounting of Clovis, Charles Martel, and Charlemagne. In comparison to the
latter two Carolingians, the Merovingian Clovis gets short shrift. His ability in battle and his
victories over the Roman rump state of Soissons, the Alemanni, and other smaller tribal groups
are mentioned, but the majority of the chapter on Clovis is taken up by issues of religion. Clovis,
the text relates, is the one who decided that Roman Christianity, instead of Arian Christianity,
which “appealed more to the Germanics,” would be the official princely religion of his empire
because of the large population of Romans and Gallic peoples who inhabited the southern
reaches of the new Frankish realm.139 And although the authors admit that Clovis’s decision to
adopt Roman Christianity was the deciding factor in Christianizing Germanic Europe, the
authors spend many pages extolling the virtues of Germanic resisters to this development.
The problem, as the authors relate, was that the Germanics outside of the Merovingian
empire found it difficult to give up their old gods. They easily enough adopted Christian
symbolism, but “wanted to remain faithful to the customs of their fatherland [and] could not
leave their gods.” Conversely, the Merovingians “had degenerated prematurely, and their rule
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was stained by kin-slaying and disloyalty.”140 Chief among these resisters to both Christianity
and the Merovingians was Radboud of Frisia, who, despite experiencing ups and downs on the
battlefield, “remained loyal to his race and his fatherland.”141 The tenor of the chapter makes
clear, without disparaging Christianity directly, that the religion of the Romans instituted a break
with the Germanic past, one that was not for the better.
After running quickly through the history of the Carolingian family, with a healthy side
portion of bemoaning the enserfment of the peasantry, which “was completely in conflict with
the ancient liberty and right of property of Germanic farmers” and was blamed, mostly, but not
entirely on the Church, the authors move on to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours.142
Naturally, the Muslim conquerors were supported by Germanic shock troops, descendants of the
Germanic Vandals and Goths who had inhabited the Iberian peninsula and North Africa in Late
Antiquity, even if many of those previously pure-blooded people had debased themselves
through intermingling with local populations.143 But their degeneration had left them weaker
than the Frankish host, who soundly defeated the invading Muslims and pushed them back over
the mountains into Iberia.
“All German races, and also the non-German, Germanic races, who are still aware of
their ancestry, above all the lower Franks on the Rhine and the Maas, can be proud, that the first
Emperor of a Greater Germanic Empire is of their own blood.”144 Thus begins the recounting of
the rise of Charles Martel’s grandson, Charlemagne, whose empire, “for the first time … united
the six great tribes which would later form the German volk, the Franks, the Swabians, the
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Bavarians, the Thuringians, the Saxons, and the Frisians. In this period, we also see for the first
time the common name ‘Duitscher’—from ‘duitisce,’ that means: volksche.”145 “Charles was
great in all that he did,” whether as soldier, general, or statesman, and remained “as Germanic as
the land in which he was born.” His rule extended across Europe, going so far as to serve as
protector of the holy sites in the Near East, according to the authors.146 When quoting a passage
from Einhard discussing Charles’s physical characteristics, the authors note that this described
his “Germanic character and Nordic blood.”147 In fact, it is this emphasis on the Germanic nature
of Charles that chiefly differentiates it from a work like Einhard’s, as it is otherwise simply a
recounting of his great and noble deeds.
The authors then turn to those Saxons that were not already a part of Charlemagne’s
empire, noting that, unlike the Franks whose rule had stretched to the south and thus
incorporated non-Germanic elements, the Saxons “knew how to preserve their pure blood.”
Quoting Adam of Bremen, the authors note that the Saxons “did not corrupt themselves through
marriages with foreign and lesser peoples. They strove to be an independent and pure people,
that remained true to their own blood.”148 The purpose of this description, beyond extolling the
values the authors see as important for their readers, is to explain why the Saxons resisted
incorporation into Charles’s empire. It was, according to the authors, to remain free of the
influence of non-Germanic blood and to keep their own Nordic blood pure. The great hero of
this story is, of course, Widukind, leader of the Saxons against Charlemagne. Widukind
preached to his people of the need to protect “customs of the Fatherland and freedom of belief”
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against the Christian king Charles, and in this way, he was a latter-day Arminius. But
Widukind’s resistance to Frankish expansion was doomed for two reasons: their own disunity
and the greatness of Charles’s power.149 Despite the defeat of the Saxons, this heroic people’s
influence could still be felt throughout the Germanic lands between the Rhine and the Elbe, as
evidenced in any number of place names, and of course, through their blood. Widukind’s
descendant Mathilde, became queen to Henry the Fowler and mother to Otto the Great, the first
“actual” king and emperor of the German Empire.150
After a quick recounting of the dissolution of Charlemagne’s empire by his sons and
grandsons, the final result of which was the conglomeration of all of the actual Germanic
peoples, including the people of the Low Countries except the Flemish, into a single empire
ruled by Louis the German (thus making them German), the authors move on to their final
chapter, which focuses on the Vikings.151 But this chapter is really just a brief summary of the
various exploits of Scandinavian raiders and explorers, jumping from their adventures in the
North Atlantic, including the establishment of the colony of Vinland, to the Baltic Sea and the
Russian Steppe, down through the Mediterranean, and all parts in between. Special emphasis is
placed, of course, on the Vikings’ actions in the Lower Rhine Valley, where the authors argue
that they helped influence the later culture of the Low Countries in everything from their seafaring nature to the building of windmills.152 But beyond that, the Viking excursions and
settlements in the Germanic lands add the final element the authors see as foundational to the
establishment of Germany proper. Just as the Frankish and Germanic tribes had contributed to
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the decline of Roman power, the Vikings contributed to the decline of Frankish power: “The new
order, which also ruled the fate of the Netherlands, arose in the German Empire.”153
Given the repeated references to the heroic Germanics throughout the work, the nearly
constant extolling of their desires to fight to defend their “fatherland” or “customs of the
fatherland,” and to keep their “blood pure,” it is easy to see why van Dam’s reviewer was
unhappy with the work. The book has little to say about Christianity in general, and even less to
say that paints Christianity in a positive light, instead extolling the virtues of Germanic pagans,
which would surely cause problems in the confessional schools, something Schwarz likely was
acutely aware of given his extreme anti-clericalism. But in its prescriptive elements, it is also
easy to understand why the Germans would have wanted to institute the work in the schools as a
textbook for secondary education. With its focus on keeping blood pure, on heroic resistance in
defense of the Fatherland, in ascribing a common, Germanic heritage to all the inhabitants of the
lands between the Rhine and the Oder, and even further east, it fits perfectly within the ideals of
the German leadership in the Netherlands and their desire to foster the incorporation of the Dutch
youth into the Nazis’ Greater Germanic Reich.
Although the work was ultimately rejected for incorporation into the curriculum, it was
placed for use in school libraries, where it would be available for students should they or their
teachers wish to consult it. While it is difficult to say to what extent students and teachers did
avail themselves of this option, that question is of little importance when looking at the
Germans’ plans for Dutch education. Rather, the Germans’ very attempts betray the ideals that
leaders like Schwarz had for the areas under their charge—the fostering of a new Dutch identity
aimed at the eventual incorporation of the Netherlands into a Greater Germanic Reich.
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Volk en Bodem
Although Onze Voorouders, Over Volk en Vaderland, and De Germaansche
Nederlanden: Duizend Jaren Germaanse Geschiedenis were the only historical texts that were
discussed at the highest levels of the occupation regime, other attempts were made by various
actors to introduce new history textbooks. For example, in mid-1941, the völkisch publisher
Volk en Bodem154 in Amsterdam suggested to van Dam that it had several history books that
would be of use for school instruction. Included in the list were books designed for primary
schools, secondary schools, and the teacher training colleges. Although van Dam indicated
interest in the works, in his reply to the publisher, he noted that he did not, as yet, have control
over the curriculum and therefore could not enforce their use in the schools. But he did offer the
publisher help in formulating marketing ideas for the books, which, van Dam suggested, would
make great inroads in teaching circles should they become better-known.155
Volk en Bodem was a relatively new organization, having been founded in November
1940, but it did have a longer history than its later foundation might suggest.156 Its founder was
Evert J. Roskam, who had been active in NSB circles for some time. Beside Roskam could be
found other völkisch-oriented thinkers who would later form the core of the SS party within the
NSB during the German occupation, including Henk Feldmeijer, later head of the
Nederlandsche SS/Germanic SS in the Netherlands; J. C. Nachenius, an artist, frequent
contributor to various national socialist publications, and later member of the Nederlandsche
Kultuurraad; Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, who at this point was still not a member of the NSB;
Geerto Snijder, the University of Amsterdam professor who would be so influential in his more
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behind-the-scenes role during the occupation; and many others.157 Chief among these, if not
officially, then certainly in practice, was Frans Eduard Farwerck. Farwerck had been an old
member of the NSB and was a close associate of Mussert, serving as propaganda leader of the
party in its earlier years. By late 1935 and early 1936, however, he had become the leading
völkisch thinker and agitator in the NSB, at least until that position was usurped by Meinoud
Rost van Tonningen after the latter joined the party in 1936 after returning from Austria. In fact,
later members of the SS circle during the occupation would look back to this period in late 1935,
specifically the fourth party congress of the NSB held in Loosduinen on October 12, as the real
founding of the SS in the Netherlands.158
On July 7, 1937 Farwerck and several others associated with the völkisch movement
within the NSB founded Der Vaderen Erfdeel,159 a foundation which was, in many ways, a Dutch
counterpart to the SS-Ahnenerbe, and although Farwerck’s name did not appear in the
administration of the organization, he was very much the behind-the-scenes director.160 This
organization was designed to investigate the Germanic history of the Dutch people, and to
awaken the völkisch spirit of the Dutch.161 It was this foundation, and its in-house publisher, that
would publish several historical textbooks during the late 1930s that Roskam would later attempt
to have introduced into the schools during the occupation.162 However, despite his clearly
suitable ideological outlook, Farwerck was also a Free Mason. Free Masons were not entirely
uncommon in the early years of the NSB, but owing to the deep suspicion of Free Masonry on
the part of German Nazis, Farwerck lost much of his influence both within the völkisch-oriented
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group and within the larger NSB shortly after the German invasion.163 As a result, the
foundation Der Vaderen Erfdeel was disbanded and replaced, mostly in name only, with the
Volkse Werkgemeenschap164 in late 1940, which was essentially Der Vaderen Erfdeel minus
Farwerck.165 For his part, Roskam, who had been the head of the in-house publisher of Der
Vaderen Erfdeel—also called Der Vaderen Erfdeel—re-founded the publishing house as Volk en
Bodem in late 1940.166
Roskam, in his letter to van Dam, had offered two works specifically for use in the
schools (the others were meant for teacher training colleges and a general educational audience),
both of which had been published in 1938 under the supervision of Der Vaderen Erfdeel. As a
result, both works, while certainly influenced by German Nazi, völkisch thought, were not
directly influenced by the occupation regime itself, but nonetheless reflect the view of history
cultivated by Dutch volksche theorists who were largely aligned with the ideology of the later
German occupiers, and therefore deserve a closer look. The first was a fifty-six-page booklet
designed for primary school instruction authored by Farwerck himself entitled Het is anders dan
men ons leerde.167
The goal of Het is anders dan men ons leerde was simple: to upend the portrayal of the
Germanics that had, according to the author, been dominant over the last several hundred years.
This portrayal, which argued that the Germanics were little more than nomadic barbarians
wearing animal pelts whose culture was significantly beneath that of the Romans who
encountered them, Farwerck argues, was the result of, on the one hand, a lack of knowledge or
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interest in Germanic peoples on the part of Roman authors, and, on the other, the result of the
influence of Christian and later Renaissance thought.168 But unlike earlier authors, Farwerck
argues that recent work in archeology combined with a more critical eye toward the writings of
classical authors, could give the reader a much more accurate understanding of their Germanic
forefathers.
The work covers much of the same material as Onze Voorouders but does so with less
pomp and gusto regarding the character of the Germanics and with an eye toward specifically
overturning the previously held conventional wisdom, which is outlined through a series of
quotes from other historical textbooks at the end of every chapter. For example, in the first
chapter on clothing, Farwerck argues that the Germanics wore spun cloth for clothing, as
evidenced by spinning rolls found in graves, fastened together with pins made of bronze.169 He
then proceeds to quote from nine separate school textbooks all of which argue that the
Germanics wore either much simpler clothing or animal hides instead of spun cloth.170
Alternatively, Farwerck argues that road infrastructure can be found in Germanic lands centuries
prior to their contact with Romans, despite other works claiming that the Germanics inherited the
knowledge of road building from the Romans themselves.171 Similar arguments can be found
throughout the work, whether dealing with weaponry, agriculture, jewelry, and architecture.
Unlike Onze Voorouders, Over Volk en Vaderland, and De Germaansche Nederlanden,
Farwerck gives comparatively little coverage to racial elements. While he certainly
acknowledges that the Germanics were a part of the Nordic Race, he does not emphasize this
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argument nearly to the extent that the authors of those later works would, nor does he posit that
this racial group was somehow superior to others as work commissioned under the German
occupation would. Rather, the mentions of races in Het is anders dan men ons leerde take the
form of descriptions of various peoples, such as an individual in a grave in which cloth spun
clothing was also found who was a member of the Nordic race, or the occupants of the territory
between the Germanics and the Romans, that is the Celts, who were of a different racial group
called the “western race,” which was differentiated from the Nordic race. In fact, a third of the
mentions of the term race come as reference to another work with that word in the title.172 So
where later works intended as school textbooks focus overtly on the racial element, Farwerck’s
treatment of the Germanics takes a much less racialist view, even if racialism still can be found
within.
It is difficult to say why, exactly, this might be the case. The work itself appears to be
much more objective than later exemplars would be, trying to stick as closely as possible to what
could, at least in the author’s eyes, be supported by evidence, even though he was, at the time of
its publication, one of the leading völkisch thinkers in the NSB.173 In doing so, Farwerck
restrained himself from including much of the more outlandish heroization of the Germanics that
could be found in the works commissioned by the German occupiers, preferring instead to
content himself mostly with the argument that the Germanics were, as a group, not necessarily
greater than the Romans or, as in the case of de Vries, greater than even Slavic peoples of the
modern period, but rather, that the Germanics simply were not as barbaric as was otherwise
taught.
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Van Dam gives only hollow excuses for his refusal to make the work mandatory, noting
that he does not have the necessary authority to compel usage of the works in the schools. While
that was technically true, his later efforts betray a willingness on his part to work toward the
introduction of other such works, which suggests that his refusal to Roskam in 1941 was either
due to timing or to the content of the works, rather than a lack of proper authority. The question
of timing cannot be ruled out by any means, nor can its insufficiently racial outlook or the
question of Farwerck’s authorship of the book, who by this point in 1941 had lost all influence
within the völkisch wing of the NSB and who had never had any real influence with the
Germans. It is also possible that a combination of factors led to van Dam’s decision, but which
elements were most influential in his refusal will likely remain unknown.
The second work that Roskam recommended to van Dam was written by Jan Coenraad
Nachenius, entitled Beknopte geschiedenis van het noordras.174 Nachenius had a long pedigree
in national socialist circles in the Netherlands. He gained his interest in völkisch ideology in his
youth through reading the work of the British-born, German racialist writer Houston Stewart
Chamberlain. A painter by trade whose artistic work focused on the landscapes of the Guelders
province in the Eastern Netherlands, he was also a prominent racial theorist, plying his
arguments in publications such as De Wolfsangel,175 which was a publication of the NSB’s Raad
voor Volksche Cultuur176 and which would later be subsumed into Der Vaderen Erfdeel.
Nachenius was actually one of the official founders of Der Vaderen Erfdeel, even if Farwerck
had been the principle force behind its creation. In spring 1940, Nachenius would be promoted
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to editor of the official journal of Der Vaderen Erfdeel - also called Der Vaderen Erfdeel. When
the foundation Der Vaderen Erfdeel was reorganized in late 1940 into the Volksche
Werkgemeenschap, under the leadership of Feldmeijer, the journal Der Vaderen Erfdeel was
changed to the Volksche Wacht177 and published by Hamer.178 Like Volk en Bodem, Hamer was a
successor publishing house to Der Vaderen Erfdeel, although Hamer had an even closer
relationship to the SS as its official publishing organ tasked with propagating the Greater
Germanic ideal within the Netherlands. Nachenius would later be appointed to the
Nederlandsche Kultuurraad and join the Nederlandsche SS, becoming the educational leader of
the latter organization.179 He would end the war working in Berlin for the SS.180
As his pedigree shows, he was not considered suspect by the German occupiers like
Farwerck. In fact, Nachenius gained even more influence as the occupation persisted. The
author of multiple books and articles in national socialist publications, his Beknopte geschiedenis
van het noordras, which had originally been published under a pseudonym in 1938, was actually
published a second time, with minor changes and under his own name by Hamer in 1944.181 The
work itself, intended for secondary school instruction, was much longer than Het is anders dan
men ons leerde, reaching one hundred thirty-seven pages, along with a sixteen-page appendix. It
is divided into five main chapters, each with several sub-units, covering the development of the
Nordic Race, Neolithic culture, the spread of Nordics throughout the world, and the rise of the
Germanics.
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In what can only be described as a testament to why historians and artists should
probably steer well clear of evolutionary biology, Nachenius begins his work with an
introduction that compares the development of the Nordic race with the breeding of sheep and
hunting dogs, even if he couches his comparison with the note that humans are more complicated
than animals.182 Extremely important to this racial development is the climate in its broadest
sense, according to Nachenius. In what is essentially an argument based on a racialized
understanding of natural selection, Nachenius argues that certain races became adapted to the
northern European climate during the last ice age, while others faltered and were extinguished.
What was left was the Nordic race, a race whose characteristics are both external, that is its
phenotype, as well as a part of its inner posture: “race is disposition, including [the] spiritual.”
Naturally, the inner disposition of the Nordic race is that of ruler, specifically a “ruler with selfcontrol.”183 After discussing the physical characteristics of the Nordic race, including a climatebased argument that the Nordics must have originated in Northern and Northwestern Europe, not
in Asia, the Middle East, or Africa, Nachenius moves on to various Neolithic cultures.184
His description of Neolithic Europe is cursory in its coverage, subsuming the various
cultures into three major groups: the Funnelbeaker culture, the Linear Pottery Culture, and the
Middle Danubian culture. He argues that the first two were definitely of the Nordic race, while
the third was mostly of a foreign race, using both anthropological and archaeological evidence to
argue that, at best the ruling faction of the Middle Danubians were of the Nordic race. This
Nordic influence eventually overran the foreign racial influence in the Middle Danubians, such
that when later cultures emerged, such as the Ancient Greeks, they had significant Nordic
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qualities, naturally through the influence of Nordic blood.185 After a second section on the
landscape of Europe during the late stone age and a short description of the etymology of the
Dutch term Noordras (“Nordic race”), Nachenius turns to the spread of the Nordic race
throughout the world.
Because the Nordic race, according to Nachenius, stems from Northern and Northwestern
Europe, it is necessary to explain how, in contrast to the contemporary (and still current
scientific) understanding of the origins of Indo-European peoples, the Nordic race spread from
Northern Europe to the other areas that are populated by Indo-European speaking peoples,
instead of the dominant thesis of an Indo-European homeland in Southern Russia along the
Caspian Sea.186 Unsurprisingly, Nachenius argues that the upper classes of the “Aryan” peoples
of the Middle East and South Asia were Nordic, although coming to South Asia via Southern
Russia, using evidence as varied as archeology and literature.187 Somewhat curiously, in his
section on the ancient peoples of the subcontinent, he compares the Aryan conquests with
Tacitus’s description of later Germanic conquerors to argue that these people must have
originated in Europe.188 While in and of itself not surprising, it is curious because Farwerck uses
the very same similarities to argue that Tacitus’s descriptions adhere only to a conventional
Greco-Roman trope regarding anything foreign, and therefore cannot be trusted.189
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Regardless of the contradictory evaluation of Roman sources, the conclusion Nachenius
comes to regarding the Indians is the same as other national socialist writers. Through
intermixing with non-Aryan peoples, they lost their purity and can no longer be considered part
of the Nordic race.190 Similar arguments are made regarding the other larger group of Aryan
invaders in Asia, the Iranians, although in this case, the influence of intermixing with local, and
later subjugated, populations, including Greeks and Jews, meant that the original Aryan
conquerors diluted their Nordic blood to a much greater extent than the ruling classes of India.191
At this point, Nachenius also takes several paragraphs to discuss how Jewish culture and religion
were influenced by Persian culture, and that through this interaction, as well as Persian influence
upon Greece and later Islamic encounters, Persian culture had greatly influenced European
culture.192 He closes the chapter with a shorter recounting of Nordic influence in East Asia,
which was much lower than in South Asia, but still perceptible, not least because “it is quite
possible that the great Confucius is a descendant of the Scythians,” who Nachenius argues were
similar in racial make-up to the Aryans who would go on to conquer south Asia.193
In Europe the situation was mostly similar to Asia. Southeast Europe and the Eastern
Mediterranean had originally been populated by a mixture of peoples, but by the time of the
Greek heroic age, a conquering race, descended partially from the Middle Danubians, and also
probably from the Linear Pottery Culture, and thus with a strong Nordic influence, conquered the
area and set themselves up as the rulers. It was these people that Homer discussed, according to
Nachenius, in his epic poems of the heroic age of Ancient Greece. Naturally, Ancient Greece
then was a mixture of racial and cultural influences—and for Nachenius, culture is merely a
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symptom of race, much in the same way that one’s internal spirit was a symptom of one’s race—
but in the Greek case, it was the Nordic influence that predominated and determined its
essence.194 Thus all of the great cultural artifacts of Ancient Greece can be said to have been the
result of Nordic influence.195
The situation in the western Mediterranean was somewhat different, for this area was
originally populated by the “western race,” which was the most closely affiliated race to the
Nordic, having the same ancestors in the middle and late stone ages, but who had simply
migrated south. Nonetheless, there were also some other racial influences, personified by the
Etruscans, who after their migrations into Italy from the areas around the Danube, assimilated the
culture of the original Indo-Germanic, “western race” inhabitants. Thus, the original Romans,
while not necessarily Nordic themselves, was descended from the Nordic race. Eventually these
original inhabitants became the patriciate, while later additions to the Roman polity became the
plebeians. But again, intermixing with these lesser peoples, according to Nachenius, led to the
decline of the Romans by the time of the imperial period. Equally important to this decline was
the role of other Nordic peoples, especially the Macedonians and Alexander. Himself a Nordic,
as all Macedonian nobles were, Alexander was a purveyor of the false idea of equality among
peoples, and through his efforts at integrating the peoples of his empire, allowed for the
influence of various outside, non-Nordic ideas which helped lead to a cultural degeneration of
Rome, as it adopted Hellenistic cultural norms.196
The other major part of the “western race” were the Celts. Originally a part of the Nordic
Race, the original Celts came from what is today southern Germany. Eventually, through
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migration, they settled in various locations, but principally in present-day France, Spain, and
Northern Italy, and there acted as a sort of buffer zone between the Romans and the Germanics.
As a result of this influence, not necessarily intermixing with other races, the Celts developed
into a different race, one that spoke Romance languages and was strongly influenced by the
peoples to their south.197 It is here that Nachenius’s argument that the landscape and
environment, as much as the blood, comes to its fullest form. It was not that blood mixing with
foreign races changed the Celts from Nordic to “western,” rather that the cultural influences of
Rome and other Mediterranean peoples, whether language, art, or spirit, caused the
transformation, although, especially in France, this would be combined with later race mixing
with eastern and colonial peoples, such that by Nachenius’s time the French had been
“bastardized.”198
In his final section, Nachenius devotes the entire chapter to the Germanics, which he
notes could have just as easily been included in the previous chapter on European groups.
Rather, he chooses to put the Germanics in their own chapter for two reasons. First, because
they are still living in the same area as the original Nordics and are therefore also the direct
descendants of those peoples. Second, and perhaps more importantly for the author’s didactic
purposes, “there is no doubt that they are still the culture-creating power in the North and NorthWest, and—it is a serious word—the last reserves of the Nordic race.”199 The rest of the chapter
takes up the history of the Germanics from the late Stone Age through the Early Middle Ages,
focusing first on anthropology and archeology, and then moving into historical inquiry proper.200
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But the emphasis in all of this is on the maintenance of the race, of which the Germanics of old
were acutely aware. Further, Nachenius exhorted his readers to respect this tradition:
It is necessary to write about it [i.e., the racial consciousness of the Germanics] extensively in order to
gradually get back to something like that, to awaken this consciousness, in the hope that, at the eleventh
hour, the downfall of the Nordic race can be reversed. For “the last reserves” of this race will also
irrevocably go the way that all the waves of this race have gone, they will fade for the last time, wasteful of
blood by negligence, by disobeying the “holy order,” through neglecting the conservation and improvement
of the race by means of superior families.201 When we preach this, the dazed, short-sighted ones call out:
idolization of the race, but we know that we obey our conscience, that we do not “exalt” ourselves, in
overestimating the powers that are in us, but that we are reflecting on the most sacred thing that awakens in
our minds, and that we feel as in harmony with the creation, as an outgrowth of God [is] in us, as our
farthest ancestors must have felt in the religious representations of their time, which in essence (not in
form) are also ours, therefore we are not deterred, but work with dogged earnestness to this awakening,
before it is too late. It may sometimes seem hopeless—we do not ask but do our duty. How this insight
can be converted into practice, cannot be treated here, but the practice must be preceded by the awakening
of responsibility and we can do that by learning from the history of the Nordic race.202

In their overall tenor, the two works suggested by Roskam are similar to those directly
created or suggested by the occupation regime. All of the works serve to promote the Germanic
element in the Netherlands specifically, and Northern Europe more broadly, with the specific
goal of educating young minds about their place within their race and their race’s place within
the larger world. That the works written by Dutch authors prior to the occupation were never
introduced in schools does not take away from their content or the didactic purpose that is clear
in the writings. While it is not entirely clear, beyond van Dam’s hollow excuses, why these
works were not suitable for introduction into the schools, especially in the ideologically reliable
Nachenius’s case, van Dam’s reaction to the works as worthy of a broader audience testifies to
their acceptable content, even if the author of one of the works, Farwerck, was seen as suspicious
by the regime itself. In fact, all of these works, both those written before the invasion and those
written after, fit into a larger schema of Nazi historicization of the Netherlands that was favored
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by the occupation regime, and which, especially after the occupation began, became increasingly
popular among historical writers writ large.
A Nazi View of Dutch History
Much like the political landscape of National Socialism in the Netherlands prior to the
German occupation, there was no singular, national socialist view of Dutch history. Beyond an
overt glorification of the high-points of the Dutch past, such as the acts of the water-geuzen and
sea-faring exploits of the early modern Dutch state, probably the most common theme was the
importance of the language barrier as being the defining element of what made up the
Netherlands—that is to say that most, but not all, Dutch Nazi historical thinkers viewed the
boundaries of the Dutch nation as being coterminous with the boundaries of the Dutch language,
rather than being the political boundaries of the modern Dutch state.203 This is in lock step with
the more popular political ideology of Dutch national socialist parties that followed the Diets
ideology, to say nothing of their nineteenth century German counterparts, as discussed in
chapters two and three. But moving beyond that general framework, which itself was not
universal among such thinkers, there is little to unify the historical views of the majority of Naziinclined historians in the pre-occupation Netherlands.
As discussed in chapter two, there was a growing movement for the study of the Low
Countries in Germany in the early twentieth century, although for various reason, this was, more
often than not, subsumed under the field of German Studies.204 Centered at the Universities of
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Bonn and Cologne, especially the latter, a diverse group of thinkers came to see the peoples of
the Low Countries as ethnically related to the German nation. Although this work, subsumed
under the title Westforschung was not overtly tied to völkisch, racialist thinking, there was a
strong overlap between the two, with many scholars engaged in the Westforschung espousing
völkisch beliefs. With the onset of the Nazi dictatorship, this overlap became much stronger.205
In 1935, Dr. Walter Frick, an official at the Reich Education Ministry in Berlin set forth a
fifteen-point program for historical scholarship and instruction designed to bring historical
education into line with the “decreed science” that was representative of national socialist
scholarship.206 Historical instruction and scholarship in a national socialist mold should,
according to Frick, include:
1) Role of prehistory in which is emphasized the high civilization attained by the ancestors of the Germanic
race.
2) Role of the primitive race in which are prefigured all the great peoples and personalities of Germanic
origin.
3) Role of the racist and national idea as opposed to the internationalist ideal so perilous to the German
people, too much inclined to dreams and utopias.
4) Role of the great Germanic community scattered throughout the world and inseparably linked to the
destiny of the Reich.
5) Role of political history which surveys the ensemble of large historic periods and takes account of their
laws.
6) Role of the idea of heroism, in its Germanic form, which is inseparable from the idea of chief and leader.
7) Role of the heroic ideal, peculiar to the German race, always compelled to assert itself against an
encirclement of enemies.
8) Role of the great migrations of peoples since the glacial epoch, which have determined the history of the
Germanic race and assured the preponderance of Indo-Germanic languages.
9) Role of the great Germanic migrations into Asia and Africa which explain the pre-excellence of the
Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations.
10) Role of the mixtures of races, with disastrous consequences—to be extensively developed and
explained.
11) Role of the ancient Greeks, closest brothers of the Germanic race, with explanation of how they
succumbed when the population declined and they were outnumbered by inferior and democratic races.
12) Role of the great Germanic migrations into Italy, France, Spain, and England, which explain the
preponderance of these countries over Russia and the Balkans, which have not been fertilized by new
blood.
13) Role of the conquest of territory east of the Elbe.
14) Role of modern history which shows how Germany was too easily receptive to alien influences, and
then lost consciousness of her own qualities, through lack of knowledge of the laws of blood.
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15) Role, in particular, of the last twenty years in the course of which Germany, having struggled against
the coalition of her enemies, was betrayed by forces hostile to the nation and led to the verge of ruin by
liberal and Marxian ideologues, carried down to the day when, in a heroic resurgence, she gave herself to
National Socialism.207

The points outlined by Frick are clearly visible in the works that were intended for school
instruction in the Netherlands during the occupation. In fact, if one substitutes “the Netherlands”
for “Germany” in the last two points, they fit nearly perfectly. There are some slight variations,
such as Nachenius’s use of the term “Nordic race” in favor of “Germanic race,” but that is a
minor difference, with Nachenius seeing the Nordic Race as being the original race, and the
Germanics being their direct descendants who had never been corrupted by “race-mixing.” But
by and large, it is easy to see how some works produced by national socialist authors prior to the
German invasion as well as those produced directly on behalf of the German occupation were
influenced by the points Frick proposed in the 1930s, even if direct evidence that this exact
program was prescribed for the individual authors is lacking.208
As in Germany, the ascendancy of Nazism via occupation also allowed for a greater
consensus among Nazi-oriented historians in the Netherlands. Very quickly after May 1940, the
focus in Dutch Nazi historical writing shifted from an emphasis on language as being the
defining characteristic of the Dutch nation to blood and race being the defining characteristics,
although there was some pushback and variation within that larger shift.209 Beyond a shift in
focus toward the racial, a more unified, but still not completely homogeneous, interpretation of
the historical development of the Netherlands came into being. This movement was led by both
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Dutch and German Nazi scholars, intellectuals, and popular thinkers, including, but by no means
limited to, Robert van Genechten, Tobie Goedewaagen, Alfred A. Haighton, P.E. Keuchenius,
Hendrik Krekel, J.C. Nachenius, Franz Petri, Werner Reese, Robert van Roosbroeck, Christoph
Steding, Rudolf Steinmetz, Johan Theunisz, and the father and son combination of Jan and Hans
de Vries.210
Through a close examination of these and dozens of other scholars and publicists who
produced thousands of books, pamphlets, and brochures regarding the history of the Netherlands
from a national socialist perspective, Ivo Schöffer has managed to sketch out a very general
outline of Dutch history as seen through the lens of national socialist ideology.211 Without a
doubt, the history of the Netherlands, according to this national socialist view, was a history of
lost opportunities.212 By and large, the schema outlined by Schöffer fits with the histories
presented in those works designed for primary and secondary education, even though Schöffer’s
analysis focuses on the larger field of national socialist historical writing instead of those work
intended for school instruction specifically.
According to the national socialist conception of Dutch history, it had all started out
along the right path. In Antiquity, the Netherlands was populated by the same Germanic tribes
as the rest of non-Roman Western and Northern Europe. But unlike the previously held wisdom
of humanistic, and especially Roman-Catholic tradition, these were not savages at all. In reality,
these people were “tall, upright, beautifully dressed with that strong, hard face and those steelblue eyes, entirely the National Socialist heroic ideal.”213 Their technology was by no means
inferior, and in some cases, perhaps superior to that of the Romans, and of course, their warlike
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nature was feared by their contemporaries, with heroes such as Julius Civilis and Arminius. In
any case, and perhaps most importantly for the racially-obsessed, völkisch faction of Dutch
Nazis, their racial and genetic characteristics had carried through, unmolested, to the present
day.214
The history of the Franks was especially troublesome for national socialist scholars, for
although the Franks definitely started as a Germanic tribe, their later Romanization resulted in
the modern state of France, which itself was definitely not Germanic, even if Germanic elements
could be found within its borders. The general schema that resulted was to argue that the
Frankish conquest had been mostly the result of its original Germanic element. Under the
Merovingians, these original conquerors had become Romanized as they pushed south and west
toward Paris, the Seine, and the Loire (i.e., Neustria). Alternatively, it was the Carolingians
whose strongly Germanic, un-Romanized nature, centered as it was on the Maas, Moselle, and
Rhine regions (i.e., Austrasia), that managed to establish dominance later in the Early Middle
Ages and halt the spread of Roman culture and language north and eastward. Thus, using this
scheme, the national socialist scholars could argue that not only was Charlemagne really
Germanic, but they could also explain the language border that arose between the Low German
languages of the Lower Rhine Valley and northern Low Countries and the Romance languages
further south.215
Charlemagne himself had been, prior to the Second World War, somewhat problematic in
the national socialist mind. The Saxon Wars; Charlemagne’s turn toward Rome and the Church,
which led to further Romanization of the Germanic world; his embracing of Christianity and his
Christianizing mission; and his effort toward universal, rather than Germanic, empire were all
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parts of his legacy with which true-believing Nazis took issue. But during the war, a sort of
rehabilitation of his image took place.216 His wars against Saxons were perhaps unfortunate, but
he could not be blamed entirely. They were, after all, not different than later intra-German wars,
such as those between Frederick Barbarossa and Henry the Lion or between Frederick the Great
and Maria Theresa. Moreover, he could not be faulted for a lack of a specifically Germanic
identity, as no such identity had existed at that time, and even so, his focus on waging war to the
east meant a turn toward the Germanic, instead of focusing to the South. His turn toward Rome
was mitigated with the argument that he had not actually wanted to be crowned by the Pope and
he perhaps really wanted to subjugate the Papacy under his own rule. That it worked out as it
did, with the Pope crowning him was unfortunate, but hardly enough to throw away his legacy.
And of course, the Nazis’ own efforts in Europe during the 1940s, which included domination of
many non-Germanic peoples in Eastern Europe put Charlemagne’s universal ambitions in a new
light. And so, during the Second World War, many Nazi thinkers reevaluated their opinion of
Karel de Grote and came away with a much more positive view. He was, definitely, Germanic,
a true leader of whom national socialists could be proud.217
A similar veneer can be found for the rest of medieval history. The various groups and
events were all seen through the lens of those elements most dear to National Socialism: a
strong, warlike nature; mythic elements; vitality; and above-all race. In that vein, the Vikings
were hardly blood-thirsty pillagers, but rather the bringers of Germanic vengeance who spread
their blood from north to south and from west to east.218 The entire High and Late Middle Ages
were particular high-points in both Dutch and German history. This was the time of the
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colonization of the east by Germanic peoples, which saw Dutch and Germans moving further
east, establishing themselves over the native populations there.219 It was also the time of the
Hanseatic League, the beginnings of which, at least, were viewed by many national socialists as
a sort of pan-Germanic community. While it was definitely an economic grouping, that element
was downplayed in favor of emphasizing the “more ethical view of the excellent Germanic
person” and his integration with his community, by focusing on the cities themselves, rather than
the trading between them.220
Even events that might otherwise be seen as disastrous were repainted in a positive light
as much as possible. So, the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire was actually a good thing,
as it allowed for the permanent separation of Germanic and Romance cultures and languages.
Far from a dissolution, the breakup of the Carolingian Empire was a reassertion of Germanic
interests against proto-French domination, in what appeared to be remarkably similar argument
to that used by Nazi historians for the explanation of Carolingian ascendancy, only with the
Carolingians now representing French influence rather than being the bastion of Germanic blood
and culture.221 Similarly, the domination of the Low Countries by the French Dukes of Burgundy
was seen as a step in the wrong direction, with their connections to the French throne seen as
pulling the Low Countries away from its Germanic roots.222
But these minor setbacks were nothing in comparison to the tidal wave of problems that
began with the onset of the modern period in the sixteenth century. The breakaway of the
Netherlands from the Holy Roman Empire, which started with the Dutch Revolt in 1568 was just
the beginning of the downward spiral. But even here, the focus of the historiography was
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slightly altered. Where previous historians like Treitschke had argued that the independence of
the Low Countries had been a shortcoming of the Holy Roman Empire, national socialist
historians, especially Hendrik Krekel, focused instead on the innocence of the Reich and played
up the dissolution of the Netherlands as a single state through the breakaway of the Seven United
Provinces from the larger Seventeen Provinces.223 This tactic of bemoaning the setbacks of the
early modern and modern periods, but highlighting certain aspects as exceptions to this general
rule was a reversal of sorts of the very same tactic which saw the medieval period as largely a
sort of Germanic golden age with only certain low points.
In this way, the geuzen, hardened by a strict adherence to Calvinism and led by the great
leader William the Silent, were seen as a singular highlight of the otherwise disastrous Dutch
Revolt. The culprits, on the other hand, were the burghers and regents of the cities, focused as
they were on economic gain instead of the well-being of the volk.224 In the same way, despite the
growing commercialism and liberalism of the nineteenth century, national socialists could be
proud of Dutch imperial exploits in South Africa and the Far East as well as growing GermanDutch and German-Flemish contacts.225 Even at points that one might expect national socialist
thinkers to see positive developments, such as the period of the United Kingdom of the
Netherlands, instead the focus is on the cause of the creation of that state through defeat by
France, the dominance of the English in Northwest Europe, and the state’s eventual dissolution
into the Netherlands and Belgium in 1830.226
But, in the grand scheme of things, none of this really mattered in the Nazi view of
history, for in 1940, the German savior had come to help their Germanic brothers find their
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rightful place among the peoples of Europe. It would awaken within the Dutch nation the
völkisch, Germanic thinking whose absence had been at the root of so many of the problems of
the previous centuries. The problems of the past would be corrected through the dynamism of
the coming future.
Voorbije tijden: vaderlandsche geschiedenis voor de lagere school
The Nazi view of history was substantially different from that which had been taught in
Dutch schools prior to the German invasion. Although, to a certain extent, there was some
penetration of Germanic ideas regarding historical instruction among the far-right of Dutch
society, this view of history had in no way penetrated the educational establishment. While
some teachers certainly were NSBers, even members of the völkisch wing of the party, their
teaching material was strictly traditional. This was, after all, one of the primary reasons that
occupiers decided to both censor school books and attempt to introduce new, more Nazi-oriented
works.
One such work that was deemed unworthy of use in education during the German
occupation was the primary school history book Voorbije tijden: vaderlandsche geschiedenis
voor de lagere school by J. Dijkstra.227 Dijkstra, who was a school head in The Hague, was a
prolific author of history textbooks during the 1920s and 1930s. His various works were
designed for all levels of education in the Netherlands, from primary education to the teacher
training colleges. His textbook Voorbije tijden had multiple editions designed for both primary
and lower secondary schools, beginning no later than 1926, with later editions being published in
1928, 1929, 1932, and 1933. Given the prolific nature of his work, it was likely relatively widely
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used in schools, although given the decentralized nature of Dutch education in the preoccupation period, it is impossible to determine exactly how widespread its use actually was. On
the other hand, it does not appear on any of the lists of banned books, which may indicate that its
use was not terribly widespread.228 However, given that it most certainly was used at schools in
The Hague, the failure of the school book control commission to notice it was more likely an
oversight on the commission’s part and a testament to how enormous the task of censoring the
entirety of Dutch school literature truly was.
The book did come to van Dam’s attention, via Goedewaagen, when, in November 1943,
F. J. Meijer informed the Goedewaagen about the less-than-satisfactory content of the book.
Describing the chapters over the Germanics of antiquity as “rubbish” and “nonsense,” Meijer
noted that such material “in the present time” would cause the “spirit of our children to be
poisoned.”229 In fact, when one compares the material in Dijkstra’s work with those that more
closely conform to the national socialist view of Dutch history, it is clear that Meijer had
definitely found a work that was, at least from a Nazi perspective, worthy of disdain.
Using Roman authors, especially Tacitus and Caesar, as his sources, Dijkstra notes that
the Germanics were “true nomads” who subsisted off of hunting and fishing, and when they had
free time engaged in gambling and drinking. They did little in the way of farming, but when
they did, it was exclusively the work of women and slaves. They clothed themselves with
animal pelts, although he does note that they wore linen cloth as well. They lived in what could
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best be described as “little more than clay huts.”230 Their religion, which was based on nature,
was actually a “terrible superstition” which saw every elderly woman as a witch to be abused.231
If the description of the Germanics was not bad enough, Dijkstra’s argument regarding
the Romans was much worse, from a national socialist point of view. The “most highly
civilized” Romans were “much, much more developed” than the Germanics, with their roads,
cities, and palaces, and as such practiced a “civilizing influence” upon them. This included
increases in commerce, through Roman roads and trading materials such as coinage, better
agricultural practices, and the knowledge of digging wells and finding non-riverine water
sources, allowing the Germanics to settle land further away from rivers and streams, which had
not been possible prior to Roman contact.232 Naturally, this higher form of civilization led to
Roman military dominance, against which the Germans eventually unsuccessfully rebelled.
Dijkstra makes no mention of Arminius at all, while noting that the rest of the rebellions against
Roman dominance were all eventually defeated. It was only the later Germanic migrations of the
5th century that ended (western) Roman imperium.233
Post-Roman life, according to Dijkstra, was not entirely dissimilar to Germanic life
during Roman times. Many of their customs remained, including a division of people into free
and unfree, the latter including both serfs and slaves. They continued to hold proto-assemblies in
the open air in which free men could discuss the future of the community, offer sacrifices to their
gods, and try criminals for their offenses. These “trials,” ordeals really, included such actions as
an accused holding their hand in fire with innocence being proved by a lack of harm.
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Alternatively, the accused might be thrown into water where floating was a sign of guilt.234 And
then came Christianity. After spending several pages discussing the Christianization of the
Netherlands, in which individuals such as Radboud of Frisia, who it will be recalled, according
to Werner vom Hofe, Peter Seifert, and Werner Steinbacher in their De Germaansche
Nederlanden, had “remained loyal to his race and his fatherland.” For Dijkstra, however,
Radboud was nothing more than a “Christian-hater” who stood in opposition to the Irish
missionary Willibrord’s efforts to bring the faith to the Netherlands.235 Of course, in both
accounts, Christianity eventually prevailed against Germanic paganism, but according to
Dijkstra, this was very much a positive development, for one Christianity was adopted “one
could see the blissful effects: bondage was softened, wives were raised from slave-status, the
desire for revenge was curbed, [and] alcoholism was contested.”236 There could hardly be a more
of a contrast between the Germanic period as presented by Dijkstra and the very same presented
by later, national socialist authors.
Another period of Dutch history on which national socialist historians focused was the
Dutch revolt. As the author of Over volk en vaderland noted at the end of the chapter on the
Dutch Revolt, the very same treaties that had given the Netherlands its de jure independence also
marked the end of the devastating Thirty Years’ War and the beginning of the end of the Holy
Roman Empire.237 Dijkstra’s recounting, however, does not even mention Germany in the five
chapters he spends on the Dutch revolt, save to briefly mention William the Silent’s brief selfimposed exile there and his raising of mercenary troops. The Thirty Years’ War and the decline
of the Holy Roman Empire go unmentioned entirely. Where later Nazi historians would bemoan
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the breakaway of the Netherlands from the Holy Roman Empire and the lack of unity among the
entirety of the Low Countries, Dijkstra does no such thing, moving triumphantly from the Peace
of Münster to the Golden Age and the establishment of the Netherlands as a colonial and world
power.238 In fact, the entire last forty per cent of the book that includes the chapters covering the
ascension of Charles V and Phillip II through to the end of the work, offer a predominantly
triumphant narrative of Dutch resolve in the face of overwhelming odds, the eventual successes
that resolve achieved, and the subsequent reward, in the form of Dutch independence, the
subsequent Dutch Golden Age, and the formation of a colonial empire. This is explicitly and
unapologetically a Dutch story. There is no bemoaning of the lack of unity among “Germanics”
here or even among the people of the Low Countries; this is purely a patriotic Dutch history
celebrating the very events that make the Dutch unique among those larger groups. It is no
wonder that the German occupiers and their sympathizers would find the book problematic.
Conclusion
Of all the German occupiers’ many attempts to instill a more Germanic identity among
Dutch youth through educational initiatives, the most concerted effort was put toward the
creation of new school books, especially history books, aimed at this end.239 This effort was not
entirely limited to the Netherlands either. In February 1944, a group of German, Austrian, and
Dutch scholars met in Salzburg to discuss an all-encompassing Germanic history book.240 Unlike
the other books that Nazis had tried to introduce into Dutch schools, this work was meant to be
applicable everywhere, from Norway to Austria to the Netherlands and everywhere else in
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between, although all of those in the planning meeting were either German, Austrian, or Dutch.
Nothing came from the planning session beyond a commitment to continue working on this idea,
but the continued efforts of the Nazis to recast history along Germanic lines in such a way as to
bring together the Germanic peoples of Europe is indicative of the importance leading
ideologues placed on Germanic identity and historical education as a way to inculcate that in, not
just the Netherlands, but the wider European populace under Nazi control.241
The Nazis attempted to use historical education to re-create and reshape the way that
Dutch youth thought about their society, its past, and its place within the larger European world
in order to instill a völkisch spirit, often called a vaderlandsche or volksche geest.242 Preoccupation historical works like Voorbije Tijden focused on an overtly national identity, with the
history of the Netherlands and the Dutch people viewed through the singular lens of the Dutch
nation and its interactions with the wider world. Everything else was secondary, filler material
aimed at giving context to the uniquely Dutch story taking place. The heroes of these works
were Dutch patriots, like William the Silent and Prince Maurice, father of the Zuiderzee Works
Cornelis Lely and liberal constitutional reformer Johan Thorbecke. Christianity, and especially
Calvinism, were defining elements of what made the people of the Netherlands Dutch, and the
adoption of Christianity was viewed as a positive development in the history of the Low
Countries, helping to rid the country of dangerous superstitions. Moreover, commercial,
scientific, and artistic development; liberal parliamentarianism; the expansion of the franchise;
and the establishment of a proto-welfare state were seen as victories for the Dutch people. It
was, by and large, a Whig-style history of progress, a movement of society from the dark into the
light.
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In contrast to this triumphant, national history, Nazi ideologues and historical thinkers
promoted a pan-Germanic mindset. The high point of his Germanic civilization had been in
antiquity and the Middle Ages when Germanic peoples had understood the importance of their
race. They were united, more or less, through the apparatus of the Holy Roman Empire, but this
changed with the transition to modernity when Dutch history became a history of setbacks and
lost opportunities. First was the independence of the Dutch from their Germanic brothers in the
Holy Roman Empire, and then disunity among the peoples of the Low Countries themselves.
Chances to make the most of that disunity, through the establishment of a strong, unitary state
with a singular leader were defeated by urban merchant elites. From there things only went
downhill, as foreign powers took control of the country, liberalism was cemented as the
governing ideology, and the people were divided along confessional and political lines. The
Netherlands ended up as a weak state, unable to protect itself. But worst of all, it was
disassociated from the Germanic world, taking instead its cues from France and England. The
Dutch had, according to Nazi thinkers, lost their place in the world, unaware of the most
important and defining aspects of historical and cultural development: their Germanic identity.
Luckily, the Germans, with their racially conscious National Socialism would help the Dutch
find their true calling and return the Netherlands to the greatness it deserved as members of a
ruling Germanic ruling class.
The change in emphasis exhibited by Nazi historical theorists displays their
understanding of what it truly meant to be Dutch. The true meaning of Dutchness was as a
constituent member of the larger Germanic community. The place of the Netherlands lay at
Germany’s side, and together they would, along with other Germanic nations, lead the future
Europe into a new era defined by their own perceived racial superiority. When the Netherlands
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had strayed from this path, as it had in the modern era, it was met with setbacks and defeat.
Even in those areas where the Dutch had shown characteristics of what the Nazis viewed as
greatness, such as the establishment of a Dutch colonial empire across the seas, the emphasis was
always on what could have been if the Netherlands had had the powerful German nation standing
alongside it.243
The changes to the historical curriculum were meant to foster this cultural identity among
Dutch youth, and these efforts were part of a larger educational project with the same end goals,
which itself was part of a larger cultural project aimed at transforming Dutch identity writ large.
As the highest levels of the Nazi leadership understood, education was a tool that could be used
to shape the youth in much the same way that propaganda could be used to shape the larger
populace.244 But much as resistance to Nazi designs began to pervade Dutch society, in the
classroom Nazi educational “reformers” experienced significant resistance to the changes they
hoped to implement.245 The following chapter turns to the local level, with a focus on the two
extraordinary school inspectors tasked by the regime with maintaining peace and order in the
schools. Through a close examination of their work, as well as the many complaints regarding
anti-regime activity on the part of students, teachers, and administrators that made their way up
the hierarchy to the Education Department in The Hague, it will be shown that the majority of
Dutch students, teachers, and administrators had little use for their new German overlords and
the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands.
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Chapter 7 - Chaos and Disorder in the Schools1
Again and again there are noticeable signs of a destructive and negative attitude, which presents itself in the
spreading of rumors and jokes, the slandering of the Germans and [our] fellow countrymen, the passing on and
writing down of childlike, indeed repulsive, nonsense. …In particular, every terror against teachers and pupils with
national socialist convictions must also be strictly suppressed. - Jan van Dam, January 29, 19412

Thus far the focus of this study has been placed upon the efforts of the German
administration and their Dutch collaborators in the education realm during the Nazi occupation
of the Netherlands in the Second World War. That is, the focus has remained upon the upper
echelons of the administrative and educational apparatus in the Netherlands, the actions of men
like Heinrich Schwarz and Jan van Dam. This chapter will deviate slightly from that focus to
look more closely at what was happening in the schools themselves. It will approach this topic
from two perspectives. First, it will look at the efforts of the men appointed by the government
to enforce “peace and order” within the schools. These men, Piet van Rossem and Dr. D. G.
Noordijk, stood outside of the already extant School Inspectorate and were tasked with, mostly,
combating anti-German and anti-NSB actions on the part of teachers, administrators, and
students, although Noordijk’s commission expanded significantly as the occupation entered its
third calendar year.3
It should be noted from the outset, however, that there was a bit of a divergence between
the ways in which “peace and order” were described by the government and what was actually
going on in the schools themselves. For the most part and for the overwhelming majority of
students, teachers, and administrators, school life went on more or less the same as it had before
the occupation began.4 With the exception of higher education, which saw significant
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disruptions during the occupation as a result of both university closures and the forced-labor
service, the larger educational establishment continued to operate as usual. Schools remained in
session and most students kept attending classes, except for those students forced out of the
classroom because of their Jewish heritage. While there were occasional student revolts, with
the exception of some unrest that followed the dismissal of Jewish civil servants, there were no
large scale, nationwide protests or strikes in primary or secondary education, as occurred at the
universities. Those strikes and protests that did occur were limited to a single school and lasted
no more than a day. For the most part, peace and order as a modern reader would understand it
actually reigned throughout the occupation period, despite the changes the occupation regime
hoped to implement.
Despite that, however, the government was overwhelmingly concerned with maintaining
“peace and order” in the schools and was decidedly suspicious of the regular school inspectorate
tasked with enforcing it.5 But it is on this point that the occupation regime’s definition of “peace
and order” is betrayed, as what the government meant by “peace and order” was really the
removal and/or suppression of anti-NSB or anti-German elements from the schools.6 If a teacher
was thought to have been imparting anti-regime politics to the students, that threatened “peace
and order.” Similarly, if students, teachers, or administrators demonstrated against the regime or
engaged in acts of harassment against NSB colleagues or students, that was seen as disrupting
“peace and order.” To the extent that these types of actions occurred, the occupation authorities
viewed the educational establishment as needing a reestablishment of “peace and order.” It was
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these types of acts, after all, that were at the center of the overwhelming majority of
investigations conducted by van Rossem and Noordijk.7
The second focus of this chapter is on those actions actually taken by administrators,
teachers, and students that contributed to the regime’s belief that chaos and disorder ruled in the
schools. These actions ran the gamut from passive protests through the wearing of political
insignias such as Nederlandsche Unie badges to active harassment of NSB connected
individuals, up to and including physical violence.8 Most of the passive and active resistance
performed by teachers, administrators, and students did not necessarily affect the functioning of
the classroom itself. Passive resistance was, by its very nature, mostly non-disruptive, even if
the occupation authorities took a dim view of it, while more active resistance, actions like the
bullying and harassment of NSB students and teachers, tended to affect the victims specifically
more than the entire classroom more generally. Both types of resistance to the occupation
regime were widespread if the records of the two extraordinary inspectors and the complaints
that made it to the Education Department are any indication. All of these actions, when taken
together, suggest a widespread disdain on the part of students and teachers for the occupation
regime and its supporters in the education realm, but do not necessarily evidence a widespread
state of chaos within the schools, even if the government often described it so.
These types of anti-regime demonstrations, whether by students or teachers, were among
the few ways that students and teachers could demonstrate their anti-regime feelings without
exposing themselves to the risk of retaliation. Occasionally students and teachers were actually
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suspended, fired, and even arrested for the actions they took inside the schools, but such
instances were comparatively rarer. Rather, the most common punishment such individuals
received as a stern warning from the educational inspectors or van Dam. For this reason,
resistance through the creation of “chaos and disorder” in the schools offered students and
teachers a relatively safe way to protest the occupation regime, and given the option, many
Dutch students and teachers took it.
Finally, it is difficult to argue with any certainty that the actions of teachers and students
toward their NSB or German-oriented colleagues was tantamount to a specific rejection of the
Nazi occupiers’ Germanic project in the Netherlands, as opposed to a rejection of foreign
occupation more generally. In most cases, those accused of anti-regime activity denied the
allegations against them rather than offering a motive for their purported actions. Nonetheless,
passive and active resistance against the regime and their local representatives, whether those
representatives were government officials or simply members of NSB organizations,
demonstrated a rejection of the occupation regime in its entirety on the part of those who
committed such acts. Therefore, it is not necessary in my view to be able to prove exactly what
motivated anti-regime agitators in the schools. Given the antipathy that many Dutch students
and teachers displayed toward the German occupation regime, it is extremely unlikely that they
were disdainful of the messengers while at the same time indifferent to or even supportive of the
message itself. This is all the more true because the German occupiers tried to put a positive
spin on their occupation during the initial “hearts and minds” phase, and yet, active and passive
resistance in the schools was prominent right from the very start of the 1940-1941 school year.
Most Dutchmen and women simply viewed the occupation with scorn, and that scorn extended
to any policies the Germans tried to implement. Had the Nazis’ Germanic project been
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implemented by a democratically elected, native Dutch movement, it is certainly possible,
although in my view still highly unlikely, that it would have been more readily accepted by the
populace.9 But it was not instituted in such a way; rather, it was instituted by a conquering
regime that was detested by the majority of the populace, and as such, was a nonstarter entirely.
The Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar for Supervision of Peace and Order
in the Schools
The efforts of the government, whether by the German supervisory administration or
their Dutch collaborators, to change the curriculum in schools could only be carried out if there
were enforcers on the ground who made sure that local administrators, school heads, and
teachers actually implemented the mandated “reforms.” As briefly mentioned in chapters three
and five, one of the first actions that the Germans took in this regard was to appoint the NSB
teacher Piet van Rossem as the “Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar for
Supervision of Peace and Order in the Schools.”10 Van Rossem, a Belgian by birth, fought in the
Belgian Army during the First World War where he became involved with Flemish nationalist
circles known as Activists who were willing to collaborate with the German army. After the war,
he fled to the Netherlands where he continued his studies and eventually became a teacher in
Zwolle.11 Already a member of the NSB when the Germans invaded, van Rossem quickly made
himself widely known as sympathetic to the occupiers. When a local German official
complained to the director of the lyceum where van Rossem taught about anti-German
sentiments being spread by the student body, the director held an assembly wherein he, the
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director, praised the German people. In protest, several teachers walked out, and in response,
two of them were arrested by the German security police. It was widely believed that van
Rossem had denounced the arrested teachers to the German authorities.12 Shortly thereafter, on
November 15, 1940, van Rossem received his commission from Seyss-Inquart to inspect the
schools.
Van Rossem was directly empowered by Seyss-Inquart to investigate incidents in all
schools, both public and private, save institutions of higher education, regarding the behavior of
teachers in the classroom as it related to “peace and order.” To further this effort, he was
empowered to sit in on lessons; gather information, including making copies of documents; and
conduct interrogations of faculty, staff, students, and other relevant parties. He was then to
submit the results of his investigation to Wimmer and suggest appropriate measures.13 To
complete his work, van Rossem would need a certain amount of support, but unfortunately for
him, Jan van Dam had been appointed to the position of Secretary-General of the Education
Department shortly after van Rossem’s own appointment, and van Dam had little use for the
Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar. Van Dam consistently worked to undermine
the Authorized Representative in every way. For example, van Rossem requested a salary
increase to the level of Chief Inspector of Secondary Schools, but van Dam countered with an
increase to the level of Chief Inspector of Primary Schools, which was only equivalent with that
salary of a regular Inspector of Secondary Schools. Further, van Rossem requested that he be
allowed two deputies, J. J. Valkenburg and P. R. Dijkema, and while van Dam initially declined
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this request, he eventually relented and allowed for the temporary installation of Valkenburg and
Dijkema as van Rossem’s lieutenants for the period of three months.14
To make matters worse for van Rossem, van Dam issued a series of instructions in early
January 1941 regarding how van Rossem was to carry out his duties as Authorized
Representative.15 First and foremost, van Dam noted, in contradiction to the actual order of the
Reichskommissar, that van Rossem’s “work consists of conducting research into the behavior of
teachers, who could be dangerous for the maintenance of peace and order in the schools … and
issuing advice to the Secretary-General.”16 Further, any conclusions should likewise be brought
directly to van Dam’s attention. This restriction issued by van Dam was due to a certain amount
of vagueness in the original order given by Seyss-Inquart. That order stated that van Rossem
was empowered to “investigate which teachers, according to their general behavior, do not offer
or offer only an incomplete guarantee that peace and order reigns in school life, or those teachers
who in their current assignment do not appear to be suitable for the development of the school
system in the interest of the Dutch people.”17 Van Rossem understood this authorization to mean
that his authority extended to more general personnel matters, but van Dam made clear that this
was not the case—van Rossem was to be restricted only to actions that affected “peace and
order.”
When performing his work, van Rossem was to work in concert with the heads of the
sub-departments (i.e., primary education, secondary education, etc.) within the larger Education
Department and the existing school inspectors, and only in “very urgent cases” was he to venture
out on his own without first informing the School Inspectorate, and even then, he was to inform
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the School Inspectorate and the corresponding sub-departmental chief immediately afterward.
Further, van Rossem was to steer clear of anything dealing with the appointment of teachers, as
van Dam reserved that prerogative for himself, as he was soon to make public.18 Should van
Rossem encounter any resistance in his activities, he was to inform van Dam, who would take
care of the issue, for van Rossem was in no circumstances to attempt to counter any such
resistance on his own. Finally, he was to allow all teachers who came under suspicion to explain
their actions in person. There would be no decisions made based upon rumor and conjecture
alone.19 In total, it was clear that van Dam was trying to curtail van Rossem’s personal authority
and subsume it under his own.
Naturally, van Rossem objected to many of the restrictions that van Dam attempted to
place on his personal authority, especially the curtailment of his authority over general personnel
matters. In his reply to van Rossem’s objections, van Dam relented regarding the temporary
installation of Dijkema and Valkenburg but noted that the curtailment of van Rossem’s
jurisdiction over general personnel matters had been approved by Schwarz. Moreover, he
informed van Rossem, that, after consultation with the German authorities, it had been
determined that not only were the appointments of Dijkema and Valkenburg temporary, so was
van Rossem’s appointment itself.20 The power struggle between the two men that had begun
almost immediately after van Dam’s appointment in November 1940, was ended, thanks to the
support of Schwarz, in a decisive victory for van Dam by the end of January. This sort of back
and forth, in which both men attempted to assert their own authority would continue for the
remainder of van Rossem’s time in office.
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Despite the restrictions that van Dam put in his way, van Rossem, along with his two
colleagues, J. J. Valkenburg and P. R. Dijkema, proceeded to create more unrest in the education
field than peace and order. By and large, the actions of van Rossem’s office were sporadic,
given the still large mandate they had to ensure peace and order. In most cases the Authorized
Representative or his deputies would receive tips from regime-oriented teachers or parents, or
sometimes directly from Robert van Genechten, who had been appointed Solicitor-General in
The Hague after he had failed to attain the top spot in the Education Department. They would
then investigate the circumstances of the incidents and recommend actions to be taken directly
by Wimmer or van Dam.21 The tips van Rossem’s office received and the cases they investigated
ran the gamut from ordinary issues of discipline that could be expected at any school in any age
to specifically anti-German and anti-NSB activities that could border on the cruel and unusual.
Despite the broad power granted to van Rossem and his deputies by Seyss-Inquart,
however, their investigations took on a broad pattern for their entire tenure in office. First, the
incidents reported, such as the anti-German and anti-NSB actions of the students, whether
directed at other students, teachers, or passers-by on the street, were encountered by van Rossem,
Dijkema, and Valkenburg much more often than the more regular incidents of student
misconduct. This is, however, unsurprising given the nature of van Rossem’s mandate. Those
more typical incidents of poor student behavior generally did not fall under the purview of his
office and so only reached his desk rarely, staying instead under the purview of the local
administration or, if necessary, the regular School Inspectorate. Second, upon receiving a report
from van Rossem’s office, van Dam tended to turn the issue over to the local school inspectors to
get a second opinion, most of whom were careerists in the Education Department and only a
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couple of whom, at least at this early stage in the occupation, were NSB or German
sympathizers.22 Finally, because van Dam trusted the reports provided by the local school
inspectors more than those presented by van Rossem’s office and because he set himself up as
van Rossem’s opponent, the punishments that the latter or his deputies suggested were often
significantly curtailed, if an agreement on the facts was even possible in the first place, which
was not always the case.
Typical of the types of investigations handled by van Rossem’s office was one incident in
Doetinchem, a small town to the east of Arnhem, near the German border. In March 1941,
Dijkema received a tip from a local NSB official regarding a whole range of illegal activity at the
public lyceum there. Among the activities being carried on by the students there was the illegal
sale of stamps with the Queen’s portrait on them, purportedly with the approval of the school
director. After an investigation was conducted, it turned out that the student body at this school,
with the tacit support of the administration, was practically in open revolt against the new
regime, at least as much as could be expected from school students. Accusations abounded,
including the widespread distribution and display of stamps in support of both the Queen and the
Nederlandsche Unie, death threats against the children of local NSB functionaries, harassment of
a local NSB functionary and a German official on the street in front of the school, and a studentled strike after the larger dismissal of Jewish civil servants. To rectify the situation, Dijkema
suggested the that the school director be dismissed from his position and transferred to another
school as a teacher, that another involved teacher be suspended for a month without pay, and that
one offending student be suspended for a month while a second student should be expelled for a
year. Van Dam availed himself of the local school inspector, who conducted his own
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investigation, which established that many of the points Dijkema had made were, at least in the
inspector’s eyes, and thus also van Dam’s, less than completely forthcoming.23
The local school inspector noted that the incidents regarding the sale of Unie stamps had
occurred not during the school day, were quite limited in nature, and the students were not even
aware that it was against the rules. Further, the director had, originally, no knowledge of the
nascent black market that had developed, and when he did discover it, he put an end to it
immediately. The incident with the German official had been handled by the Germans
themselves, with the offending student having been hauled down to the local police station and
given a stern talking to, while an incident between another student and an NSB functionary had
been handled by that NSB man himself, who got in touch with the student’s parents. As for the
school director, he was judged to be both competent and hard-working, taking every effort to
clamp down on disorder, as evidenced by the lack of such since the new year had begun. The
teacher, on the other hand, was the victim of a series of misunderstandings. The only issue that
van Dam found concerning was the strike, but even then it was downplayed significantly, with
the local school inspector noting that the strike had been spontaneous, lasted barely forty-five
minutes, and ended when the teachers called the students back into class and discussed the
inappropriateness of their actions.24 It was, for all intents and purposes, a total rebuke of
Dijkema’s investigation and complete undercutting of the authority of the office of the
Authorized Representative.
As a result of van Dam’s constant use of local inspectors to undercut the authority of the
Authorized Representative, van Rossem and his lieutenants were largely ineffective in their
work. Occasionally, because of the resistance that they faced from van Dam, van Rossem or his
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subordinates would attempt to go over the head of the Secretary-General straight to Schwarz, but
this did not usually have the desired effect. On March 4, 1941, van Rossem wrote to Schwarz
complaining about van Dam’s practice of having the regular school inspectors conduct secondary
investigations of complaints regarding peace and order in the schools, thus undercutting van
Rossem’s authority.25 Schwarz does not appear to have taken any action in response, as the
practice continued unabated. On April 22, Dijkema complained to Schwarz about van Dam
undercutting his authority at the public secondary school in Winschoten, where the director was
making his anti-NSB attitude known among the student body. In this instance, instead of
punishing or removing the director, van Dam sent a letter telling the director to knock it off.
Again, Schwarz did not take any action to counter van Dam, as van Rossem was still
complaining about the situation a month later, this time about a synagogue visit planned for
students by that very same school director.26
In fact, van Rossem made a similar appeal to Schwarz regarding the situation in
Doetinchem and van Dam’s less than helpful reaction on May 29, more than two months after
Dijkema’s initial investigation began. But by this point, although van Rossem did not yet know
it, he had been fired from his position as Authorized Representative. After a discussion with van
Dam on the subject of van Rossem in mid-May, Schwarz convinced Wimmer and Seyss-Inquart
to remove the Authorized Representative’s mandate. Wimmer had originally scheduled the
removal to take place on May 25, but the actual order from Seyss-Inquart was only signed on
May 26 and forwarded to van Rossem on May 29, apparently after he had sent his complaint
about van Dam to Schwarz. The official reason for van Rossem’s dismissal was that his office
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had achieved its function to restore peace and order in the schools. But that was purely a cover.
In reality, anti-NSB and anti-German activity in the schools continued to be a problem for the
authorities. The real reason for van Rossem’s dismissal is that he had stood outside of van
Dam’s authority, and van Dam had been acting to contain under his own control all elements of
education in the Netherlands. All van Dam really needed to do was to convince Schwarz of this
necessity, which van Dam was able to accomplish in mid-May.27 The falsehood behind van
Rossem’s dismissal was made clear when, a few weeks later, van Dam appointed a new
functionary to fulfill the exact same role, but this time directly under his own authority.28
During his time as Authorized Representative, which spanned about six months from
mid-November 1940 to late-May 1941, van Rossem and his deputies fielded hundreds of
complaints from cities and towns across the country. The overwhelming majority of these
complaints dealt with actions that were perceived to be anti-German and/or anti-NSB and the
perpetrators of these acts came from all areas of the educational system, whether students,
teachers, or administrators. By and large, however, van Rossem and his lieutenants were
ineffective in combating chaos and disorder within the schools. At the ground level, the odds
were simply stacked against them, as the overwhelming majority of both faculty and students
were in some way opposed to the German occupation regime and their Dutch collaborators.
Their efforts were made more difficult by the lack of support they received from van Dam, who,
it should be noted, was looking out more for his own political authority within the educational
system than he was acting on behalf of anti-German or anti-NSB students. Not only did van
Rossem represent a threat to van Dam’s own authority via his position outside the chain of
command of the Education Department, van Rossem, as a member of the NSB, represented that
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sector of Dutch society that van Dam otherwise detested. Van Rossem’s position, therefore,
represented not just a threat to van Dam personally, but also the ascendancy of the NSB within
education more generally. By getting rid of van Rossem, van Dam was able to not only make his
own position more secure, but also to remove the threat of the NSB in the education realm at the
same time.29
The Inspector of Education in General Service
Only a few weeks after van Rossem was sacked by Seyss-Inquart, van Dam appointed a
new functionary as extraordinary school inspector: Dr. D. G. Noordijk. The official rules for the
new “Inspector of Education in General Service” were approved August 29, and then published
in the Nederlandsche Staatscourant, the official government bulletin on September 2.30 In large
part, the new rules for Noordijk’s position as they regarded school inspections were essentially
similar to those that van Dam supplied for van Rossem’s position the previous January, except
for one major difference. The new Inspector of Education in General Service also carried the
authority to make suggestions and consultations regarding all hiring and firing of teachers and
education officials, and in the case of primary education, the additional authority to mandate that
any proposed personnel changes be brought directly to the attention of the Secretary-General.
Thus, Noordijk held a weak veto power over appointments and dismissals in primary education,
limited only by the direct authority of van Dam himself. In exercising his right to give input on
appointments, Noordijk was to pay special attention to “the suitability of the candidate to be
employed in education in a manner and in a spirit, as would be expected in connection with the
state of occupation of the Netherlands.”31
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The weak veto that Noordijk held was more powerful than it might at first appear,
however, because Noordijk was an old acquaintance of van Dam’s and had been one of the
individuals van Dam consulted before the latter took up the position of Secretary-General of the
Education Department.32 He was, according to van Dam, “my closest adviser from the very
beginning and a colleague on all points where education had to be adapted to the current political
situation.” At the same time, Noordijk was the one who was to carry out “the dirty work.”33
Noordijk was trained as a Germanist and, at the time of his appointment, was a lecturer of
German in The Hague. He was also a member of the NSB, although more closely aligned with
the SS faction thereof, and the Opvoedersgilde. He was generally a bit more radical than van
Dam in his ideological outlook, but because he was a member of the SS faction, as opposed to
the Mussert faction, he suited van Dam’s purposes as Educational Inspector.34 Administratively,
he was positioned directly under the Secretary-General, although he largely worked with the
existing School Inspectorate. This meant, from van Dam’s perspective, that there was a bit of a
check on how much trouble the new Inspector of Education in General Service could stir up, lest
he turn out to be as disruptive as van Rossem and his subordinates had been.
In reality, Noordijk’s tenure as Educational Inspector was a continuation of the work van
Rossem had begun.35 The cases that reached Noordijk’s desk were essentially similar to those
that van Rossem had investigated, indeed he even took over cases that had originally been sent to
van Rossem.36 For all intents and purposes, Noordijk’s office functioned as a sort of “universal
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complaint bureau.”37 For example, at the Amsterdam Lyceum in summer 1942, one of the
teachers was accused by an informant of having passed the collection plate in order to help a
dismissed Jewish colleague. Although this was a banned offense, the teacher, according to the
complaint that reached Dr. Albrecht, who worked in Schwarz’s Main Department Education and
Churches, replied, “I don’t care. I do what I want.” As a result, Noordijk was sent to investigate.
Upon reaching the lyceum, both the individual teacher and the school director were interviewed,
steadfastly denying having passed the hat for their departed colleague. Although Albrecht had
wanted to dismiss both the teacher and the school director, Noordijk recommended that too little
evidence existed for their dismissal and both remained in place for the foreseeable future.38 The
same school also had problems with NSB-oriented students being bullied by their classmates as
well as one teacher who was pro-German being disrespected by her students. It got so bad for
the NSB students that several students actually ended up switching schools to other institutions,
while the teacher side-stepped the administration and took her complaints directly to Noordijk.
The disruptions continued, however, until late 1941 when the school director finally started
punishing the perpetrators with detention and ultimately suspensions.39
In another instance at the Ambachtsschool in Amsterdam, one disruptive student was
assaulted by his teacher—the teacher hit the student with a ruler—and then removed to the
hallway. When the student kept being disruptive from the hallway, the teacher sent him to the
director’s office. The student’s father, who was an NSB member, complained to Noordijk,
suggesting that the cause of the problem was political and that the teacher was taking out
frustrations with the regime on his son. Although both the teacher and the school administration
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insisted that the student himself was the cause of the problem, with his constant disruptions,
Noordijk appears to have sided with the NSBer, recommending that the teacher be suspended for
a week, which was carried out in early 1942. The teacher’s assault on the student does not
appear to have factored heavily into the punishment, rather the belief that his motives were
political was the cause.40
Sometimes, however, Noordijk’s investigations revealed what he considered to be good
work on the part of school officials. When one student at a private school in Cuyk was being
harassed by other boys in his class, naturally because of politics, the school director sent
circulars home with all students warning parents that future transgressions, that is bullying,
would incur stiff penalties. When the harassment of the one child continued, the perpetrators
were suspended. All of this had already occurred by the time Noordijk got around to
investigating, and so he cut his investigation short, noting that the school director was doing
good work to maintain peace and order.41
These examples are typical of the types of inquiries that Noordijk’s office handled for
most of the time he was on the job as Inspector of Education in General Service. He would
receive a tip or complaint, sometimes directly from the complainant him or herself, but also
through other channels such as the police, van Genechten’s office, or through local NSB circles.
He would then contact the school to inquire, which usually led to a personal investigation when
possible or his reliance on the existing school inspectorate when he was not personally able to
intervene. He would then pass along his recommendations up the chain for further action by van
Dam or one of their German supervisors. In both style and function, he was the successor of van
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Rossem. But this all changed in 1942, as his own personal power to affect changes in personnel
matters was expanded greatly.
In January 1942, van Dam delegated to Noordijk the direct authority to fire teachers and
other school inspectors. This had not been one of the original powers granted to Noordijk by van
Dam when the former was appointed and empowered in summer 1941. Rather, this new
authority was the result of an order by Seyss-Inquart from January 9, 1942, promulgated along
with the Second Appointment Decree, which gave the Secretary-General the authority to fire
teachers, when previously such personnel changes had required either the intervention of one of
the German administrators, such as Schwarz, Albrecht, or Wimmer, or the compliance of the
local authorities, whether schools boards, school directors, or mayors.42 Van Dam’s new power
was further expanded in June of that year to include the ability to suspend teachers,
administrators, and school inspectors.43 Van Dam quickly delegated his new authority to
Noordijk, and in concert with the latter van Dam outlined the use of that authority in set of
guidelines that was published on September 2.44
The “Guidelines to Follow for the Implementation of Order Number 5/1942” outlined the
duty of the educator to both uphold and pass along to the student a sense of solidarity with
Germany, its government, and its people. Key to this duty is an understanding of the
volksgemeenschap. Where the previous era of individualism, which was based on the ideas of
the French Revolution, saw the volk as individuals merely living near each other, the present
saw individuals living with each other, or as van Dam writes, it is the difference between an
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orchard and a forest, where the former is simply “mechanical” and the latter is “organic.”
Arguing that the Dutch owe loyalty to the German government and its people, not just because it
was expected by the occupation authority, but also because of “common descent and
neighborliness,” this loyalty and approval by the Dutch of the new ideas of volksgemeenschap
“must now be attested to in education, especially in history education.” And because the idea of
a volksgemeenschap is “not only just an acclamation, but also a reality,” benefits for
volksopvoeding can also be attained in the Netherlands through collaboration with Germany.45
This required a defense of the youth from Bolshevism, which threatened their western ideals and
Christian character, and support of the struggle, led by Germany, for the future of European
civilization.46
The guidelines were set up in two parts, one for school inspectors and one for teachers.
With the exception of a single guideline directed specifically at school inspectors, which stated
that they should never deny those teachers who support the new ideals of the volksgemeenschap
appointments and promotions in favor of those teachers who do not support the new Europe, the
entire list is the same. Included among the combined set of guidelines were instructions that
implored teachers and school inspectors to “face the music of the meaning of this time and that
the exercise of their activities should bear witness [to that] in the formation of the youth.”
Further, that they “at least should show understanding for National Socialism and appreciation
for the work of its carriers in the Netherlands”47 as well as showing “appreciation for the struggle
to orient the people toward the idea of community [gemeenschapsidee], for the position and
work of the Greater German Reich which leads the way in the new Europe, and for the place of
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the Dutch people therein, including its Germanic character.”48 Finally, the guidelines warn
teachers and inspectors that they should work toward a better understanding between the Dutch
and German peoples and should avoid any type of resistance and, indeed, work against any
resistance activity.49
Noordijk exercised his new powers broadly. For example, in April 1942, he dismissed a
teacher from his position in The Hague for making anti-German remarks. The teacher was
accused of telling a student, whose father had recently been released from a concentration camp,
that the father would, in due course, attain a position of honor for the ordeal he had been forced
to go through. The teacher was subsequently arrested by the German police. When questioned
about his statements, the teacher suggested that he was merely reflecting the popular attitude of
the public in The Hague but owing to this being his second infraction—the same teacher had
made anti-German statements the previous December—he was fired from his position.50
Similar situations were encountered across the country. In Rotterdam at the
Zeevaartschool, a teacher was fired for making anti-German statements, according to several
students and the school director.51 While at the secondary school in Winterswijk, it was the
gymnastics teacher who was causing problems by fostering an anti-NSB environment in his
class. Noordijk suspended the teacher pending an investigation, while the teacher was
subsequently arrested and interred at the concentration camp at Amersfoort. Shortly after his
arrest, he was fired permanently.52 In Tilburg, at the St. Odulphus school, the school director
was taken to account, not for having engaged in anti-German activity, but merely for not having
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reprimanded students who hooted and hollered during a public film viewing. During a school
festival, a film was shown to some five hundred attendees, many students among them. When a
character named Adolf died in the film, the students erupted in laughter, but the school director
did not respond to this provocation. He was suspended pending an investigation, after which
both the local school inspector and Noordijk both concluded that suspension was sufficient,
given that the director was an otherwise upstanding citizen. Their German superiors, however,
felt that suspension did not go far enough, and ordered his removal, both from his position as
school director and from his position as lecturer at the local university. It was only through the
direct intervention of Wimmer, who personally reviewed the case, that the dismissal was
reversed, with the Commissioner-General noting that his actions were “exceptional” to the
standard procedure.53
Sometimes, the anti-German activity was not limited to a single teacher or administrator
but was more widespread. Such instances presented a problem for Noordijk as he could not very
well close the entire school for anti-German activity.54 This was the case at a primary school in
Neerbosch, near Nijmegen. According to a local leader of the Opvoedersgilde, the entire school
establishment, from the director and teachers, down to the students, exhibited strongly antiGerman sentiments. Among the various accusations included the school director passing out
Nederlandsche Unie pamphlets, passing along Radio Orange reports to students, singing antiGerman and anti-NSB songs, and hanging anti-NSB placards in the school hallways, as well as a
general anti-German and anti-NSB teaching curriculum. The school director steadfastly denied
these accusations, but when he learned of an impending investigation by the local school
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inspector instigated by Noordijk, the illegal placards were apparently taken down, again
according to the Opvoedersgilde leader. When the local inspector completed his report, it was
determined that all of the accusations were basically correct. The school director was eventually
fired in June 1943, while the rest of the administration and faculty was given a stern talking to.55
Although Noordijk was primarily concerned with anti-German sentiments, sometimes it
was a teacher’s pro-German sentiments that brought on Noordijk’s investigation. At the St.
Antonius School in Voorhout, a teacher incensed the local clergy by proclaiming that “Christ
was not a Jew. He was the first and best National Socialist.” Complaints about the incident made
Noordijk’s desk, who actually agreed that the teacher’s statements were uncouth. After promises
by the teacher to refrain from such pronouncements in the future, Noordijk recommended only a
warning in April 1942. The school board, however, felt this was insufficient, and so fired the
teacher anyway. The situation was brought to the attention of Dr. Zunft, a German official in
Wimmer’s office, who ordered Noordijk to have the teacher reinstated, while others were to take
the teacher’s place on the unemployment rolls for anti-German statements that had been
uncovered during the course of the original investigation.56 Clearly, one needed to tread
carefully when involving the authorities.
In another case of being reckless when the authorities were near, a teacher in Groningen
was at first cleared of wrongdoing through Noordijk’s investigation. The teacher, who taught at
one of the local secondary schools, was accused of having said in front of his class, upon the
death of an NSB-oriented student, “It is good that the swine is dead, it was getting too hot for
him.” Naturally, the teacher denied it completely, but when the local school inspector conducted
an investigation at Noordijk’s request, it turned out that only a single student, also an NSB
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sympathizer, was making the accusation, while the rest of the students in the class said it had
never happened. The teacher was cleared of wrongdoing, but then, unwisely, noted to another
teacher that they need to be careful around the NSB sympathizer, because she was a tattle tale.
That statement, which was obviously made to the wrong colleague, got him suspended and
fined.57
It was not just the actions of teachers inside of the classroom that garnered Noordijk’s
attention. A teacher’s actions outside of school could also become a cause for dismissal. One
teacher in Amsterdam at the Reseda School was picked up on the street for wearing a Jewish star
in solidarity with the persecuted Jewish population in spring 1942. She was subsequently
sentenced to six months’ incarceration. Upon receiving word of the incident from Albrecht,
Noordijk immediately suspended the teacher for the duration of her imprisonment, but later fired
her outright and took away her pension, owing to the severity of her “crimes,” despite protest
from the local civil administration of Amsterdam and the teacher’s status as a breadwinner for
her younger sister and elderly parents.58 Similarly, a teacher was arrested in De Bilt for having
passed along information about a potential hiding location to a local Jewish woman. When the
teacher’s “sabotage” was discovered, she was arrested on June 22, 1943, with her suspension and
ultimately her dismissal following later in the summer.59
In a similar situation in Alphen on the Rhine in September 1943, a teacher was caught
listening to English radio broadcasts. This came out because he mentioned to his students,
without naming the source or discussing it in a political way, that Allied armies had landed in
Italy the previous day. As it would turn out, one of his students had also heard the same report,
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knew the source of information was English radio, and spread this information clandestinely
around the school. When word reached Noordijk, he began an investigation, and the teacher
admitted to having listened to English broadcasts on an illegal radio. But Noordijk and the
teacher were old acquaintances, having been university students together at the University of
Amsterdam. Noordijk knew from his previous experience that this particular teacher, who taught
German language and mathematics, was generally pro-German in his sensibilities. The teacher
claimed only that he was listening to English broadcasts to better his English language abilities,
which Noordijk believed. Van Dam, who also knew the man, also tried to intervene on the
teacher’s behalf. Regardless, Noordijk determine that, at the least, he must suspend the teacher,
which he did. Because the teacher was listening to an illegal radio, however, the
Sicherheitsdienst began a parallel investigation, arrested the teacher, and sentenced him to one
years’ imprisonment at the concentration camp Vught. Despite appeals from Noordijk, Van
Dam, and the local Protestant preacher, the latter of whom especially bemoaned the case because
the teacher was one of the few non-NSBers in the local area who was well known for his proGerman sensibilities, the sentence was upheld in December 1943. As a result, a little more than
halfway through his imprisonment at Vught, he was dismissed on Wimmer’s orders.60
In Apeldoorn, in November 1943, five teachers were suspended not because of what they
did, but because of what they did not do outside the classroom. In this case, the mayor of
Apeldoorn called for a teachers’ conference where lectures from local and regional figures would
be held, including the head of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde and an official from the Department of
Arts and Public Enlightenment. When another scheduled speaker, the municipal “Councilor for
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Education” in Apeldoorn, noted the five teachers’ absence to Noordijk, they were suspended for
one month and their pay was docked.61
Not uncommonly, a teacher, seeing the writing on the wall, attempted to head off
discipline. In one case in Bellingwolde, a teacher at the local school refused to interact with the
school director, who was an NSBer. She learned of the director’s complaints against her, which
reached Noordijk via the Opvoedersgilde, and pro-actively announced that she would retire at the
end of the school year. Given that it was already July, and only six weeks of classes remained
before the summer break, she apparently hoped this would buy her a reprieve. She was wrong.
Noordijk simply suspended her for the remainder of the term, with her outright dismissal set to
come into effect at the beginning of the new school year on October 1.62
Toward the end of the occupation, this type of strategy took a different turn. Instead of
announcing one’s retirement, teachers just absconded entirely, as was the case of one school
head who objected to the Red Cross handing out oranges to school students. Noordijk was
unable to determine why, exactly, such a thing would be objectionable, but the local NSB
chapter leader was insistent that the school director be punished for his obstinance in the matter.63
The only thing Noordijk could do was dismiss the director, as he was unavailable to participate
in any investigation because he went underground shortly after the incident. His extended
absence—several months by the time of his dismissal—was cited by Noordijk as the cause.64
In other cases, teachers absconded for reasons that were not entirely clear, and that was
the cause of an investigation. In Doetinchem, one teacher went underground on June 6, 1944,
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feigning illness, which was one of the more common excuses teachers gave before going
underground, likely because it would allow them to continue to receive their pay and benefits for
the immediate future. When the teacher never returned to school, an investigation was launched
by Noordijk, and it was determined that the teacher had never been ill in the first place,
according to his own wife, who may, or may not, have been in on the secret. According to the
wife, the teacher had simply disappeared on June 6 and had not been seen or heard from since.
Because he was a reserve officer in the Dutch army, Noordijk determined that the likely cause of
the teacher’s disappearance was his desire to join the invading Allied armies in Northern France.
Noordijk turned the case over to the SD in late June, and formally dismissed him on July 25.65
Over the course of his tenure, Noordijk would intervene in thousands of cases and
suspend or dismiss dozens of teachers and administrators for their anti-German actions. But this
was, in the grand scheme of things, less substantial than his other primary intervention into the
school establishment—the dismissal of school inspectors. Beginning with his newly designated
authority, Noordijk began to implement a “cleansing” of the School Inspectorate, replacing antiGerman inspectors with NSBers. The impetus for these changes came directly from SeyssInquart himself in November 1941, who ordered a survey of the School Inspectorate to be
conducted by the Reichsbeauftragten of the Reichskommissar in the various provinces. The
survey results were less than stellar, with more than half of the inspectors judged as poor, and a
third as merely “provisionally acceptable.”66 Although the surveys included inspectors of all
levels, both the Germans and their Dutch collaborators were overwhelmingly more concerned
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with primary education.67 It was there that the minds of the future would be won, but also there
that resistance was least likely.
Noordijk got to work quickly. He began with the Primary School Inspector in Deventer,
who had previously ordered that van Rossem’s staff be barred entry to schools under his
supervision unless he personally accompanied the agents of the Authorized Representative.
Noordijk suspended him indefinitely in January 1942 because of his anti-NSB activities, very
shortly after he gained that authority.68 His suspension was turned into a dismissal the following
summer. Noordijk’s attempts to “cleanse” the School Inspectorate picked up steam in summer
1942. It was at that time that W. Terpstra, who also happened to be Mussert’s brother-in-law,
was promoted by van Dam to head the Sub-Department Primary Education. Terpstra, who had
previously been a school inspector himself, was, unlike Noordijk, an ardent Mussert supporter.
To be certain, Terpstra was not the first NSBer with a prominent position in the department - that
honor belongs to G. Vlekke, who in November 1940 was appointed to Chief Inspector of the
First Inspectorate, which encompassed the provinces of Limburg, Gelderland, and North Brabant
in the southeastern part of the country—but it was Terpstra’s appointment that marked a rather
rapid increase in the number of NSB functionaries, especially within the School Inspectorate.69
Before the war started, there were only three NSB members working for the Department of
Education, Sciences, and Arts out of a total of one hundred, seventy-eight. But by 1943, that
number had increased to thirty-four, out of a total of two hundred, sixty-seven officials in the
Department of Education, Science, and Cultural Administration. The NSB’s strength within the
department was growing much faster than the department itself.70
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Within the School Inspectorate, Terpstra and Noordijk formed a partnership of sorts
aimed at ridding the Inspectorate of suspect individuals. After the first dismissal of the school
inspector in Deventer, it was the turn of the inspector in Utrecht, who was dismissed on June 8,
1942, for refusing to sit on a committee for a home crafts exhibition. On June 6, 1942, an annual
meeting for primary school inspectors was held in Utrecht, during which Terpstra interviewed
the inspector from Breukelen, whose unsatisfactory answers provided an excuse to dismiss him.
Seven other school inspectors were summoned to The Hague for interviews and were
subsequently dismissed as a result of unsatisfactory answers they provided Terpstra regarding all
nature of questions. These included the inspectors in Nijmegen, Tilburg, Breda, Amersfoort,
Zwolle, Zaandam, and Dordrecht, all of whom were dismissed over the next two months.71 An
eleventh inspector was fired by Noordijk later that year.72 Given that there were only forty-nine
primary school inspectorates across the country, grouped under three Chief Inspectorates, the
eleven who were fired by Terpstra and Noordijk in the summer and fall 1942 would amount to a
significant change in the personnel of the primary school inspection regime.73
All of these fired inspectors were replaced by NSBers, but they too were problematic.
Van Dam, who like Schwarz was never a fan of the National Socialist Movement in the
Netherlands, found most of these new school inspectors to be sub-par, and so prevented, as best
he could, the appointment of further NSB members to the School Inspectorate. For the
remainder of the occupation, only five additional NSBers were appointed as school inspectors.74
When Mussert attempted to have a further five NSB candidates appointed to positions as school
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inspectors in 1944, van Dam rejected all five. Mussert appealed to Schwarz, but to no avail.75
Although the NSB managed to get a total of sixteen members appointed as school inspectors
over the course of the occupation, mostly as a result of the actions of Noordijk and Terpstra in
the latter half of 1942, NSB members never formed a majority of primary school inspectors.
They did, however, make up almost a third of the total inspectors, which accounts for a much
more significant impact by Noordijk (and Terpstra) upon the inspection corps than upon school
faculty. So, while van Rossem had little impact on the educational realm, beyond creating chaos
in the ranks, Noordijk was comparatively much more effective.
Over his time as Inspector of Education in General Service, Noordijk handled thousands
of inquiries, with an average of roughly eighty replies going out per day and even more inquiries
coming in in the first half of 1942 alone. He personally dismissed or suspended a total of fifty
one teachers, although his own willingness to accept the recommendations and proffered
punishments of local administrators and school inspectors, most of whom had no interest in
helping Noordijk in his work, was in complete contrast to van Rossem and likely helped keep
this number relatively low.76 Even when one considers his additional tasks of handling students
transfers, the composition of exam committees, and work on the German language text book for
primary schools, this is still an incredible amount of work that Noordijk and his office managed
to complete.
Resistance at the Local Level
Ostensibly, both van Rossem and Noordijk were to be occupied with keeping peace and
order in the schools. In reality, their job was more akin to enforcing the will of the occupation
regime upon students, teachers, and administrators at the local level. Although Noordijk was
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more effective than van Rossem in making personnel changes both within the schools and in the
inspectorate, neither was very successful in rooting out passive or active resistance on the part of
teachers, administrators, and students. There was simply too much work to be done and too few
willing collaborators, whether in their individual offices or within the School Inspectorate more
generally, to effectively police a teaching population that reached into the tens of thousands. At
best, their efforts could be described as a game of whack-a-mole, in which the inspectors would
reply to complaints, “solve” an issue, and return to find four more complaints in queue. To the
extent that one can describe anti-German and anti-NSB resistance by administrators, teachers,
and students as “chaos and disorder,” it reigned supreme for the duration of the occupation at all
levels of schooling in the Netherlands.
Resistance by students, administrators, and teachers took various forms. It included the
wearing of political insignias such as orange ribbons and badges; the singing of anti-German,
anti-NSB, or patriotic songs by students, often with the either tacit or explicit support of their
teachers; anti-German and anti-NSB pronouncements and lessons by teachers, including the use
of banned books; the hanging of anti-regime placards; and harassment of pro-German and proNSB students and teachers by their colleagues. The records of both of the extraordinary school
inspectors and the complaints that reached the central office of the Education Department in The
Hague (and later Apeldoorn) are riddled with such actions.77
For the most part, it is difficult to determine the deeper political motives of many of these
actors. The overwhelming majority of teachers, students, and administrators who were
investigated either denied outright the accusations leveled against them or recast them as
complete misunderstandings. Little good could come to a teacher in admitting anti-German or
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anti-NSB activity. If they were lucky, and most were, they would be given a warning, but if they
were unlucky, they would be suspended, expelled, fined, fired, arrested, and/or imprisoned in a
concentration camp. The complainants, on the other hand, usually assumed that the motivations
of those against whom they informed to the authorities were entirely political. But it is
impossible to determine whether the political manifestations of particular incidents were causes
or symptoms of a deeper misunderstanding.78 Regardless, the mere fact that politics was used by
some individuals to lash out at their colleagues and charges, even if their motives were not
political in origin, suggests that using the political dimension as an avenue of attack was seen as
especially effective. In other words, if a student or teacher used a colleague’s association with
the NSB as a weapon with which to attack that colleague, regardless of whether the assailant him
or herself even cared about the victim’s politics, it suggests a wider understanding within the
schools that NSB or German-related activity or affiliations were worthy of scorn, and so itself
serves as evidence of this larger phenomenon of anti-NSB and anti-German sentiment.
The Singing of Patriotic and Anti-German Songs
Perhaps most benign of all forms of passive resistance was the singing of patriotic songs.
The most obvious such song is Het Wilhelmus, the Dutch national anthem. Van Dam recognized
this early in his tenure as Secretary-General, writing to Dr. Albrecht in Wimmer’s office asking
for advice. He suggested that the song be viewed in two lights. In its cultural and historical
context, van Dam did not believe that it could be banned completely, and so suggested that, so
long as it was sung as part of a lesson in a music class or read as a poem in a literature class, its
use in the schools should remain. Alternatively, if it is sung as political demonstration, and that
included any performance of the song outside of the classroom, it should be banned as all anti-
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German political demonstrations were. The German leadership agreed with his suggestion.79
This understanding, however, would cause problems because it was often impossible to
determine whether its singing inside of the school was meant to be an anti-German
demonstration.
Many teachers and administrators took full advantage of this ambiguity.80 For example,
at the Primary School B on the Weesperstraat in The Hague, students often sang Het Wilhelmus
as they returned from school field-trips. Owing to the letter of the regulations, this should have
been seen as a violation outright, as it was not in the classroom. The teachers present did little to
stop the students, and both students and teachers claimed that the singing was on the initiative of
the students themselves. As so often was the case, the local school inspector’s investigation
simply sided with the teachers, noting that “according to all witnesses, one cannot call it
provocative.”81 That is all witnesses save the NSB-oriented students with whom the complaint
originated.
Similarly, at the public primary school in Oud-Zuilen, the children had taken to singing
Het Wilhelmus three times each day. Van Genechten, whose office sent the tip to van Dam noted
that, as far as he knew, the children were not being forced to sing the song, “but whenever it
happens three times in a day, it takes on the character of [an anti-German] demonstration.” When
the local inspector went to investigate, it turned out that the song was sung one per week, and
then during music lessons. Both the inspector and van Dam declined to take any measures
against the school, although it should be noted that this particular inspector, based in Breukelen,
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was one of the several who would be dismissed by Noordijk in the coming months as
unsatisfactorily pro-German.82
In one instance, the problematic nature of the singing was clear. At the Marnix
Gymnasium in Rotterdam in early 1941, one teacher allowed students to pick their own songs for
musical instruction and the class overwhelmingly voted for Het Wilhelmus. When the students
changed the text to indicate William being of Dutch blood, instead of German blood, that was
indeed not allowed.83 When their spontaneous changes to the text went unpunished, the students
pushed it further, choosing poems and songs that highlighted freedom of thought and which
called on patriots to either defend their freedoms or die trying. Again, it was a change in the text
that pushed the students’ action into the realm of subversion. In one poem, in which the original
text noted that “there is freedom of thought in Holland,” the students changed to “there was
freedom of thought in Holland.” Although there were several teachers who were suspect,
according to Valkenburg, who investigated the case, there was little that the inspectors could do
about it. The main teacher involved steadfastly denied the accusations, or placed the blame upon
the students, who had, after all, voted themselves on which songs and poems to recite. The
single student who admitted to substituting in the subversive lyrics even covered for his teacher,
telling the local school inspector that the teacher reprimanded him immediately. Because the
local school inspector disagreed with Valkenburg’s conclusions, the matter was mostly dropped.
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Valkenburg was able only to urge that the teacher be denied any advancement—the teacher was
in line to become the next school director—but van Rossem’s office was unable to take any
further steps.84
In another, similar instance, at the Queen Wilhelmina School in Haarlem, students and
teachers sang the song in combination with a prayer for Queen Wilhelmina and the oppressed of
the country, while a drawing of a German eagle and swastika was torn apart by a teacher in a
“demonstrative way,” according to the Weerafdeling member who filed the tip with van
Rossem’s office. Valkenburg, who replied to the tip, noted that the singing of the Wilhelmus
was, in and of itself, not forbidden, while the rest of the tip was simply too vague to act upon.85
In another instance, when the son of an NSB student refused to sing along to the Wilhelmus with
the rest of his class and was sent to the school director’s office as punishment, Valkenburg
replied to the inquiry, which had gone up the chain from the child’s father through the local NSB
apparatus, that singing of the Wilhelmus was not banned unless it was meant as an anti-German
demonstration, which did not appear to be the case in the father’s complaint.86 But exhibiting the
confused nature of the situation, one tip that made it directly to van Dam regarding two primary
schools in The Hague stated that during a combined field trip to a museum, students began
singing anti-German songs. When the tipster went to the school director to complain, the school
director noted that the Wilhelmus, the song in question, had not yet been banned so not only
would the director not punish the students, he would have them sing it the following day. Van
Dam only promised to look into the matter.87
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Other times, the songs in question were much more clearly anti-German, and these were
generally banned outright. But this did not stop students from singing them, with or without
their teachers’ permission. For example, at the Protestant primary school in Heemstede, in
addition to Het Wilhelmus, students were fond of the following song:

Holderdebolder
Hitler hangt op zolder
Een touw op zijn nek
Een prop in zijn bek
Daar hangt die halve gek.

Swinging back and forth
Hitler hangs in the attic
A rope on his neck
A gag in his mouth
There hangs the weirdo.

Zie ginds komt de stoomboot
Uit Engeland weer aan
Zij brengt ons Wilhelmintje
Ik zie haar al staan
Hoe waaien de wimpels
Van ’t rood, wit, en blauw
Laat Hitler maar strikken
Wij bleven getrouw.88

See yonder comes the steamboat
From England again
It brings us sweet Wilhelmina
I already see her standing there
How the pennants blow
Of red, white, and blue
Let Hitler [remain] tied up
We remain faithful.

When the local inspector came to investigate the matter, the teacher in charge of supervising the
children on the playground denied being able to determine what was being sung, and as soon as
she did figure it out, she banned the students from singing it, or so she claimed; the inspector
suspected that she was fully aware of the students’ actions from the beginning. The inspector
held an assembly for the teachers of the school and told them to take better charge of their pupils,
but that was the end of the whole ordeal. As for the singing of Het Wilhelmus, all of the teachers
denied it, including the music teacher, for whom assigning the song would not have been against
the rules.89
For the most part, anti-German songs appear to have been relatively common in schools
across the country as many of the same songs show up in different locations, sometimes with
their verses altered slightly. For example, the second verse of the above-mentioned song that
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was sung in Heemstede, which lies just south of Haarlem in the far west of the country, also
appears with slight alterations in complaints regarding the Protestant primary school in Dreumel,
clear across the country near Nijmegen:

Zie ginds komt de stoomboot uit Engeland weer aan
Ik zie Wilhelmina aan ‘t stuurboord al staan
Hoe waaien de wimpels van rood, wit, en blauw
Laat Hitler maar komen, Ik blijf Wilhelmina getrouw90

See yonder comes the steamboat from England again
I see Wilhelmina standing on the Starboard [side]
How the pennants of red, white, and blue blow
Let Hitler come, I remain faithful to Wilhelmina

Similarly, an anti-NSB song from the primary schools in The Hague shows up again in slightly
altered fashion at the Juliana School in Amsterdam. In The Hague, the verses, as recorded by a
complainant, are rendered as:

Op de hoek van de straat staat een pharizeeër
‘T is geen man, ‘t is geen vrouw, maar een NSBer
Met een krant in zijn hand staat - is daar te vinden
Hij verkoopt zijn Vaderland voor 6 losse eenden91

On the corner of the street stands a Pharisee
It is no man, it is no woman, but an NSBer
With a paper in his hand - is there to find
He sells out his Fatherland for 6 loose ducks

While in Amsterdam, the same song is rendered:
Op de hoek van de straat staat een pharizeeër
‘T is geen man, ‘t is geen vrouw, maar een NSBer
Op de hoek van de straat, staat hij daar te venten
En verraad zijn Vaderland voor ‘n paar roode eenden92

On the corner of the street stands a Pharisee
It is no man, it is no woman, but an NSBer
On the corner of the street, he stands to peddle
And betray his Fatherland for a pair of red ducks.

Another song initially reported in The Hague found its way across the country to Emmen, in the
province of Drenthe, on the German border, again in slightly altered form. According to van
Genechten’s sources, in The Hague, the song had two very similar versions:

1)
Holland is gevallen door verraad
Engeland kwam natuurlijk te laat
Vliegtuigen rondom
parachutisten op de grond
Holland viel door verraad

2)
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England, naturally, came too late
Airplanes all around,
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Holland fell by treason
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Holland is gevallen door verraad
Engeland kwam precisie een dag te laat
Het is gevallen voor een boef
Die op alle landen loert
Holland viel door verraad93

Holland has fallen through treason
England came exactly one day too late
It has fallen to a scoundrel
Who lurks in every land.
Holland fell by treason

In Emmen, however, the song went, according to Dijkema:
Holland is gevallen door verraad
Engeland kwam natuurlijk weer te laat
Hitler is een groote ploert
Die op kleine landjes loert
Enz.94

Holland has fallen through treason
England again came naturally too late
Hitler is a huge bastard
Who ambushes small countries
Etc.

The variations in these anti-German and anti-NSB songs, as well as their wide
distribution, from north to south, and east to west, suggests that they were being passed by word
of mouth, and although the records do not indicate the singing of these particular songs at other
schools between the various locales, it stands highly likely that they were, in fact, sung at many
more locations than just Dreumel, The Hague, Amsterdam, Emmen, and Heemstede. This is not
to say, however, that other songs were not sung at schools across the country. In reports to
Schwarz by van Genechten, several other songs or rhymes were relayed to the German
administrators in The Hague, including:
1)
Heb je het gehoord
Peter Ton is vermoord

Have you heard
Peter Ton was murdered95

2)
Wie is Jansen, Wie is toch deze Jansen
Jansen is de leider van de Swingclub NSB96

Who is Jansen, who is this Jansen
Jansen is the leader of the swing club NSB

By and large, most of these songs were harmless little tunes sung by school children. The
records do not indicate any instances in which teachers sang along with the children, save for Het
Wilhelmus, although teachers’ tacit approval was likely common enough, regardless of their
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denials. The songs might be directed at a particular classmate, hoping to taunt those particular
children, as was recorded occurring at the Primary Schools on the Weesperstraat in The Hague,
but beyond a few hurt feelings, the school yard singing of children was unlikely to actually stir
up trouble directly.97 In much the same way, school children took up another form of largely, but
certainly not entirely, passive political protest: the staging of anti-regime demonstrations.
Political Demonstrations
Anti-regime political demonstrations took many forms. They ranged from relatively
minor “silent demonstrations,” in which students might wear particular clothes or political
insignias to the distribution of anti-regime propaganda and, in some cases, all-out student strikes
aimed at protesting the regime. The government took a range of steps to combat these efforts on
the part of students, most of which were entirely reactive. Over the first few years of the
occupation, the Education Department, and sometimes the German administrators in the
Reichskommissariat themselves, sent out repeated decrees banning certain types of political
insignias, everything from badges and pins to pictures of the Queen. When these actions did not
prove effective enough, the government resorted to threatening local administrators to take
further precautions to prevent anti-regime agitation on the part of students. This was, by and
large, more effective, but the unequal application of punishments, whether of students or of
teachers, kept these further regulations from being completely effective.
Political insignias were first banned generally in September 1940 by the SecretaryGeneral of Internal Affairs for all state officials, save those that were specifically prescribed by
the government. This was followed by a circular from the interim Secretary-General of
Education Reinink in October 1940 noting that educational establishments were included in this
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ban.98 But these did not have the effect of banning the wearing of such insignias by students,
which had become problematic for the occupation regime in the meantime. For example, at the
advanced primary school in Bilthoven, students had taken to wearing orange ribbons, whereas at
the municipal secondary school in Zutphen, the students took to waving orange flags as symbols
of their patriotism. In both instances, according to police reports, the teachers and administrators
appeared to at least tacitly support the students.99 At the same time, in a primary school in The
Hague, students hung orange flags in a classroom as a sign of their own political feelings,
although these were promptly removed by the teacher.100
The situation regarding political insignias was so poor in Maastricht that the mayor and
city council wrote to Reinink on November 11 asking him to amend the rules to this effect. Van
Dam, who was appointed on November 25, complied with their request on December 11,
outlawing the wearing of “insignias or other differentiating symbols” by students in or near
school buildings, and ordering teachers, administrators, and local officials to help police the
matter. This second circular, which was followed by a third on December 23, caused much
confusion within the ranks. Questions came in regarding German Nazi symbols, such as the
swastika, the Wolfsangel, and the Sonnenrad.101 While others questioned whether it was
permissible to wear completely non-political insignias, such as those often worn at parochial
schools as part of the uniform. The mayor of the town of Vries noted that several local
townships in his area often distributed pins to advancing students meant to spread notions of
traffic safety among the locals. Surely that could not be problematic, he believed.102
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Van Dam appears to have immediately recognized the problem and sent the question
upstairs to Wimmer’s office. Albrecht responded and informed van Dam that all insignias and
differentiating symbols, save German symbols, were banned, although he did not directly
address the three specific symbols Nazi symbols in van Dam’s inquiry. Van Dam then sent out a
fourth circular in April 1941 noting that all such symbols and insignia, even as parts of a
uniform, were banned, save those specifically authorized by the state, followed by a fifth circular
in late May that expanded the ban to any Dutch placards or posters of a political nature, save
those issued by the Dutch government at the occupiers’ behest (such as those supporting
Winterhulp Nederland).103 Neither Albrecht’s reply nor van Dam’s circular cleared up the matter
regarding what, exactly, constituted a German symbol, as questions still came in asking for
clarification. For example, in the second half of 1941, repeated questions came into the
Education Department regarding students who wore an orange V symbol (presumably indicating
vrijheid) on their clothing.104 Oddly, van Dam, in consultation with Schwarz, decided that the
orange V was actually a German symbol and thus should be allowed, although V symbols of a
different color or form were not to be allowed.105 The curious case of orange Vs was only one of
many.
The goal of the German regulation, of course, was to prevent the display of patriotic or
anti-German insignia by students and teachers in the schools, as this was a common tactic
students and teachers used to show their loyalties. Such was the case at Woerden in May 1941,
when a local NSB member, who lived across the street from the local primary school, hung an
NSB placard in his window. In response the students of the school hung Nederlandsche Unie
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placards in the windows and doors of the school. Although the political element of the
provocation was obvious, the school director did not act until directly confronted by the NSBer,
at which point he ordered the Unie placards removed and strictly enforced the ban on political
demonstrations. The NSBer then withdrew his complaint. Noting that the complaint was
withdrawn in his reply to van Genechten’s office, van Dam saw no reason to take any further
action against either the students or the administrator.106
Similarly, at the Princess School in Amsterdam, some twenty students, both boys and
girls, arrived at school with Nederlandsche Unie leaflets and wearing red-white-blue caps. In
what was clearly an anti-German demonstration, the director appears to have done little to
combat the student agitation. Upon investigation, he admitted that some students had brought
oranges (that is, the fruit) into school—which he himself had forbidden previously—but claimed
not to remember anything else. Noordijk took this as a sort of nolo contendere plea and
recommended he be put on probation for six months. This, it would turn out was a light
sentence, as van Genechten, through whose office the complaint first emerged, suggested a more
proper punishment might be sending him to a concentration camp for his trouble.107
Although such anti-regime displays continued to occur throughout the occupation, their
banned status was not really in question. Alternatively, the status of non-political and nonGerman, pro-regime insignia and uniforms was completely in flux. Non-political uniforms and
insignia had to be handled on a case by case basis. Students at shipping and vocational schools
who wore “uniforms as such,” were permitted to continue as they always had.108 But when the
head of a private, Catholic school in Arnhem inquired about symbols worn by a priest, who also
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occasionally taught religion classes, van Dam informed the school director that such symbols
were definitely not allowed. He further informed the director that if the priest did not want to
comply, then the school director should inform van Dam directly.109
Even more problematic than non-political insignia were non-German, pro-regime
insignia. Most obviously here, the NSB was not a German organization nor had the wearing of
NSB insignia been explicitly allowed by the state and so questions came flooding in regarding
NSB and its associated organizations, such as Winterhulp Nederland, the Nazi charity
organization.110 The answers proffered by van Dam defied a specific logic. Winterhulp
Nederland insignia were to be allowed.111 The Wolfsangel, as van Dam understood it, was not
specifically German, but rather used by the NSB, and so should be banned. At the same time,
iron rings, which NSB youth commonly wore on their fingers, were not banned by van Dam,
even though van Genechten, head of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde and Solicitor-General in The
Hague, saw them as “differentiating symbols” that should be banned.112 The issue of NSB
related symbols and uniforms was only finally cleared up on February 2, 1942, when a circular
released by van Dam made allowances for the NSB and its related organizations, such as the
Nationale Jeugdstorm (NJS). Although van Dam released the circular, the order came from
Wimmer.113 This was later followed up with an allowance for officials to wear NSB insignias
and uniforms as well.114
Finally, the logic of the occupiers came full circle, when on February 20, 1942, van Dam
decreed that Nazi organizations such as the Waffen SS and the NJS were allowed to hang
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propaganda posters in the schools and that requests to hang such posters “are to be granted.”
When questions came asking whether this final circular was a direct order to allow such posters,
van Dam clarified his position on May 4, noting that while the ultimate decision was left to the
individual administrators at each school, it was certainly wise to acquiesce given that Waffen SS
posters were meant to further “the fight against Bolshevism and the preservation of our own
Christian civilization, which is important to and must be valued by everyone, young and old,
who have not consciously chosen the side of communism.” He followed this up with a warning
that should such requests by the Waffen SS be denied, it would reflect upon the individual
administrator’s personal feelings regarding this larger struggle. A similar argument was made
regarding NJS posters, although when it came to the distribution of pamphlets, van Dam
suggested it would be better to simply provide the NJS with the home addresses of students so
that direct propaganda initiatives would remain outside of the schools.115
The problem, however, with allowing Nazi paraphernalia in the schools, aside from the
larger political dimensions, was that it gave anti-German students and administrators yet another
reason, or more likely an excuse, to harass their pro-German or pro-NSB classmates. In summer
1941, Albrecht wrote to van Dam noting that he had gotten many complaints of students wearing
Hitler Youth uniforms in schools being sent home. Van Dam again released a new circular on
August 16, reminding local officials that German symbols and uniforms were completely
allowed, this time specifically mentioning the Hitler Youth. In the same circular, van Dam
warned of the “undesirable consequences” that would follow should such anti-German
disturbances continue. It must not have been universally accepted, however, as yet more
circulars were released later that year, this time aimed specifically at confessional schools.116

115
116

NIOD 216e/14; NA 2.14.37/539, 542.
NA 2.14.37/530.

391
In a similar case in ‘s-Hertogenbosch in April 1941, a primary school director began
harassing a German student at that school for wearing symbols associated with the Hitler Youth.
The director attempted to claim to both the local school inspector and Valkenburg, both of whom
investigated the case, that his actions were more of a blanket ban against any and all insignias,
which he attempted to institute because he had difficulty telling various allowed and banned
insignias apart from one another. Neither the local inspector nor Valkenburg bought this
explanation, and both were of the opinion that the director’s excuses were just that, excuses
meant to cover up his anti-German attitude. Although Valkenburg recommended a stiff penalty,
van Dam let the director off with a stern warning.117
A blanket ban on political insignias was a rather common tactic used by school directors
during the early days of the occupation, although if one can believe the complaints of NSB
parents, it was often selectively enforced. At the Van Speyk primary school in The Hague, the
director there banned all political insignia personally when the school year began in September
1940. One particular child, who had been accosted by his classmates as a “traitor” and “scummy
NSBer” previously, apparently wore an NJS insignia in some form of personal protest,
complaining that other students were wearing Nederlandsche Unie badges at the same time,
knowledge of which the director denied entirely. The school director personally confiscated the
NJS badge and warned the student to not try and argue with him. When the child’s father wrote
to the school director, the director, believing that the father had written at the instigation of the
child, took this to be a direct affront to his own authority and his previous warning not to argue
and suspended the student. A personal intervention by the father at the director’s home resulted
only in the return of the particular NJS badge, but not the reinstatement of the student because
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the teacher became even more convinced that the student had instigated his father’s intervention.
When the police investigated the case, it also turned out that a history and geography teacher at
the school had made some inopportune comments about the governance of Eupen-Malmedy (the
teacher said it was easiest to assume it was a part of Belgium), and so the authorities focused
almost exclusively on that aspect. When van Dam finally wrote to the school director, he did not
even mention the insignia case, and so it was left to stand in favor of the school director.118
In a more troubling instance, at a Catholic boys’ school in Haarlem, the insignia ban does
not appear to have been initially enforced at all, whether for patriotic insignia or for NSB-related
insignia. In February 1941, the student body was heavily anti-German, with the anti-German
faction wearing coins, which contained portraits of Queen Wilhelmina, as symbols of their
patriotic allegiance. One Nationale Jeugdstorm member was intercepted on the way to school by
a group of boys from the anti-German faction who began accosting the lad. The group attempted
to forcefully remove his NJS badge from his rucksack, and when the boy defended himself, the
group of assailants attempted to throw him off a bridge into the canal below. Only the
intervention of a second group of students, who warned against such an attack as being Pyrrhic
in nature, brought the assailants back from the brink. All the while a teacher from the school was
standing there, refusing to intervene, ostensibly because the incident occurred off school
grounds. In another instance, the same NJS student was threatened by at least two other students
with knives. In both cases the police were involved, but the only penalties handed out were for
the leader of the group of student assailants, who was expelled, and to the teacher, who was
given a stern warning.119
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The case of the Catholic boys’ school in Haarlem is representative of a particular type of
problem for the German occupier—what to do about the royal family. As is the case in many
monarchies, the presence of the royal family was rather ubiquitous in the Netherlands. In the
education sphere, this specifically took the form of portraits and school names, while in the
larger public arena, street names, currency, and other public symbols of the royal family were
widespread. The occupation authority took quick action, when in late 1940, internal discussions
took place regarding the naming of new school buildings, including those already under
construction, after living members of the royal family.120 The ban came out on February 7,
1941.121 This was furthered when, in October 1941, the use of names of living members of the
royal family was extended to all public associations and organizations. The ban on the use of
such names for new buildings and institutions was one thing, but the expansion of the rule to
encompass all already existing institutions created quite a dilemma, as van Dam himself
immediately recognized.122
Despite this, the Germans were determined to go through with the changes. Streets,
parks, large hotels, bridges, and other public buildings were to be renamed. To make matters go
smoothly, at least in theory, the responsible organizations were to submit a name change list to
the Representative of the Reichskommissar for their province, after whose approval was given,
the name changes could go through. Excepted from this rule were only private residences and
smaller, less important hotels, although Wimmer’s office noted that the continued choice of a
name of a living member of the royal family for such buildings would be seen as provocative.123
The results in the education sector were somewhat mixed. Many schools simply changed their
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name outright, such as the Queen Wilhelmina Primary School in Voorburg, which changed its
name to the Christian Primary School in Voorburg. Similarly, the Queen Wilhelmina School in
Sneek changed its name to the rather pedestrian “School on the Frederick Hendrik street.”
Alternatively, the same school association rejected a change to the Queen Wilhelmina School’s
sister school, known as the Princess Juliana School. The board informed van Dam that the
Juliana in question was not the daughter of Queen Wilhelmina, but actually Juliana van Stolberg,
the mother of William the Silent, and thus it did not fall under the ban against naming institutions
after living members of the royal house. Similarly, the Queen Wilhelmina School in The Hague
made an end run around the decree, changing its name to the Queen Emma School, Emma being
a popular nickname for Wilhelmina.124
The question of political insignias based on the royal family had further implications as
well. The students in Haarlem had used coins to display their patriotic affinities, but this was by
no means the only form of royal portraiture that could be found across the country. Initially,
such portraits were not banned from public display, if for no other reason than that they could be
found everywhere and their removal would be a gargantuan task. The sole exception to this rule
were portraits of Prince Bernhard—consort to Princess Juliana—whose trademark white
carnation became a symbol of Dutch resistance to Nazi domination when, on the prince’s
birthday June 29, 1940, the Dutch public adopted the wearing of carnations as a sign of passive
resistance in what became known as Carnation Day. As a result, the Germans banned any
portraits of Bernhard in public, arrested Dutch commander-in-chief Henri Winkelman, and fired
the mayor of The Hague, where the largest demonstrations had taken place outside of the
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Noordeinde Palace.125 But for the time being, only Bernhard’s portrait was banned in public
spaces and buildings.126
For the immediate future, the question of portraits of other members of the royal family
came up repeatedly. When van Rossem advised the head of the primary school in Avereerst in
April 1941 that it would be wise to remove the portrait of the Queen that was then hanging in the
school, van Dam intervened, telling van Rossem that only portraits of Prince Bernhard were
banned.127 In another instance, in Alphen on the Rhine, the director of the secondary school there
actually inquired about portraits of the Queen and royal family in April 1941. Valkenburg
replied that, as far as he could determine, the ring one girl had been wearing that included a
picture of the queen fell under the ban on the wearing of political insignias, but that the actual
portraits hanging in the schools were allowed, provided that they did not include Prince
Bernhard. Van Dam seconded this opinion, noting that the ring should be considered as a
political demonstration and therefore, the girl who wore the ring should be punished for breaking
the rules.128
In what was seen as a much more serious issue, the previous month, March 1941, a
twenty-year old teacher at the Christian National Primary School in Groningen was arrested for
the production and distribution of over three thousand photos of members of the royal family.
The school director informed the local school inspector that he was unaware of any such
distribution in the school itself and dismissed the possibility as “out of the question.”
Furthermore, the school inspector came to the conclusion that the young man was not entirely
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aware of the severity of his crime, owing to his young age and his only very recent employment
at the school. The case was treated with some leniency—by Dutch law, he was still a minor—
but he was nonetheless dismissed from his position after his release from custody.129
The situation was finally resolved from an administrative standpoint through the
complete ban on public portraits of living members of the royal family that was enacted by Karel
Fredericks, Secretary-General of Internal Affairs, under orders from his German superiors, likely
Wimmer, on May 2, 1941, although buildings in use by the government itself were exempted.130
That was extended by Wimmer personally on June 28 to all public places, this time including
schools and other institutions used by the government. Van Dam passed this order along to
educational institutions on July 1, at which time he also removed the portrait of Queen
Wilhelmina that had been hanging in his own office.131 The ban on using portraits of the Queen
was so all encompassing that it included a ban on the use of Dutch coinage in math lessons,
because those coins contained portraits of the Queen, although it was not extended to permitted
history texts, probably because that would have been indefensible from a regulatory and fiscal
standpoint.132
By mid-1942, the government had finally figured out the larger outlines of the insignia
ban generally and the place of the royal family specifically as it related to educational
institutions. Political insignias of any and all non-Nazi organizations or groups were banned, as
were any portraits of living members of the royal family. Alternatively, Nazi organizations were
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allowed to both use the schools as bases of propaganda and their members, whether students or
teachers, were allowed to wear their uniforms and insignias as they saw fit. But this did not
solve the question entirely. Questions regarding specific organizations continued to roll in
regularly and had to be handled on a case by case basis. Nor did the problem of students and
teachers wearing banned insignias end.133 Reminder circulars went out repeatedly from the
central government in The Hague to the towns and provinces warning local officials to carry out
the decrees of the occupation authority under penalty of severe punishment.134
The wearing of anti-regime political insignias was most often seen by the regime as a
form of political demonstration, but that was not the only way in which students protested the
occupation. In early May, 1941, the director of the public secondary school in Tiel reached out
to van Dam in order to get ahead of what he feared was a planned series of student
demonstrations against the regime. The school director noted that on April 30, 1941, many
students had come to class wearing their “Sunday best,” which the director could only assume,
given the unusual nature of such a concerted effort by the students, was meant to be an antiGerman “silent demonstration.” He feared that the upcoming May 7 birthday of a recently
dismissed Jewish teacher would turn into cause of a second demonstration and had heard rumors
of a third impending “silent demonstration”—via the wearing of black scarves—planned for May
10, the anniversary of the German invasion of the Netherlands. He requested from van Dam the
authority to close the school entirely to prevent such demonstrations, apparently fearing that, as
the head of the school, he would be found partly responsible for any such actions on the part of
the students. Although van Dam did not grant that specific request, he did take the extraordinary
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step of empowering the local school inspector to shutter the school and ordered the school
director to keep in close telephone contact with the local inspector.135 Unfortunately, the records
in the file do not indicate whether the feared second and third demonstrations actually went
forward.
Although in Tiel, van Dam was supportive of the director’s efforts to combat student
demonstration, in other instances, van Dam came to the aid of students themselves. One such
student at a secondary school in Zwolle collected English propaganda pamphlets that had likely
been dropped out of a British airplane near his house and distributed them to his classmates.
Initially, the school expelled him for this action, but the boy’s father appealed, noting that the
thirteen-year-old child could barely read the German language fliers, and so had no idea of what
he was doing, and did so despite warnings by his father against bringing them to school. The
local school inspector, upon hearing the father’s appeal suggested to van Dam that the boy be
allowed to return to school with a stern warning. Van Dam, convinced of the father’s case as
well, was able to persuade Schwarz to allow the child to return, should the school accept him.
Regardless of this fortunate intervention by van Dam on the boy’s behalf, he still was out of
school for more than two months in spring 1941 while the case was adjudicated.136
Although van Dam’s close relationship with Schwarz allowed him a certain amount of
influence in such cases, the Germans were not always as lenient, especially if older students were
involved. At St. Trinitatis Lyceum in Haarlem, two older students were caught producing antiGerman propaganda. As a result, the two students were arrested, expelled from the school, and
forbidden to continue their education at any other institution in the Netherlands.137 In other cases,
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the provenance of anti-regime propaganda was unknown, but it was nonetheless spread through
the school. Such was the case at the Royal Secondary School in Maastricht, in which some two
dozen students were found to have been in possession of communist propaganda pamphlets
aimed at Dutch youth. Although all of the students claimed that they had found the propaganda
pamphlets by the bicycle racks, the original finders of the pamphlets did distribute them to the
rest of their classmates, at least until they ran out of the roughly thirty pamphlets that were
found. Neither the police report nor the included correspondence between van Dam and
Noordijk reveal what actions the occupation authorities took against the students, most of whom
freely admitted to spreading the propaganda. However, given the age of those involved—most
students were thirteen or fourteen years old—and the quickness with which the school director
took action to combat the spread of the propaganda, it is unlikely they suffered severe
consequences, although that cannot be determined with any certainty.138
In perhaps the most draconian reaction to anti-regime demonstrations, the mayor of the
public lyceum in Eindhoven suspended or expelled more than half the school, in response to one
of the largest anti-NSB demonstrations at any non-university educational establishment during
the entire occupation. The immediate cause of the disruption was a visit by NSB Leider Mussert
on May 29, 1942. As part of the visit, local officials hung the orange-white-blue Prince’s Flag
on the school building, which was the preferred flag of the NSB.139 When the flag remained up
at the school even after Mussert had left, the students decided to strike. The following day, of
the two-hundred, ninety-three total students at the school, two-hundred, sixty remained home.
Although most returned to school the following Monday, the message the students had hoped to
send was clear. Equally clear was the message the mayor sent in response. One-hundred, eight
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students were given some form of detention, the overwhelming majority being required to stay
late at school Wednesday and Saturday afternoons. The other one-hundred, twelve students were
suspended for a period of between eight days and an entire year, with more than half receiving a
suspension of one month, and a full twenty receiving a suspension of one-half year. The curators
of the lyceum and the parents involved were, naturally, furious. The stiff penalties handed out
by the mayor threatened not only the smooth functioning of the school but the future education
of dozens of students, and so both groups took their complaints to van Dam. The SecretaryGeneral agreed that some punishment was necessary, but also found the rather harsh nature of
the mayor’s actions troubling, especially for the twenty-four students who were punished with a
one-half year or full-year suspension. Luckily, the timing of the event played to van Dam’s
favor, as the upcoming summer break offered the opportunity for van Dam to suggest to the
mayor that he could, on the last day of class, offer a general amnesty to the most severely
punished students, support for which he appears to have received from both Noordijk and
Schwarz. Equally luckily for those students involved, the mayor availed himself of this
opportunity and announced the amnesty for the twenty students who had received a half-year
suspension, although he waited until later in the summer to extend that offer to the four students
who had received a full-year suspension.140
The Harassment of NSB Members and Children
Although anti-regime demonstrations occurred throughout the Netherlands, that was not
the most common form of agitation that students engaged in, nor was it the type of anti-German
activity that most perturbed the authorities. By far the most pervasive form of anti-German
activity found in the records of complaints that reached Education Department was the
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harassment of NSB and German-friendly children by both teachers and students. This type of
activity ran the gamut from the relatively innocuous anti-German or anti-NSB statement to
physical violence directed at such youths. In the case of the former, it could rightly be
questioned whether, in some cases, minor statements or asides were even actually directed at
specific children intentionally, although in those cases that went up the administrative chain, the
complainants usually believed as much. Regardless of whether anti-German or anti-NSB
statements were directed at specific children, however, the presence of NSB and/or German
children in the classroom must have been known to those who made such statements, and so
would constitute harassment regardless of whether or not the perpetrator intended it as such. At
the very least, anti-German or anti-NSB statements would have contributed to a hostile learning
environment for children with personal or familial connections to Dutch or German Nazism.
And that is the least corrosive form of harassment those children faced. On the other end of the
spectrum, literal, physical violence, including death threats made with brandished weapons, were
not unheard of.
Naturally, the German authorities and their Dutch collaborators took these cases very
seriously. On the one hand, mere anti-German statements, much like larger political
demonstrations, threatened to poison the well of the next generation, undoing all of the work the
occupiers hoped to accomplish. On the other, physical violence against NSB or Germanoriented youths in or outside the school was, in the eyes of the regime, just about the most severe
form of resistance a school-aged student could engage in on their own initiative. The prevalence
of such complaints in the records testifies to both the seriousness with which the government
viewed these types of activity and the frequency with which they occurred.
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Given that most of the accused steadfastly denied the charges against them, it is difficult
to determine with any certainty whether or not the accusations leveled against them were
accurate. Generally speaking, van Rossem, Dijkema, and Valkenburg tended to assume the
worst of the accused, while Noordijk and the local school inspectors tended to be a bit more
trusting of the teachers’ (although not necessarily of students’) explanations, but this is only a
general trend. Moreover, school directors tended to side with their teachers (again, not
necessarily with students) against the inquiries of the government. In the case of the Authorized
Representative and his deputies, they had a vested self-interest in portraying the schools as
centers of chaos and disorder, for if the schools were bastions of peace and discipline, there
would be no need for their services, which would have put them in a precarious position given
van Dam’s clear desire to remove them. Alternatively, Noordijk’s and the local inspectors’
positions were relatively more secure, and so they would have little need to take otherwise mild
infractions out of context as a means of creating job security.141
At the same time however, the local inspectors, especially before Noordijk managed to
make substantive changes in their numbers, were, by and large, in lock step with the larger antiNSB consensus in the country, even though they mostly carried out the orders of the central
government faithfully.142 Assuming that these career officials overlooked harassment of NSB or
German-friendly students in deference to their own political motivations is unsupported by the
evidence and needlessly casts doubt on the work ethic of these largely career public servants.
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Finally, it is extremely unlikely that all of the incidents that were reported up the chain, whether
through local NSB circles, via the police, the local inspectors, or through the office of the
Authorized Representative were entirely fictitious. Even in those cases in which it was later
determined that the events had originally been substantially misrepresented to the authorities,
some kernel of dissatisfaction on the part of the complainant(s) must have been present,
otherwise they would not have complained in the first place, and most of the time, the
complainants represented that dissatisfaction as political in nature.
Such was the case at a Protestant school in Amsterdam, when a father complained of
violent interactions between his three children and other students that included the throwing of
rocks which caused injuries, owing to his wife’s membership in the NSB. As it would turn out,
the family only had two children at that school, and both denied having had any adverse
interactions with their classmates as a result of their mother’s NSB membership, although one of
the children did, after prodding, recall an incident that occurred when he was passing by a
completely different school in which he was accosted because of his mother’s NSB
membership.143 So although the original complaint was unfounded, there was a kernel of truth to
it in that the one child had, in fact, been mistreated as a result of his connection to Dutch Nazis.
In other instances, the connection to politics was simply unclear or imagined entirely.
Such was the case at the expanded primary school in Steenwijk, where a student who had a long
history of truancy was finally expelled from the school after he passed the age of required
attendance. His parents both complained through NSB circles that this was the result of the
boy’s role in the NJS, but when the inspector investigated, it turned out that the boy was
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welcome to return, so long as he actually attended regularly. This particular offer was left out of
the original complaint by the boy’s parents.144
Nor was it uncommon that the authorities would view certain acts through the lens of
politics when no such intention was present. In one such example, in a teachers’ lounge at the
First Public Trade School in Amsterdam, teachers hung a thank-you note from the widow of a
recently deceased colleague. Because this colleague was Jewish and had been dismissed along
with other Jewish civil servants, the German authorities, upon learning of the thank-you note,
assumed the matter was entirely political. In fact, it had often been the custom in that particular
school to hang announcements and other items of interest in the teachers’ lounge so that all of
the faculty might see them, as was the case here. The fact that the recently deceased teacher was
Jewish was, according to Noordijk and all of the witnesses he interviewed, completely
coincidental.145
At the protestant primary school in Driebergen, local NSB officials complained to van
Genechten that the “strong anti-national socialist” mood of the school, especially by the director
and one of the teachers, had led to several NSB and German families to remove their children
from the school and send them elsewhere. As part of his investigation, the local school inspector
inquired about every single student who had left the school since May 10, 1940. In the previous
year, forty-four students had left the school, and of those, forty-three had either moved or
fulfilled their schooling requirements. Only a single student, who switched to the German
School in Utrecht, had complained of anti-NSB or anti-German harassment as the cause of the
move. The only actual “infraction” that the inspector could find was that the accused teachers
had, in fact, allowed students to sing Het Wilhelmus in a music lesson, and only then, it was
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problematic because the teacher had previously been investigated by the NSB’s security
service.146
Despite evidence that some complaints about disorder in school were mostly, or entirely,
misrepresentations of the true events, anti-German or anti-NSB statements were common
throughout the occupation. By and large, it was teachers who were most accused of making
these types of more general anti-regime statements. At the Pontinstituut in Rotterdam, on
October 15, 1940, a teacher told three girls, none of whom were affiliated with the NSB, that
“The NSBers always disrupt radio broadcasts” and “NSBers are genuine traitors.”147 The
inspector, in his report, noted that no one in the class actually heard the teacher say the second
item about NSBers being traitors, even the girl whose father initially reported the incident to the
authorities. The teacher did admit to the radio comment, however, received a stern talking to,
and promised to keep politics out of the classroom.148
At the municipal secondary school in Zutphen, one teacher constantly made anti-German
and anti-NSB statements to his class, noting things such as, “there are the NSBers, who all think
that they are world reformers,” and, whenever a plane would fly over, “There go our
defenders.”149 Upon inspection, the teacher denied having ever made such statements, and
indicated that, at worst, he had made more innocuous statements that students had taken out of
context and assumed referred to the NSB. He even wrote directly to van Dam defending his
maintenance of order within the classroom. The inspector warned him about how things could
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be taken out of context, but owing to a lack of any further evidence, was forced to let the issue
slide.150
Even though these types of anti-regime statements were not necessarily directed at a
specific student, their meaning was still clear to anyone paying attention. For example, at the
extended primary school in the small village of Klazienaveen, near the German border, a history
teacher going over the Napoleonic Era asked his students about St. Helena, “Who should actually
be sent there?” In unison, the class answered, “Hitler.”151 One school director at the Christian
advanced primary school in Noordwijk elicited a “hoorah” from students by noting that they
seemed boisterous in class, perhaps because of the recently reported death of Rudolf Hess, which
earned the school director a warning from Noordijk to keep politics out of the classroom.
Although the director denied it specifically, the testimony of several students in the class,
including one who participated in the “hoorah” and subsequent laughter, worked against him.152
At a public primary school in The Hague one religion instructor, according to four
witnesses, referred to the German bombing of Rotterdam as the work of the devil, thereby
comparing the Germans themselves to the devil. According to the witnesses, he bragged about
actually saying this, in Dutch, to two German soldiers while visiting his parents in Rotterdam
shortly after the Dutch capitulation, but the German soldiers did not understand the meaning of
the man’s words. At another point, the same teacher, in front of his students, compared the
bombing of Rotterdam to Genesis Flood Narrative, noting that what the Dutch had to go through
in Rotterdam was child’s play compared to the trials of the ancients. As the father of one of the
students was a member of the NSB, these utterances made their way to the police, who informed

150

NA 2.14.37/413.
NA 2.14.37/410.
152
NA 2.14.37/519.
151

407
van Dam. As was not uncommon, instead of taking more drastic actions, van Dam told the
school director to make sure the teacher stopped teaching in such a way.153
In other cases, teachers and administrators were more direct in their criticism of
individuals because of their connection to the regime. At a primary school in Leiden, a specific
NSB child was constantly bullied by other students because of his father’s connection to the
NSB. When the father went to the school to complain to the director, the director told the father
that he wanted nothing to do with the NSB (i.e., the father) and he refused to instruct the children
to stop their torment of the individual student.154
At the private primary school in Dreumel, the pastor, who occasionally came to teach at
the school, harassed one 12-year old NSB student in particular with statements such as, “You all
think that you are the bosses, but that won’t last much longer” and “Look in front of you, you
need not look at me any longer.”155 It would turn out, after the local school inspector conducted
an investigation, that the child in question was unable to remember exactly what the teacher had
supposedly said. Even her parents suggested the child had difficulty remembering such things,
although they stood by their original complaint. For his part, the teacher steadfastly denied any
wrongdoing, suggesting the complainant had misrepresented his actual statements.156
Other times, the teacher did not deny wrongdoing. When the director of a secondary
school in The Hague passed away from a heart attack one evening, the following morning one of
the teachers accused students at the school of having been the impetus for the heart attack
through their spreading of NJS propaganda, which, according to the teacher, the poor director
simply could not tolerate. The director was so taken aback, the teacher claimed, that he suffered
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the heart attack as a result. At the same time, another teacher at the school reacted to the death of
the director by noting that all NSBers should be removed from the school including those only
suspected of NSB membership. As it would happen, only the first teacher was actually removed
from his position, primarily because he actually admitted to having made the offending
comments, albeit the teacher’s version of the events, he stated only that “the events of yesterday
probably did not do him [the deceased director] any good. He got very annoyed by it all.”157
Students were not the only recipients of teachers’ ire, however. Sometimes it was
representatives of the regime directly. In these cases, there was little the offending teachers
could do in their own defense, as the accusers were trusted bureaucrats, not school children or
their parents. In one instance at a public primary school in The Hague in May 1943, a teacher
was visited by the local school inspector for a regular inspection. The inspector was
accompanied by a local city councilor who was also an NSB member. When the councilor
offered the teacher his hand for a hand shake, the teacher refused. This was bad enough, but to
make matters worse, the teacher refused in front of his class of third graders. Noordijk
suspended the teacher for one month without pay. Such an affront was not taken lightly, as Dr.
Schmidt, in Wimmer’s office became aware of the case and requested an even stiffer penalty,
although Noordijk held his ground on that point.158
The previous month, in April 1943, in Heerlen, a similar incident bordered on the
childish when a local school inspector came to visit the class of a teacher at the Christian primary
school there after receiving several complaints. This particular inspector was one of the NSBers
who Noordijk had appointed in 1942 after the latter made significant changes to the School
Inspectorate. When the inspector offered his hand to the teacher as a greeting, the teacher
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refused it, in front of both the school director and the entire class. The inspector tried to remain
civil and brought the teacher into the hallway. He informed the teacher that there was no need
for such childishness, as he was there as a part of the government and that their individual
political beliefs need not interfere with their official business. The teacher replied that if he were
truly acting childish, he would invite the inspector out into the school yard to handle things in a
more physical manner. Moreover, the teacher insisted that, as a reserve officer in the military, he
had sworn allegiance to the Queen and the government in London. The inspector demanded the
teacher’s immediate dismissal, which the director refused to do. The very next day, Noordijk
signed the order to dismiss the teacher from his position. The school board tried to intervene,
suggesting that Noordijk did not have such authority, even though Noordijk very clearly did.
Noordijk kicked the complaint upstairs to Schwarz’s office, who took Noordijk’s side in the
dispute. It all became moot, however, as the teacher and his family absconded and went
underground within a week.159
Local government officials were not the only ones to earn the wrath of teaching faculty.
In some cases, Dijkema and Valkenburg, the two deputies of the Authorized Representative were
themselves the recipients of anti-NSB or anti-German opposition, for example, when they
encountered trouble just entering the schools in the first place, as happened at a primary school
in Deventer in spring 1941. There, Dijkema saw a child playing with a political pin—in this case
one supporting the Nederlandsche Unie—and confronted the student. When Dijkema then
attempted to take the child inside to meet with the school master, a teacher barred his way. As it
would turn out, the teacher was acting on orders from the local school inspector. Although
Dijkema protested to van Dam, the school inspector explained in reply that it was all a
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misunderstanding and that he had told the school administrators to not allow entrance to anyone
who did not have proper authority, a prohibition which obviously did not apply to van Rossem or
his deputies. The entire incident turned into a contest between van Dam and van Rossem
regarding their respective spheres of authority. Van Dam refused to punish school inspector and
claimed that the director’s refusal was based only on a misunderstanding that developed because
Dijkema, in the director’s eyes, appeared to be too young to have held such authority and
therefore must have been an impostor with falsified credentials.160 The protection this particular
inspector received turned out to be short-lived. He was the very first such inspector dismissed by
Noordijk when the latter was appointed to the role of Inspector of Education in General
Service.161
In a similar instance in April 1941, the director of a secondary school in Alphen on the
Rhine attempted to put barriers in the way of Valkenburg, who wanted to sit in on a class of a
teacher suspected of instructing students in an anti-German manner. This had been the second
time recently that Valkenburg had been denied entry into a classroom, the first time at a
Christian primary school in Haarlem. In both instances, the Valkenburg and van Rossem
complained to van Dam, who only noted to the school directors that it was not their place to bar
van Rossem or his deputies from sitting in on classes.162
In both of these cases, those who barred entry to the deputies of the Authorized
Representative claimed a misunderstanding was the result. No such claim could be made for a
teacher at the Catholic lyceum in ‘s-Hertogenbosch, who refused on principle to shake
Valkenburg’s hand upon meeting him in May 1941. The teacher did not mean it to be insulting,
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he promised, but rather it was a matter of principle. “As a Dutchman I cannot be a national
socialist, not even shake a national socialist’s hand,” he reportedly explained to Valkenburg.
This case apparently hit a nerve with van Dam, as he ordered the teacher suspended immediately
and then summoned him to The Hague for an in-person dressing down.163
Although teachers and administrators often expressed their opposition to the occupation
regime through a general anti-NSB or anti-German attitude and sometimes directed their ire
directly at adult representatives of the occupiers, harassment of NSB students by teachers was
comparatively rarer. No such thing could be said for students themselves, however. The files of
the Education Department are littered with complaints of harassment of NSB-oriented children
by their fellow classmates, sometimes with the at least tacit approval of their teachers. In May
1941, a complaint came into van Rossem’s office about the Catholic boys’ school in Noordwijk.
Students there were continually accosting NSB children as “traitors.” Valkenburg requested that
the school director conduct an investigation, and although the teacher in the class, per the
investigation conducted by the director, was in a position to have possibly heard the insults, he
claimed ignorance. The director still punished the offending students, but not the teacher.164
In early 1941, at the Hogere Burger School (secondary school) in Terneuzen, one girl,
who was a member of the Nationale Jeugdstorm was constantly harassed by fellow students.
Her life was being “made impossible” and she was accused of being a “traitor” by other students.
Although the girl’s parents took the issue directly to the director, the school head was either
unwilling or unable to put an end to the harassment. The complainants suggested in their letter
to van Rossem’s office that there were only a few NSB-oriented students at the school, all of
whom were subjected to abuse by the “Unie-clique”—the group affiliated with the
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Nederlandsche Unie—to which a majority of students belonged; several of the teachers
apparently condoned this behavior. Unfortunately for the girl in question, van Rossem was
unable to conduct an inquiry to investigate the matter.165
In most cases, the central government left discipline of students up to school officials,
although they freely handed out warnings to teachers and school directors that they had better
take more care to prevent disorder in the schools. At the Girls’ Primary School in Utrecht, one
ten-year old student complained to her teacher that she was being harassed by her fellow students
with constant taunts of being an “NSBer.” Her teacher replied to the girl with the less than
supportive notion that “if you always have arguments with other girls, you could go to another
school.” The teacher freely admitted this to the local inspector when interviewed, although
denied the more serious charge that was brought up in the initial complaint that she had called
the student a “traitor” and further taunted the girl by telling her, “if you are bothered by that, just
get out of school.” The teacher and the school’s director faced only a warning that they should
better keep order in the school.166
At the primary school in the village of Oud-Sabbinge, the children of two NSBers were
occasionally harassed by fellow students with statements such as “Orange on top” and “long live
the Queen.”167 The boys, all of whom were between eight and ten, recognized that these taunts
were directed at them because when they refused to take part in the chants, they were further
accosted by their classmates. But in this case, it appears to have been a temporary matter, as by
the time the local inspector got around to investigating, the matter had cleared itself up, with the
parents of one set of brothers saying there was no longer any other problem and the father of the
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other victim indicating he had only complained because he thought it was his duty as the local
NSB leader to pass complaints up the ladder. The school inspector agreed that any disruptions
had since ceased, and so no further actions were necessary by the inspector.168
It was also not unheard of that students harassed their NSB colleagues with the support of
their teachers. In one instance in at a confessional school on the Koepelstraat in Rotterdam, an
NSB affiliated student was constantly harassed by his classmates, including through name
calling— “NSBer” and “traitor”—as well as hitting him with sticks. When he tried to complain
to the teacher, she labeled him a “tattle-tale” and a “wimp,” and she refused to punish the
offenders. His further complaints to the school director, as well as those of his mother to both
the teacher and the school director were rejected, for the teacher denied her actions and the
school director stood behind his faculty member. The director further attempted to deflect blame
from the accused students by noting that the NSB child had also used a stick against his
assailants, although that was claimed by the boy’s mother to be pure self-defense. Only when
Noordijk interrogated the teacher directly did the truth of the matter come out through her own
direct admission of having ignored the proper protocols and tacitly approved the harassment.
Again, Noordijk only suggested that the teacher be sternly warned against future indiscretions.169
Harassment of NSB students was not limited to the classroom either. In the small village
of Roosendaal, the anti-NSB attitude extended to the church, when two NSJ students were barred
entry to Saturday morning services at the St. Josephskerk, not once but twice. When their father
kept the children home from school the following Monday in protest — the students attended a
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private school attached to the church — the children in the class celebrated their absence,
according to fellow students who were in attendance.170
In some cases, the form of harassment that NSB students endured was more
problematic. Name-calling was one thing, but when harassment threatened to, or actually did,
turn violent, it was an altogether different beast. In one such instance in The Hague, a student at
a private primary school there was constantly accosted as a “mof” by his classmates, which
caused the student, who was half-German, to respond that his assailants were “kaaskops.”171 In
reply, several of the other students prepared a “death warrant” for the half-German child. The
child obtained a copy of this “death warrant” and brought it home to his mother, who promptly
complained through NSB circles. It took the usual path of going through van Genechten’s office
to van Dam and then to the local school inspector, the latter of whom determined that the
creating and signing of the “death warrant” had occurred off school grounds and thus could not
be punished by the teachers. Given the ages of the children, all of whom were between twelve
and thirteen, it is unlikely that the “death warrant” was meant in earnest. The authorities
certainly did not perceive it that way otherwise van Genechten would likely have involved the
police in the matter rather than sending it over to van Dam’s office.172
Death threats, however, were only the tip of the iceberg when it came to anti-NSB
violence by students. In Bussum, a thirteen-year-old girl was harassed by fellow students, with
one tarnishing her blouse, which was strikingly similar to that of the NJS uniform, with
garbage.173 Sometimes harassment took on an even more criminal nature. At the municipal
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secondary school in Hilversum, the daughter of an NSB member was repeatedly harassed by her
fellow classmates, both verbally and through theft of her belongings, including her wallet, which
was taken from her rucksack. Although the school director could not punish the culprits of the
thievery, because they were unknown, he did punish the leader of the students harassing her
verbally with a five-day suspension. To make matters worse, several children at the school took
to following the girl home on their bicycles, riding in such a way as to cause the girl to
repeatedly fall off her bike to avoid getting into a bicycle accident. Much to the chagrin of the
director, however, the girl was unable to name her assailants, and so they too went unpunished.174
Direct assault was also not uncommon. At the Catholic Bonaventura School in
Rotterdam, one set of brothers was repeatedly harassed by their classmates because of their
membership in the NJS. Each of the brothers, who ranged in age from eleven to thirteen, had
been victims of assault by other students, either by being punched or hit with belts, albeit always
outside of school. If that were not bad enough for the poor children, one of their teachers
appeared to be fond of punishing them by expelling them from class for no other reason than
their membership in the NJS. Even the government did not take very stern measures, as the
teacher in question was judged by Noordijk to have suffered enough during his two-month wait
between the time when the reports first came out and his journey to The Hague to be interviewed
by Noordijk. The teacher was, according to Noordijk, quite concerned about his fate and had
kept the stress bottled-up inside, not even informing his own wife of the potential trouble he
might be in. The student assailants, save for one child who actually hit one of the brothers inside
the classroom went unpunished entirely. The only administrative punishment meted out by the
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Education Department was a stern warning that the school administration would be held
responsible for any future transgressions.175
Violence was not limited to male students either. At the Mariengaarde Girls’ School in
Aarle-Rixtel, one girl was constantly harassed by her classmates. Inside of the school, she was
taunted by her classmates as a “dirty NSBer,” had paper balls with curses thrown at her, and was
otherwise shunned. But it was on the way home from school that the harassment became violent,
as she was sometimes followed home from school, whereby her classmates would push her
around and sometimes even throw rocks at her. One time, a boy of unknown origin got involved
in the harassment and even threatened her with a knife. Unfortunately, Noordijk’s report is
missing from the file, but a later note of his indicates that the harassment eventually petered out
after his intervention, suggesting that at least some of the accusations by the girl and her mother
were true.176
The ride home from school also presented some youth the opportunity to harass their
NSB-oriented classmates. In one such instance at the Reformed Lyceum in Amsterdam, a girl
had come to school wearing an NJS uniform in April 1941, before it was officially permitted.
The school director, hoping to avoid problems, allowed her to wear her jacket over the uniform
instead of sending her home to change, which, in retrospect, probably would have been the better
option. When school let out, the girl was followed by a large crowd of students that eventually
forced her into the house of a sympathetic neighborhood doctor, who immediately called the
school director to come and intervene, which the latter did. After breaking up the gathering, the
girl was able to make her way peacefully home. Van Dam, in consultation with Valkenburg,
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ordered that the students who led the anti-NJS crowd be punished with suspensions, while the
girl was to be reminded that uniforms of the NJS were not allowed to be worn in school.177
Conclusion
For the most part, the reports that made their way to the Education Department in The
Hague come from the first three years of the occupation. Starting in about mid-1943 they drop
substantially in frequency, becoming more and more infrequent as the occupation goes on.
There are many possible reasons for this. The most obvious possible cause for the drop in the
number of complaints is that the incidence of anti-regime agitation inside the schools began to
subside, that is, because the new regulations and punishments meted out by Noordijk, van Dam,
and their German superiors started becoming effective. This seems especially unlikely given the
overall tenor of the occupation, with resistance activity picking up precisely around this period
owing to the changing tide of the war and the general increase in German repression. Antiregime students, teachers, and administrators would have been emboldened by the uptick in
resistance activity and increase in German oppression; it is unlikely that they would have chosen
this time to stop causing problems for the regime and their local representatives on the ground,
especially since such activity had not yet been, up to that point, especially risky for most
individuals.
Another, related possibility is that fewer complaints reached the central Education
Department offices in Apeldoorn—the Education Department moved from The Hague to
Apeldoorn in March 1943—because inspectors on the ground were both initiating and handling
the investigations entirely themselves. This is certainly possible and cannot be discounted
entirely. But this theory does not account for the ways in which most complaints made it to the
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local inspectors in the first place, that is, via NSB circles, through van Genechten’s office, along
to van Dam, and down to Noordijk and the local inspectors. It seems unlikely that van Dam’s
office would have been excluded in this way. Moreover, the majority of the School Inspectorate
was never in the hands of NSB officials, and those career officials would have no reason to
exclude van Dam’s office from their investigations, especially since van Dam tended to support
their conclusions.178
A more reasonable explanation comes in the demotion of Robert van Genechten from his
position as Solicitor-General in The Hague in February 1943. While this is certainly possible, it
assumes that van Genechten was the main force behind these complaints reaching van Dam’s
office. Although it cannot be discounted entirely, it seems unlikely that victims of harassment
would give up their attempts to gain relief simply because one key advocate was no longer
employed in a specific key position. After all, many individuals made complaints through
several channels, including via the NSB, the local police, and the educational establishment more
generally, all of which continued to supply cases for investigation after van Genechten was
demoted.179
In my view, the most likely reason that complaints stop showing up in mid-1943 is
because the government was simply dealing with other matters of greater import. Noordijk’s
office and purview expanded significantly over the course of the occupation, and so he was
dealing with many other issues beyond inspecting the schools.180 The German administrators
were, by mid-1943, more worried about extracting the greatest amount of resources possible
from the Dutch populace in the name of winning the war. And of course, it is around this time
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that van Dam stopped performing anything but house maintenance at the Education
Department’s central offices.181 Schwarz’s last report to the office of the Party Chancellery in
Berlin is, although undated, also written around this time.182 It seems most likely that the
significant drop off in reports of anti-regime agitation in the schools is connected to this larger
drop off in general activity at the Education Department after its move to Apeldoorn.
Regardless of the cause in the decline in reported anti-regime agitation, however, the first
three years of German rule offer more than enough evidence that students and teachers were
unsupportive of the German occupation. Even if anti-regime activity actually declined, rather
than the reporting of such activity declining, that would certainly not mean that students and
teachers had been somehow convinced of the larger German mission or were for some reason
less antagonistic to the occupation itself. From early 1943 onward, the Nazi regime was less and
less tolerated by the Dutch public owing to the increasingly repressive nature of the occupation.
Assuming that students and teachers for some reason bucked this trend defies logic entirely.
In fact, during the occupation, anti-regime activity in schools was a widespread problem
for the German occupiers and their Dutch helpers. Although it is impossible to say for certain
what motivated most individuals to act out against the regime, the very fact that they did strongly
suggests a general antipathy towards not just the occupation itself, but also the goals the
occupiers hoped to implement. Students and teachers displayed their antipathy through a myriad
of ways, all of which combined to make the classroom an especially uncomfortable place for
supporters of the regime. By rejecting the representatives of the occupation in their local
context, students and teachers also rejected the goals of the occupation more broadly.
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In the following chapter, the focus turns back to the institutional changes the German
occupiers tried to institute in Dutch society. Unlike those “reforms” discussed in chapters four,
five, and six, however, the new initiatives were mostly reactive rather than proactive. As 1942
pressed on, the German occupiers turned to ever more repressive measures that had the dual
purpose of punishing those who engaged in resistance and providing economic support for the
German war effort, but which nonetheless had a significant effect on the education sphere. Gone
were the days in which Seyss-Inquart tried to win the “hearts and minds” of the Dutch populace.
Rather, as the war went on, the Dutch would be compelled, by force if necessary, to do the
Germans’ bidding. The nature of these newer “reforms” would cause even greater resistance on
the part of the Dutch populace, and eventually, would convince even van Dam, one of the most
strident supporters of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Dutch educational realm, to question
whether success was possible, or even desirable.
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Chapter 8 - The End of Educational Reform
Thus, the policy of the [Reichskommissar] is either fruitless in its effect, since it leads to nothing, or even fatal for us
since it must lead to a complete suppression of our people. - Jan van Dam, June 1, 19431

By mid-1943, the tenor of the German occupation of the Netherlands had significantly
changed. On the one hand, reversals in the field, especially in Eastern Europe at the hands of the
Red Army, but also in North Africa, where the Western Allies had pushed the Germans out of
Africa, followed by the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy in Summer 1943, made it
increasingly likely, even from the layman’s point of view, that the Germans would lose the war.
These reversals were a partial cause of a significant uptick in resistance activity on the part of the
Dutch populace. On the other hand, the German war effort against the Soviet Union required
ever larger extractions of materiel and labor from occupied Europe. In the Netherlands as it
related to the education sphere, this was most prominent through the increase in forced labor
drafts, which hit young Netherlanders especially hard, many students among them. Moreover,
the recall of Dutch soldiers in April 1943, which was a precursor to their interment in prisonerof-war camps in Germany, ignited the second large strike action during the German occupation.
This concluding chapter focuses on those events, mostly in late 1942 and early 1943 that
led to the end of educational reform in the Netherlands. It was during this time of unrest and
worsening repression that resulted from the disruptions to higher education because of the forced
labor drives, the general increase in resistance activity because of the changing tide in the war,
and the April/May Strike of 1943 that work at the central Education Department declined
significantly. From then on out, the majority of work done at the Department of Education
consisted of either cursory administrative work or active resistance to German goals, such as
working against the forced labor drafts of students and department officials. It is also during this
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time that van Dam even begins to actively help at least one acquaintance involved in direct
resistance activities. By this time, Van Dam appears to have lost his prior zeal for educational
“reform,” questioning whether it was possible, and if it was, whether it was desirable.2
On the German side, the activities of Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, and Schwarz in the
education realm also begin to lessen. With the exception of historical education, for which some
work does continue, the efforts of the Education Department largely stop.3 For the remainder of
the occupation, local municipalities and schools were able to continue without much interference
from the central government. And so the situation would remain until the late summer and fall
1944, when the southern portions of the country were liberated by Allied armies. Naturally, the
nature of the southern portions of the country being an active war zone caused significant
disruptions in education, and the same would happen over the rest of the country during Spring
1945 as Allied armies pushed the remaining German forces out of the Netherlands.4 Once the
Western Allies liberated the country, democratic rule returned and schools got back to the
normal process of educating the next generation.
Forced Labor
On May 23, 1941, Seyss-Inquart decreed that all young Netherlanders of both sexes were
required to register for the Nederlandsche Arbeidsdienst (NAD) where they would serve the
Dutch volk.5 The goal of the Labor Service was “educate Dutch youth in the spirit of a true
Volksgemeinschaft toward a moral sense of work and, in particular, for a respect for manual
labor.”6 Under the terms of the new decree, all Dutch youth were to register for labor service by
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the end of their eighteenth year and were liable for service until they reached twenty-five years
of age. The idea of work as an educational tool had been a justification that Seyss-Inquart had
used before. In July 1940, he stressed that much in a speech he gave in The Hague when he
argued that labor service would help educate young Netherlanders in the ideals of National
Socialism.7
The NAD was a successor to the Opbouwdienst, which Seyss-Inquart had also seen as an
educational institution.8 The Opbouwdienst dated to the very beginning of the occupation when
the new occupation authority was trying to find a way to put the recently demobilized Dutch
military back to work. Beginning in July 1940, thousands of mostly voluntary former soldiers
began working for the Opbouwdienst in various jobs such as road construction, wetland
drainage, and land reclamation. The Opbouwdienst was meant to be a temporary endeavor for
individual workers who would, in time, find regular work. And although it was not required,
pressure was put on workers to perform militarily essential tasks, such as working at German
airports—this was during the height of the Blitz when those German airports in the Netherlands
were prime military targets for British retaliation—or on coastal fortifications in Belgium and
France. Workers who were not willing to work on German military projects, and who could not
otherwise find work in the Netherlands or Germany, could not receive state benefits, which made
even the dangerous jobs in the Netherlands attractive to some.9
The Opbouwdienst, however, was a short-lived project. The following summer, SeyssInquart established the Nederlandsche Arbeidsdienst, which started with about 20,000 workers
who were simply transferred from the now-defunct Opbouwdienst. This “educational”
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institution, which was designed to instill a Greater Germanic mindset among the youth, was
originally also voluntary, but in April 1942, Seyss-Inquart, by way of the Secretary-General of
General Affairs, decreed that service in the NAD was mandatory for all persons wishing to be
appointed to public service, including teaching personnel in both public and confessional
schools, as well as any student who wanted to matriculate into higher education and currents
students who wanted to take their university exams. Those who were already employed in public
sector or in confessional education were required to perform their labor service by July 1, 1944.10
Later that year, in October 1942, service with the NAD was made mandatory for all unemployed
persons, in addition to those already required to serve. More importantly, however, instead of
simply requiring young adults who worked in schools to perform their labor service before July
1, 1944, this new order called up specific age cohorts for service at designated times, with the
first group—those born between April 1, 1922 and March 31, 1923, who would have been
nineteen and twenty at the time—to perform their service in the first six months of 1943.11
The regulations that were decreed had only minimal initial effect on the educational
sector. At first, those who worked in schools and were required to register for labor service could
delay their service period. Once the government started calling up specific age cohorts, however,
many people simply did not show up at the designated time. School heads and school boards
failed to check whether their new applicants had performed their labor service, to say nothing of
the universities, which did even less to help the NAD, so that the NAD eventually started
checking the records of schools and educational institutions themselves. Furthermore, even
Jap Schrieke, “Departement van Algemeene Zaken - Besluit van den waarnemend Secretaris-Generaal van het
Departement van Algemeene Zaken betreffende den Arbeidsdienstplicht (Arbeidsdienstplichtbesluit),”
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though there was little organized resistance to the NAD, the Department of Education, which
was the most affected department because of the nature of the regulations, did nothing in support
of the measures either, meaning that there was not much pressure on prospective applicants to
teaching positions to actually fulfill their service.12 Van Dam claimed, after the war, to have
never once done anything to help the NAD in its activities.13
Although the NAD did not have a great impact upon education, it did summon tens of
thousands of young, unemployed Netherlanders for work. Service performed for the NAD was
similar in nature to that of the Opbouwdienst. Tasks included mostly manual labor, including
agricultural work, that were meant to show young people the value of hard work in honor of their
fatherland and, in theory, win them for National Socialism and the Germanic project. And the
work was, more or less, directly in service to the Dutch nation and not the German occupier.14
So in that sense, labor service with the NAD really was in the interests of the Dutch volk, but this
changed in spring 1942, when compulsory labor service in Germany, known as the arbeidsinzet,
began.
The arbeidsinzet, or Forced Labor Service in Germany, had been the result of two
intermingling factors. First, like many of the major powers during the Great Depression of the
1930s, Nazi Germany engaged in an active attempt to reduce unemployment, and in that effort,
the Nazis experienced great success. By 1936, Germany experienced a shortage of skilled
workers which only grew as the 1930s went on, such that by mid-1938, the German government
instituted compulsory labor service. When Hitler’s armies began their conquest of Europe in
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1939, the large numbers of formerly working men who had been drafted into military service
created even larger labor shortages in the German economy, which were only exacerbated by the
German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, and their subsequent defeats during the winter of
1942-43. Those defeats led to increased military drafts and the ever-greater need for military
production, further increasing the labor shortages that were already quite prevalent in Germany’s
economy.15
The second factor was the nearly opposite situation in the Netherlands. Where the large
economies of Germany and the United States combated the depression through large scale state
intervention into the economy, the Dutch governments of the 1930s preferred to take a hands-off
approach. Thus, in 1936, when Germany was experiencing a labor shortage, unemployment in
the Netherlands was extremely high at roughly half a million workers out of a working
population of just over three million individuals. Although the Dutch government at that time did
look to Germany as a source of inspiration for combating their economic woes, little actual
policy resulted, such that, on the eve of the invasion, there were at least two hundred thousand
officially unemployed workers in the Netherlands, with perhaps a half million total unemployed.
The demobilization of another seventy thousand soldiers after the Dutch capitulation only made
matters worse.16
Already in the late 1930s, the Dutch government had toyed with the idea of sending
Dutch workers to Germany to fill out the labor shortages there and briefly even made accepting
work in Germany a condition for the continued reception of state benefits, although that policy
was reversed, in secret, in 1939. After the German occupation began, this policy of trading state
subsidies for work in Germany was re-instituted by the Dutch government of its own accord by
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simply not telling the German authorities that the policy had been abandoned in the first place. It
was the re-institution of this policy that led to the first wartime labor drafts of Dutch civilians to
work in Nazi Germany, even though such a position was, strictly speaking, illegal under Dutch
laws that were aimed at preventing the coerced use of Dutch labor on behalf of the German war
effort. Despite this coercion, the Germans’ propaganda efforts focused on the “voluntary” nature
of the work assignments in Germany.17 To the extent that unemployed Dutch workers were not
forced at the point of a gun, the “voluntary” nature of the work assignments is accurate, but the
financial coercion employed by the Dutch government and their German overseers should not be
ignored.
This changed in two ways during the spring of 1942. One the one hand, labor service
became compulsory, with shirkers threatened with arrest and imprisonment. On the other hand,
the labor drafts were no longer limited to the ranks of the unemployed, as employed workers had,
up to that point, not been shipped to Germany to work in factories, on farms, and in other
industries deemed vital to war production. These changes were a direct result of Germany’s war
effort. The German economy lost roughly six million workers between 1939 and mid-1941, the
vast majority to the German military. From mid-1941 when the Germans launched the invasion
of the Soviet Union through mid-1942, almost two million more Germans were called into
military service.18 The situation got even worse after the German defeat at Stalingrad and the
subsequent declaration of total war in early 1943, with German demands for Dutch conscript
laborers reaching into the tens of thousands of individuals per month, although they were rarely
able to meet these quotas.19
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Administratively, the Forced Labor Drafts were handled on the Dutch side through the
Generalkommissariat zur besonderen Verwendung led by Fritz Schmidt and, to a lesser extent,
by the Generalkommissariat für Finanz und Wirtschaft headed by Hans Fischböck.20 On the
German side of the equation, administration was handled by various agencies, including the
Office of the Four Year Plan, headed by Hermann Goering as well as the
Reichsarbeitsministerium,21 but in March 1942, the planning and administration of forced labor
was centralized under the auspices of Fritz Sauckel, former official in Göring’s office, Gauleiter
of Thuringia, and newly appointed Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz.22 Sauckel
would be the person who coordinated most of the efforts on the German side for the use of Dutch
forced laborers, and it would be his office that set the quotas for forced labor participation.
The forced labor draft affected the educational sphere in two ways. First among these was
the recruitment, and later forced removal, of Education Department personnel to work in
Germany. Beyond the voluntary teacher re-training seminars held in Oldenburg for teachers
looking for placement in German schools, the forced labor of workers in the education
department was not a problem until the changes implemented in spring 1942 that allowed for the
deportation of employed workers to Germany. Even here, the most heavily affected sector of the
department that was sent to Germany did not include instructors, but rather those who performed
auxiliary services, such as maintenance. For his part, van Dam was a significant defender of the
personnel in his department, complaining constantly to Schwarz, Wimmer, and even SeyssInquart about the problems that would follow if departmental personnel were sent to Germany in

20

That is, until Schmidt passed away in June 1943. He was replaced as Generalkommissar zur besonderen
Verwendung by Willi Ritterbusch, who had previously served as one of Seyss-Inquart’s Beauftragte for the Province
of North Brabant.
21
Reich Labor Ministry.
22
General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment.

429
large numbers. All of the “reforms” that had been instituted in the prior three years, he argued,
would be for naught. Moreover, given his position as Secretary-General, with its consequent
ability to mark personnel as indispensable, he was able to hold off the worst of the forced labor
drafts from affecting teachers.23 Luckily, Wimmer agreed with him, such that by the end of
1943, only twelve officials in the department had been sent to Germany in the labor service.24
In 1944, the problem of teachers being sent to Germany for forced labor became more
serious, but again, van Dam worked against the Germans in this regard. By this time, most
people who were being called up for forced labor were not reporting but rather going
underground, and this included teachers.25 But teachers going underground because they had
been called up for labor service was actually one half of the reason. Just as many, if not more,
teachers had gone underground because of the recall of former POWs in April 1943.26 Obviously,
the German authorities saw this situation of teachers going underground as untenable, but van
Dam continued to drag his feet on the matter. In February 1944, Schwarz sent a sternly worded
letter—complete with specific words underlined and the word Sofort! (immediately) written in
red and underlined twice for emphasis—to van Dam demanding to know how it was possible
that the wife of a teacher who had gone into hiding was still receiving his paycheck. Schwarz
demanded an answer within one week. Van Dam replied simply that it is an issue of inefficient
bureaucracy.27
The problem for the Dutch authorities was political in nature. On the one hand, the
inspectorate, headed by Dr. Noordijk, wanted nothing to do with the situation. He did not think it
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possible to fire such teachers, as they were using sick leave as their excuse for not working, but
because he kept getting questions on how to proceed, he simply passed the problem up the chain.
The provincial and central administrations decided that the best course of action was to turn the
matters over to the police, as this was not an appropriate task for the school inspectors.28
Therefore, van Dam turned to Schwarz and Wimmer for instructions on how to proceed. As far
as van Dam was concerned, it was not possible to characterize the situation of a teacher who had
used sick leave to go underground as having been released. Only a new governmental decree
could change that situation, and when Schwarz had ordered him in mid-June to draft such a
decree, he came up with the idea that any teacher who had been absent for more than a month
would be considered released. Schwarz was not happy with the month-long waiting period and
ordered that the period of absence be reduced to only two days, which mirrored the time frame
for other government officials who had not reported to work without any notice at all.29 The
circular was finally released on August 8, 1944; van Dam had managed to drag his feet for
almost six months. By this point, however, central control was beginning to break down. Only a
month later, the first Allied troops would enter the country.
The other way in which the Forced Labor Service affected the Education Department was
through the impressment of students, especially those in the final years of secondary education
and in higher education. The genesis of the plan to send students to Germany came from G. A.
Apitz, head of the Hauptabteilung Soziale Verwaltung30 of the Generalkommissariat für Finanz
und Wirtschaft. Sauckel’s quotas for the period of April through November 1942 had not been
met, falling short by about twenty-four thousand people, despite the fact that the number of those
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sent to Germany, roughly one hundred, five thousand, had been higher than the number sent to
Germany in all of 1941. When Sauckel’s demand for twenty-five thousand forced laborers be
sent in December, Apitz decided that he could pad the numbers with some five thousand
students.31
Apitz then informed Schwarz that six thousand students were to report for labor service
(he had increased his requirements), who suggested that the number was impossible to fulfill,
and even if it were possible, it would engender much resistance among the students, who had
formed a strong contingent of the resistance movement over the course of the year. Apitz, who
was supported by Schmidt, refused to budge, and sent his requirements directly to van Dam, this
time with a further increase in number to between six and eight thousand. Although van Dam
protested to Schwarz, arguing that only graduated students should be sent to Germany, his
objections were set aside, even though he was able to obtain some minor concessions.32 Instead
of reporting for labor service on the nineteenth of December, the students destined for the
arbeidsinzet could stay in the Netherlands until after the Christmas holidays, their labor service
was promised to be no longer than one year, and they were to be installed in locations that made
the further pursuit of their studies during their year in Germany feasible. Regardless of the
concessions, however, the forced labor draft would mean that the total number of Dutch students
studying in higher education in the Netherlands would be cut roughly in half.33
With the concessions in hand, van Dam assembled the heads of the various universities
and informed them of the situation, against which all of the university leaders, save one,
strenuously objected. But their objections did little good, as the Germans were intent on
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following through with the policy. They left their December 9 meeting with van Dam without
having gotten any real answers about their concerns and were instructed to keep quiet about the
coming labor drafts. How exactly, the news got out is uncertain, given the large number of
individuals privy to the otherwise secret information, but it did get out quickly.34 The Council of
Nine, an umbrella organization that coordinated student resistance at the nine Dutch institutions
of higher education, called for student strikes, many of which occurred, but none of which had a
centralized leadership and so all fizzled out. On Saturday December 12, van Dam sent telegrams
to the various universities asking for the names and addresses of students, so that he could
forward them to the appropriate authorities. That evening, however, the student registry at
Utrecht went up in flames. The following Monday, Schmidt gave in. He had not expected the
level of resistance to the labor draft that had occurred, and informed Apitz and van Dam that the
labor draft would not be possible.35
In early February 1943, a pair of attacks against NSB collaborators spurred the Germans
back into action. The first was a deadly attack against Hendrik Seyffardt, a General in the Dutch
Army and member of Mussert’s newly established shadow cabinet. Two resistance fighters, the
communist neurologist Dr. Gerrit Kastein and a university student named Jan Verleun, looked up
Seyffardt’s address in the local telephone book, went to his house on the evening of Friday,
February 5 and simply rang the bell. Seyffardt, who was home alone, answered the door and was
greeted with two bullets to the stomach. He died the following day, but not before reporting that
the perpetrators of the attack against him had been students. On February 7, Kastein carried out
another attack against H. Reydon, the successor to the recently dismissed Dr. Tobie
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Goedewaagen as Secretary-General of the Department of People’s Enlightenment and Arts.
Kastein had located Reydon in Voorschoten, a small town between Leiden and The Hague, and
upon approaching him, shot both Reydon and his wife. Reydon survived the assassination
attempt, but his wife did not. Kastein fled to an unknown location where the police could not
find him, but after a member of his resistance cell was compromised, he was picked up by the
Sicherheitsdienst on February 19 in Rotterdam. He was taken back to The Hauge to be
interrogated, but instead of submitting himself to the brutal interrogation methods of the SS, he
jumped through a closed window, fracturing his skull on the pavement below. He died within
hours.36
As a result of the attack on Seyffardt, the Germans conducted razzia raids in Amsterdam,
Delft, Utrecht, and Wageningen on February 6 that netted about six hundred students and sent
them to the concentration camp at Vught.37 Then, on February 9 an even larger razzia raid in
Amsterdam netted about twelve hundred young people, most of whom were university students,
but some who were also secondary school students.38 They too were sent to Vught. Although
the Germans had netted just under two thousand students, the plan had been much greater. In
meetings with Seyss-Inquart, Rauter, and Schmidt, the discussion had been to arrest as many as
five thousand young people, and possibly to execute fifty on the spot, even if those fifty could
not be directly connected to resistance activity. Luckily, Seyss-Inquart, with the help of more
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level-headed German officials, came to his senses and recognized that such drastic measures
would be counterproductive.39
As a result of the raids, many students simply stopped going to school, given the danger
of collecting so many students in a single place.40 If it was not the danger of being collected for
forced labor, it was the danger of being arrested in German reprisals. Which factor most students
thought more dangerous is difficult to determine, but regardless, such a situation was impossible
to endure, even for the German leadership. As a result, on February 17, 1943, Seyss-Inquart
released a circular stating that those young men under eighteen years of age and those older
students who were engaged in serious study would not be called up for the arbeidsinzet. When
some students continued to receive calls to report, Seyss-Inquart issued a second circular on the
matter in March, exempting all secondary school students from forced labor, but also ordered
that students who were nineteen years old needed to take their school exit exams, regardless of
whether they were otherwise prepared. Even more students responded by going underground.41
The Loyalty Declaration
Although the Germans had been somewhat successful in collecting and deporting
workers, many of whom were students, for labor in Germany, the goals they had set were almost
never met. Their most effective actions had been razzia raids collecting students off the street.
While some students did, indeed, report when called, they were a small minority. Many more
responded to the summons by going underground. Thus, already by early 1943, Seyss-Inquart
was at an impasse. His superiors in the Reich were demanding quotas of young Netherlanders to
work, but try as he might, those young Netherlanders would not answer the calls. He could not
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allow that situation to continue. Moreover, university life had been nearly shut down by the
February razzias, and this threatened to cause political problems for Seyss-Inquart if Rauter and
Harster were able to assert themselves vis-à-vis Seyss-Inquart by arguing that students were a
significant portion of the resistance. This might, Seyss-Inquart rightly feared, allow the two SS
men to refer the entire question of universities and student labor over to the German security
forces.42
In order to help solve the problem, van Dam returned to his request from the previous
December—to force students who had completed their studies to join the Forced Labor Service
while keeping still enrolled students free of such obligations. According to van Dam, this had
several benefits. First and foremost, it would reduce the ongoing student insurrection. But it
would also, hopefully, provide a steady stream of graduating students for labor in Germany, and
even better, workers who might actually be qualified to perform the work to which they were
assigned, instead of students who were, at best, still in training. He granted that the roughly two
thousand students who would complete their studies each year was a far cry from the five
thousand which Sauckel had been demanding, but it was, nonetheless, better than no students at
all, and the German war economy needed all of the labor it could get.43 At the same time, van
Dam suggested two further regulations aimed at preventing too many students from using further
university study from delaying their labor service in Germany: the loyalty declaration and a
general numerus clausus limiting the total number of students who were allowed to attend
university in any given year.44
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By this point, A. A. Mussert, leader of the NSB, had been declared by Hitler as the Leider
of the Dutch nation. Although it was a mostly meaningless gesture, it did give him the ability to
insert himself into the internal deliberations at the Reichskommissariat. He wasted no time in
doing so and used this opportunity to try and strike a blow against his nemesis van Dam (van
Dam was one of many Mussert nemeses). Because he had not been consulted, or even informed,
about the razzias against the students that took place on February 6 and 9, Seyss-Inquart was
forced to allow Mussert a seat at the table regarding the loyalty declaration. Where van Dam had
wanted to limit the loyalty declaration to students alone, Mussert hoped to not only force
students to sign the loyalty declaration, but also hoped to require professors sign along with
them. Furthermore, he wanted to insert language that forbade any actions by students that went
against the NSB and its student organization. Finally, he wanted to expand the powers of the
university curators and rectors. The former would be able to suspend instructors and the latter to
suspend students for up to a year, where they had previously been limited to suspensions lasting
a single week. Van Dam opposed all of these insertions, save the increased power of the
university rectors and curators. Van Dam asked Wimmer to intercede on his behalf, which
Wimmer did. In the end, van Dam’s position held; the Leider was totally defeated.45
The second week of March, the government made public two decrees that followed the
intent and purpose of van Dam’s recommendations. The first regarded the arbeidsinzet and was
issued directly by Seyss-Inquart. “In order to guarantee, on the one hand, total commitment,
including academic youth, to the European fight against Bolshevism and, on the other hand,
sufficient academic talent,” the Secretary-General in the Department of Education is empowered
to implement a numerus clauses in all areas of university education.46 University students who
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had completed their exit examinations were required to work in the arbeidsinzet for a specified
period of time, provided they did not receive a reprieve from either the Secretary-General of the
Education Department or from the same in the Department of Social Affairs. The second decree,
which was issued by van Dam himself, detailed the new authorities of university rectors and
curators, including their increased ability to suspend students, as well as made mandatory the
signing of the loyalty declaration. The loyalty declaration declared only that the undersigned
would follow the appropriate laws, decrees, and governmental regulations; would not engage or
support resistance acts against the German Reich, Wehrmacht, or Dutch government such that
would endanger the peace and order in the universities.47 Three days later, on March 16, the
majority of the students who had been interned at Vught were set free.
The declaration itself had been rather reserved in nature. It had called only for the signers
to refrain from engaging in anti-German activities to the extent that they would disrupt the
universities. Moreover, he required only that students sign it “every year.” This latter point had
the effect of pushing the requirement to sign the declaration into the winter semester of 1943/44.
But without his knowledge, the Germans inserted a clause into the decree that stated, “every
year, for the first time one month after this regulation goes into effect…” This meant that the
first students were required to sign the loyalty declaration within a month of the order going into
effect in order to keep studying.48 Van Dam had been too clever by half.
In a radio speech to the Dutch nation, van Dam declared that signing the declaration did
not mean that students would automatically, voluntarily register for the arbeidsinzet after they
Ibid., 28/1943. The full declaration reads: “De onderteekende ……, geboren ……, te …… wonende te ……,
verklaart hiermede plechtig, dat hij de in het bezette Nederlandsche gebied geldende wetten, verordeningen en
andere beschikkingen naar eer en geweten zal nakomen en zich zal onthouden van iedere tegen het Duitsche Rijk, de
Duitsche Weermacht of de Nederlandsche autoriteiten gerichte handeling, zoomede van handelingen en
gedragingen, welke de openbare orde aan de inrichtingen van hooger onderwijs, gezien de vigeerende
omstandigheden, in gevaar brengen.”
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completed their studies. The order requiring participation in the Forced Labor Service had been
released by Seyss-Inquart and was completely separate from the loyalty declaration decree issued
by van Dam himself. Even the dates on which the two decrees had been released were different
(by a single day).49 Van Dam further argued that the loyalty declaration had only two purposes:
the maintenance of peace and order in the universities and the guarantee that students would be
able to complete their studies. In contrast to the fears of many students, the loyalty decree would,
if signed before the deadline of April 10, prevent signers from being shipped to Germany, not
cause it, or so he argued. As was by this point nearly formulaic, van Dam ended his address by
appealing to the listeners’ sense of patriotism: “It is up to you to show whether you will answer
these attempts with understanding for our intentions and an attitude, which better than anything
negative, witnesses to a truly sophisticated patriotism that is elevated above the influences of the
day!”50
Regardless of van Dam’s efforts to make the loyalty declaration palatable to students and
convince them that it was in their best interest to sign it, the Council of Nine advised students to
refuse to sign the declaration, and their advice was taken to heart. Only about thirteen per cent of
students signed the declaration at all by the deadline, with rates varying from university to
university, with some student bodies effectively refusing to sign en masse.51 Rates increased
only slightly after the deadline.52 On the other hand, the loyalty declaration was quickly
overshadowed by the strike events of late April and early May, during which Rauter decreed that
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anyone who had not signed the loyalty declaration by May 5 were required to sign up for the
arbeidsinzet—about three thousand of the students did just that.53
As a result of the low rates of signing the loyalty declaration, the universities in Tilburg,
Utrecht, Groningen and Nijmegen, as well as the Free University of Amsterdam were all closed.
The German security forces rounded up thousands of students who had not signed the loyalty
declaration and sent them to Germany as part of the arbeidsinzet. Thousands more went
underground. Although most of the closed universities were reopened shortly, they proved
almost empty of students.54 In March 1944, van Dam sent a letter to Wimmer describing the
general state of affairs in higher education. He noted that although there had been disturbances
among the students in the 1943/44 school year, they had not been as bad as the previous year.
More problematic was the loss of both students and teachers to the arbeidsinzet. On the other
hand, too many teachers were going underground, using sick leave as the pretense. Nor were
there enough vacancies to fill those positions left unoccupied. As van Dam put it, “the machine
cannot be put back into gear.”55 Although higher education would struggle through the final year
of the war, it was a shadow of its former self. This was made worse by the fact that the
Netherlands in fall 1944 and spring 1945 was turned, quite literally, into a war zone, as Allied
and German forces fought for control of the crucial Rhine river crossings. Across all of the
universities in the Netherlands, these various factors would combine to keep total enrollments to
less than two thousand students, when the university student population had traditionally hovered
around sixteen thousand annually.56 The machine was indeed completely broken.
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By this point in the occupation, van Dam seems to have grown weary of the Germans. He
had not been a fan of the NIVO but did not actively work against it. The same could be said for
the Reichsschulen. He had opposed most of the anti-Jewish measures, along with the rest of the
Dutch bureaucracy, but again did not entirely stand in the way of the Germans’ efforts in that
realm, although he was instrumental in saving a small group of about 700 Jewish Netherlanders,
by working along with his colleague Karel Frederiks, the Secretary-General of the Department of
Internal Affairs. The two of them had interceded with Seyss-Inquart to save a number of notable
individuals who were, for various reasons, deemed significant to Dutch culture. Compared to the
many points on which van Dam had agreed with the Germans’ policies, or indeed been an
originator of such policies, these few instances of resistance are outliers. The loyalty decree,
which was van Dam’s last real attempt at implementing major policy, had been an effort to
forestall the worst of the Germans’ actions against students, but it was largely ineffective in this
purpose, since so few students were willing to sign it. With the imposition of forced labor, the
razzia raids against students, their internment in concentration camps, and other elements of
increased repression against the Dutch populace, van Dam began working, more or less, against
the ultimate goals of the Reichskommissariat.
The April/May Strike
The loyalty declaration, which had been devised as a way to both maintain order in the
universities as well as increase enrollments in the arbeidsinzet, had been an abject failure. But
while the situation in higher education had led to massive resistance efforts on the part of the
students, it did not disrupt the entire country in the same way that the recall of POWs would. The
very fact that POWs could be recalled was due to an order that Hitler had given the German High
Command in the Netherlands shortly after the armistice in May 1940 to release the members of
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the Dutch military back into civilian life. Hitler, of course, wanted to show the Dutch that he was
looking out for their best interests, but at the same time, forced the soldiers to sign a loyalty
declaration stating that they would not engage in anti-German activities.57 Contrary to what
Hitler might have hoped, however, the former soldiers would, in many cases, not adhere to either
the letter or spirit of their pledges.
The process of recalling former soldiers included two stages. The first came in May 1942,
when, under orders directly from Hitler, the Germans began considering the recall of the officer
cohort of the Dutch military. The reason for this recall was simple. Many Germans officials
believed, not incorrectly, that the Dutch Army contained within its ranks important members of
the resistance movement that had been picking up steam over the previous months.58 Career
officers, with their training and organizational abilities, would be essential to the resistance
movement, and so in order to crush resistance, it would be necessary to remove the military
leadership from the scene. So, on May 9, at the behest of Luftwaffe General Friedrich
Christiansen, the commander of German military forces in the Netherlands, former career
military officers, cadet officers, and officers of the Dutch Army in the Dutch East Indies who
were under the age of fifty-five, were ordered to report to various barracks throughout the
country precisely at 2pm on May 15. No reason was given for the order.59 However, two days
later, the Commissariat for the Interests of the former Dutch Army, a section of the Dutch
Department of Defense that had been re-established under German orders to look after the well-

57

De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, VI/791.
Warmbrunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation, 56.
59
“Tweede verplichte bijeenkomst ter controle van de voormalige Nederlandsche weermacht,” Leeuwarder
Courant, May 9, 1942, Day edition.
58

442
being of former soldiers, posted announcements that those officers required to report to barracks
would be eligible for reimbursement of their traveling costs, both to and from their destinations.60
But there was no return home for these soldiers as they were all promptly arrested and
sent to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany. Two days later, Christiansen made clear their
reasoning: “Members of the former Dutch Army have participated to a significant extent in all
kinds of hostile acts against Germany. Among them were a considerable number of officers and
aspiring officers … [who] had broken their word.” Moreover, in case the stakes were not clear
enough, the notice went on to threaten non-commissioned officers and reserve officers with
future arrest should former soldiers continue further anti-German sabotage actions and general
resistance.61 Although some career officers had seen the writing on the wall and did not report to
the barracks on May 15, they were a small minority. The vast majority of those who reported,
over two thousand career military officers from both the army and the navy, were arrested,
although some exceptions were made, such as for members of the NSB, the weerafdeling, and
those who had actively collaborated with the Reichskommissariat in some form or fashion.62
Although there were some protests at the train stations as the officers were led away, given the
secretive nature of the events, those protests were only attended by people who had happened to
be there at that time, making them small in nature and easily controllable.
The underground newspaper Het Parool reacted to the arrest of the career officers with
its characteristically sharp tongue. Noting that the officers had been arrested for failing to honor
the pledges they had been forced to sign in May 1940, the paper wrote: “The way in which this
was done, of course in the lowest, worst way, shows again that the occupying power does not
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know what is meant by ‘soldier’s honor.’” The paper went on to note that the entire reason these
career officers had been released in the first place was not, as the Germans had declared, out of a
friendly belief in the racial kinship between the two peoples, but rather because they had hoped
that they would be able to “shackle the Dutch volk, in its entirety, into a Germanic front, with the
chance then that our Dutch officers could be taken up into the German Wehrmacht.”63
The second stage of the POW recall occurred almost a year later, in late April 1943, when
the German high command called for the re-internment of the 300,000 members of the Dutch
military. But given the underhanded way in which the arrest of the officer corps had proceeded,
even the German High Command in the Netherlands could not have expected to be able to repeat
the process so easily. When Christiansen released his decree, he did not mince his words. The
soldiers of the Dutch Army would be sent away to POW camps and had “only to thank the
instigators who have made this action necessary by their criminal behavior.”64 Despite his
statements that the reason for the POW recall was a punishment, that was only half the reason.
Himmler had imagined the recall of Dutch soldiers as a new reserve labor force for German
industry.65 Regardless of the motives, however, just as Christiansen had been less reserved in his
decree, the population was considerably less reserved in its reaction.
Christiansen’s decree was transmitted to the newspapers the morning of Thursday, April
29. In the town of Hengelo, near the German border, the director of a printing company with ties
to the local newspaper decided not to wait for the decree to hit the papers and instead to print
large copies of the proclamation that very morning and hang them as placards in the street-facing
windows of his printing shop. The shop itself happened to be located on a street located near
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several large factories, which resulted in large numbers of workers seeing the placards during the
morning shift changes.66 Word of the recall of POWs spread quickly from there to neighboring
towns in the region as workers returned home from the overnight shift and informed their
friends, colleagues, and neighbors. The reaction was nearly unanimous among the local
population, which turned to the greatest weapon they had to protest the Germans’ actions—a
general strike. By midday, of the forty-one major factories in the Twente region, twenty-eight
were already closed as more than twenty thousand workers took to the streets. And all of this was
before the newspapers had even published Christiansen’s decree.67
The German reaction to the events in Twente was immediate but hampered by SeyssInquart’s absence from the country—he was visiting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden at that very
moment. Hanns Albin Rauter, the Higher SS and Police Leader and Generalkommissar for
Security Matters in the Netherlands took the lead.68 The plan had been, since after the February
1941 strike, to declare martial law, but only the Reichskommissar could give that order. This had
been officially implemented by order of the Reichskommissar in early 1943, which allowed him
to suspend the regular courts and establish police courts, which would preside over little more
than show trials.69 Because he was unreachable in Berchtesgaden—Rauter tried to call SeyssInquart, but could not reach him—Rauter instead ordered SS police regiments into service and
sent them to Twente with orders to await the declaration of martial law and then, when it came,
to start shooting into any crowds they came across. There would be no arrests and certainly no
trials.70 At some point during the night of Thursday into Friday, Seyss-Inquart got word of the
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unrest in Twente and immediately took a train back toward the Netherlands. In the meantime, he
granted the order for martial law in those areas in which strikes had broken out.71
By the morning of Friday, April 30, the news of the POW recall had spread to the rest of
the country, along with rumors of all sorts, including the imminent invasion of the Allies. Strikes
broke out almost everywhere that morning, and those places that remained calm in the morning
joined in the strikes that afternoon. Rauter called into service all of the SS battalions and German
police battalions that were stationed in the country. He then ordered placards be hung in various
locales throughout the nation declaring martial law and warning citizens that any groups of five
or more individuals congregating on the street or in market squares would be shot on sight. In
many places the German police did just that, killing about ninety-five people over the next few
days. At the same time, they also arrested hundreds, put them in front of police courts, and
“tried” the defendants. In most cases, the defendants were convicted in these summary courts and
sentenced to death. The sentences were usually carried out immediately, although, since this was
mostly meant as a scare tactic, clemency was offered in some cases, especially if other strikers
agreed to go back to work.72 Also on Friday, the Dutch government in exile in London had gotten
news of the POW recall, and through the BBC’s Radio Oranje broadcasts, argued that the
recalled soldiers simply not show up at the appointed time. If necessary, they should go
underground. But because their sources of information were limited—they learned of the POW
recall through a Swiss newspaper—the Queen and her ministers were not aware of the strikes
breaking out across the country.
Over the weekend, the pace of the protests slowed down considerably, hampered by that
fact that the 30,000 members of the Dutch railway service stayed on the job and did not join the
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strike at all.73 The railways had not had a long history of striking and their refusal to join the
strike actions of the rest of the population allowed both for the effective deployment of German
police units throughout the country as well as for those individuals who did not want to join in
the strike to continue to go to work. By Monday, many of the strikers who had joined in the
protests on Friday and over the weekend went back to work, leaving only a hardened core of
strikers on the streets, who made easy prey for the German security forces. In some areas, the
strike actions continued throughout the rest of the week, but these were mostly isolated stretches
of the countryside; the major, nation-wide strike ended on Monday.74 Over the course of the five
days, hundreds of people were arrested, with over a hundred sentenced to death for participating
in the strikes, although some of those sentences were commuted. At least ninety-five had been
shot on the streets without even being arrested.75
The April/May Strike of 1943, in many ways, marked the very end of any attempts by the
Germans to be accommodating to the desires of the Dutch population, and, for that reason, is
usually cited as a major turning point in the occupation.76 It was clear, even to the occupation
authorities, that the Dutch would not be won over to Nazism, but would resist in any way
possible. Moreover, the entire impetus for the strike, the recall of the POWs, had been an abject
failure. The overwhelming majority of former soldiers simply went underground and did not
report for arrest. Between former soldiers and students, as well as the tens of thousands of Jewish
individuals who were in hiding, the Netherlands was a nation in open rebellion against the
demands and desires of their German occupiers. In response to this fact, but also as a result of the
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ever-worsening war situation, which saw the Soviets both gaining strength and repelling German
attacks in the east, the Germans turned to outright repression in the occupied Netherlands, intent
on extracting as many resources as possible, whether capital or human, in order to save their
teetering empire.77
Forced Labor, continued
By mid-1943, the Forced Labor Draft as a whole stopped being an entirely effective tool
for the Germans. German attempts at registering the Dutch population for labor in Germany had
mostly been a failure, whether through resistance of the Dutch bureaucracy and Dutch industry
or through the efforts of the Dutch Resistance to destroy successfully compiled records. To make
matters worse for the Germans, most Netherlanders went into hiding when called up for labor
service, so even if the Germans could successfully compile and maintain accurate records, it did
them little good. Although the Germans continued to attempt to register Dutch workers and force
them to go to Germany, their efforts were faltering greatly. In the first seven months of 1943,
roughly 118,000 Netherlanders had been successfully sent to Germany for forced labor, for an
average of just over 16,000 workers per month. In August, that number dropped to just over
9,300, while in September it fell further to about 4,400, and fell again in October to just over
3,000. Between November 1943 and July 1944, on average, just over 2,000 workers were
deported monthly to Germany for forced labor.78
In the summer 1944, there was a short hiatus in the forced labor draft, but by the autumn
and winter of that year, the labor drafts picked up again, and in even greater numbers than ever.79
Because fewer and fewer Netherlanders were actually reporting for labor service when called,
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whether by going underground or feigning illness, the Germans resorted to razzia raids to collect
men on the streets and from their homes.80 Between September and December 1944, at least
120,000 Dutch laborers were deported for work in Germany, including an astounding 50,000
who were rounded up in the city of Rotterdam over two days in early November.81 By this point
in the occupation, however, the dynamics of the war had changed significantly. The Germans
were in open retreat on all fronts and forced laborers from the Netherlands were no longer being
put to work in factories or on farms, but rather doing the grunt work of military fortification in
advance of the impending Allied onslaught.82 Indeed, the first Allied troops reached the city of
Maastricht, in the far south of the country in mid-September, liberating it on September 15,
1944.
Two days after the liberation of that city, as the Germans and Allies were engaged in a
heated battle over Rhine river bridge crossings at the city of Arnhem as part of Operation Market
Garden, the Dutch government-in-exile in London ordered Dutch railway workers to strike in an
effort to keep reinforcements and supplies from reaching the German forces there.83 Although the
Dutch railway workers dutifully carried out the orders and successfully shut down the Dutch
railway system, the German defenders managed to hold off the Allied advance. The German
reprisals for the railway strike were unimaginably harsh. Seyss-Inquart, who was never a
supporter of the forced labor drafts because of the instability they caused among the Dutch
populace, threw caution to the wind and ordered a complete cessation of food imports to the stilloccupied and heavily-populated western provinces.84 The forced famine that resulted, known as
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the Hunger Winter, resulted in the death of about twenty thousand Netherlanders over the next
several months.
It is difficult to say how many Netherlanders in total were deported to Germany for
forced labor for several reasons. First, not all labor contracts were indefinite, and many Dutch
workers ended up being sent to Germany multiple times and being counted more than once as a
result. Further, many workers escaped the forced labor service illegally, especially those who
were sent to work just across the German border and for whom escape back into the Netherlands
would have been relatively simple. Finally, an untold number of workers died in Germany,
further throwing off the statistics. A rough estimate, taking these factors into consideration
would be that somewhat more than 550,000 Netherlanders—out of a total Dutch population of
about nine million—were sent to Germany to work at some point during the war.85
By all accounts, the increase in the use of forced labor was problematic for van Dam
specifically, especially as the forced labor drives began to disrupt the educational sphere he
oversaw.86 The Loyalty Declaration would turn out to be van Dam’s last major effort to initiate
occupation policy, and it was a failure. The month of March 1943, when the Loyalty Declaration
was issued, marked another important milestone for the department—the move to Apeldoorn in
the interior of the country. Although the move itself likely had little to do with van Dam’s
declining interest in the aims of the German occupiers, it does correspond mostly with that
apparent change in van Dam’s views, and therefore, in many ways, marks the end of educational
reform efforts during the occupation.
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Van Dam and the End of Educational Reform
On August 19, 1942, British, Canadian, and American forces launched a small-scale raid
on the French port town of Dieppe. The purpose of the raid was to gather intelligence about
coastal fortifications in “Fortress Europe.” The raid was never meant to establish a lasting
beachhead in Europe, but rather to test the defenses the Germans had devised. Ultimately, the
raid itself was an immense failure, with several thousand Allied casualties and a retreat back to
England on the very same day. Although from a military-strategic perspective the raid had failed,
it did have consequences throughout German-occupied Western Europe. One of those
consequences was the removal of most Dutch government offices from The Hague, which lies
along the Atlantic coast in the southwestern Netherlands, to the interior of the country.87
Although the planning and execution of the move took some time to accomplish, the Education
Department finally moved offices to the central city of Apeldoorn in late March 1943.88
The move to Apeldoorn, in many ways, signified the end of any concerted effort at
educational “reform” on the part of the German occupiers and their Dutch helpers. Rather, for
the rest of the war, the Germans focused on further implementing those changes in Dutch
education that had already been introduced, or in the case of historical instruction, conceived of.
But the German leadership did this without much success.89 It was also around this time that van
Dam appears to have lost all motivation to carry out further attempts to work in support of those
objectives. In the realm of higher education, the arbeidsinzet and the loyalty decree had wreaked
havoc across the nation. Those universities that were still open were open almost in name only,
given the lack of both instructors and students. Moreover, the rectors and curators of the
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universities had lost all confidence in van Dam’s ability to act in the best interest of the nation.
His influence in higher education was completely shot.
In primary and secondary education, his status was not much better. The introduction of
the eighth school year of primary education had to be pushed back a second time in summer
1943, and, as a result, would not be implemented at all. His attempts to increase the influence of
the state, especially in the confessional schools, were met with significant and effective
resistance. The Catholic and Protestant school associations were, for all intents and purposes,
still de facto independent of the central government and the attempts by van Dam, the Germans,
or their other collaborators to control them met with failure, despite the de jure control they had
attained. The arbeidsinzet continued to cause problems for teachers in the lower schools as well,
and van Dam had to spend much of his time attempting to get exemptions for teachers and
secondary school students from the forced labor drives, all in an effort to simply keep the schools
running. In many ways, van Dam’s efforts in Apeldoorn were just holding actions to keep the
department running and to prevent the education system in the country from collapsing entirely.
It was also in mid-1943 that van Dam appears to have undergone a personal change of
opinion regarding National Socialism and the German occupation more generally. In a draft
letter, intended probably for Wimmer, with whom he was acquainted on a friendly basis, he
criticized the inefficiency and corruption of National Socialism, including the Germans. SeyssInquart’s policies were pointless as they did not do not lead anywhere, and if they did lead
somewhere, that usually ended up being the repression of the Dutch people. The Dutch were
simply too individualistic to accept a political ideology such as Nazism, which was too
complicated, often contradictory, and sometimes outright random in its efforts and effects.90 It is

90

Ibid., 284.

452
unclear whether the letter was ever sent, but its contents nonetheless reveal van Dam’s state of
mind at the time.
Moreover, van Dam also started to tangentially participate in the resistance. An old
acquaintance of his from his days as a military reservist lived in Apeldoorn and van Dam, who
was granted a car and chauffeur for his personal and professional use, routinely picked up the
man’s wife on his way to and from the office. While he likely did not know, at first, that this
woman was a courier for the resistance movement in Apeldoorn, he did eventually learn the truth
yet far from doing anything to sabotage the woman’s efforts, he instead put his car and chauffeur
at her disposal.91 Furthermore, it was during his time in Apeldoorn that van Dam’s greatest and
most far reaching efforts to save the roughly 700 Jewish Netherlanders deemed to be culturally
significant took place, although those efforts had started in the latter part of 1942.
At the same time, however, van Dam did not discard his affinity for German culture, nor
did he renounce his membership in the SS. While in Apeldoorn, he continued to expend
significant effort on his publication De Waagschaal, which continued to appear until August
1944. But this focus on extra-departmental activities was somewhat of a common occurrence in
Apeldoorn. Other departmental officials spent their time writing plays and doing other non-jobrelated activities.92 But otherwise, for the most part, work at the department in Apeldoorn came
to a standstill.93
Unsurprisingly, this situation led some of van Dam’s adversaries to use his waning efforts
on behalf of the German occupation against him. Jap Schrieke, who attempted to blame his own
failures regarding the prosecution of confessional school boards who had defied the appointment
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decree is one such example. The NSB declared him “Public Enemy Nr. 1” due to the “the
untenable state of the department of education due to the impossible attitude of van Dam” and
attempted to have him sacked from his office.94 Hanns Albin Rauter, the Generalkommissar für
das Sicherheitswesen and Higher SS and Police Leader in the Netherlands, complained to SeyssInquart about several alleged offenses van Dam had committed, including helping to save Jews,
and defending a man who had murdered a Dutch police man (van Dam was acquainted with the
murderer’s father, and appears to have intervened on the father’s behalf).95 Dr. Harster, the head
of the security police and SD in the Hague attempted to work against him as well. The SS
magazine Storm declared that the Department was “the strongest crutch of confessionalism” and
that “its leaders covered for those whose lack of belief is well known.”96 But despite these
efforts, van Dam retained the confidence of those most important to his position within the
Education Department and his personal well-being: Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, and Schwarz.
In his final report to the Party Chancellery on November 23, 1943, Schwarz listed a
number of “radical measures” for which he thought van Dam’s support had been necessary.97
The right of confessional schools to appoint their own teachers had been revoked and could only
proceed with the approval of the Secretary-General, and therefore also of his direct superior,
Schwarz. The state gained the authority to determine the curriculum and to punish financially
those schools that did not comply. In this way, Mein Kampf was introduced in secondary schools,
physical education in primary schools, and German propaganda school films in both. The state
was also able to dismiss teachers and school heads as necessary, which it was able to accomplish
through the appointment of a school inspector in general service, whose office was filled with
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Greater-Germanic thinkers. By using these authorities, the position of the confessions could be
broken, especially through the closing of confessional teacher training colleges, the removal of
clerical school heads, and the reduction of clerical teaching salaries. The school inspectorate had
been filled with Dutch Nazis of a Greater Germanic mindset, while Jewish children had been
removed from the schools. Parity between the German Schools in the Netherlands and Dutch
schools was achieved, as was the introduction of German language instruction in primary
education and an increased emphasis placed upon German language in secondary education.
Becoming a German instructor was made more appealing by freeing them from the
Arbeitseinsatz as well as exempting them from arrest as POWs. These new German language
teachers were trained in SS schools and were opened to the Germanic ideal. Twelve thousand
school books were “cleansed” and those that were anti-German or written by Jews were removed
from circulation. And a school history book on the Germanics as well as a new book for German
language instruction in the primary schools were both introduced. As Schwarz put it regarding
van Dam, “despite some relapses into a false sense of humanism, on the whole, he has proved
himself.”98
Van Dam would stay in the position of Secretary-General until the end of the war. In
March 1945, he moved back to Amsterdam, shortly before Apeldoorn was liberated by Allied
armies. On May 7, he was suspended by the Minister of Education and five days later, he was
arrested by Dutch Resistance fighters. He would spend the next four years, to the day, in various
prisons. Over the course of the winter and spring of 1946, a parliamentary commission was
established to look into his activities during the occupation. The commission established that he
had mostly acted as a mouth-piece for the German occupiers, helped them carry out their plans,
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but also had, for the most part, done his best to serve the interests of the Dutch nation. The
commission, however, did not have all of the facts in front of them, especially the Gedanken und
Vorschläge and Reform pieces, which spelled out his part in initiating many of the “reforms” he
later attempted to blame on the Germans. But also working in van Dam’s favor were his various
actions toward the end of the war, such as his role in saving Jewish Netherlanders, his work
against forced labor, and his model status as a prisoner after the war. Despite the commission’s
report, however, he was not freed. In 1948, after several years’ wait, he was put on trial for his
actions in support of the German occupiers, for which he was found guilty and sentenced to
seven years’ imprisonment on November 8, 1948. Through several interventions, including
Cardinal De Jong, as well as a Royal commutation (which was given to many prisoners, not just
van Dam), he was eventually freed on May 12, 1949. Although he attempted to reenter
professional service, those doors were closed to the former professor. He lived out the rest of his
life in relative obscurity working odd jobs in the educational field and as an editor to make ends
meet. He died on October 30, 1979, aged 83 years.99
His work during the German occupation is somewhat of a mixed bag, although certainly
not nearly as clean as was judged by either the parliamentary commission or at his trial. Without
question, many of the “reforms” that the Germans instituted during the occupation were actually
his ideas. In fact, it was in light of these ideas that he was chosen in the first place over van
Genechten.100 Van Dam proposed the introduction of German language and physical education
long before he was in a position to carry out those “reforms.” Van Dam proposed the curtailing
of clerical authority; indeed, his initial proposal went further than the “reform” eventually
adopted in 1941. Van Dam argued long before he was appointed that the influence of the state
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needed to be increased and that education must be given in a national sense.101 In those areas of
school “reform” with which he did not agree, he was nonetheless a willing tool of the German
occupier, although the same could be said of both van Poelje and Reinink.102
His motivations for his actions remain equally suspect and ambiguous. He stated both
during the war and after that he was only looking out for the best interests of the Dutch people.103
There is no reason to believe that van Dam himself did not believe that was the case. But it does
beg the question, what, exactly, he thought those best interests were. Long before the war started,
he had been fascinated by Germany and German culture. Already in the 1930s, he had moved in
völkisch circles in the Netherlands and had been a leader within that movement, which was
capped off with his joining the SS in September 1941. Once the war broke out, he argued over
and over and over again that the future of the Dutch people lay with the German Reich. That
future was one in which Germany would be the leading force in Europe and it was, therefore, in
the best interests of the Dutch people to ally itself with Germany, to be a partner in the future
Germanic Reich that the Germans were attempting to build. Although it does appear that van
Dam did not believe the Dutch would have a choice in the matter—he was convinced, as so
many others were especially in the early days of the conflict, that the Germans would win the
war and become the undisputed masters of Europe—his belief in the inevitability of German
victory does not negate his predilection for the type of society that the Germans were hoping to
build. If anything, they were mutually reinforcing. The inevitability of German victory
confirmed his own beliefs in, and affinity for, German culture and the German people.
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Conclusion
The efforts of the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators to create a new type of
education in the Netherlands were largely a failure. The German occupiers had entered the
country with the express goal of winning over the Dutch populace for National Socialism in
order to eventually incorporate the Netherlands into a Greater Germanic Reich. In the
educational sector, as Schwarz outlined, this process flowed along two paths: a direct path
through German educational institutions like the German International Schools and the
Reichsschulen and an indirect path through Dutch schools. Both paths proved unsuccessful
avenues for the creation of a new Dutch national and cultural identity for several reasons.
The direct path was inhibited, on the one hand, by resistance from within. This included
infighting within the SS over the ultimate authority over the two Reichsschulen, opposition on
the part of the NSB against the German International Schools, the NIVO, and the Reichsschulen,
and a lack of acceptable teaching staff. But even if this avenue had been effective, it was aimed
only at the future elite of the new order, and therefore did not have an appreciable influence on
the larger population. Moreover, the use of these schools as models for the reform of Dutch
education was largely ineffective. Had the Germans been able to cement their control and
continue down this direct path, it is certainly possible they might have encountered more success,
especially if the populace ever resigned itself to permanent German hegemony, but as that never
happened, it is impossible to say if such a success was possible, let alone likely.
The indirect path, while broader, was resisted by the majority of those whom it affected.
Dutch school administrators and teachers were, by and large, unwilling to acquiesce to the
demands of the central government in The Hague (and later Apeldoorn). Whether it was the
appointment decrees, the introduction of new subjects like German language instruction, changes
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to already existing subjects like historical instruction, the extension of primary education to an
eighth school year, the use of banned books, etc., there was simply too much opposition on the
part of teachers and local administrators. Additionally, significant structural obstacles existed
that made the attempted “reforms” nearly impossible. Primary school teachers were not prepared
to teach German language, nor were there acceptable numbers of qualified professionals for the
introduction of physical education, to say nothing of the lack of space and appropriate material.
Even when it came to the introduction of propaganda films into the classroom, the shortage of
film stock became problematic. Just as with the direct path, had the Nazis been able to secure
their place atop the Dutch state indefinitely, it is certainly possible that these efforts would have
been more successful, but whether or not that is the case is impossible to say.
In his reports back to the Office of the Deputy Führer/Party Chancellery, Schwarz was
acutely aware that more time was necessary for the “reforms” about which he raved to be fully
implemented. He was under no delusions that the work he was attempting to implement would
be quick or easy. The steps that the occupiers and their Dutch helpers had taken were
introductory and would need to be followed up with further efforts if they were to bear fruit.104
The changing tide of the war, the increased resistance of the Dutch populace to Nazi rule, and the
increasingly repressive nature of the German occupation essentially put an end to any hope of
success in the immediate future. German defeat would make success impossible.
In this inquiry, however, I have been just as much, if not more concerned with the
Germans’ goals in the educational sphere as with the actual “reforms” implemented. In this
instance, it is clear that the goals of the German occupiers in the educational realm were largely
in lock step with the larger German goal of incorporating the Netherlands into the Greater
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Germanic Reich. In order to fully incorporate the Dutch nation into this new European empire, it
was necessary to win the Dutch over to National Socialism, to a racialist, völkisch, Germanic
mindset which would then prepare them for future incorporation into the Reich. This was the
impetus behind the “reforms” introduced in the educational section. And the entire leadership of
the Reichskommissariat agreed in this larger goal.
While the question of the motives of the German leadership in the Netherlands, as well as
Nazi leaders in Berlin, is, in my view, clear, it is more difficult to determine the exact motives of
their chief collaborator in the Netherlands, Jan van Dam. Van Dam clearly was sympathetic to
Nazi rule. He was sympathetic to the völkisch tendencies of the SS, even joining the organization
in September 1941. His two pieces on education reform written before he was appointed to lead
the Education Department show that many of the various “reforms” he proposed were essentially
similar to the same ideas promoted by the Germans, indeed this had been one of the reasons for
his appointment in the first place. At the same time, he does not appear to have been a “diehard”
member of the SS clique in the Netherlands. All evidence suggests, for example, that he did not
share the virulent antisemitism of the SS. Moreover, his growing antipathy toward the German
occupation, especially in the last two years of the war, suggests he had lost confidence in the
correctness of his earlier views.
It is equally difficult to say where van Dam stood on the question of the Greater
Germanic Reich. He does not appear to have taken a public stance on it during the war, indeed,
he may not have even been aware of this goal of the occupation, since concrete plans for the
incorporation of the Netherlands into the Reich were never made, remaining instead in the realm
of conjecture and possibility, being put off until the future European settlement was more clearly
visible. Van Dam certainly believed that the relationship between the Netherlands and Nazi
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Germany would be much closer after the Nazis won the war, but whether van Dam saw that
relationship looking like the federated empire preferred by Mussert or the more centralized
empire preferred by the Germans is unknown. By way of speculation, given his overall
tendencies in favor of the SS, it stands to reason that, at least in the early part of the occupation,
van Dam would have preferred the more intimate relationship between the two countries, but
whether or not that is the case is impossible to know. During his trial, he denied any motives
other than doing what was in the best interests of his country and fellow Netherlanders. But
then, that was also the motive he most often gave during the early years of the occupation when
he was clearly working in support of goals he himself shared. And quite frankly, under the
circumstances, what else would he have said? Given that the most damning evidence of his direct
collaboration—his two pre-appointment writings on educational reform—were unknown, he had
a significant amount of plausible deniability regarding his actions on behalf of his German
superiors. He, like most other senior Dutch bureaucrats, could argue that they were simply
carrying out the orders that were given them. Had he quit in protest, his work would have been
carried on by someone else. So, his protests that he was only trying to work in the interest of the
Dutch people could not be rejected outright. Nor should they.
In my estimation, van Dam appears to have taken the mostly pragmatic view that Nazi
rule over the Netherlands was unlikely to end any time soon. In the near term, the Nazi
occupiers’ goals and his own goals lined up almost perfectly, and so van Dam believed that his
collaboration with the regime was in the best interests of the Dutch nation. Whether or not van
Dam viewed these “reforms” through the long-term lens of the creation of a German-dominated
Germanic empire in Europe is more difficult to say. Either way, the changing tide of the war and
the increased repression of the German occupiers against the Dutch people removed the
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pragmatism behind van Dam’s initial choice of collaboration, for even he did not believe the
Germans’ efforts at this later stage were really in the best interest of the Netherlands. It was
around this time, early to mid-1943, that van Dam began working against his German superiors.
So even if van Dam was a true believer early in the war, he was not so strongly attached to his
own views about educational reform to ignore the damage being done to the Netherlands
generally and Dutch education specifically through German repression.
Ultimately, however, van Dam’s motives are secondary to the overall history of
educational “reform” attempts in the Netherlands during the German occupation. His initial
support and later antipathy for many of the Germans’ efforts had little, if any, effect on the
Germans’ overall designs, of which education was but a single piece in a much larger puzzle. In
the education sphere specifically, van Dam was able to work against some measures, such as the
introduction of German language in the third year of primary education, but then it was a matter
of degree more than substance.105 He was also able to effectively counter the draft of many
students and educators into forced labor, or at least significantly reduce their total numbers, but
this too was really in defense of the education sector writ large, for further disruptions, especially
of teachers, might have actually caused a breakdown in primary and secondary education as had
already happened in higher education. But for the most important changes, van Dam either
largely went along with the Germans or was sidelined entirely.
Although van Dam was a central figure in the education sector during the occupation, his
work must be seen through the lens of the German occupiers’ goals, and in that lens, as Schwarz
noted, van Dam had, despite some humanistic misgivings, proved himself useful. But despite the
utility that van Dam offered, the task the Germans were attempting to complete in the
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Netherlands was simply too gargantuan to be effectively forced through in the short period
during which they had total control of the education sector. Even if there had been no resistance
to their overtures, and there certainly was significant resistance from the Dutch populace, their
task would have taken many, many years to complete. It was, after all, an attempt to influence
the next generation of Dutch adults, and so the fruits of that effort would have only been
vindicated had the Germans maintained their control for decades into the future.
But the future the Nazis hoped for, the future at which their attempts to change education
in the Netherlands were aimed, never arrived. Instead of a thousand-year Reich, Hitler’s empire
crumbled under the combined military might of the wartime Allies after only thirteen years in
power. The Nazis’ grandiose plans at a Greater Germanic Reich, their efforts at educational
“reform” in the Netherlands, and their very existence as a governing power crumbled away with
it.
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